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THE PROBLEMATISATION OF URBAN INSECURITY AND VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AS A SOLUTION IN BUDAPEST (HUNGARY) AND MILAN (ITALY)

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Abstract

This study is devoted to the investigation of urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance in public spaces. It aims at contributing to the current body of knowledge by conducting a problematisation analysis of urban insecurity, grounding it in the local context. Given the logic of the problematisation analysis, video surveillance is analysed as a solution.

Focusing on Budapest and Milan, two contrasting cases within Europe regarding their socio-economic situation, the research draws on two theoretical approaches: surveillance society and security state, based on Foucault's ideas. The research applies a mixed-methods approach to the study, utilising desk-based research, semi-structured interviews, and multilevel modelling. The desk-based research facilitates the profound exploration of the local contexts and the analysis of the discourses on urban insecurity in the relative legislation. Semi-structured interviews are used for acquiring knowledge on the ways of construction of urban insecurity and video surveillance by the experts and representatives of NGOs directly involved in dealing with the problem of urban insecurity in the studied contexts. Lastly, the multilevel analysis facilitates understanding the impact of the presence of video surveillance cameras on the perception of insecurity in Hungary and Italy.

The research findings suggest that urban insecurity is a complex social phenomenon deeply grounded in objectively existing and constructed phenomena. Therefore, video surveillance might be a partial solution, implemented along with other situational and social interventions and in compliance with several conditions. The findings propose policy recommendations that include a suggestion to invest in obtaining high-quality and reliable data on the roots of urban insecurity in the city to fill in the gaps in knowledge and policies. Another significant proposal is to open a communication channel with the local inhabitants.

Keywords: urban insecurity, video surveillance, surveillance society, security state, problematisation analysis, Budapest, Milan.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Introduction

The problem of urban insecurity is not new but still persists in cities around the globe. City authorities undertake many efforts, including preventive measures, to tackle the problem of urban insecurity, and, at least partially, they bring some results. For instance, numerous studies show that the level of crime is reducing in cities across Europe. Simultaneously, the research shows that the perception of insecurity and fear of crime in urban spaces remain stable or even increase (Tulumello, 2015; Valera & Guàrdia, 2014; Wyant, 2008). Partially, it is connected to the ever-expanding concept of urban insecurity and a wide variety of global and local factors impacting the perception of insecurity. Therefore, there is a paradox indicating a discrepancy between an objective security situation and perceived insecurity in urban areas. This paradox is one part of the current research.

Another part focuses on video surveillance as a measure for dealing with urban insecurity. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, installed by the authorities and private agents, became widespread across European cities in the middle of the 1990s – the beginning of the 2000s. At the time, the governments frequently justified the spread of video surveillance by constructing an image of it as an effective tool for combatting crime, enhancing the safety of public spaces, and, as a result, increasing the perception of security (Bannister et al., 1998).

Given that the technology became widespread relatively recently, the research still investigates the implementation of video surveillance in various contexts. It seeks to comprehend video surveillance's impact on urban spaces and their inhabitants. In particular, the current body of research provides contradictory evidence on the influence of the presence of CCTVs on crime rates and the perception of insecurity (for instance, see: Phillips, 1999; Cerezo, 2013; Appleby-Arnold et al., 2018). Moreover, there is a growing debate on CCTV as a data collection technology that might be used for invading privacy. In turn, it might generate even further insecurity among citizens. So, there is also a paradox that video surveillance, initially aimed at providing security, might generate feelings and perceptions of insecurity even further.

To comprehend the current state of research regarding the problematisation of urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance in urban spaces, this study started with the literature review presented in *Chapter 2: Literature review*. The literature review also unveils some controversies and gaps in current academic knowledge on the studied phenomena.

Firstly, the literature review reveals a conceptual dispute over the phenomenon of urban insecurity, which is ever-expanding and lacks a unified and commonly-accepted definition. The situation is

compounded by a presence of intersecting, although semantically different concepts of urban safety and fear that could lead to further confusion in the applied research if no clear terminological distinction is made between them. The literature review illustrates an absence of conceptual clarity on definitions developed within one of the theoretical and normative approaches, both adopted in the empirical research. The difference between the definitions results in the inconsistency of knowledge about the phenomenon of urban insecurity, which might implicitly impact the policies tackling it.

Secondly, there is a scarcity of research on the problematisation of urban insecurity, facilitating understanding of how the phenomenon is rendered problematic in a studied context. However, researchers have extensively investigated the factors impacting urban insecurity in an attempt to comprehend the phenomenon within both positivist and interpretivist frameworks. Therefore, the current research helps reconstruct which phenomena contribute to the problematisation of urban insecurity and what solutions are proposed to tackle it. For instance, as argued in the literature review, it could be concluded that such common issues as criminal activity, incivilities, social and physical degradation, and global societal processes as immigration, the precarity of work, etc. contribute to the problematisation of urban insecurity. As to the solutions, the literature suggests that a wide range of situational and social interventions should improve the quality of urban life. However, these findings are frequently fragmented as studies focus on one or several aspects of urban insecurity instead of comprehending it in its complexity.

Furthermore, there are some indications of a variation in issues contributing to the problematisation of urban insecurity and solutions between the contexts in which the phenomenon is studied. The comparative research especially highlights the variation. This part of the literature review shows very scarce research on the problematisation of urban insecurity that would focus comprehensively on the phenomenon and be grounded in the context in which it is produced.

Lastly, the literature review highlights inconsistency in the research on video surveillance as a technology aimed at providing urban security. On the one hand, studies provide controversial evidence on the effectiveness of CCTV systems for crime reduction, showing some fluctuations between the studied contexts. Thus, the studies show that there might be a variation in the effects of video surveillance between different cities or various locations within one city. On the other hand, there is contradictory evidence on the impact of video surveillance on the perception of urban insecurity, which, again, might be attributed to the variation in the studied contexts. Therefore, the literature review reveals that, so far, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of video surveillance, and there is a need for further investigation to inform better not only the research on the solutions to urban insecurity but also public policies to counter the phenomenon.

The research proceeds from the literature review on urban insecurity and video surveillance to the theoretical considerations of the phenomena in *Chapter 3: Surveillance Society or Security State?* As it follows from the title of the chapter, it elaborates on two main theoretical approaches to comprehending security and surveillance in public spaces: surveillance society and security state. Although both theoretical approaches are grounded in Foucault's work, until now, the researchers have rarely built a dialogue between the two. An absence of such communication between the theories might lead to limitations in empirical studies. For instance, applying only the surveillance society model to the analysis of the empirical data might lead to finding traces of disciplinary power everywhere and interpreting reality as the one in which disciplinary power is the only power modality (Borch, 2015). However, Foucault's later analysis of security, crime, and power suggests a complex interplay of different power modalities, as was shown in his lectures at the College de France. Additionally, an emerging body of research indicates that the provision of security and implementation of video surveillance might have different underlying logics even within one city. Therefore, the first part of the theoretical chapter describes how these theoretical approaches consider security provision, implementation of surveillance, urban spaces, and other germane for the study topics.

The last part of the theoretical chapter considers the impact of the two theoretical approaches on the theorisation of urban insecurity within the neoliberal framework. More specifically, it considers how these approaches impacted the problematisation of urban insecurity and the possible solutions. The neoliberal framework also helps understand the complexity of the phenomenon of urban insecurity as it shows a complex interplay of local and global processes that might be related to urban insecurity. Furthermore, the theory advocates for understanding the specificity of neoliberalism in the studied context; therefore, it facilitates grounding urban insecurity and video surveillance in the specific context in which they are investigated.

Derived from the review of the literature and the theoretical considerations, the research aims were set out. The research questions are presented in *Chapter 4: Research questions and conceptual framework.* To account for the complexity of the phenomenon of urban insecurity, the issues in the implementation of video surveillance, and the possible impact of the context in which the phenomena are studied, the current research was performed in two contrasting contexts. It is reflected in the main research questions. The first question is formulated as follows: How is urban insecurity problematised in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)? The second question is: How is video surveillance constructed to respond to the problem of urban insecurity in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)?

Chapter 4 also discusses the rationale behind selecting Budapest and Milan for this study. Thus, the literature shows that South and Central European countries have been at the periphery of urban studies and recently got into the spotlight. Furthermore, the recent research shows the importance of studying these countries to investigate neoliberalism, its specificities, and variations. Therefore, within these two European regions, the countries were selected based on the maximum variation approach, facilitating an understanding of the similarities and specificities of each context. At the same time, to make the confrontation of the contexts possible, the cities were chosen based on similar population sizes and the highest crime rates in the respective countries.

The research questions foster studying urban insecurity within the interpretivist paradigm as they primarily focus on social constructs existing around the phenomenon and solutions to it. At the same time, they imply grounding the research in the context, 'reality,' which can be addressed by applying quantitative methods, especially those that allow accounting for the contextual factors. Therefore, a mixed-method approach is adopted in the current research, as discussed in *Chapter 5: Research Methodology*.

Three main methods are employed in this research. The first one is document analysis. More specifically, this research focuses on legislation to investigate how urban insecurity is problematised and codified there. Additionally, this method allows examining the proposed solutions to tackle the problem and whether video surveillance appears among them, possible limitations in implementing CCTV systems, etc. The second method is the semi-structured interview, which facilitates studying people who deal with urban insecurity in a professional or volunteer way in an immediate environment in which the phenomenon is produced. The main focus is on the ways of construction of urban insecurity and video surveillance in the context in which they work. The ways of problematising urban insecurity might also be impacted by respondents' values, beliefs, knowledge, ideology, and other factors. The third method is multilevel modelling, which investigates how the perception of insecurity in urban spaces relates to various individual socio-economic, attitudinal, and contextual factors. The chapter also accounts for the reasons behind the choice of the methods, their advantages and disadvantages, the selection of interviewees, data sources of statistical analysis, and the ways of designing and testing the methods.

Chapter 6: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Budapest discusses the study's empirical findings conducted in Budapest. The discussion of the current Hungarian and Budapest cultural, economic, political, and social context opens up the chapter to account for the conditions in which urban insecurity exists in the country and the city. The description of the current context is based on the current body of literature on urban insecurity in the country and the city. Then Chapter proceeds

to the results of the legislation analysis, which aims to understand the problematisation of urban insecurity and the proposed solutions to it as perceived by the policy-makers at the state and local levels. Around 20 documents have been subjected to content analysis.

The information derived from the current situation in the country and the city, along with the analysis of the legislation, contributed to formulating context-related questions for the semi-structured interviews and facilitated the selection of the respondents. The following two sections of *Chapter 6* present the results of the semi-structured interviews with the experts and the representatives of the NGOs, respectively. They investigate the perceptions and beliefs related to urban insecurity, possible solutions to it, and the implementation of video surveillance in Budapest. The analysis of the interviews reflects the theoretical framework and current knowledge presented in the academic literature on urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance, especially in the Hungarian and Budapest context.

The last part of the desk-based research, multilevel modelling, is discussed in the next section of the chapter. In particular, it investigates the impact of individual socio-economic, attitudinal, and contextual factors such as the number of CCTVs and crime rates on the perception of insecurity in urban areas. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings, combining the results of desk-based research, semi-structured reviews, and statistical analysis.

The results of the empirical research on and in Milan are presented in *Chapter 7: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Milan*. The structure of the Milanese chapter follows that of the Budapest one. Thus, *Chapter 7* commences with the description of the current political, cultural, economic, and social context in Italy and Milan. Then it proceeds to the analysis of the current legislation (more than 20 documents) and the semi-structured interviews with the Italian experts and the representatives of the NGOs. The results of multilevel modelling are examined in the penultimate section of the chapter. Finally, a brief discussion of the results of the empirical study in Milan concludes the chapter.

The last chapter of the study, *Chapter 8: Discussion and conclusions*, discusses the main insights of the conducted research, synthesising the results of the legislation analysis, semi-structured interviews, and the multilevel modelling in both studied contexts: Budapest and Milan. It discusses the similarities and disparities in the ways of problematisation of urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance as one of its solutions. Additionally, the conclusion denotes some practical recommendations for policies and programs aiming at tackling urban insecurity in Budapest and Milan, respectively. Also, the research-informed recommendations are offered to implement video surveillance in public spaces in the studied in this research cities. Finally, the thesis concludes with an outline for the possible direction of future research.

2. Outline of chapters

Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter states the main problem investigated in this research. Additionally, it presents the relevance of the research problem and explains how the parts of the research are interlinked. Thus, it accounts for how the research started with the literature review and then proceeds to the theoretical framework. The research questions and methodology have been formulated based on the gaps and contradictions identified in the literature review and theoretical considerations. Then the introduction explains how the proposed methodology was implemented in each studied context and what analytical results it brought, which led to their discussion and conclusion.

