We investigate a class of parametric network games which encompasses both the cases of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. In the case of a bounded strategy space, we derive a representation formula for the unique Nash equilibrium. We also prove a comparison result between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and then compute the price of anarchy for some simple test problems
Passacantando, M., Raciti, F. (2024). Some properties of a class of Network Games with strategic complements or substitutes. In T.M. Rassias, P.M. Pardalos (a cura di), Mathematical Analysis, Differential Equations and Applications (pp. 689-709). Singapore : World Scientific Publishing Company [10.1142/9789811267048_0023].
Some properties of a class of Network Games with strategic complements or substitutes
Passacantando, M;
2024
Abstract
We investigate a class of parametric network games which encompasses both the cases of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. In the case of a bounded strategy space, we derive a representation formula for the unique Nash equilibrium. We also prove a comparison result between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and then compute the price of anarchy for some simple test problems
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Passacantando-2024-Math Analysis Diff Equations Appl-AAM.pdf
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