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5 **On the primitivity of the AES-128 key-schedule**

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23 The key-scheduling algorithm in the AES is the component responsible for selecting
 24 from the master key the sequence of round keys to be xor-ed to the partially encrypted
 25 state at each iteration. We consider here the group Γ generated by the action of the
 26 AES-128 key-scheduling operation, and we prove that the smallest group containing Γ
 27 and all the translations of the message space is primitive. As a consequence, we obtain
 28 that no linear partition of the message space can be invariant under its action.

29 *Keywords:* Primitive groups; cryptography; group generated by the round functions;
 30 AES; key schedule; invariant partitions.

31 Mathematics Subject Classification: 20B15, 20B35, 94A60

32 **1. Introduction**

33 The encryption functions of the AES are the composition of a sequence of round
 34 transformations made by a confusion and a diffusion layer followed by a key addi-
 35 tion with the so-called round key, derived by the user master key by means of
 36 the public key-scheduling algorithm. While the confusion-diffusion step has been
 37 designed to provide long-term resistance against known and possibly future attack,
 38 the key-schedule has been chosen also without neglecting the application of the

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1 cipher in resource-constrained devices. The necessary efforts to keep the encryption
2 lighter [16] made *de facto* the confusion-diffusion step almost completely in charge
3 of the security. Although some recent improvements in the AES cryptanalysis are
4 based on structural properties of the SPN design (e.g. [26, 9, 15]), unsurprisingly,
5 also the key-schedule has been targeted in various attacks in recent years [7, 23, 8].
6 In general, key-scheduling algorithms appear to be the component on which there
7 is the least consensus on general design criteria and arguably the components for
8 which attacks are less standardized.

9 Despite two decades of cryptanalysis, only recently Leurent and Pernot showed
10 the existence of an invariant subspace for four rounds of the AES-128 key-
11 schedule [22]. Such a finding allowed the authors to provide an alternative represen-
12 tation of the key-schedule as four independent actions on each of the 4-byte-word
13 components of the round key. Although related only to the key-schedule, the result
14 is then used to obtain global improvements in already known differential attacks,
15 showing how the subspace analysis of the key-schedule may highlight some subspace
16 structures that interact with similar structures in the main round function inducing
17 security flaws.

18 Initially, the more general idea of finding subspaces which are invariant under the
19 encryption functions, for some or possibly all the keys, has been notably exploited
20 by Leander *et al.* to cryptanalyze PRINTcipher [20]. The above-mentioned strategy
21 makes use of the fact that an entire subspace of the message space (or of the key
22 space) is not moved by the encryption functions. Subspace trail cryptanalysis [19],
23 a generalization of invariant subspace cryptanalysis, has been also used to attack
24 reduced-round AES [18].

25 The imprimitivity attack, introduced by Paterson against an intentionally flawed
26 but apparently secure DES-like block cipher [25], is conceptually similar to invariant
27 subspaces attacks, except it exploits the existence of a full *partition* of the message
28 space that is preserved by the encryption. In particular, in this attack scenario, the
29 cryptanalyst usually takes advantage of an entire *linear partition* of the message
30 space, i.e. a partition made by the cosets of a proper and non-trivial subspace,
31 which is invariant. While it is hard in general to prove the non-existence of invariant
32 subspaces (see [6] for an analysis of the security impact provided by the choice of the
33 round constants), the non-existence of invariant linear partitions after one round
34 can be more easily established using group-theoretical arguments, i.e. proving that
35 a given group containing the encryption functions acts primitively on the message
36 space.

37 Non-existence results for invariant partitions in standardized constructions have
38 been proved in the last years [29, 27, 28, 4], and more general results determining
39 conditions which imply the non-existence of invariant linear partitions obtained by
40 primitivity arguments can be found in the literature [14, 5].

41 In this work, we prove a *primitivity* result on the AES-128 key-schedule (see
42 Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.4), i.e. we show that no linear partition can be invari-
43 ant after one round, when each possible vector is considered as round counter.

On the primitivity of the AES-128 key-schedule

1 The strategy used here is the following: the action of the key-schedule is modeled
 2 by means of a formal operator defining a group which is proved to be primitive
 3 using Goursat's lemma (cf. Theorem 4.1). In particular, we prove that the group
 4 generated by the action of the AES-128 key-schedule is primitive provided that
 5 a suitable considerably smaller group generated by some AES-128 components is
 6 primitive, a result which can be established using known facts [14, 5]. As a con-
 7 sequence, our result can be generalized to each substitution-permutation network
 8 whose round components are suitable for generating a primitive group [14] and
 9 whose 4-branch AES-like key-schedule is built accordingly. To our knowledge, with
 10 respect to invariant partitions, the study carried out in this paper is the first exam-
 11 ple of group-theoretical investigation of the sole key-schedule, which is in general
 12 excluded from primitivity arguments, except for some recent partial results [3, 11].

13 *Related works.* In this paper, we use the strategy of a *primitivity reduction* via
 14 Goursat's lemma. We show indeed that the primitivity of a complex structure,
 15 such as the 4-branch key-schedule transformations of AES, is inherited from the
 16 primitivity of the group generated by simpler SPN-like functions, i.e. those acting
 17 on the last group of bytes. Similar arguments have been used to prove that the
 18 primitivity of other more complex structures (e.g. Feistel networks, Lai-Massey
 19 constructions) reduces to the primitivity of their inner SPN-like components [2, 1].

20 This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce the notation and the
 21 preliminary results, and present an algebraic representation of the AES-128 key-
 22 schedule and the related permutation group. In Sec. 3, we present our primitivity
 23 reduction in Theorem 3.1 and show its application to AES in Corollary 3.4. The
 24 technical proof of Theorem 3.1 with the use of Goursat's lemma is shown in Sec. 4.
 25 Finally, in Sec. 5, we draw our conclusions.


26 2. Preliminaries and Model

27 In this section, we introduce some notation and preliminary results, starting by
 28 briefly recalling the definition of the AES-128 key-schedule. The reader is invited
 29 to refer to Daemen and Rijmen for a detailed description including comments on
 30 design choices [16].