Chapter 2: Literature review. The chapter accounts for a current challenge in conceptualising urban insecurity and the scarcity of research on the problematisation of urban insecurity. It also reviews the literature on the factors contributing to urban insecurity that, at least partially, allow to reconstruct the problematisation. Additionally, it examines the literature on the estimation of various solutions to the problem of urban insecurity. The last part of the literature review discusses controversies and challenges in studying the implementation of video surveillance in an urban setting. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of the current gaps and inconsistencies in the existing body of research.

Chapter 3: Surveillance Society or Security State? The chapter reviews two main theoretical standpoints on security provision and surveillance. It points out the importance of a dialogue between the two as it might greatly inform the empirical research, and there is some evidence on the implementation of different logics for security provision and surveillance even in one city. The chapter closes with a discussion of the impact of these theoretical standpoints on neoliberalism, which, in turn, affects how the problem of urban insecurity is problematised and dealt with.

Chapter 4: Research questions and conceptual framework. The primary and intermediate research questions are presented in this chapter, showing how the current work aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the studied phenomena. The chapter also explains the reasons behind the choice of Budapest and Milan for the current research. Thus, it highlights the fact that there is a lack of attention to the countries in which these cities are located. Simultaneously, it underlines that studying the topic in these countries might contribute significantly to understanding the phenomena, especially given the proposed theoretical framework. Lastly, the chapter also introduces the conceptual framework for conducting the research.

Chapter 5: Research Methodology. The chapter explains the theoretical and practical reasons for choosing a mixed-methods approach in this research. Then it explains the main three stages of the study: desk-based, semi-structured interviews, and multilevel modelling, highlighting the

interconnectedness of these stages. The chapter also accounts for the advantages and limitations of the selected research methods.

Chapter 6: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Budapest. The results of the empirical work in Budapest are presented in this chapter, which starts with the description of the current situation in the country and city that facilitates contextualising the study. Then it proceeds to the analysis of the legislation, the interview data, and multilevel modelling. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how urban insecurity is problematised in Budapest, what the main solutions to the problem are suggested, and whether video surveillance is constructed among such solutions.

Chapter 7: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Milan. The chapter discusses the main results of the empirical study in Milan. At the beginning of the chapter, the current context in Italy and Milan is described to ground the further analysis. Then, the outcomes of the legislation analysis, the semi-structured interviews, and multilevel modelling are discussed in the respective sections of the chapter. Lastly, the chapter closes with a brief deliberation on the problematisation of urban insecurity, suggested solutions to it, and the role of video surveillance in tackling urban insecurity in Milan.

Chapter 8: Discussion and conclusions. The research concludes with the discussion and contrasting the results of the empirical study in two contexts: Budapest and Milan, highlighting the common and distinct features of each. Therefore, the study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance by shedding light on possible common and context-dependent features of the studied phenomena. The chapter also considers the practical implications of the research results for policies and programs to deal with urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance in Budapest and Milan. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

1. Introduction

In the literature, the problem of urban insecurity is considered from positivist and interpretivist standpoints. Therefore, on the one hand, this phenomenon can be regarded as objectively existing. Researchers studying the objective dimension of urban insecurity usually focus on crime statistics, physical space and its features, and institutional arrangements set up by different actors. On the other hand, urban insecurity can be studied as a perceived phenomenon. Therefore, such studies focus on the perception of insecurity or urban fear (Echazarra, 2013; Furstenberg, 1971; Valera & Guàrdia, 2012). However, there is very scarce research on the problematisation of urban insecurity, that is, research examining how urban insecurity is socially constructed to be problematic, which issues contribute to it, and what solutions are proposed to contrast it.

Lefebvre (1991) argues that social actions depend on spatial and social context. Physical features of space and its socio-cultural context simultaneously affect how people perceive it and behave in it; therefore, objective and subjective dimensions of urban insecurity are interconnected solidly. Consequently, urban insecurity is a complex social phenomenon, and it is essential to study both its dimensions and their interplay: how different spatial and other objective attributes affect the perception of urban insecurity and vice versa. This interplay might serve as a fundamental premise for understanding what social constructions exist concerning urban insecurity and how they contribute to the problematisation of the phenomenon.

Given the complexity of urban insecurity, there might be a necessity for a complex set of actions and initiatives to overcome and resolve it. This study focuses on a specific intervention – the implementation of video surveillance in public urban spaces, which was initially argued to improve urban security and the perception of security in cities, as discussed in *Chapter 1: Introduction*. Consequently, the literature review focuses on the current academic knowledge on the effects of the presence of video surveillance on objective (mainly crime) and subjective (mainly fear of crime) urban security. However, considering the relative novelty of this phenomenon, the current studies frequently produce contradictory results.

Considering all of this, the current chapter synthesises a current body of academic knowledge and highlights controversies and gaps existing in it. The chapter consists of three sections. The first one presents the conceptual debate on the phenomenon of urban insecurity. The second reviews the literature on the production of insecurity in urban spaces. Specifically, it discusses the current knowledge on contextual and environmental factors of urban insecurity, subjective insecurity, and

ways of tackling the phenomenon. The last section is devoted to revising studies examining video surveillance in urban spaces and its possible impacts.

2. Conceptual challenge of defining urban insecurity

The definitional challenge starts with an absence of a unified definition of the notion of security, which is due to multiple meanings and interpretations of this notion. For example, Guild (2009) points out that the concept of security is increasingly expanding and, consequently, begins to include other previously not related notions: 'the more widely the concept of security is defined, the more state activities fall within its remit.' In particular, security might be directly or indirectly connected to physical integrity, labour, economics, migration, and other social issues.

An additional obstacle is the presence of such concepts as 'safety' or 'fear' that are overlapping, although semantically different. Z. Bauman (1999) suggests considering insecurity in three dimensions:

- cognitive that relates to the growing number of uncertainties present in the modern world and the future. So, a person cannot comprehend, estimate and be emotionally ready to face all the risks and threats that they could come across during their life;
- existential that is linked to the ongoing changes in the labour market, intensified geographical and social mobility, weakening of social relations;
- civil that is connected to personal and property safety.

From this conceptualisation, it stems that insecurity consists of two parts – constructed and objective. On the one hand, insecurity reflects risks and uncertainties that exist in the modern world and may be present in the future. However, on the other hand, insecurity relates to their perception and growing inability to exercise control over different aspects of one's own life.

Additionally, from Bauman's approach, it can be concluded that insecurity is a more general term, while safety and fear can be considered as parts of it. Safety is connected to the civil dimension and describes the physical protection of both the physical body and one's property from risks and threats. Fear relates to the cognitive dimension of insecurity, specifically to its emotional aspect. At the same time, there is a connection between all the dimensions of insecurity. Thus, people exist and participate in the world through their bodies and experiences that are tied to a concrete physical space and time (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

Adding the adjective 'urban' to the concept of insecurity introduces a spatial dimension: a territorial area appears in which insecurity problems emerge with greater proximity and visibility to citizens

(Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018). In urban settings, fear is an integral part of life as the confrontation with the different, 'others' is unavoidable and is more frequent than in the rural areas. So, a person encounters more local and global uncertainties in cities. However, fear within the urban areas is not necessarily a bad experience; it also can be an impetus for avoiding personal and social stagnation as it may incentivise social acceptance of others, creativity for developing ways for reducing the probability of encounters with dangers, etc. (Bannister et al., 2006).

The research examining urban insecurity within the interpretivist framework usually focuses on the perception of insecurity and fear in urban spaces. There are three main dimensions of studying the perception of insecurity (Furstenberg, 1971; Valera & Guàrdia, 2012) that are interrelated with each other (Rader, 2004):

- the emotional dimension that entails fear of crime or feeling of unsafety in an area;
- the cognitive dimension that is related to how a person assesses their risk and probability of victimisation;
- the behavioural dimension that reflects changes in one's behaviour as a response to fear and assessment of victimisation chances.

Additionally, some researchers note that the perception of insecurity can be at two levels: personal and altruistic (Ferraro and LeGrange 1987). At a personal level, people are concerned about their security and assess their probability of victimisation. At the altruistic level, the concern for others (for instance, relatives, friends, neighbours, etc.) comes to the forefront.

The normative definition of the two terms 'urban security' and 'urban safety' differs from Bauman's approach. For instance, the International Centre for Prevention of Crime (2012) gives the following definitions:

- urban security is a public good that is 'delivered by the state under regular circumstances';
- urban safety is a citizens' feeling of 'being secure.'

So, this definition attributes the cognitive dimension of insecurity to urban safety, while urban security's definition concentrates on the civil aspect of insecurity as proposed by Bauman. Some scholars exploring the issue of urban insecurity in Europe adopt this approach (for instance, Tulumello, 2018) as it offers a new institutional perspective for considering urban insecurity by pointing out the state's role as a principal provider of security for the population. Nevertheless, at the same time, it creates some confusion in the terminology and might result in obstacles to communication between the approaches to urban security.

3. Factors of Urban Insecurity

3.1. Urban insecurity studies within a positivist framework

Scholars who consider urban insecurity to be an objectively existing phenomenon quite often refer to *criminal activity and registered crime rates* (or police recorded crime rates) in an urban environment (de Jubainville, 2018). It is considered that crime is a phenomenon that opposes security conditions in urban spaces, but simultaneously, crime is an integral part of urban life (Baldwin, 1997). The higher concentration of possible victims, higher financial returns from crime, lower possibilities of arrest, and other characteristics of metropolitan cities explain higher crime rates in them (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1999). Hence, an increase in urbanisation is followed by a rise in crime rates (Brennan-Galvin, 2002).

Drawing on routine activity theory (Felson, 1994; Newton & Felson, 2015), it is possible to assume that urban spaces usually offer more opportunities for a criminal to meet a potential victim in a place with no guardian. In particular, an absence of formal and informal surveillance (Malleson & Andresen, 2016; Stults & Hasbrouck, 2015), proper street lights (Murray & Feng, 2016; Xu et al., 2018), and poorly designed public spaces (Price, 2016) are among factors that facilitate the convergence of conditions for committing a crime.

In urban spaces, crime can take such forms as organised crime and conflicts between different crime organisations, thefts, robberies, drug trafficking, assaults, killings, incivilities, and others (Moser, 2004). Studies point out the growing role of *incivilities and disorder* in contributing to the conditions of urban insecurity (Skogan, 1990). The importance of incivilities for deteriorating the quality of urban life is usually explained through the 'broken windows' theory, which suggests that with time minor signs of urban decay and incivilities can attract more prominent and more serious criminal offences (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Incivilities can be divided into categories – physical and social. Physical incivilities usually take the forms of street littering, graffiti, destruction of public property, etc. Social incivilities manifest through bar fights, street confrontations, public drinking or drug use, unsupervised groups of teenagers, etc. (McCormick and Holland, 2015; Ward et al., 2017).

The literature suggests a multitude of interventions and actions to tackle crime in urban spaces. For instance, interventions in physical space aim to reduce the chance for a possible offender to meet a potential victim in a place without a guardian. They are frequently referred to as situational crime prevention. Such interventions entail but are not limited to increased policing, especially in crime hotspots (Braga et al., 2019; Weisburd & Telep, 2014) or based on predictive policing (Ingilevich & Ivanov, 2018), investments in street lighting (Atkins et al., 1991; Painter and Farrington, 2001; Xu et al., 2018) and video surveillance (Welsh & Farrington, 2003).

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) also gains popularity as a form of intervention aimed at crime deterrence. It seeks to enhance the usage of public spaces and, consequently, informal surveillance (Armitage, 2016; Crowe & Zahm, 1994). The first research demonstrating the positive impact of urban design on curbing crime appeared in the 1960 – 1970s (Angel, 1968; Jacobs, 1961; Newman, 1996). CPTED primarily aims at crime reduction through 'the design, manipulation and management of the built environment' (Armitage, 2013). In the academic literature, there is no consensus on the components of CPTED. For example, Cozens et al. (2005) propose the seven principles: defensible space, access control, territoriality, surveillance, target hardening, image and activity support. Armitage (2013) suggests five principal components of CPTED: physical security, surveillance, movement control, management and maintenance, and defensible space.

For the purposes of this research, it is worth clarifying that, within the CPTED framework, surveillance usually entails informal (residents, passers-by, shop owners and workers, etc.) and formal (police, private security). Therefore, space should be designed in such a way to maximise both types of surveillance (Armitage, 2013). Video surveillance is usually considered as one of the components of physical security or target hardening. Thus, space should be protected through physical tools of space design (fences, locks, video surveillance, etc.). Several studies show that physical security is efficient for reducing such crimes as burglaries, car thefts, etc. (Tseloni et al., 2017; Vollaard & van Ours, 2011).

The number of police workforce can be associated with crime rates; however, the literature does not show any conclusive evidence of it as there is a reciprocal dependence between crime rates and the number of police officers (den Heyer & Mendel, 2019). On the one hand, literature shows that the number of police officers can predict crime reduction (Bradford, 2011; Braga et al., 2019; Weisburd & Telep, 2014), especially when the police workforce is used to tackle crime hotspots[1] or in criminogenic areas. In addition, the police efficiency index calculated by the law enforcement workforce per hundred arrests for different criminal offences shows a crime deterrence effect (Bothos & Thomopoulos, 2016). On the other hand, literature states that higher crime rates (Levitt, 2002) and citizens and policymakers' perceptions of crime risk (Kleck & Barnes, 2014) encourage the extension of the police workforce.

