The paper shows that Wittgenstein's and Schlick's criticisms of the phenomenological idea of "material a priori" derive from such a complete misunderstanding, that the examples they choose are indeed examples of formal, not material, a priori, at least in a phenomenological sense. It is then possible to show this sense and the roots of the distincion formal/material suggested in a phenomenological approach to philosophy of logic and language
Miraglia, R. (2006). Dove iniziano gli a priori materiali. In R. Lanfredini (a cura di), A priori materiale. Uno studio fenomenologico (pp. 95-120). Milano : Guerini Editore.
Dove iniziano gli a priori materiali
MIRAGLIA, ROBERTO
2006
Abstract
The paper shows that Wittgenstein's and Schlick's criticisms of the phenomenological idea of "material a priori" derive from such a complete misunderstanding, that the examples they choose are indeed examples of formal, not material, a priori, at least in a phenomenological sense. It is then possible to show this sense and the roots of the distincion formal/material suggested in a phenomenological approach to philosophy of logic and language
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