31 The AES-128 key-schedule is an invertible function of $\text{Sym}(\mathbb{F}_2^{128})$ which, using
 32 the cipher's components, transforms the previous round key into the next one,
 33 starting from the master key, proceeding as shown in Fig. 1, where

- 34 — $\lambda : \mathbb{F}_2^{32} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{32}$ denotes the linear operation **RotWord**,
- 35 — $\gamma : \mathbb{F}_2^8 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^8$ represents the AES S-Box **SubBytes**,
- 36 — $rc_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^8$ is a round constant different in each round.

37 In particular, round-key bits are gathered into four groups, each consisting of
 38 4 bytes. The bytes of the last group are first shifted left by one position and then
 39 transformed by the cipher's S-Box. Finally, a round-dependent counter is xor-ed to



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


Fig. 1. The i th transformation of the AES-128 key-schedule.

1 the first byte of the last block. The output of this transformation is then xor-ed to
 2 the remaining three blocks of bytes, as shown in Fig. 1.

3 **Notation.** In the following, n is a non-negative integer and $V \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is the n -
 4 dimensional vector space over \mathbb{F}_2 . If H is a subspace of V we write $H \leq V$, and the
 5 same notation is used to denote subgroups. We denote by $\mathbb{0} : V \rightarrow V$ the null func-
 6 tion on V . Moreover, $\text{Sym}(V)$ denotes the symmetric group acting on V and $\mathbb{1}$ its
 7 identity. If $f \in \text{Sym}(V)$ and $x \in V$ we write xf to denote the functional evaluation
 8 $f(x)$. The group of the translations on V , i.e. the group of the maps $\sigma_v : V \rightarrow V$,
 9 such that $x \mapsto x + v$, is denoted by T_n . We also denote by $\text{AGL}(V)$ the group of all
 10 affine permutations of V and by $\text{GL}(V)$ the group of the linear ones. In particular,
 11 in the case under investigation, we mean by n the size of each group of 4 bytes,
 12 i.e. $n = 32$ bits. Under this assumption, the key-scheduling transformation will be
 13 acting on V^4 as an element of the symmetric group $\text{Sym}(V^4)$, whose corresponding
 14 group of translations is denoted by T_{4n} , where the translation $\sigma_{(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4)}$ acts on
 15 $(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) \in V^4$ as

$$(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) \mapsto (v_1 + x_1, v_2 + x_2, v_3 + x_3, v_4 + x_4).$$

16 It is worth noting here that the addition with the round counter in the AES-128
 17 key-schedule acts exactly as a particular translation of T_{4n} .

18 For sake of clarity, we will use different notations for elements of V , V^2 and V^4 .
 19 In particular, we will denote an element of V^4 by superscripting an arrow on the
 20 symbol, i.e. $\vec{v} \in V^4$, an element of V^2 using symbols in bold, i.e. $\vec{v} = (\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2)$, in

1 such a way

$$\vec{v} = (\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2) = (v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4) \in V^4,$$

2 where $\mathbf{v}_i \in V^2$ and $v_j \in V$ for $1 \leq i \leq 2$ and $1 \leq j \leq 4$.

3 Let us now introduce the elements of group theory used throughout this paper.

4 **Groups.** Let G be a group acting on a set M . For each $g \in G$ and $v \in M$ we
 5 denote the action of g on v as vg . The group G is said to be *transitive* on M if for
 6 each $v, w \in M$ there exists $g \in G$ such that $vg = w$. A partition \mathcal{B} of M is *trivial*
 7 if $\mathcal{B} = \{M\}$ or $\mathcal{B} = \{\{v\} \mid v \in M\}$, and *G -invariant* if for any $B \in \mathcal{B}$ and $g \in G$
 8 it holds $Bg \in \mathcal{B}$. Any non-trivial and G -invariant partition \mathcal{B} of M is called a *block*
 9 *system* for G . In particular any $B \in \mathcal{B}$ is called an *imprimitivity block*. The group G
 10 is *primitive* in its action on M (or G acts *primitively* on M) if G is transitive and
 11 there exists no block system. Otherwise, the group G is *imprimitive* in its action
 12 on M (or G acts *imprimitively* on M). We recall here some well-known results that
 13 will be useful in the remainder of this paper [12].

14 **Lemma 2.1.** *If $T \leq G$ is transitive, then a block system for G is also a block*
 15 *system for T .*

16 In the case under consideration in this paper, the block system will be a *linear*
 17 *partition*.

18 **Lemma 2.2.** *Let M be a finite vector space over \mathbb{F}_2 and T its translation group.*
 19 *Then T is transitive and imprimitive on M . A block system \mathcal{U} for T is composed*
 20 *by the cosets of a non-trivial and proper subgroup $U < (M, +)$, i.e.*

$$\mathcal{U} = \{U + v \mid v \in M\}.$$

21 **The key-schedule representation.** Let us now introduce the representation of
 22 the AES-128 key-schedule that allows us to provide an easy description of the
 23 subgroup of $\text{Sym}(V^4)$ which is the subject of this work. Let us start by defining the
 24 transformation acting on the last group of four bytes, as in Fig 1.

25 **Definition 2.3.** Let $\rho_{\text{AES}} \in \text{Sym}(V)$ be the composition of λ and the parallel
 26 application of 4 copies of γ , i.e.

$$\rho_{\text{AES}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda\gamma' \in \text{Sym}(V),$$

27 where $\gamma' : \mathbb{F}_2^{32} \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^{32}$, $(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4) \mapsto (v_1\gamma, v_2\gamma, v_3\gamma, v_4\gamma)$, with $v_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^8$.

28 The function previously defined, up to the xor with the round counter in the first
 29 byte, represents the transformation acting on the last group of bytes in the AES-128
 30 key-schedule. The following definition is instead a more general description of the
 31 full transformation.

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


Fig. 2. The key-schedule operator induced by ρ .