Crime rates might also diminish due to the presence of private security organisations (Garmany & Galdeano, 2018; Shearing & Stenning, 1983). Moreover, due to neoliberalisation and redistribution of security provision from the state to private providers, the number of private security companies

[1] Areas with higher than average crime rates.

has risen in cities worldwide (Wood & Shearing, 2007; Zimmerman, 2014). Usually, private security companies offer the following services and products: watchman service (for instance, bodyguards, uniformed security guards, etc.), installation and monitoring of alarms and other security equipment, production of such equipment, private detectives and investigators, monitoring for and investigation of corporate and white-collar crime, and consultation on risk management (Button, 2003; Sarre, 2005; van Steden & Sarre, 2007).

Even though the research in the USA shows that private security companies are more focused on protecting business interests, they also can contribute to the provision of urban security by creating a safer environment in districts where they operate (Vindevogel 2005; Ruddell et al., 2011). Mainly, it applies to business improvement districts that attract many private businesses and, consequently, private security organisations. Additionally, there is some evidence that the installation and maintenance of alarms, anti-burglar systems, and other fortification equipment and services provided by private security companies to businesses and citizens lead to a reduction in property crimes and vehicle thefts (Cook & MacDonald, 2010; Zimmerman, 2014).

Additionally, civil organisations might contribute to the reduction of crime. Neighbourhood watch is one of the most studied forms of self-organisation in terms of its impact on urban insecurity and crime prevention. A meta-analysis of the research on the impact of neighbourhood watch programs on crime reduction shows that neighbourhood watch usually results in 16 – 26% crime reduction (Bennett et al., 2006). However, one of the studies suggests a delay of up to ten years between the commencement of a voluntary organisation in a neighbourhood and crime reduction in the area (Wo et al., 2016). In particular, the quickest effect is on motor vehicle thefts as the presence of neighbourhood watch reduces them almost right after the start of the activity, while for assaults, burglaries, and robberies, the most efficiency is reached after ten years.

Although the literature on neighbourhood watch depicts it as a public good because neighbourhood watch should stimulate civil engagement and social cohesion in the area (Donnelly & Kimble, 2006), more recent research, mainly USA-based, shows that such community associations tend to reinforce social exclusion and segregation. So, Johnson (2016) suggests an inherently exclusionary logic in neighbourhood watch as the idea underlying its work is the protection of 'us,' the community, from 'them,' others who show deviance. Some scholars also point out racial bias and exclusion in the work of neighbourhood watch (Bloch, 2021; Thakore, 2014).

A more sociological perspective on crime supposes that different socio-economic and personal factors might induce criminal activity in urban spaces. Thus, it is demonstrated that income and educational inequalities and unstable economic and labour market situations can be predictors of a rise in crime

(Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 2008; Freeman, 1999; Melick, 2003). Also, the research points out that criminals usually come from a socially disadvantaged background, focusing on family (parents' income, level of education, work position, etc.) or neighbourhoods conditions (a share of people in the neighbourhood with higher education, a share of employed, prices on a real estate property in the area, density of population, etc.) (Bothos & Thomopoulos, 2016; Sampson, 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2016). In addition, different personal factors are also considered in the literature as predictors of crime: level of education, school desertion (Bothos & Thomopoulos, 2016), age (Piquero et al., 2003; Rocque, 2015), substance abuse (Skjærvø et al., 2021), inability to exercise self-control (Agnew et al., 2011; Evans et al., 1997; Hirschi, 1969), exposure to crime as a teenager (Bothos & Thomopoulos, 2016) and others.

Social crime prevention interventions are implemented to tackle the social roots of crime. In particular, a variety of social protection interventions is found to have a significant crime reduction effect: the introduction of a minimum wage (Hansen & Machin, 2002), creation of employment opportunities (and, as a consequence, income opportunities) (Fishback et al., 2010), prevention of youth delinquency through investments into schooling and interest educational groups (Donohue and Siegelman, 1998; Lochner and Moretti, 2001; Tanner-Smith et al., 2013), provision of parent training and education (Tanner-Smith et al., 2013), and others. However, even though these interventions are frequently implemented more for social protection than crime prevention, they still have it as a by-product.

3.2 Urban insecurity studies within an interpretivist framework

Perception of insecurity and fear of crime in the urban spaces can be treated as a social construct that tends to reproduce despite the changes in the objective reality and social circumstances. Stereotypisation and stigmatisation of some urban areas as 'insecure' tend to be robust and reproduce even if changes have been introduced to the area (Tulumello, 2015). Moreover, fear tends to deepen with time regardless of the possible changes in the objective situation (Tulumello, 2015; Valera & Guàrdia, 2014).

While personal interaction experiences in an urban space are a primary source of the social constructs, the media and rumours are a secondary source for their creation (Ferraro, 1995; Tulumello, 2015; Zurawski, 2010). The influence of the media on the perception of crime and especially fear of crime is well-studied in the literature. So, the media impact on the fear of crime depends on sensationalism, the physical proximity of crime, and the proportion of crime coverage in a total media product (an issue of a newspaper, a TV news program, etc.) (Heath & Gilbert, 1996). Additionally, the reception of the media content is essential as the perception of the news as relevant impacts people's fear of

crime (Jensen, 1991). Finally, the media also contributes to the creation of 'geographies of fear,' that is, the stigmatisation of some places within the city as criminogenic, dangerous, etc. The existence of 'geographies of fear' is one of the factors explaining the negative perception of some places and the modalities of their use (Shirlow & Pain, 2003; H. H. Smith, 1986).

Rumours can be treated as social constructs that reproduce in the population and become persistent in the mind of the population despite the social and physical changes that occur within the urban spaces: some spaces can be considered as secure while the others as insecure and stigmatised as 'spaces of fear' or 'fearspaces' (Tulumello, 2015). Such labels as 'crime hotspots' or 'spaces of fear' are socially and politically constructed, and they have a significant impact on people's perception of the space. Newman's (1996) 'defensible space' project illustrates an attempt to redefine space that has a stigma of being unsafe and insecure.

Negative social construction and stigmatisation also concern specific social groups. Current research demonstrates that racial segregation is based on the stigmatisation of some ethnic groups as dangerous and threatening (Picker, 2017). In particular, the research in the USA shows that historically there has been racial segregation. The white population prefers to live in neighbourhoods where not more than 30% of inhabitants are black (Krysan et al., 2009; Kurwa, 2019).

As to the factors of urban insecurity, there are contradictory findings on the connection between the environmental factors and the perception of urban insecurity. For instance, the current body of literature shows inconsistencies in the evidence on the impact of crime rates on subjective urban insecurity. Some scholars find that there is no or very weak interrelation between crime rates and perceived insecurity: for instance, low crime rates in the neighbourhood do not lead to the (or lead to a tiny) decrease in one's fear of crime (Echazarra, 2013; Ferraro, 1995; Miceli et al., 2004; Robinson et al., 2003). In contrast with this, the others provide evidence that the police registered crime rates in the neighbourhood are directly related to the level of experienced fear (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011). Other research shows that the fear of crime increases along with the regional (Wyant, 2008) and national (Visser et al., 2013) crime rates.

The literature shows that incivilities are positively correlated with the fear of crime and the perception of insecurity in urban spaces (Bannister et al., 2006; LaGrange et al., 1992; Valente and Pertegas, 2018). Primarily, it concerns incivilities and disorder at a neighbourhood level (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2015) as their manifestations are in the immediate proximity to local inhabitants and significantly affect the fear of crime and the perception of insecurity.

Physical space itself and its features also can have a considerable impact on the perception of insecurity. Research shows that the presence of physical attributes of security (proper lighting at

night, fences, cleanliness of the streets, etc.) could significantly improve the perception of spaces and increase their liveability (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011; Newman, 1996; Wyant, 2008). Furthermore, even building density and height are connected with the perception of insecurity (Newman & Franck, 1982). Therefore, interventions aimed at improving the physical environment might reduce the perception of insecurity.

Besides, the feeling of and an ability to exercise control over the space of inhabitation and its surroundings (for example, keeping a place clean, exercising informal surveillance, etc.) are the factors improving the perception of security (Newman, 1996). In addition, emotional proximity to a space or place-identity plays a role in whether a place is perceived as secure or not. Thus, familiarity with a particular space and the frequency of visits there significantly impact the perception of security in it (Low, 2001; Tester et al., 2011; Zurawski & Czerwinski, 2008). Consequently, the literature suggests that incentivising citizens to live urban spaces might bring positive results in terms of subjective urban security.

The existence of social ties (e.g., knowing one's neighbours, social trust, social networking, shared practices, etc.) in the neighbourhood can improve the perception of security there (Jacobs, 1961; Newman, 1996; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). A sense of community trust that could be generated through community and social integration is one of the aspects of 'ontological security' (Giddens, 1991) related to the perception of urban insecurity. The research shows that a higher feeling of community trust leads to lower rates in the perception of urban insecurity; therefore, it should be encouraged (Gibson et al., 2002; Kristjánsson, 2007). At the same time, urban life quite often leads to the disintegration of social ties and difficulties with (re)integration and restitution of the feeling of community belonging (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011).

Demographic factors greatly influence the perception of security. Thus, gender and age play a significant role in forming the feeling of insecurity in urban spaces. Studies show that women (Collins, 2016; Rader et al., 2020) and the elderly (Greve et al., 2018) have higher levels of insecurity than other groups (Amerio & Roccato, 2005; LaGrange & Ferraro, 1989; Scarborough et al., 2010). However, some research challenges the assumption of women's higher level of insecurity by providing evidence that men might have even higher levels of insecurity concerning some types of crime (L. W. Reid & Konrad, 2004).

Researchers developed a 'vulnerability perspective,' which relates to a person's perception of self as physically disadvantaged against a criminal and, consequently, more vulnerable to a crime even in a situation in which there is no real threat of victimisation (Wyant, 2008). In the literature, there are two types of crime vulnerability. Firstly, there is a physical vulnerability that applies to people who

perceive themselves as weaker and unable to properly defend themselves against crime (Clemente & Kleiman, 1977). Women, the elderly, and people with poor health (including mental health) are usually referred to this group, and the studies show some evidence that they are more likely to be victimised (Gates and Rohe, 1987; Lorenc et al., 2014; Rader et al., 2007; Wallace, 2012). The research shows that these groups also demonstrate avoidance behaviour to enhance their feeling of security: they avoid visiting certain places that they perceive to be dangerous in general or at certain times (May et al., 2010; Rader et al., 2007).

The second type of vulnerability applies to people who are more likely to be crime victims due to their socio-economic status. In particular, such characteristics as low level of income and education, precarious working conditions, etc., are considered to impact the perception of urban insecurity (Britto, 2013; Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011; Herda, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2007; Will & McGrath, 1995). Therefore, authorities might contrast the increasing vulnerability of various social groups by introducing various labour, educational, and health policies and interventions to improve the quality of life of these groups.

Perceived urban insecurity is a complex social phenomenon connected tightly with social insecurities and risks. In particular, precarious working conditions, unstable economic situation, shrinking social welfare programs, increasing geographical migration, and other factors are connected with the fear of crime and, more generally, the perception of urban insecurity (Holloway & Jefferson, 1997; Hummelsheim et al., 2011). So, as Wacquant (2010) suggests, social insecurity experienced in urban spaces is not produced by criminal activity but rather by neoliberal policies, the reduction of social security programs, and their consequences.

In the literature, urban insecurity is also studied as a social construct by analysing legislation and policies. In particular, such studies usually investigate how the policies are formulated and how urban (in)security is constructed through them (Edwards et al., 2013). Local contexts and practices have a significant impact on the formulation of urban security policies because they aim at dealing with problems existing at a local level (Chalom et al., 2001). At the same time, more global processes and trends also impact urban insecurity problems. For instance, some research shows a complex interplay between local and international trends in urban policies (Crawford & Evans, 2017; Recasens et al., 2013).

Besides, policymakers can codify their perception of and interests in urban insecurity through legislation (Lakoff & Klinenberg, 2010). The research provides evidence that right-wing politicians more frequently prioritise security as their goal and frequently address it through various repressive and situational measures. In contrast, leftist politicians focus on social programs that can have a

reduction in crime and fear of crime as a side-effect, but they rarely exploit security discourses directly (Kübler & de Maillard, 2020).

At the same time, this political division impacts how urban insecurity is codified in the legislation. For example, the perception of migrants as a source of insecurity and danger was developing in European countries alongside neoliberalisation (Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018). Frequently, politicians, especially the right-wing ones, make claims that an increase in migration rates would bring about an increase in criminal activity and undermine the labour market. However, the research does not support such statements, demonstrating contrary results that, for instance, an increase in the number of migrants could actually lead to a reduction in crime rates (MacDonald et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the perception of migrants as a source of threat impacted not only migration but also criminal, urban security, cultural and other policies (Bosworth et al., 2018).