1 **Definition 2.4.** Given $\rho \in \text{Sym}(V)$, let us define the *AES-like key-schedule operator*
 2 *induced by ρ* as the formal matrix

$$\bar{\rho} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} \\ 0 & \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} \\ 0 & 0 & \mathbb{1} & \mathbb{1} \\ \rho & \rho & \rho & \mathbb{1} + \rho \end{pmatrix},$$

3 acting on V^4 as

$$(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4) \mapsto (v_1 + v_4\rho, v_1 + v_2 + v_4\rho, v_1 + v_2 + v_3 + v_4\rho, v_1 + v_2 + v_3 + v_4 + v_4\rho),$$

4 as also displayed in Fig. 2. The operator $\bar{\rho}$ has the following inverse acting as

$$(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (v_1 + (v_3 + v_4)\rho, v_1 + v_2, v_2 + v_3, v_3 + v_4).$$

5 It is not hard to notice, when considering ρ_{AES} , that the map

$$\overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}\sigma_{(\overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i})},$$

6 correspond to the i th round-key transformation in the AES-128 key-schedule, where
 7 $\overline{rc_i} = (rc_i, 0, 0, 0) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{32}$. Keeping in mind that our focus is to study group-
 8 theoretical properties of the subgroup $\Gamma < \text{Sym}(V^4)$ generated by the elements
 9 of the type of $\overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}\sigma_{(\overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i}, \overline{rc_i})}$, for each admissible value of $rc_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^8$, and establish its primitivity by using Lemma 2.2, it is important to notice that Γ does not
 10 contain the whole translation group T_{128} . For this reason, Γ needs to be extended
 11 by assuming a more general action of the round counter.
 12

1 **Definition 2.5.** Let us define the group

$$\Gamma_{\text{AES}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}} \sigma_{(x,y,z,t)} \mid (x, y, z, t) \in V^4 \rangle.$$

2 It is easily noticed that

- 3 — Γ_{AES} , which contains Γ , is the smallest subgroup of the symmetric group con-
 4 taining both T_{128} and the transformation of the AES-128 key-schedule, when
 5 the correct round counter is chosen;
 6 — $\Gamma_{\text{AES}} = \langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}, T_{128} \rangle$.

7 In the remainder we prove that Γ_{AES} is primitive. This guarantees that no
 8 nontrivial and proper subgroup $U < V^4$ can generate a partition, as in Lemma 2.2,
 9 which is invariant under the transformations of Γ_{AES} .

10 3. The Primitivity of Γ_{AES}

11 In this section, we prove our main result, i.e. the primitivity of Γ_{AES} (cf. Corol-
 12 lary 3.4), as a consequence of a more general result (cf. Theorem 3.1) in which we
 13 show that the primitivity of $\langle \overline{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$ *reduces* to the primitivity of $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$, when $\overline{\rho}$ is
 14 the key-schedule operator induced by ρ (cf. Definition 2.4) and provided that ρ is
 15 bijective and not affine. The proof of the primitivity reduction is rather technical
 16 and makes use of repeated applications of Goursat's lemma (see Sec. 4) so, for the
 17 sake of readability, is shown in a separate section.

18 We can anticipate our main contribution which is stated as follows:

19 **Theorem 3.1 (Primitivity reduction).** *Let $\rho \in \text{Sym}(V) \setminus \text{AGL}(V)$. If $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$
 20 is primitive on V , then $\langle \overline{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$ is primitive on V^4 .*

21 **Proof.** See Sec. 4. □

22 According to the previous fact, the primitivity of the AES-128 key-schedule can
 23 be deduced by the primitivity of the group generated by ρ_{AES} and T_{32} , i.e. by the
 24 composition of the linear transformation `RotWord` and the parallel application of 4
 25 copies of the S-Box `SubBytes` and by the translations on the space of 4-byte words.
 26 As already mentioned, the primitivity of the latter can be obtained, as shown below,
 27 from already established results.

28 Let us prove that $\rho = \rho_{\text{AES}}$ satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1, i.e. that
 29 $\langle \rho_{\text{AES}}, T_{32} \rangle$ generates a primitive group. To do so, we need the following definitions
 30 and a general result of primitivity for substitution-permutation networks [5].

31 Let us write $n = s \cdot b$, for some $s, b > 1$, and let us decompose V as a direct sum
 32 of subspaces accordingly, i.e. $V = \bigoplus_{i=1}^b V_i$, where $\dim(V_i) = s$. Each V_i , spanned
 33 by the canonical vectors $e_{s(i-1)+1}, \dots, e_{s(i-1)+s}$, is called a *brick*. Recall that, in
 34 the case of ρ_{AES} , we have $n = 32$, $s = 8$ and $b = 4$.

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1 Given $f : \mathbb{F}_2^s \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^s$, for each $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^s$, $a \neq 0$, we denote by

$$\partial_a(f) : \mathbb{F}_2^s \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^s, \quad x \mapsto xf + (x+a)f,$$

2 the derivative of f in the direction a . Recall that when $f \in \text{Sym}(\mathbb{F}_2^s)$ is δ -
3 differentially uniform, for some $2 \leq \delta \leq 2^s$, then $|\text{Im}(\partial_a(f))| \geq 2^s/\delta$ for each
4 $a \neq 0$. Moreover, if $0f = 0$, we say that f is δ -anti-invariant if for any two sub-
5 spaces $W_1, W_2 \leq \mathbb{F}_2^s$ such that $W_1f = W_2$, then either $\dim(W_1) = \dim(W_2) < s - \delta$
6 or $W_1 = W_2 = \mathbb{F}_2^s$.

7 The next theorem is stated using the notation introduced above in this section.

8 **Theorem 3.2 ([5]).** *Let $f \in \text{Sym}(\mathbb{F}_2^s)$ such that $0f=0$, let $F \in \text{Sym}(V)$ be the*
9 *function acting as f on each s -dimensional brick V_i of V and let $\Lambda \in \text{GL}(V)$. If no*
10 *non-trivial and proper direct sum of bricks of V is invariant under Λ and for some*
11 *$2 \leq \delta \leq s - 1$ the function f is*

- 12 — 2^δ -differentially uniform,
- 13 — $(\delta - 1)$ -anti-invariant,

14 then $\langle F\Lambda, T_n \rangle$ is primitive.

15 We are now ready to prove the primitivity of $\langle \rho_{\text{AES}}, T_{32} \rangle$ as a consequence of
16 Theorem 3.2.

17 **Theorem 3.3.** *The group $\langle \rho_{\text{AES}}, T_{32} \rangle < \text{Sym}(\mathbb{F}_2^{32})$ is primitive.*

18 **Proof.** Let $\lambda \in \text{GL}(V)$ and $\gamma' \in \text{Sym}(V)$, as in Definition 2.3, be, respectively,
19 the RotWord transformation and the parallel application of 4 copies of γ , the S-Box
20 SubBytes. It is well known that γ is, up to affine transformations, the function
21 which sends 0 into 0 and each nonzero element into its multiplicative inverse in
22 \mathbb{F}_{2^8} . Such a function is 4-differentially uniform and 1-anti invariant, i.e. satisfies the
23 hypotheses of Theorem 3.2 for $\delta = 2$ [24, 14]. Note that anti-invariance and differen-
24 tial uniformity are invariant under inversion [13] and under affine transformations,
25 i.e. also γ^{-1} satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 3.2. Moreover, it easily checked
26 that no non-trivial and proper direct sum of bricks of V is invariant under λ , and
27 the same trivially holds also for λ^{-1} . Therefore, from Theorem 3.2, $\langle (\gamma')^{-1}\lambda^{-1}, T_{32} \rangle$
28 is primitive, and consequently so is $\langle \lambda\gamma', T_{32} \rangle = \langle \rho_{\text{AES}}, T_{32} \rangle$. \square

29 The following final conclusion is derived.

30 **Corollary 3.4.** *The group $\langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}, T_{128} \rangle < \text{Sym}(\mathbb{F}_2^{128})$ generated by the transforma-*
31 *tions of the AES-128 key-schedule is primitive.*

32 4. The Primitivity Reduction - Proof of Theorem 3.1

33 This section is entirely devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.1, which may be skipped
34 entirely from the reader who is not interested in the technical details. Despite its

1 apparent complexity, the (repeated) use of Goursat's lemma, which is introduced
 2 below, represents a reasonable way to describe any generic subspace U which is
 3 candidate to be a linear block (and which, *a fortiori*, is necessarily trivial).

4 In order to prove our result, we need to determine a block system for $V^4 =$
 5 $V^2 \times V^2$, i.e. the set the cosets of a suitable subgroup of $V^2 \times V^2$. This can be
 6 accomplished by using the following characterization of subgroups of the direct
 7 product of two groups in terms of suitable sections of the direct factors [17].

8 **Theorem 4.1 (Goursat's lemma).** *Let G_1 and G_2 be two groups. There exists*
 9 *a bijection between*

10 (1) *the set of all subgroups of the direct product $G_1 \times G_2$, and*

11 (2) *the set of all triples $(A/B, C/D, \psi)$ where*

- 12 • *A is a subgroup of G_1 ,*
- 13 • *C is a subgroup of G_2 ,*
- 14 • *B is a normal subgroup of A ,*
- 15 • *D is a normal subgroup of C ,*
- 16 • *$\psi : A/B \rightarrow C/D$ is a group isomorphism.*

17 *Then, each subgroup of $U \leq G_1 \times G_2$ can be uniquely written as*

$$U = U_\psi = \{(a, c) \in A \times C \mid (a + B)\psi = c + D\}. \quad (1)$$

18 Note that the isomorphism ψ induces a homomorphism $\varphi : A \rightarrow C$ where
 19 $a \mapsto a\varphi$ is such that $(a + B)\psi = a\varphi + D$ for any $a \in A$, and such that $B\varphi \leq D$.
 20 Such a homomorphism is not necessarily unique.

21 **Corollary 4.2.** *In the notation of Theorem 4.1, given any homomorphism φ*
 22 *induced by ψ , we have*

$$U_\psi = \{(a, a\varphi + d) \mid a \in A, d \in D\}.$$

23 **Proof.** Let $(a, c) \in U_\psi$. By definition of φ , $(a + B)\psi = c + D = a\varphi + D$, so
 24 $c \in a\varphi + D$, and therefore there exists $d \in D$ such that $c = a\varphi + d$. Conversely, if
 25 $a \in A$ and $d \in D$, then $(a + B)\psi = a\varphi + D = a\varphi + d + D$. \square

26 4.1. Use of Goursat's lemma

27 Let U be a subspace of $V^4 = V^2 \times V^2$. From Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 we
 28 have that there exist $A, B, C, D \leq V^2$ and $\psi : A/B \rightarrow C/D$ isomorphism inducing
 29 an homomorphism $\varphi : A \rightarrow C$ such that

$$U = \{(a, a\varphi + d) \mid a \in A, d \in D\}.$$

30 Without loss of generality, a basis of A can be completed to a basis of \mathbb{F}_2^{2n} and φ
 31 can be arbitrarily defined from the basis of the complement A^c of A to a basis of

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1 (Im(φ))^c. Finally, φ can be extended by linearity on the whole space \mathbb{F}_2^{2n} , providing
2 us with a matrix representation of φ as

$$\begin{pmatrix} \varphi_{11} & \varphi_{12} \\ \varphi_{21} & \varphi_{22} \end{pmatrix},$$

3 such that for each $(a_1, a_2) \in A \leq \mathbb{F}_2^{2n}$

$$\mathbf{a}\varphi = (a_1, a_2)\varphi = (a_1\varphi_{11} + a_2\varphi_{21}, a_1\varphi_{12} + a_2\varphi_{22}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2),$$

4 where for $1 \leq i \leq 2$,

$$\varphi_i = \begin{pmatrix} \varphi_{1i} \\ \varphi_{2i} \end{pmatrix}.$$

5 Applying again Goursat's lemma on $A, D \leq V^2$, we obtain that

6 (i) there exist $A', B', C', D' \leq V$ and $\varphi_A : A' \rightarrow C'$ an homomorphism such that

$$A = \{(a', a'\varphi_A + d') \mid a' \in A', d' \in D'\},$$

7 (ii) there exist $A'', B'', C'', D'' \leq V$ and $\varphi_D : A'' \rightarrow C''$ an homomorphism such
8 that

$$D = \{(a'', a''\varphi_D + d'') \mid a'' \in A'', d'' \in D''\}.$$

9 The previous construction and notation will be used in the remainder of the paper
10 every time a subspace U is considered as a candidate for the linear component of
11 an invariant linear partition. More precisely, we have the following.