Therefore, policy areas tend to intersect. The research indicates that urban security policies are strongly connected with employment, education, health, social inclusion, housing, and other urban policy areas (Chalom et al., 2001). It might be related to a very vague concept of insecurity, which is intertwined with various fields of social life.

4. Video surveillance as a tool of security provision

4.1. Video surveillance and crime

According to the situational crime prevention and rational choice theory, CCTV serves as a deterrence from crime as a potential offender becomes aware of the presence of video surveillance, and the chance of being caught and punishment outweighs the benefits of committing a crime (Clarke, 1997; Piza et al., 2015; Ratcliffe & Groff, 2019). Besides, CCTV cameras should theoretically prevent the return to crime if an offender is aware that they have been caught by video surveillance.

There is a distinction in crime deterrence mechanisms of video surveillance. Webster (2009) proposed the following typology of CCTV systems:

- non-active: video surveillance functions as a visual deterrent that creates only a vision of surveillance;
- reactive: CCTV systems are employed for recording, replaying footage, and identifying criminals retrospectively;
- proactive: surveillance systems imply real-time, live monitoring of cameras, which makes possible immediate response to a (forthcoming) crime.

In reality, there could be some combinations of these mechanisms. For instance, CCTV cameras installed in one area of a city could be constantly monitored for an immediate reaction, but,

simultaneously, they might have a deterrence function, and CCTV records could be used to investigate already committed criminal actions.

The empirical research on the impact of the presence of video surveillance on the objective dimension of urban insecurity usually studies it through the estimation of the effect of CCTV on crime reduction. However, despite the general political and media claims that the installation of CCTV should lead to crime reduction through deterrence of crime and disorder, the empirical research demonstrates the ambiguous results on the impact of CCTV on the crime rates (Phillips, 1999). Furthermore, some studies indicate that the installation of CCTVs surveying public spaces can lead to a rise in the registered crime rate, which can be attributed to an increase in the number of detections but not in actual crime rates (Phillips 1999; Welsh et al., 2015).

The literature shows that the efficacy of the installation of CCTV depends on the type of crime. For instance, video surveillance is less effective in the prevention of impulsive crimes (such as alcohol- or drug-induced crimes), crime against a person (violence, murder, and others,) and public disorder, incivilities (Alexandrie, 2017; Gill and Spriggs, 2005; Lawson et al., 2018; Phillips, 1999; Piza et al., 2019; Ratcliffe and Groff, 2019; Waples et al., 2009; Welsh and Farrington, 2009). Simultaneously, the effect of video surveillance on premeditated crimes that require some preparation is more tangible (Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Lawson et al., 2018; Phillips, 1999). So, the research provides evidence that CCTV systems can be effective in preventing those crimes that are more amenable to this measure: car thefts, break-ins, property crimes, and street drug selling crimes (Alexandrie, 2017; Piza et al., 2019; Ratcliffe & Groff, 2019; Waples et al., 2009; Welsh & Farrington, 2009). However, these studies highlight that the impact is usually modest and conditional, although statistically significant.

Some authors attribute the modest effect of CCTV on crime reduction to the lack of the proper work of the people observing the CCTV monitors (usually the police) and of the organisation of the command room (Norris & McCahill, 2006; Piza et al., 2015, 2019). The active monitoring of CCTV can increase the effectiveness of its implementation in the following ways (Alexandrie, 2017):

1) it increases the perceived chance of punishment as the police can react quicker; therefore, the deterrence function of video surveillance gets more realised;
2) it can facilitate the identification of a criminal using the footage and, consequently, a rational criminal would avoid committing a crime in the presence of video surveillance systems;
3) it can facilitate police intervention before a serious crime is committed.

Other research also provides evidence that the effectiveness of the implementation of video surveillance rises when the work of control rooms is well-coordinated. For example, Gill and Loveday (2003) established through interviews with prisoners that the offenders are more concerned with the

presence of the police and police's ability to react to (attempted) offences observed through CCTV. Hence, the CCTV systems can be more effective when integrated into police proactive functions (la Vigne et al., 2011).

The empirical studies also highlight the role of the space where CCTV cameras are installed and how CCTV cameras may impact different locations within cities. Welsh and Farrington (2009) did a meta-analysis of the studies focusing on CCTV as the primary intervention in various city locations (city and town centres, public housing schemes, transportation systems, and car parks). The study revealed that video cameras were effective (although the impact was relatively low) at reducing crime rates in car parks, while other city locations were not affected by them. However, other interventions also took place in the car parks: improved lighting, improved fencing, and the presence of security guards. This evaluation aligns with the research that video surveillance can reduce car thefts. In their systematic review, Piza et al. (2019) also demonstrate that the crime rates significantly reduced after installing public video surveillance in car parks and residential areas.

Also, the difference in the effectiveness of the implementation of CCTV cameras in diverse city locations is demonstrated in the review made by Alexandrie (2017). Contrary to the previously mentioned studies, this research reveals the positive effect of video surveillance cameras on crime reduction in public streets and subway stations in the city centre, while parking facilities and suburban train stations are unaffected by the presence of CCTV.

The current body of research also provides contradictory findings on the effects of the presence of video surveillance in crime hotspots. On the one hand, some research demonstrates a reduction in violent crime in crime hotspots (la Vigne et al., 2011; Piza et al., 2015). According to the studies, the main effect is achieved through active monitoring of CCTV by the police and a solid connection with street patrols. For example, Shah and Braithwaite (2013) demonstrate in their study in Chicago the crime reduction effect of the installation of video surveillance. Additionally, they argue that installing video surveillance cameras in crime hotspots and adjacent areas might be more worthwhile than equally throughout the whole city. They mainly base their assumption on the finding that CCTVs do not reduce crime in areas other than crime hotspots. On the other hand, Gerell (2016) challenges this finding by demonstrating no statistically significant effect of video surveillance in Malmö, Sweden.

The crime displacement effect induced by CCTV's introduction is also studied in the empirical research to understand video surveillance in urban spaces. In particular, some studies show that crime is transferred from areas covered by CCTV to the areas that are not (Alexandrie, 2017; Cerezo, 2013; Skinns, 1998; Welsh & Farrington, 2003). In particular, Cerezo (2013) demonstrates that the installation of CCTVs can cause the displacement of property crime while the crime against a person

is not affected. This finding aligns with some of the evidence on the effectiveness of video surveillance to deter burglaries and break-ins, but not crimes against a person.

Simultaneously, the research reveals that there is an opposite effect of the diffusion of benefits from the installation of video cameras. The benefits diffusion effect means that the crime-reduction effect of CCTV spreads out to adjacent territories that are not, however, covered by video surveillance (Clarke, 1995). Besides, some studies demonstrate that the effect of the diffusion of benefits is stronger than the displacement one (Lim & Wilcox, 2017; Piza et al., 2019).

Additionally, the literature points out the importance of considering confounding factors that might influence the positive effect of video surveillance cameras on crime reduction (Gill & Spriggs, 2005). Other interventions into physical space can also have a crime prevention effect, primarily if they are implemented together with the installation of video surveillance. In particular, they might include, but are not limited to the improvement of street lighting, the visible presence of security guards and/or place managers (for instance, parking lot attendants), and fortification of space (for example, the installation of controlled gates) (Welsh et al., 2015). In the meta-analysis of the empirical studies, Piza et al. (2019) demonstrate that implementing multiple crime prevention interventions alongside CCTV leads to a statistically significant reduction in crime. Lawson et al. (2018) also show that targeting the most criminal areas of a city by simultaneously increasing video surveillance and street lighting is the most effective mode of intervention.

Furthermore, social costs of other than video surveillance crime prevention measures might be lower. Welsh et al. (2015) reveal in their analysis that the improved street lighting will not lead to a rise in anxiety about personal liberties, while the installation of CCTVs could have such an effect. Therefore, the installation of CCTV might have higher social costs.

4.2. Video surveillance and subjective insecurity

The research-based evidence on the impact of video surveillance on the perception of insecurity in urban spaces is mixed. Gill et al. (2007) show that CCTV has a minimal effect on the reduction of fear of crime in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the research demonstrates that the levels of support for CCTV reduced after the installation of video surveillance, although remaining relatively high. The authors explain this by residents' high expectations that CCTV would effectively reduce crime levels and, consequently, the levels of victimisation, which were not fulfilled by the introduction of video surveillance.

Another factor that could explain the perception of video surveillance as an ineffective tool of security production is that it is a symbol of authorities doing something about insecurity in the area instead of

really engaging in solving the problem (Leman-Langlois, 2008). Therefore, people might feel that the government abandons them and is not willing to provide proper care and security for them

The systematic literature review by Lorenc et al. (2013) also demonstrates that the empirical studies do not support the hypothesis that CCTV would reduce fear of crime. Zurawski (2010) supposes that urban citizens' feeling of security depends on a physical space itself, its attributes, and the pre-established reputation of an area as secure/insecure. The video cameras are a part of the security arrangements of the physical space. His empirical research in Germany shows that the feeling of security in an area depends on already existing spatial perceptions and is not affected by the introduction of video surveillance.

Contrary to it, Cerezo (2013) demonstrates in her research in Spain that CCTV can improve the perception of streets' security of some groups of urban inhabitants after its installation. The study highlights that this positive trend is mainly traceable among shopkeepers and owners who feel more secure about conducting their businesses after the introduction of video surveillance by the local authorities. However, the positive impact of CCTV on the perception of insecurity was not detected among local inhabitants or visitors of the area. So, this research points out that there are differences in the impact of video surveillance on the perception of insecurity in various social groups.

Additionally, studies show an improvement in the feeling of security among the users of specific city locations after the installation of CCTV. Brands et al. (2016) point out that the greater awareness about the presence of CCTV among nightlife district visitors in the Netherlands leads to a greater feeling of security in the area. Reid and Andresen (2012) found out that the fear of victimisation significantly reduces after installing CCTV in a car park. Although the studies show that there is a gender gap in the improvement of the feeling of security after the installation of CCTV in car parks: women's feeling of security is less affected by the introduction of CCTV cameras than men's (A. A. Reid & Andresen, 2012; Yavuz & Welch, 2010). Besides, just like the research by Gill et al. (2007), Reid and Andresen (2012) show that the users of car parks estimated CCTV's effectiveness higher before the installation than after it. The authors attribute it to the reduction mainly in the females' estimations.

Among the factors explaining the positive effect of video surveillance on the perception of insecurity is the well-managed work of control rooms. The mediation of people engaged in the management of and responsible for the implementation of video surveillance enhances the feeling of security of those under surveillance (Latour, 1999). It happens as the observed believe that the dangerous situation will be handled more effectively. The survey data research shows that, generally, urban citizens believe that CCTV can be useful for crime deterrence (a proactive mechanism) and investigation (a reactive

mechanism) (Appleby-Arnold et al., 2018; Koskela, 2003). At the same time, the general public points out that video surveillance can 'lag behind' with response during a criminal event (Brands et al., 2016) if there is no effective person-technology mediation and, consequently, it could take some time for police or security to respond.

Some studies show that the installation of public video surveillance may even foster further fear of crime due to the pre-existing reputation of a place. Therefore, CCTV does not directly impact the perception of insecurity but builds on already existing attitudes towards a specific place. Thus, CCTV may facilitate the identification of space as unsafe if it already has a reputation of being criminogenic. Furthermore, it happens as a higher presence of video surveillance might be associated with higher crime rates in the general public's mind (van der Wurff et al., 1989; Zurawski and Czerwinski, 2008). Consequently, the local inhabitants may perceive the installation of CCTV as a signal that the area is more dangerous than they previously assumed (Gill & Spriggs, 2005).

However, video surveillance reinforces not only negative stereotypes of specific places but also of some social groups. Thus, Williams and Ahmed (2009) demonstrate in their study that CCTV may reinforce the negative stereotype of 'dangerous others' and the perceived threat from them. Additionally, not only CCTV but signage about surveillance can also symbolise that others should not be trusted within the location.

In general, signs of ongoing video surveillance play an essential role in studying the effect of video surveillance on fear of crime. Due to technological development, video cameras are rendered less visible to those who are observed (Lippert, 2009). Therefore, video surveillance signage becomes more important as it should be highly visible and noticeable. The signage could also have a double effect on the perception of security. On the one hand, video surveillance signage might encourage people to use areas covered by CCTVs more as people feel more protected; therefore, bystander surveillance also increases, which poses an obstacle to committing an offence.

On the other hand, some adverse effects of CCTV signage are described in the literature. In particular, the visibility of surveillance cameras may negatively impact potential victims because their sense of security increases, and they relax their vigilance. This can lead to more risky behaviour on the side of potential victims (Armitage et al., 1999; Welsh and Farrington, 2009; Welsh et al., 2015).