12 **Definition 4.3.** A subgroup $U \leq V^4$ is a *linear block* for $f \in \text{Sym}(V^4)$ if for each
13 $\vec{v} \in V^4$ there exists $\vec{w} \in V^4$ such that

$$(U + \vec{v})f = U + \vec{w},$$

14 where we can always choose $\vec{w} = \vec{v}f$.

15 When a linear block for f is found, by Lemma 2.2 $\langle f, T_{4n} \rangle$ is imprimitive and
16 have the cosets of the linear block as a block system. By virtue of Lemma 2.2, cosets
17 of linear blocks are indeed the only kind of partitions that can be invariant for the
18 groups under considerations, despite the generality of the definition of partition.
19 Note also that if $f \in \text{Sym}(V^4)$ is such that $\vec{0}f = \vec{0}$ and $U < V^4$ is a linear block
20 for f , then U is an invariant subspace for f , i.e. for each $\vec{u} \in U$ there exists $\vec{w} \in U$
21 such that $\vec{u}f = \vec{w}$. The relation $Uf = U$ can be also expressed, in the notation of
22 this section, as

$$\forall \mathbf{a} \in A \forall \mathbf{d} \in D \exists \mathbf{x} \in A \exists \mathbf{d} \in D : (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi + \mathbf{d})f = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi + \mathbf{y}). \quad (2)$$

23 We will use Eq. (2) extensively in the next results when considering functions with
24 linear blocks, sometimes without explicit mention.

1 **4.2. The proof**

2 We are now ready to show the steps to prove Theorem 3.1. In the remainder of the
 3 paper we will make use of the notation introduced in Sec. 4.1 and we assume, with-
 4 out loss of generality and only for the sake of simplicity, that $0\rho = 0$. This is possible
 5 since each possible translation is considered in the group under investigation (cf.
 6 Definition 2.5).

7 The next result is the starting point for the proof of Theorem 3.1: we will show
 8 that assuming the existence of a linear block for $\bar{\rho}$, i.e. exploiting an invariant
 9 subspace for $\bar{\rho}$, leads to the discovery of a (possibly trivial) invariant subspace for
 10 ρ . Note that our main claim follows straightforwardly from Lemma 4.4 when such a
 11 subspace is non-trivial. In the remainder of the paper, we will discuss the remaining
 12 cases.

13 **Lemma 4.4.** *Let $\rho \in \text{Sym}(V)$ and let $U \leq V^4$ be a linear block for $\bar{\rho}$. In the*
 14 *notation of Sec. 4.1, we have $D''\rho = D''$.*

15 **Proof.** Since U is a linear block for $\bar{\rho}$, taking $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$ in Eq. (2) and considering the
 16 description of D as a subgroup of \mathbb{F}_2^{2n} (cf. (ii) in Sec. 4.1), for each $a'' \in A''$ and
 17 $d'' \in D''$, we have $(0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D + d'') \in U$. Moreover, assuming $a'' = 0$ and noticing
 18 that U is a linear block for each element of $\langle \bar{\rho} \rangle \leq \text{Sym}(V^4)$, we have $(0, 0, 0, d'')\bar{\rho} =$
 19 $(d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d'' + d''\rho) \in U$ and $(0, 0, 0, d'')\bar{\rho}^{-3} = (d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d'')$
 20 $\in U$. Therefore

$$(d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d'' + d''\rho) + (d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d'') = (0, 0, 0, d''\rho) \in U. \quad (3)$$

21 Hence, there exist $\mathbf{x} \in A$ and $\mathbf{y} \in D$ such that $(0, 0, 0, d''\rho) = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi + \mathbf{y})$, and so
 22 $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$ and $(0, d''\rho) = \mathbf{y} \in D$. From $(0, d''\rho) \in D$ we have that there exist $x'' \in A''$
 23 and $y'' \in D''$ such that $x'' = 0$ and $d''\rho = y'' \in D''$, which leads, since ρ is a
 24 permutation, to $D''\rho = D''$, as claimed. \square

25 We will use Lemma 4.4 to prove that if $\langle \bar{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$ is imprimitive, then an imprimi-
 26 tivity block for $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$ can be found. From Lemma 4.4, D'' is a natural first candi-
 27 date for an imprimitivity block for $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is organized
 28 as follows: assuming that U is an imprimitivity block for $\langle \bar{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$, from Lemma 4.4
 29 we have that D'' is a block for ρ . When D'' is nontrivial and proper there is noth-
 30 ing left to prove. In the case $D'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ we derive a contradiction and in the case
 31 $D'' = \{0\}$ we prove that, instead, C'' is a block for ρ . As before, the proof is
 32 completed when C'' is nontrivial and proper and a contradiction is derived when
 33 $C'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$. In the remaining case $C'' = \{0\}$, A' is proved to be a block for ρ , and
 34 the extremal possibilities for A' are excluded by way of contradictions. In order
 35 to prove what anticipated, the following technical lemma is needed in some of the
 36 sub-cases.

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1 **Lemma 4.5.** *Let $\rho \in \text{Sym}(V)$ and let $U \leq V^4$ be a linear block for $\bar{\rho}$. In the*
 2 *notation of Sec. 4.1, if $D = \{\mathbf{0}\}$ we have*

- 3 (1) $A = A\varphi$;
 4 (2) *if $(a_1, a_2) \in A$, then $a_1, a_2 \in A'$.*

5 **Proof.** Let us address each claim separately. Since U is a linear block for $\bar{\rho}$ such
 6 that $D = \{\mathbf{0}\}$, it means that $U = \{(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi) \mid \mathbf{a} \in A\}$ is a linear block also for $\bar{\rho}^{-1}$
 7 (cf. Definition 2.4 for the inverse of $\bar{\rho}$) and, as in Eq. (2), assuming $\mathbf{d} = (0, 0)$ and
 8 $\mathbf{y} = (0, 0)$, we have that for each $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) \in A$ there exists $\mathbf{x} \in A$ such that
 9 $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi)$. This means that

$$\begin{aligned} (a_1, a_2, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\bar{\rho}^{-1} &= (a_1 + (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, a_1 + a_2, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \\ &= (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi). \end{aligned}$$