Video surveillance could be a source of other concerns as well. Thus, Brooks (2005) elicits the following sources of concerns arising from the implementation of video surveillance in public spaces:

- the professionalism of those who observe (the police, local governments, etc.);
- the citizens' level of awareness and understanding of CCTV;

- the effectiveness of legislation controlling CCTV;
- the development and application of CCTV related technology;
- the citizens' concern over privacy issues.

Additionally, video surveillance might create a false sense of security as people might rely on the technology to protect them, but, at the same time, there is extended evidence that video surveillance has a limited crime deterrence effect (Monahan, 2010).

Although, in general, European urban citizens consider CCTV to be a helpful tool for crime prevention, the concern about invasion of privacy through video surveillance in public places is also reflected in the public opinion (Cerezo, 2013). The results of the survey conducted in European countries reveal that the proportion of those who feel insecure in the presence of video surveillance is more significant than that of those who feel secure (Appleby-Arnold et al., 2018). People's insufficient awareness of laws and regulations on data collection through video surveillance, its handling, and the feeling of a lack of control over the personal data are among reasons that might explain the perception of video surveillance as an invasion of privacy (Cameron et al., 2008; Phillips, 1999). The gap in the general public's knowledge of how, where, and when CCTV systems are used is also pointed out in the study made in two Dutch cities (Brands et al., 2016). However, despite these concerns about public video surveillance, this tool is usually supported and accepted by urban citizens (Brooks, 2005). So, it could be concluded that risks coming from CCTV are socially accepted and, in the public's perception, benefits from video surveillance outweigh the risks.

Welsh and Farrington (2009) also found out that there is a difference in the effectiveness of CCTV for crime deterrence in countries with different levels of public acceptance of surveillance technologies. In their meta-analysis, 41 studies conducted in the USA, the UK, Sweden, Norway, and Canada were analysed. As a result, they found out that the effectiveness of video surveillance is lower in countries in which citizens strongly oppose the usage of CCTV in public spaces (Norway, Sweden, Canada) in comparison with those where the population is more in favour of this measure (the UK, the USA). Similar results are presented in a review by (Piza et al., 2019). So, it gives evidence that privacy concerns affect the acceptance of video surveillance, which, in turn, impacts the deterrence effect of video surveillance.

Very few studies estimate the effect of video surveillance on fear of crime or perception of insecurity in urban areas using multilevel analysis in which the number of CCTV is an environmental variable and fear of crime or perceived insecurity is a dependent variable (Cho & Park, 2017). In the study in Seoul, Cho and Park (2017) applied this approach to the analysis of the relationship between the actual number of CCTV and fear of crime while also controlling for other variables that might impact

the fear of crime (gender, age, income, marital status, education, crime rate, disorder). The results demonstrate the limited effect of CCTV cameras on the fear of crime and perception of the victimisation risk. In particular, CCTV can be effective for reducing the fear of walking alone after dark, but it is not effective for reducing the perceived risk of victimisation. Also, the analysis suggests that video surveillance cameras are more effective for reducing fear of crime and the perceived risk of victimisation for men than for women.

5. Summary

The literature review initiated with a discussion of an ever-increasing concept of insecurity that constantly expands to include various sides of social life. The addition of the adjective urban adds a spatial dimension to insecurity, although it does not limit its scope but rather draws more attention to a complex interplay of local and global processes comprising urban insecurity. Furthermore, the first part of the literature review discusses the existence of such notions as safety and fear that are tightly interrelated with the notion of security. However, a definitional distinction should be drawn between the three concepts to clarify the research on the topic. The absence of conceptual consensus and clarity results in different approaches to them, as illustrated in the example of theoretical and normative definitions, which impact empirical research.

The discussed broad nature of insecurity impacts how it has been studied, as demonstrated in the third section of the chapter. In particular, urban insecurity is studied as a phenomenon that, on the one hand, exists objectively and, on the other hand, is constructed socially. Although up until this moment, there has not been implemented a study on the problematisation of urban insecurity, a literature review allows us to reconstruct that it could be problematised through such phenomena as crime, incivilities, stigmatisation of some social groups and places as 'dangerous' and 'fearful,' labour precarity, immigration, and others. In addition, the media and the political discourses might impact the framing of urban insecurity in a given context. Therefore, the literature review implies that political, economic, cultural, and social contexts might impact the problematisation of urban insecurity and proposed solutions to it.

The last part of the literature review focuses on the current body of knowledge on video surveillance's impact on urban insecurity. Specifically, the review explores how the implementation of video surveillance might influence objective (crime and incivilities) and subjective urban insecurity. The section demonstrates highly inconclusive and contradictory evidence provided by the current empirical studies. In particular, it shows that the effectiveness of video surveillance for objective security might depend on a type of crime, type of urban space, implementation of other interventions tackling urban insecurity, and other factors. Moreover, there are possible crime displacement and

spillover of benefits effects. As to the impact of video surveillance on subjective urban insecurity, the current empirical research is also inconclusive.

On the one hand, it shows that video surveillance might have almost no effect on the perception of insecurity or fear of crime. On the other hand, there is some evidence that video surveillance might alleviate the perception of insecurity and fear in urban spaces, at least for some social groups and in some specific urban locations. There is also some evidence that socio-economic and political context might also impact the effectiveness of video surveillance for subjective urban insecurity as in nations that have higher security concerns, video surveillance might not function as a tool for improving the perception of insecurity, while in countries with lower privacy concerns, it could.

Therefore, the literature review demonstrates a scarcity of studies on the problematisation of urban insecurity, the phenomenon that should be explored in its complexity. However, the review allows for reconstructing some issues contributing to the problematisation. The current chapter also reflects that urban insecurity might be contrasted through a variety of situational and social measures as well as by engagement of the citizens in urban security production. The proposed measures might vary between the contexts, depending on the political, socio-economic, cultural, and other contextual factors. The same applies to video surveillance because the current academic knowledge implies that there are a lot of contextual factors that should be borne in mind when investigating the impact of CCTV on urban insecurity.

Chapter 3: Surveillance society or security state?

1. Introduction

One of the first versions of video surveillance was developed in 1927 in the Soviet Union (Glinsky, 2000). The first mechanical CCTV cameras were installed in the Moscow Kremlin to monitor visitors. However, these cameras required constant monitoring as there was no possibility to record and store the information. Due to this drawback, video surveillance had not been widespread until the 1970s, when video recorder technology became available (Kruegle, 2011). The first usage of CCTV for the purposes of urban security and, more specifically, fighting crime was in the United States of America. Thus, in 1968, the police of Olean (a city in the state of New York) installed video surveillance along its main business street, and CCTV cameras were installed in Times Square in New York in 1973 (Robb, 1980; Yesil, 2006). However, later analysis of the effects of video surveillance installation did not show any impact on the crime rates in the areas (Yesil, 2006).

Since the end of the XX century, the number of installed video surveillance cameras in public urban spaces has been growing in most countries globally (McCahill and Norris, 2002; Phillips, 1999; Welsh et al., 2015). In the 1980 – 1990s, the authorities justified the installation of CCTVs by claiming that they would reduce crime rates and the fear of crime (Bannister et al., 1998). It was expected that a visible presence of a video camera would deter a criminal from breaking the law, as they would rationally estimate a chance of being caught and punished, which outweighs the benefits of committing a crime (Clarke, 1997; Piza et al., 2015; Ratcliffe and Groff, 2019). At the same time, law-abiding citizens would feel more secure in the presence of CCTV, which would stimulate a higher usage of public spaces and economic activities (Cerezo, 2013). So, the rationalisation for the introduction of public video surveillance systems had a double logic: on the one hand, it should have had a disciplinary effect on criminals, and, on the other hand, it was considered to be a service that should have improved the quality of life of citizens who comply with the law.

However, as *Chapter 2: Literature review* demonstrates, the empirical studies show that the impact of video surveillance cameras on crime rates and the perception of insecurity is disputable (Piza et al., 2019; Phillips, 1999; Welsh and Farrington, 2009). Partly, this ambiguity in findings can be explained by the fact that video surveillance has become a normal and inalienable part of everyday urban life with time. Therefore, nowadays, it is mundane, unremarkable, and unchallenged (Bigo, 2006; Wood & Webster, 2009). In turn, it affects both crime detection and fear of crime reduction functions of CCTV as neither a criminal nor a law-abiding citizen notices the presence of a video camera.

Certainly, surveillance and surveillance practices are not a new phenomenon in urban spaces. Among the traditional forms of surveillance are face-to-face surveillance, i.e., a surveyor and surveyed's physical presence in the same space and time, paper files usually produced by bureaucracies, etc. However, since the second half of the XX century, various technologies and their development have been adopted into surveillance practices, gradually driving out the traditional ones (Marx, 1998). The main distinctive feature of these technologies, including video surveillance, from the traditional forms of surveillance is their ubiquity and systematic nature (Dandeker, 1990).

In the academic literature, two main approaches have been formed to comprehend the phenomenon of security provision through surveillance technologies: surveillance society and security state. Both theoretical approaches are based on Foucault's works. The former is grounded on the concepts of discipline and disciplinary power as presented by Foucault in 'Discipline and Punish' (1995). The notion of the apparatus of security (Foucault, 2009) inspired the theorisation of the security state. The theoretical approaches have a lot in common; however, they rarely communicate (Bigo, 2006). As some research shows, such a dialogue could be very productive to deepen understanding of the phenomena of security and surveillance. In particular, one of the recent research projects demonstrates that technologies can enact several modes of governmentality within one city as their operationalisation is context-dependent (Kitchin et al., 2017). Furthermore, Monahan (2010) shows that the logic of surveying marginalised and wealthy areas of the same city could be different: if in the former, video surveillance is used for instilling discipline, in the latter, it serves for security as a tool for profiling and excepting those showing deviance.

In this chapter, the following aspects of the theoretical approaches are scrutinised:

- the main mechanisms of exercising control;
- the role of surveillance practices and technologies in security provision;
- the impact of surveillance on public spaces;
- the perception of surveillance by citizens.

Since both approaches are based on Foucault's ideas, they are considered following the development of Foucault's thought. Foucault first introduced the ideas of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1995), and later in his life, he presented the notion of security and the apparatus of security (Foucault, 2009). The last part of this chapter is devoted to the impact of these theoretical approaches on modern, neoliberal cities and the problematisation of urban insecurity there.

2. Surveillance society approach to urban security and video surveillance

2.1. Foucault: discipline and disciplinary power

M. Foucault's notions of discipline and disciplinary power induced the theorisation of a surveillance society (Lyon, 2011). Foucault considered discipline to be a spatial technology of power that exercises control over individuals and their bodies by generating knowledge about them (Foucault, 1997). The concept of a norm is crucial for understanding disciplinary power as the discipline aims at instilling norms that are dominating in a society. The disciplinary power is exercised by surveying individual bodies and normalising their behaviour, that is, modifying the behaviour to conform to the existing norms. So, disciplinary power draws on the pre-established normative model (Foucault, 2007). Technologies of surveillance and inspection are crucial for the organisation of individual bodies into 'a field of visibility' and tailoring their functionality.

In 'Discipline and Punish' (1995), Foucault illustrates the disciplinary potential of surveillance on an example of a perfect prison, the panopticon, developed by Jeremy Bentham. This prison should be ring-shaped so that all the cells are visible from the centre of the building. In the centre of the panopticon, a guard tower is located with an unseen observer in it who is capable of observing the inmates, noticing if their behaviour deviates from the established norms and introducing the punishment for it. So, at any given moment, the inmates of the panopticon are uncertain whether the guard is watching them or not. Eventually, the inmates become convinced that they are constantly watched over, and since then, the prison can work effectively even without the physical presence of the guard in the tower. Foucault refers to this process as the internalisation of the knowledge of being constantly observed. In turn, this knowledge transforms the inmates as they start behaving in a normalised way like 'docile bodies' even without any concrete evidence that there is actual surveillance. In such a way, the main aim of the panopticon – 'a prison without wardens' – is achieved.

According to this framework, reality consists of a multiplicity of activities, bodies, individuals, objects, etc. Disciplinary power is exercised in such a reality through individualisation techniques (Foucault, 1995). Thus, it is capable of normalising individuals by disaggregating a multiplicity of an individual into constituent components. Furthermore, disciplinary power uses surveillance techniques to collect information on individual bodies that are then analysed. Based on this analysis, punishment may be implemented if a deviation from the norm is detected. Following the logic of the exercise of disciplinary power, it is possible to say that it is centralised and concentrated as it requires a centralised aggregation of data for further analysis.

However, disciplinary power is not exercised only over subjects from outside (for instance, by a sovereign or a surveyor) but also from inside subjects. Thus, Foucault states that discipline creates subjectivity as an individual 'is subjected to the field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; […] he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection' (Foucault, 1995). Foucault uses the panopticon as a symbol of discipline and inherent to it pervasive surveillance and transformative power. So, the panopticon illustrates self-imposed discipline and individualisation, through which a sovereign could identify disobedience and, consequently, punish.