10 Hence $\mathbf{x}\varphi = (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) = (a_2, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1) + (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \in A\varphi$. Since $\mathbf{x}\varphi$ and
 11 $\mathbf{a}\varphi$ belong to $A\varphi$, we have $(a_2, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1) \in A\varphi$. Similarly, for each $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) \in A$,
 12 there exists $\mathbf{x} \in A$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi)\bar{\rho}^{-2} &= (a_1 + \xi + (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, a_2 + \xi, a_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \\ &= (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi), \end{aligned}$$

13 where ξ denotes $(\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho$. Hence $(a_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) = (a_1, a_2) + (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \in$
 14 $A\varphi$ and so $(a_1, a_2) \in A\varphi$, which proves $A \leq A\varphi$ and, from $|A| \geq |A\varphi|$, we obtain
 15 claim (1). Moreover, since we have already proved that $(a_2, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1) \in A\varphi = A$, by
 16 the description of A as subgroup of \mathbb{F}_2^{2n} (cf. (i) in Sec. 4.1), there exist $x' \in A'$ and
 17 $y' \in D'$ such that $(a_2, \mathbf{a}\varphi_1) = (x', x'\varphi_A + y')$, and so $a_2 = x' \in A'$. Similarly, for
 18 each $(a_1, a_2) \in A$ we have $a_1 \in A'$, i.e. claim (2) is obtained. \square

19 We now use the previous lemma to show our main result, in which we prove that,
 20 in general, the AES-like key-schedule construction generates a primitive permuta-
 21 tion group, provided that the key-schedule operator $\bar{\rho}$ is induced by a permutation
 22 ρ such that $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$ is primitive. As already anticipated, the proof is organized in
 23 several steps. We will proceed as described in the paragraph after Lemma 4.5.

24 **Proof of Theorem 3.1.** Let us assume that $\langle \bar{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$ is imprimitive, i.e. that there
 25 exists a block system \mathcal{U} for $\langle \bar{\rho}, T_{4n} \rangle$. Then, from Lemma 2.2, the block system is of
 26 the type

$$\mathcal{U} = \{U + \vec{v} \mid \vec{v} \in V^4\},$$

27 for a nontrivial and proper subspace U of V^4 . From Lemma 4.4, we have $D''\rho = D''$
 28 and the previous equation means that the subgroup $D'' \leq V$, when nontrivial and
 29 proper, is an imprimitivity block for $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$. If that is the case, there is nothing left
 30 to prove. Let us conclude the proof addressing the extremal cases $D'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and
 31 $D'' = \{0\}$ separately.

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1 $\boxed{\mathbf{D}'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n}$ Note that from Eq. (3), for each $d'' \in D''$ we have $(0, 0, 0, d'') \in U$, hence

$$(0, 0, 0, d'')\bar{\rho} = (d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d'' + d''\rho) \in U$$

2 and so $(d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho, d''\rho) \in U$. Since $D'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, also $D''\rho = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, therefore for each
3 $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ we have $v_1 = (\alpha, \alpha, \alpha, \alpha) \in U$ and so $v_2 = v_1\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (\alpha, 0, 0, 0) \in U$, $v_3 =$
4 $v_2\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (\alpha, \alpha, 0, 0) \in U$ and $v_4 = v_3\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (\alpha, 0, \alpha, 0) \in U$. Therefore we have
5 $v_5 = v_2 + v_3 = (0, \alpha, 0, 0) \in U$, $v_3 + v_4 + v_5 = (0, 0, \alpha, 0) \in U$ and $v_1 + v_4 + v_5 =$
6 $(0, 0, 0, \alpha) \in U$. We can conclude that $U = \mathbb{F}_2^{4n} = V^4$, a contradiction.

7 $\boxed{\mathbf{D}'' = \{0\}}$ Let us prove first that, in this case, also $B'' = \{0\}$. Indeed, since $B''\varphi_D \leq$
8 D'' (cf. in general the definition of $U = U_{\psi_D}$ in Eq. (1)) and $D'' = \{0\}$, we have
9 $B''\varphi_D = \{0\}$. If we consider Eq. (2) setting $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{d} = (b'', b''\varphi_D) = (b'', 0)$
10 with $b'' \in B'' \leq A''$, then we have $(0, 0, b'', 0) \in U$. Moreover, we have that

$$(0, 0, b'', 0)\bar{\rho} = (0, 0, b'', b'') \in U,$$

11 and so $(0, 0, b'', b'') + (0, 0, b'', 0) = (0, 0, 0, b'') \in U$, which implies $(0, 0)\varphi + (0, b'') =$
12 $(0, b'') \in D$, and so there exists $x'' \in A''$ such that $(0, b'') = (x'', x''\varphi_D)$, from
13 which $0 = 0\varphi_D = b''$, i.e. $B'' = \{0\}$. This also proves that $\varphi_D : A'' \rightarrow C''$ is an
14 isomorphism. Now, setting $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$, we have

$$(0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho} = (a''\varphi_D\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho, a'' + a''\varphi_D\rho, a'' + a''\varphi_D + a''\varphi_D\rho) \in U$$

15 and

$$(0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho}^{-3} = (a''\varphi_D\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho, a'' + (a'' + a''\varphi_D)\rho, a'' + a''\varphi_D) \in U.$$

16 Therefore, there exist $\mathbf{x} \in A$ and $\mathbf{y} \in D$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho} + (0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho}^{-3} &= (0, 0, a''\varphi_D\rho + (a'' + a''\varphi_D)\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho) \\ &= (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi + \mathbf{y}) \end{aligned}$$

17 and so $(a''\varphi_D\rho + (a'' + a''\varphi_D)\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho) \in D$. This means that $a''\varphi_D\rho = x''\varphi_D$
18 for some $x'' \in A''$, i.e. $a''\varphi_D\rho \in A''\varphi_D$, and so $A''\varphi_D\rho = A''\varphi_D$, since ρ is a
19 permutation. Since φ_D is an isomorphism, this proves that $C''\rho = C''$. If C'' is a non-
20 trivial and proper subgroup of V , then we have determined another imprimitivity
21 block for $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$, so the claim is proved. Let us address the extremal cases $C'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$
22 and $C'' = \{0\}$ separately.

23 $\boxed{\mathbf{C}'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n}$ First notice that $A'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and $B'' = \{0\} = D''$ since, as already proved,
24 φ_D is an isomorphism. In other words, φ_D is an automorphism. For each $a'' \in A''$,
25 considering $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$, we have

$$(0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = ((a'' + a''\varphi_D)\rho, 0, a'', a'' + a''\varphi_D) \in U$$

26 and so $(a'' + a''\varphi_D)\rho \in A'$. If we define $S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{a'' + a''\varphi_D \mid a'' \in A''\}$, then we have
27 $S\rho \leq A'$. Suppose that $\bar{a} \in A''$ is a fixed point for φ_D : we have $\bar{a} + \bar{a}\varphi_D = 0$, and
28 so $(0, 0, \bar{a}, \bar{a}\varphi_D)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (0, 0, \bar{a}, 0)$, which implies that $\bar{a}\varphi_D = 0$, i.e. $\bar{a} = 0$ since φ_D

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1 is an isomorphism. Hence we proved that $\mathcal{K} + \varphi_D$ is injective, and so $S = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, since
 2 $A'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Therefore $A' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, since $\mathbb{F}_2^n = S\rho \leq A' \leq \mathbb{F}_2^n$.

3 We claim now that also D' is equal to \mathbb{F}_2^n . Indeed, if

$$\begin{aligned} U \ni v_1 &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D) + (0, 0, a'', a''\varphi_D)\bar{\rho} \\ &= (a''\varphi_D\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho, a'' + a''\varphi_D\rho), \end{aligned}$$

4 then for each $a'' \in A''$ we have

$$v_1\bar{\rho}^{-1} + v_1\bar{\rho}^{-3} = (0, a''\rho, a''\varphi_D\rho + a''\rho, 0) \in U,$$

5 so $(0, a''\rho) \in A$, which means $a''\rho \in D'$, that is equivalent to saying that $A''\rho \leq D'$.
 6 Since $A'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and ρ is bijective we obtain $D' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$.

7 Therefore we have $A' = D' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and so $B' = C' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, since by hypothesis
 8 $A'/B' \cong C'/D'$. This proves that $A = \mathbb{F}_2^{2n}$.

9 Notice now that $A \leq A\varphi + D \leq C$. Indeed, for each $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) \in A$, considering
 10 $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{0}$, there exist $\mathbf{x} \in A$ and $\mathbf{y} \in D$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi)\bar{\rho}^{-2} &= \\ &= (a_1 + \xi + (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, a_2 + \xi, a_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \\ &= (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi + \mathbf{y}), \end{aligned}$$

11 where ξ denotes $(\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho$. Hence

$$(a_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) = (a_1, a_2) + (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) = \mathbf{x}\varphi + \mathbf{y} \in A\varphi + D$$

12 and so $(a_1, a_2) \in A\varphi + D$, which proves $A \leq A\varphi + D$. From $\mathbb{F}_2^{2n} = A \leq A\varphi + D \leq$
 13 $C \leq \mathbb{F}_2^{2n}$ we obtain $C = \mathbb{F}_2^{2n}$. Therefore $D \cong \mathbb{F}_2^n$, since $D'' = \{0\}$ and φ_D is an
 14 automorphism, and, from $A/B \cong C/D$, we also have $B \cong \mathbb{F}_2^n$.

15 We now claim that $B = D$. Indeed, let us consider Eq. (2) with $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2) \in$
 16 $B \leq A$. Since $B\varphi \leq D$, we can also choose $\mathbf{d} \in D$ such that $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{b}\varphi$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} U \ni v_1 &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (b_1, b_2, 0, 0)\bar{\rho} = (b_1, b_1 + b_2, b_1 + b_2, b_1 + b_2), \\ U \ni v_2 &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (b_1, b_2, 0, 0)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = (b_1, b_1 + b_2, b_2, 0) \end{aligned}$$

17 and therefore $v_1 + v_2 = (0, 0, b_1, b_1 + b_2) \in U$, from which we derive, since $D'' = \{0\}$,
 18 that

$$b_1\varphi_D = b_1 + b_2 \tag{4}$$

19 and $b_1 \in A'' = A''\varphi_D$ and $b_1 + b_2 \in A''\varphi_D$. So also $b_2 \in A''\varphi_D$. This proves that
 20 $B \leq D$, and so $B = D$. Let us now show that this leads to a contradiction.

21 Again from Eq. (2), this time with $\mathbf{a} = 0$ and with \mathbf{d} being the same element
 22 $(b_1, b_2) \in B = D$, we obtain

$$U \ni v_3 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (0, 0, b_1, b_2)\bar{\rho}^{-1} = ((b_1 + b_2)\rho, 0, b_1, b_1 + b_2)$$

23 and so $v_1 + v_2 + v_3 = v_4 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} ((b_1 + b_2)\rho, 0, 0, 0) \in U$. Manipulating v_4 as in the case
 24 $D'' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ we prove that $(0, 0, 0, (b_1 + b_2)\rho) \in U$, which means $(b_1 + b_2)\rho = 0\varphi_D = 0$,

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1 i.e. $b_1 = b_2$. Then, from Eq. (4) and since φ_D is an isomorphism, we have $b_1 = b_2 =$
2 0, a contradiction.

3 $\boxed{\mathbf{C}'' = \{\mathbf{0}\}}$ Since φ_D is an isomorphism, we have $C'' = D'' = B'' = A'' = \{0\}$,
4 and so $D = \{\mathbf{0}\}$. Let us now prove that $B = \{\mathbf{0}\}$. Since $B\varphi \leq D = \{\mathbf{0}\}$, then
5 $B\varphi = \{\mathbf{0}\}$. If $(b_1, b_2) \in B$, then $(b_1, b_2)\varphi = (0, 0)$, and so $(b_1, b_2, 0, 0) \in U$. Similarly
6 to the previous case, we obtain $(0, 0, b_1, b_1 + b_2) \in U$, i.e. there exists $\mathbf{x} \in A$ such
7 that $(0, 0, b_1, b_1 + b_2) = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi)$, so we have $(b_1, b_1 + b_2) = (0, 0)$, which implies
8 $(b_1, b_2) = \mathbf{0}$. This proves that $B = \{\mathbf{0}\}$ and that $\varphi : A \rightarrow C$ is an isomorphism.
9 From (1) of Lemma 4.5, we have that φ is an automorphism of A . Moreover, for
10 each $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) \in A$, we have $(a_1, a_2)\varphi = (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \in A\varphi = A$, and by (2) of
11 Lemma 4.5 we obtain $\mathbf{a}\varphi_1, \mathbf{a}\varphi_2 \in A'$, and so $\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2 \in A'$. Consequently,

$$\text{Im}(\varphi_1 + \varphi_2) = \{\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2 | \mathbf{a} \in A\} \leq A'.$$

12 Note that $\varphi_1 + \varphi_2$ is surjective, since $\varphi = (\varphi_1, \varphi_2)$ is an invertible matrix, and so
13 $\text{Im}(\varphi_1 + \varphi_2) = A'$.