The ideal of disciplinary power is an entirely transparent social and physical space that could create complicit individuals. At the same time, agency (sovereign) and agents (guards) exercising power can preserve their invisibility and anonymity (Forrester 2014) as the image of the panopticon shows that they can impose discipline and realise surveillance without revealing in any way their identity to the inmates. Ideally, such social space should exist in an enclosed and fixed physical space designed to allow the individualisation and disaggregation of multiplicities of observed bodies (Foucault, 1995). Besides, the organisation of the physical space should correspond to a pre-established normative model and serve the aim of normalisation (Foucault, 1995). Therefore, there is a rationality behind such spatial organisation, including the economic one, as it implies individualisation and self-discipline.

As a consequence, the services of guards or observers are no longer needed with time because the potential for deviation is eliminated (Foucault, 1995). Foucault suggests that spatial organisation should be designed from pregiven raw materials, but its construction should be from scratch. Foucault draws on the example of the panopticon as it achieves normalisation through its architectural design.

2.2. Further developments of Foucault's ideas: Control and surveillance society

Based on these Foucauldian ideas, Deleuze (1992) proposes a theory of control society. According to Deleuze, modern society is characterised by the expansion of discipline from physically enclosed spaces (prisons, factories, schools, etc.) to whole societies (Deleuze, 1992). Under this framework, a state aims at managing and controlling its population. Technologies capable of collecting and accumulating data on the population underlie the mode of governmentality in the control society because they allow for extended and deepen surveillance (Deleuze, 1992). In particular, they can collect and accumulate data by tracking movement, transactions, and other routine actions determined by technologies. So, surveillance technologies are distributed across society and omnipresent. Besides, the ongoing technological development allows them to transcend borders (Hagmann, 2017); therefore, the control society is not territorially limited anymore.

Another direction in which Foucault's ideas have been further developed and transformed is the surveillance society theory. G.T. Marx (1985), inspired by G. Orwell's novel '1984,' coined the term 'surveillance society.' Such a society is based on technologies, their constant development, and ever-increasing adaptation. Thus, surveillance builds not only upon surveillance practices but also upon devices, technologies (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). In particular, technologies serve for the daily collection, storing, retrieving, and processing of information on individuals (Lyon, 1994).

So, one of the underlying assumptions of a surveillance society is that technological development and its adaptation result in an increased amount of gathered information on the members of this society. In such a way, according to Marx (1985), technologies eliminate 'the inability to retrieve, aggregate, analyse vast amounts of data.' Such inability was a mechanism of social control as bureaucracies were limited in their data aggregation and analysis capacity. However, the lack of this mechanism of social control is a crucial characteristic of a surveillance society.

D. Lyon, who is among the founders of surveillance society theory, considers video surveillance to be one of the modes of disciplinary power. In particular, within this approach, CCTV is considered to be a context for collecting, storing, and structuring information on individual members of the society (Lyon 2007; Wood and Webster 2009). An observer could detect and punish those who show deviance from 'normal' behaviour based on the collected information. Hence, within this framework, video surveillance is considered to be an instrument of exercising discipline and normalisation: it is expected that individuals will internalise the knowledge of being watched over and will start behaving in compliance with rules, that is, in a normalised way (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Graham & Wood, 2003). Therefore, video surveillance aims to anticipate and pre-manage risks that could arise within society by imposing disciplinary power.

Norris and Armstrong (1998) identified three types of disciplinary power inherent to video surveillance:

1) the authoritative response that manifests itself when an observer notes abnormal behaviour and requests to bring it to an end;
2) deterrence that is possible due to the awareness of individuals of being subjected to surveillance and, consequently, they do not break any rules and norms to avoid punishment;
3) elimination of a potential for deviance that happens once surveillance society's members internalise the knowledge of being constantly watched over and change their behaviour following norms accepted in the society. So, socially accepted norms, values, and rules are instilled into individuals as they internalise the knowledge of being watched over.

Consequently, the proponents of a surveillance society suggest that video surveillance completely supervenes discipline and has two sides of disciplinary power: control over and self-control of individuals put under CCTV's gaze.

Video surveillance also takes the asymmetry between an observer and observed after the Foucauldian description of disciplinary power (Lippert, 2009). In the panopticon, the inmates cannot reconstruct the guard's personal or social identity since they are invisible, hidden from the inmates. The operation of CCTV implies almost the same discrepancy. Video surveillance is ‘placeless and faceless’ as it is almost impossible to verify the presence and character of an observer because CCTV does not require an observer to be physically present in a place of observation. In turn, this ‘unobservable observer’ can generate anxiety as they might be considered as a threat (Koskela, 2002).

At the same time, video surveillance differs from traditional, in-presence surveillance practices. Specifically, technological development allows video surveillance to:

- transcend distance, physical barriers, and time. Hence, there is no need for a physical presence of a surveyor in the surveyed space;
- be of low visibility or invisible to those who are under surveillance;
- require more capital as there is a constant need to invest in the development;
- simultaneously, require less labour force because fewer people are needed to perform surveillance;
- be decentralised (Lyon 1994; Marx 1998).

Given the asymmetry between a surveyor and surveyed, increasingly low visibility of video surveillance cameras, and its decentralisation, in many countries, the legislation obliges private or public bodies to inform through appropriate signs that it is they who operate CCTVs in a public space. However, quite frequently, this information is limited in the content as it allows reconstructing where the observer works and maybe their position in the organisation, but any further particulars about the observer's personality are not publicly available. So, the amount of information provided is insufficient for rendering an ‘unobservable observer’ into an observable one to potential subjects of surveillance (Goold, 2002). Simultaneously, workers of CCTV control rooms can access such information about surveyed like their sex, age, social status, ethnicity, frequented places, time patterns of being in some locations, and so on. Moreover, they can reconstruct it by observing the behaviours and appearances of the individuals caught by the gaze of video surveillance (Lippert, 2009).

Due to this transformative power of video surveillance and the asymmetry between a surveyor and surveyed, a surveillance society can be considered as a constant threat to privacy and liberty. In particular, just like G.T. Marx, Garfinkel (2000) also appeals to the novel ‘1984’ and the image of

Big Brother as an extreme example of a surveillance society. At the same time, contrarily to it, CCTV can be considered an instrument of providing better public services, in particular, enhanced security, including the national one, and improved fight against crime and terrorism (Garfinkel, 2000). Government and public services play a central role in bringing forward this video surveillance's function of security provision (Wood & Webster, 2009).

Therefore, there is a dichotomy between the provision of better services, which comprises security, and privacy invasion in implementing surveillance technologies. So, data collection technologies (CCTV, ID cards, mobile phones, etc.) are represented in the terminology proposed by Taylor et al. (2008) 'information capture' for enhanced and better services and increased surveillance over people. These two sides of surveillance are interlinked and interdependent; therefore, they happen simultaneously, and there is no choice between a safe, efficient society and a surveillance society. Lyon (2001) equates such 'information society' to 'surveillance society' because they share the main underlying characteristics: administration and control are based on communication and information technologies. Zuboff (2019) also draws attention to the economic rationality behind the ever-increasing collection of information because technology-based surveillance should stimulate market activity by personalising experiences and offers, which, in turn, facilitates further capitalism development. Therefore, such 'capitalist surveillance' aims to provide better services by personalising the services and products and, on the other hand, its further development and growing profits of companies implementing surveillance.

A surveillance society is also characterised by a constant adaptation of technological development and encouragement of the spread of surveillance technologies (Lyon, 2001). Consequently, the efficacy of surveillance systems in data collection, systematisation, and individualisation increases. For example, modern technologies have a growing ability to communicate and merge, which results in an increase in the extent and depth of surveillance (Gray, 2002). For instance, combining databases of biometric ID and CCTV systems with facial recognition can facilitate the systematisation of the collected data and allow identifying a person within several seconds. Additionally, due to the spread of technologies, participation in modern (at least Western) society implies leaving electronic footprints during routine activities (paying with a bank card, using social networks, going outside and being caught by a CCTV, etc.) (Lace, 2005). All this information is collected, stored, and can be merged or coupled between various databases. So, surveillance becomes more profound, and individuals are subject to it on an ever-increasing scale.

Another outcome of the development of surveillance technologies is that they are rendered less apparent and visible to the subjects of surveillance (Lyon, 2001). This low visibility of surveillance

instruments signifies a critical departure from the Foucauldian description of disciplinary power and its mechanisms. In particular, Foucault suggests that individuals should be aware that they are subjected to constant surveillance and monitoring. Quite contrary to it, as surveillance becomes subtler, individuals are less aware of being subjected to surveillance and its scope (Wood & Webster, 2009). Therefore, the major part of such interactions with surveillance is unnoticed and considered to be normal. For this reason, some authors suggest that it is not entirely correct to consider video cameras in public spaces as a modern embodiment of the panopticon. Instead, CCTV signage takes the role of instilling discipline as, according to the legislation of many countries, it should be highly visible and remind people that they are in a zone under surveillance (Lippert, 2009).

Power institutions benefit significantly from the results of technological development; therefore, they encourage and invest in it (Kitchin et al., 2017). In particular, as surveillance technologies become more affordable due to their development, they are more spread in physical spaces and, consequently, power institutions have the ability to accumulate and analyse more information on the subjects of surveillance. Besides, Lyon (2011) suggests that a stricter panopticon regime would lead to more active resistance from the surveyed, while a subtler one would create docile bodies. Therefore, the authorities also win from increasingly lower visibility of video surveillance devices, which would invoke less resistance.

2.3. Video surveillance and urban space

The spread of surveillance technologies also affects urban design and planning as it should meet requirements of 'omnipresent visibility' (Lyon, 2011) and risk anticipation (Koskela, 2002). In particular, some urban areas, usually city centre and wealthier, 'high-status' neighbourhoods, can be technologically designated from more marginal neighbourhoods (Fussey & Coaffe, 2012). In the case of the city centre, city authorities can be interested in security provision for stimulating the economic activity there. As to the wealthier areas of a city, local inhabitants might be interested in keeping their assets safe; therefore, they invest in technologies that they presume would protect them.

Another reason for incorporating video surveillance in urban planning is an increase in surveillance over specific groups of population (Fussey & Coaffe, 2012). In particular, areas with a higher concentration of people showing deviant behaviour can be under heightened scrutiny as the local government would like to instil discipline there. At the same time, as Lyon (2011) points out, disciplinary spaces emphasise and might even provoke disorder, misbehaviour, and signs of physical disturbances (pollution, abandonment, etc.). It happens because individuals there start to perceive their bodies as being constantly subjected to surveillance and, consequently, they feel the need to 'produce themselves for the observer.'

Video surveillance in urban areas has two opposite but interlinked sides: on the one hand, it serves to provide security; on the other hand, it puts citizens under control and deprives them of some rights (Lyon, 1994). Citizens have a rightful expectation of privacy in the public spaces; however, video surveillance revokes this liberty as it allows one to scrutinise one's behaviour and patterns of everyday routine (von Hirsch, 2000). As a consequence, video surveillance could lead to the erosion of privacy. Thus, it can be used to track an individual for the purposes of security provision (someone shows deviant, suspicious, 'abnormal' behaviour, seems somehow different) and for the abuse of power (increased surveillance of someone who is known to CCTV operatives, etc.) (G. J. D. Smith, 2012; Webster, 2009). Therefore, the challenge is to prevent surveillance tools from evolving into more significant threats to the urban fabric than the ones they are utilised to solve (Gray, 2002).

Curry (1997) claims that individuals should be able to decide what pieces of information about themselves they want to make public and what they want to keep to themselves. Video surveillance deprives them of this control and an opportunity to adjust or change their social identity that they believe to be best in a given context, as once it is recorded on the footage, it stays fixed. Moreover, there is an inequality in surveillance: based on their observable behaviour, people are differentiated not by who they are but by whom they are perceived to be. As the spaces of surveillance expand and private spaces shrink in cities, urban inhabitants exercise less and less control over the data collected about them (Gray, 2002). Besides, citizens are quite frequently unaware they are being observed and do not explicitly give their consent for it (Lyon, 1994; Marx, 1998).

Despite increasing levels of surveillance, a surveillance society approach considers this exposure to surveillance to be usually benign. Relative anonymity is preserved due to 'informatisation' (Frissen, 1989): each individual's data is relatively insignificant by itself, and personal details are not utilised in any meaningful way. So, collected information is analysed in a generalised or aggregated way. Additionally, constitutional protections serve the preservation of citizens' anonymity. However, Gras (2004) points out a difference in constitutional protections for privacy across Europe due to different responses to surveillance, which can be ascribed to national institutional settings and history (C. J. Bennett & Raab, 2020).

2.4. Impact of video surveillance on members of surveillance society

A surveillance society is characterised by a lack of citizens' opposition to the spread of CCTV and surveillance in general. On the contrary, there is an enthusiasm for video cameras and demand for their installation (Brooks, 2005; Gray, 2002). Authors ascribe this enthusiasm toward video surveillance to the following factors:

- according to the people's perception, video surveillance could be a visible sign that a state is concerned about and addresses the problem of crime. 'Stage-set security' (Coaffee & Wood, 2006) or 'security theatre' (Schneier, 2008) are elements of security provision in a risk-management society as they make the state's intervention in the field of security visible to the inhabitants.
- video surveillance signifies that an observer is watching monitors and, consequently, is watching out for them (Lyon, 2001). So, under this logic, CCTV is perceived not as a tool of control but as a tool of care.
- CCTV has become a part of a cultural landscape (Groombridge, 2002). Various reality TV shows, TV series, and movies help people get used to video surveillance and perceive it as a normal part of everyday life. For example, surveillance entertainment TV shows facilitate justification and normalisation of the presence of CCTV in public areas (Andrejevic, 2004).
- argued multi-purpose of the installation of video surveillance. For instance, authorities can justify the installation of video surveillance by claiming that it would serve not only for urban security provision but also for traffic monitoring, checking on the performance of street cleaners, and others (Graham 2008; Wood and Webster, 2009).

These factors are related not only to the technology itself and its work but also to how surveillance exists at the level of emotion, symbolism, and culture. Consequently, the normalisation of surveillance happens due to the spread of CCTVs and the embeddedness of video surveillance in the norms, institutions, and culture of a society.

Simultaneously, some proponents of surveillance society suggest that video surveillance can generate more insecurity among city inhabitants. Thus, CCTV cameras and information posters about them might signify an insecure, criminogenic area because, if an area is especially prone to crime or frequented by criminals, the authorities will install more video cameras and signs there to exercise disciplinary power (van der Wurff et al., 1989; D. Williams & Ahmed, 2009). Therefore, the ubiquity of video surveillance can reduce the quality of life. Furthermore, such constant reminders about the presence of video surveillance and possible reasons for its installation might generate the feeling of anxiety even if a person does not do anything wrong and abides by the norms.

Another negative consequence of the omnipresence of video surveillance in urban spaces is that it could erode routine social interaction and informal social controls. For example, the presence of a video camera reduces the perception of accountability of those present in a surveyed urban space. This happens due to the transfer of responsibility to intervene from a bystander to a camera.

Consequently, a citizen has less incentive to come to the rescue if someone needs help or is in distress (Koskela, 2002).

This section has reviewed the key aspects of surveillance society and the role of video surveillance in it. Thus, according to the proponents of a surveillance society, surveillance technologies are the basis for exercising control in such a society as technologies allow the collection, storage, and analysis of vast amounts of information. Besides, technological development could lead to deeper surveillance over its members. On the other hand, technologies also serve the purpose of providing better services. In the case of video surveillance, it could be the provision of security and protection from crime and terrorism. Ideally, video surveillance should not only deter crime but eliminate even its possibility. Pursuing these two aims – increased surveillance and provision of security – impacts urban design, as it should be highly visible. However, such a design allows the invasion of privacy. Members of surveillance society do not oppose increasing surveillance as it is normalised and is constructed to be benign and serve their protection.

3. Security state approach to urban security and video surveillance

3.1. Foucault: Governmentality and security apparatus

The theorisation of the security state is based on Foucault's notions of governmentality, security, and security apparatus. According to Foucault, governmentality is a power modality with 'the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument' (Foucault, 2007). So, governmentality comprises the logic, rationality, and techniques that make populations governable and enable government and other agencies to enact governance (Foucault, 1991). As logic, rationality, and techniques of governance change over time to correspond to the current needs and aims of government, the nature of governmentality evolves with time. Additionally, different power actors can simultaneously implement diverse or intersecting modes of governmentality. In turn, it contributes to the fluidity of governmentality.

Therefore, Foucault suggests examining reality as moulded in a relativistic way within this framework. Constituent components of reality are constantly coordinated and adjusted in dependence on each other, and through it, the process of normalisation happens. Consequently, security considers reality to be plural and relative, and it does not have an 'ideal' reality it should aspire to accomplish. Quite the opposite, the goals and circumstances of reality undergo a continuous change accounting for shifts in circumstances and contexts of the regulation (in particular, calculation of costs of interventions, availability of control techniques, public opinion, and others). Therefore, the improvement, optimisation of the interplay of the components of reality is constant.

The apparatus of security starts the normalisation by disaggregating the reality on components. Then it identifies what normality is and, finally, it seeks to improve the interplay of the components of reality (Foucault, 2007). Just like reality, the process of normalisation is also flexible as it depends on and accounts for reality and changes there. Therefore, one of the main problems of normalisation is to identify the best ways to regulate such reality within a 'multivalent and transformable framework' (Foucault, 2007).

The proper work of the security apparatus requires disciplinary and juridico-legal techniques as they help identify conditions and boundaries within which the components or reality could be optimised. In particular, the former serves for enforcing control over individual bodies through surveillance over them, classification of their mental structures, pathologies, and so on (Foucault, 2009). Moreover, the legal system is needed for the establishment and further sustenance of a force and strength relationship in society (Foucault et al., 2017). Consequently, it reflects a redistribution of responsibilities in the security milieu: which institution should function in each security-related event (de Larrinaga & Doucet, 2008; Mérand, 2006). Also, juridico-legal techniques facilitate the institualisation of security: if some dangerous event is recurrent or persistent, a response is institutionalised and appears in policies and legal documents developed by authorities (Buzan et al., 1998). In turn, it facilitates the codification of sovereign power because security obtains its shape and content in legal documents as understood by a sovereign.

Security functions in a specific space called 'milieu' in which a series of uncertain elements and events take place and which combines already existing givens (rivers, hills, etc.) and artificial ones (constructed by people) (Foucault, 2007). Hence, a milieu is 'a medium of an action and an element in which it circulates' (Foucault, 2007). The milieu is designed to regulate, optimise and manage the circulations of the population 'in the very broad sense of movement, exchange, and contact, as a form of a dispersion, and also as a form of distribution' (Foucault, 2007). The spatial design accounts for the flexible nature of reality because its basic principle is multidimensionality and the interplay of these dimensions.

A population, defined as a variety of individuals who are biologically bound to spaces of their inhabitation, exists in a milieu. The security apparatus serves to plan and organise a milieu and, consequently, exercise power over and govern the population. In particular, power structures actions that could have been different if power had not been exercised (Foucault, 1991). Given that governmentality seeks to rationalise every practice, the government's main aim is to calculate risks arising within a population and choose measures for tackling and preventing them. At the same time,

the political economy should be applied; therefore, benefits from the realisation of preventive measures should exceed their costs.

So, the security apparatus plays a crucial role in managing the population in modern states. Foucault suggests that the security apparatus appeared in the XVIII – XIX centuries with the increasing growth of cities (Foucault, 2009). At that time, surveillance techniques were needed to improve security in cities as cities started to expand their circulation: economic and political links with the external world started to grow alongside urbanisation. Since then, surveillance techniques have been reinforced to facilitate a city's economic, political, and cultural functioning (Foucault, 2009).

Obviously, total elimination of crime and health risks, as well as establishing complete control over the future that also holds some uncertainties, is not achievable in cities. Therefore, the apparatus of security is used for dealing with risks and treats them as calculable events. In particular, risks are perceived through their probability, and measures for working with these probabilities are chosen based on their poly-functionality and costs (Foucault, 2007). Hence, the functioning of the security apparatus implies rationality, which is implemented through governmentality. Political rationalities define objects of control and risks arising within a population and decide how to interpret and act upon them (Foucault, 1991).

3.2. Further developments of Foucault's ideas: Security state

Proponents of the security state develop the ideas of security, the apparatus of security, and governmentality. A security state considers a society to be in a 'permanent state of emergency' or a 'generalised state of exception' as it is engaged in a self-declared war against an invisible, permanent, and general threat – crime, terrorism, etc. (Agamben, 2017; Bigo, 2006). Although the state of emergency is usually limited in time, space, and object, a permanent and invisible threat removes these limitations. This theoretical approach considers a sovereign as the one who decides about the introduction of the state of emergency and who has the legitimate power to name the public enemy.

Being in a state of emergency allows, under special circumstances, to act beyond the rule of law and justify the illiberal practices and violation of civil rights. The exploitation of security discourse, conjuring images of exceptional violence or threat, gives precedence to the speed and efficiency in identifying a (potential) criminal at the expense of liberal rights (Bigo, 2006). Therein lies one of the paradoxes of the security state: although, in principle, security should provide freedom from risk and danger, the pursuit of security deprives citizens of a part of their rights (Zedner, 2003). Thus, given the increasing omnipresence of video surveillance (bus stops, train stations, shopping centres, city centres, etc.) and its further development, the population does not exercise control over the data that

is collected about them, and their rightful expectation of anonymity in public spaces is corrupted (von Hirsch, 2000; Goold, 2002).

Simultaneously, a government can still adopt a liberal discourse appealing to the privatisation of security, making security not a public good anymore but a private commodity (Loader, 1999). The privatisation of surveillance is essential to rationalise the expenditures for the security provision. Therefore, video surveillance is not only increasingly ubiquitous but also privatised (Braithwaite, 2000). Besides, authorities stimulate inter-agency cooperation between state, private, and non-governmental bodies and exchange information between them (Crawford & Evans, 2017). For instance, private security organisations can hand in their videotapes if the police require them for crime investigation.

Among the drawbacks of the privatisation of security is that multiplicity of actors hinders the creation of a reliable data protection system. It happens because controls vary and might have different logic for different actors exercising surveillance; therefore, they might not be equal and target the same people in the same way (Zedner, 2003). Furthermore, despite the privatisation of security, the penal state has not diminished but, on the contrary, expanded even more (Braithwaite, 2000). States introduced stricter and more repressive penal codes, stricter regulatory legislation, provisions for licensing, inspection, and audit (Zedner, 2003).

The security state relies on the governmentality of unease. Practices of exceptionalism, profiling, and containing 'others' characterise the governmentality of unease (Bigo, 2006; O'Malley, 2004). Therefore, a security state protects one part of the population from another. It should be borne in mind that most countries have not officially declared a state of emergency. However, after 9/11, security states started to re-establish their power by extending a 'state of exception' through more severe and coercive measures to tackle insecurity (Agamben, 2005). In addition, they generate a discourse of the threat of crime and terrorism (for example, such words and expressions as 'crisis' or 'war on crime' can be used) to justify the expansion of surveillance and control technologies even if an official state of emergency has not been declared (Agamben, 2017; Bigo, 2006).

With time, the 'state of exception' and governmentality of unease become unremarkable, mundane, and not even challenged (Agamben, 2005). Normalised populations silently consent to surveillance as it symbolises protection from danger, 'others' (Bigo, 2006). This positive attitude towards surveillance generates a lack of opposition to the implementation of video surveillance. On the contrary, the population might require it or ask for its enhancement (Bigo, 2006).

Following Foucault's assumption about the lack of an 'ideal' secure reality, authors suggest that, given the flexible and evolving nature of (potential) risks and threats, the pursuit of security is endless,

and an absolute security state is practically unachievable. Therefore, the security state is constantly challenged by new threats and new forms of crime (Freedman, 1992). Besides, security is not an objective state; instead, it is constantly constructed by an interplay of social and political processes (M. C. Williams, 2003). Powerful 'securitising actors' (for instance, policymakers, the media, big private corporations, and non-governmental organisations) play a significant role in constructing the notion of security (Taureck, 2006).

Under this framework, crime is considered rational and motivated by utility maximisation (Clarke, 1995; Felson, 2002; Garland, 2001). Furthermore, it concerns the evolution of new forms of crime as criminals might be interested in developing crime activities only if they assume that their benefits would exceed the probability of being caught. Therefore, the main tools to tackle criminal activity are a statistical calculation of its probability and preventive interventions to reduce an opportunity for crime (situational crime prevention, risk assessment, monitoring, and surveillance) (O'Malley, 2004).

So, this state of affairs encourages the growing awareness of risk and the necessity of risk prevention. Giddens (1991) describes modern society as the one that is 'increasingly preoccupied with the future (and with safety), which generates the notion of risk.' Beck (1992) suggests that modern society is a risk society 'in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing, and managing risks that it itself has produced.'

In turn, this risk management facilitates the proliferation of surveillance technologies. The expansion of control and monitoring is possible due to technological advancements and their growing ability to transcend distance, physical barriers, and time. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), there is a univocal expectation that technological development, especially that of sophisticated or 'high' technology, can solve security risks and problems. Bigo (2006) suggests that in a security state, bureaucracies have a deterministic belief that technologies and, especially their capacity to trace people's movements, recognise behavioural patterns, etc., can fix any political or security problem. Such technological determinism, 'an unquestioning belief in the power of technology,' encourages technological adaptation as reflected in public policy and its further implementation (Norris & Armstrong, 1999).