14 Now, for each $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) \in A$, there exists $\mathbf{x} \in A$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\varphi)\bar{\rho}^{-2} &= (a_1 + \xi + (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, a_2 + \xi, a_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_1, a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2) \\ &= (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}\varphi), \end{aligned}$$

15 thus we obtain

$$(a_1 + \xi + (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, a_2 + \xi)\varphi = (a_1, a_2) + (a_1, a_2)\varphi \in A\varphi = A,$$

16 where ξ denotes here the element $(\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho$.

17 Hence

$$\begin{aligned} ((\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho + (a_2 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho, (\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho) &= (a_1, a_2)\varphi^{-1} \in A\varphi \\ &= A. \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

18 Therefore, from (2) of Lemma 4.5, for each $\mathbf{a} \in A$ we have $(\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho \in A'$,
19 and so we obtain $A'\rho = A'$, since

$$\text{Im}(\varphi_1 + \varphi_2) = \{\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2 | \mathbf{a} \in A\} = A'$$

20 and ρ is a permutation. As before, the proof is completed when A' is a non-trivial
21 and proper subgroup of V , since it represents an imprimitivity block for $\langle \rho, T_n \rangle$.
22 Otherwise, the following two cases remain to be discussed.

23 $\boxed{\mathbf{A}' = \mathbb{F}_2^n}$ Let us denote by

$$\theta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \varphi^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{11} & \theta_{12} \\ \theta_{21} & \theta_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

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1 and let us denote by

$$\theta_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{11} \\ \theta_{21} \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } \theta_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{12} \\ \theta_{22} \end{pmatrix}.$$

2 Note that from Eq. (5), we have

$$(\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2)\rho = \mathbf{a}\theta_2,$$

3 which implies that ρ is linear on $\{\mathbf{a}\varphi_1 + \mathbf{a}\varphi_2 \mid \mathbf{a} \in A\} = A' = \mathbb{F}_2^n$, a contradiction.

4 $\mathbf{A}' = \{\mathbf{0}\}$ First note that $A'\varphi_A = \{0\}$, so for each $d' \in D'$, considering $a'' = 0$,
5 there exists $y' \in D'$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (0, d', \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1, \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2)\bar{\rho}^{-1} &= ((\bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1 + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2)\rho, d', d' + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1, \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1 + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2) \\ &= (0, y', \bar{\mathbf{y}}\varphi_1, \bar{\mathbf{y}}\varphi_2), \end{aligned}$$

6 where $\bar{\mathbf{d}} = (0, d')$ and $\bar{\mathbf{y}} = (0, y')$. Therefore $(\bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1 + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2)\rho = 0$, and so $\bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1 + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2 = 0$.
7 This means that we have $(0, d', d' + \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1, 0) \in U$ which, since also $(0, d', \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_1, \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2) \in$
8 U , implies that $(0, 0, d', \bar{\mathbf{d}}\varphi_2) \in U$. We obtain $D' \leq A'' = \{0\}$ and thus $D' = \{0\}$.
9 Since $A'/B' \cong C'/D'$ and $A' = D' = \{0\}$, we also have $C' = B' = \{0\}$, and so
10 $A = \{0\}$. Finally, since $D = \{0\}$ and $A/B \cong C/D$, we also have $C = B = \{0\}$, and
11 so U is trivial, a contradiction. \square

12 **Remark 1.** Note that in Theorem 3.1 we have obtained our claim by reaching
13 the contradiction that D'' (or C'' or A'') is an invariant subspace for ρ . We should
14 actually prove that D'' generates an invariant partition. However, computations
15 are nearly identical and identically tedious and therefore are not included in this
16 presentation. The intrigued reader may find the same results rewriting the proof of
17 Theorem 3.1 obtaining that $(D'' + v) \mapsto D'' + w$ for some $w \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$.

18 5. Conclusions

19 In this work, we have considered the group $\Gamma_{\text{AES}} = \langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}, T_{128} \rangle$ generated by the
20 AES-128 key-schedule transformations and we have proved that no partition of
21 $V^4 = \mathbb{F}_2^{128}$ can be invariant under its action. However, the slow global diffusion
22 of the operator does not suffice to make the key-schedule transformation free from
23 invariant linear partitions when the composition of more rounds is considered. In
24 particular, since λ^2 and λ^4 admit proper and nontrivial invariant subspaces which
25 are a direct sum of bricks of V , we can conclude that group generated by i consec-
26 utive key-schedule transformations $\langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}}^i, T_{128} \rangle$ is

- 27 — primitive if $i = 1$ (this work) and
- 28 — imprimitive if $i \in \{0, 2 \bmod 4\}$ (see e.g. [14, Proposition 5.1] or [10] and [22]).

On the primitivity of the AES-128 key-schedule

1 It comes then with no surprise that $\overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}^4}$ admits invariant subspaces, like those
 2 found by Leurent and Pernet [22], using an algorithm of Leander *et al.* [21]. One
 3 example is $U < V^4$, where

$$U \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(a, b, c, d, 0, b, 0, d, a, 0, 0, d, 0, 0, 0, d) \mid a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}_2^8\}.$$

4 Although the results of this work are not straightforwardly generalized using the
 5 same methods to the case $i = 3$, we find it easy to believe that also $\langle \overline{\rho_{\text{AES}}^3}, T_{128} \rangle$
 6 act primitively on V^4 . Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the same result
 7 is not valid for the 192-bit and 256-bit versions of AES key-schedule. However, the
 8 increasing complexity of the strategy used here does not seem to be suitable for
 9 addressing the problem, which might require a different methodology.

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