Besides, in a security state, authorities encourage and invest in technological development, especially in those allowing an increasing exchange of information that is collected and stored through different technologies. For instance, the information exchange between electronic ID systems and records of CCTV with facial recognition allows identifying quickly those who are captured by video surveillance cameras. Authorities' interest can be attributed to their expectation of high returns from

these investments; therefore, they consider them profitable from an economic point of view (Bigo, 2006).

Video surveillance is among the tools facilitating the statistical calculation and prevention of dangerous situations as it allows observing, collecting, and analysing patterns of behaviour. Therefore, it is a proactive tool for tracing deviations from normal behaviour through analysing observable characteristics caught on a record and their correlations (Zedner, 2003). In turn, it contributes to the governmentality of unease by facilitating the practices of exception of those who show deviance.

3.3. Video surveillance and urban space

According to Garland (2001), urban fortification and intensified surveillance in private and public urban areas result from increased awareness of risk and governmentality of unease. This logic of dealing with threats affects how public spaces are designed. As Sorkin (2008) puts it: if every person is under suspicion and every place is vulnerable, the only solution is to put everyone under surveillance and fortify every place. The possibility of a threat becomes an obligatory part of urban planning and, therefore, it becomes tactical (Sorkin, 2008).

Big terror attacks (just to name a few, New York in 2001; Madrid in 2004; London in 2005; Boston in 2013, Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016 and others) contribute to the militarisation and fortification of urban spaces across Europe and are used to justify increased fortification. Therefore, contemporary urban spaces are 'saturated by intelligence surveillance systems, checkpoints, defensive urban design and planning strategies, and intensifying security' (Graham, 2008). Graham considers securitised cities to be a result of a close link between warfare and a city because cities are becoming a point of attraction for criminals and terrorists. In addition, practices of exceptionalism penetrate urban design through gated communities and homogeneous gentrification that could result in radical segregation because any deviance can be banned from the gated territory (Sorkin 2008). In turn, this urban design transforms people's perception of others and trains citizens to be wary of others and anything different or suspicious.

This securitisation and fortification of cities simultaneously threatens and encourages 'the right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1996). On the one hand, situational crime prevention measures and increasing surveillance practices threaten social and political dynamism and civil disobedience, which are considered deviations from norms. On the other hand, the presence of, for instance, physical vehicle barriers and video surveillance can encourage more pedestrians to be present in the streets and more people to use public spaces (Simpson et al., 2017).

3.4. Impact of video surveillance on the population of the security state

In a security society, the population is accustomed to accepting that the pursuit of security takes precedence over other public goods and services in particular situations (for example, airport security checks, border checkpoints, etc.) (Zedner, 2003). This normalisation of security precedence leads to a spillover of different security measures from 'high-risk' situations and zones (airports, national borders) to everyday life (public transport, theatres, cinemas, city squares, etc.). In this expansion of security, video surveillance observes behaviour and creates predetermined criminal profiles by collecting data. Simultaneously, CCTV is used as an instrument of management not only real but also perceived risks and threats.

Also, if previously some surveillance and biometric techniques (fingerprints and other biometric data collection) were applied to criminals only, since the beginning of the XX century, their application has expanded to all citizens and started to penetrate everyday life (Agamben, 2017). The whole population is put under surveillance, but those who show deviant, suspicious behaviour require more intense and further surveillance, which can be implemented not only through CCTV but also through checking the information in other databases. Any deviation from current norms is possible to detect due to constant social ordering, and measures should be undertaken to 'alienate' deviant individuals from the population (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Goold, 2002; Zedner, 2003). Besides, with time, the biometric techniques are considered banal and go unnoticed that nobody from the population challenges its legitimacy and questions their efficiency in preventing risks (Bigo, 2006).

Additionally, this expansion of the application of biometric apparatuses to the whole population can lead to its depoliticisation. Citizens' identity does not depend anymore on their social identity and its social recognition but is constructed based on biological data independent from the personal will and over which citizens have no control. Therefore, political identity construction is problematic under these circumstances (Agamben, 2017). Besides, a relationship between a citizen and a state is heavily transformed by applying biometric apparatuses to the whole population as it facilitates the perception of every citizen as a potential criminal.

At the same time, in a security state, crime becomes a 'normal social act' as it should be expected and responded to in a pre-established way. The authorities encourage citizens to participate in crime prevention through actions and behaviours in everyday life (Loader & Sparks, 2007). Therefore, this security mobilisation affects the social perception of threat more than the actual crime rate (Rosenbaum et al., 1998). Video surveillance and information posters about it and other visible signs of fortification remind the population that it is not safe (Monahan, 2010). Additionally, private security companies and providers of security technologies constantly remind their clients through

advertising campaigns that there is a threat against which their products and services can protect. In the end, it creates more anxiety among the citizens (Zedner, 2003). Therefore, surveillance technologies aimed at minimising the insecurity contribute to its reproduction.

In contrast, the official discourse of 'war on crime' and 'war on terrorism' along with terrorist attacks (as the ones mentioned above) facilitates the acceptance of the expansion of 'the state of security' and surveillance. Some authors suggest that perceived threats and the estimation of their likelihood lie behind a trade-off between security and civil liberties (Bozzoli & Müller, 2011; Pavone & Degli Esposti, 2012). Therefore, after the terrorist attacks, when many states started to increase their security measures, people's approval of such actions and increased surveillance has increased (Bozzoli & Müller, 2011). At the same time, citizens of some countries might also demand more transparency regarding increasing surveillance as they would like to exercise some control over the data that is collected about them (Wester & Giesecke, 2019).

The relationship between citizens is also transformed by video surveillance. Duff and Marshall (2000) highlighted that the security measures in general and video surveillance, in particular, might erode social trust and solidarity in the security state. The ongoing pursuit of security leads to the constant perception of others as dangerous and beyond trust. Video surveillance constantly reminds the population that others cannot be trusted. Norris and Armstrong (1999) also pointed out that the spread of surveillance technologies in general and video surveillance, in particular, leads to the erosion of communities and communication, calling it a 'stranger society.' However, not only surveillance technologies but also such fortification measures as gated communities facilitate the 'stranger society.'

Video surveillance affects the perception of urban spaces too. In particular, authorities constantly alert citizens about risks and threats and put visible reminders of crime (CCTV and information signs about it), enhancing risk awareness. These actions tend to deteriorate the perception of insecurity and fear of crime (Goold, 2002; Zedner, 2003). Spitzer (1987) also pointed out this paradox of security: the more the dependence on the security commodity is, the less secure people feel. According to Spitzer, it happens due to the erosion of social ties and confidence.

Monahan (2010) suggests that surveillance produces and sustains social inequalities in the security state because surveillance technologies are inherently biased and not neutral. Firstly, implemented through surveillance, social categorisation facilitates the identification of one's place in society and does not allow people to deviate from their category. Secondly, people are exposed to surveillance based on their social category. For instance, according to Monahan, marginalised people could be surveyed to a greater extent than other social groups. Besides, the process of surveillance affixes

categories of risky, dangerous, or untrustworthy to these marginalised groups and, consequently, it contributes to the sustenance of the discrimination.

Another dimension of inequality generated by video surveillance is a discrepancy between an observer and observed. For example, an 'unobservable observer' (Goold, 2002) has the power of knowledge about the whereabouts and other different circumstances of those who are under surveillance. Meanwhile, a subject of surveillance does not know (almost) anything about the observer.

This section has described the main characteristics of a security state. The adherers of the surveillance society approach suggest that such a state is engaged in a constant war against crime and terrorism even without a declaration of an official state of emergency. Such a battle against an invisible and permanent enemy allows for the expansion of control and surveillance as means of security provision. Therefore, video surveillance is an instrument of risk anticipation as it facilitates the collection, storing, and analysis of the data on observable behaviour. The declaration of war against crime also affects the design of urban spaces as they should be fortified against any possible threat. Lastly, the logic of a security space suggests that every citizen might be a potential criminal, which significantly affects trust between the citizens and their political engagement.

4. Neoliberalism and urban security

As it was briefly noted in the introduction to this chapter, theories of surveillance society and security state impacted the theorisation of urban insecurity within the neoliberal framework. For instance, neoliberal authorities apply economic rationality to security provision based on surveillance society and security state approaches. Therefore, they might seek to instil discipline to eliminate the possibility of deviation as it can be financially beneficial, redistribute responsibilities of security provision from national to a local level and non-governmental actors, and by rendering public spaces more secure, to stimulate their usage and, consequently, economic activity there.

Neoliberalism is characterised by the 'preventive turn' (Garland, 2001), which means that a state should predominantly aim at the prevention of dangerous situations, not crime repression. Here, neoliberalism follows Foucauldian understanding of the discipline in the perception of a potential criminal because 'preventive turn' implies a shift from 'issues of the mind,' for instance, criminal motivation, to 'issues of body,' observable behaviour. Therefore, the neoliberal state should aim at the disaggregation of a multiplicity of one's behaviour into composite components and analyse their interplay. By observing and analysing these behavioural components, deviance or potential for deviance can be detected, and, consequently, an intervention is implemented (Castel, 1991; Garland, 2001).

To make such analysis possible, surveillance becomes a crucial mode of organisation in these states. It happens due to the technological development (telecommunications, computing speed, etc.) that lowers the expenses on technologies and their implementation (Lyon, 2009). Therefore, the investments in video surveillance should bring the instilment of discipline and, with time, eliminate the possibility of violation of rules and norms as a result (Graham & Wood, 2003).

At the same time, this 'preventive turn' is rooted in the security state approach, which suggests that risk management and calculation are a part of the logic of dealing with dangerous situations (McCahill, 1998). As risk management aims at anticipating risks, it requires proactive strategies of prevention rather than reactive ways of dealing with crime (such as coercion). Furthermore, risk management becomes one of the principal tasks of any organisation (Beck, 1992; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).

The state can strive to prevent dangers not only through the analysis of observable socioeconomic or behavioural characteristics of a person and introducing interventions to prevent criminalisation but also by manipulating a physical space in which a (potential) criminal and a (potential) victim might meet. Hence, authorities should seek to implement such interventions to reduce the probability of danger in a given space. These two logics of prevention led to the development of preventive models: social and situational. Table 1 summarises the main points of each approach.

Table 1. The comparison of social and situational models of prevention policies

	Social measures	**Situational measures**
Focus on	Local population	Local space
The perception of a potential criminal	A potential criminal is formed under the influence of social processes around them: deprivation, marginality, etc.	A potential criminal is a rational person who calculates the risks and benefits implicated in a criminal act
Approach to deal with danger	The improvement of social conditions of a potential criminal (educational programs, creation of work opportunities, etc.) and victim	Reduction of the possibility of danger through direct manipulations with the environment (installing a light, visible presence of surveillance, etc.)

Note: The author's elaboration based on the following literature: Castel (1991), Garland (1996), Melossi and Selmini (2009), and Wyvekens (2009).

The social prevention model proliferated in Continental Europe, especially France, while the situational one was dominant in the United Kingdom (Crawford, 2009; Garland, 1996; Wyvekens, 2009). However, nowadays, in most Western countries, a mixed approach is dominating (Crawford, 2009; Melossi & Selmini, 2009).

Criminological theories contributed to the spread of situational prevention. 'Broken windows' theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) suggests that visible signs of urban decay and minor crime encourage

further decay and more serious crime in the area. Consequently, it produces a greater feeling of insecurity in the area. The authors of the theory suggested that improving the physical conditions in the area and targeting such minor crimes as vandalism and loitering could improve the conditions in problematic areas.

Another theory contributing to the proliferation of interventions in physical space is the routine activity theory. It suggests that crime opportunities arise from the convergence in a suitable space and at a suitable time of three elements: a motivated criminal, a suitable crime target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Felson, 1994; Newton & Felson, 2015). Therefore, implementing interventions into physical space that obstruct such convergence should have a crime deterrence effect.

The neoliberal framework also succeeds the theory of the security state in its supposition that the national state seeks to redistribute the responsibility of security provision to the local level of government. Under the neoliberal framework, such redistribution is justified not only by economic rationality but also by a way in which neoliberalism considers a crime. In particular, Garland (2001) points out that crime is considered to have local origins because it always happens in a specific location and affects primarily local populations. This perspective on crime makes local spaces suitable for implementing crime prevention interventions. Therefore, it encourages the redistribution of security and safety provision responsibility to the local level (for instance, city or municipal authorities). Simultaneously, the central state plays an essential role in security as it defines the modes of dealing with crime and can decide on the redistribution of duties.

Another implied in the neoliberal mode of governance direction of redistribution of security provision responsibilities is the privatisation of public institutions (Monahan, 2010). Here, proponents of neoliberalism follow the security state theory as they suggest that market rationality and economic gain should be prioritised over other factors of success in security provision. However, not only private security companies appeared, but also citizens started to enhance the fortification of places of their inhabitation.

In the 1980 – 1990s, at least the Western world faced the neoliberalisation that replaced previously dominant ‘penal welfarism’ (Garland, 2001). The neoliberalisation process has not been experienced equally across the Western countries and also inside them due to different cultural, political, economic, and social situations in different places. Therefore, as Ong (2006) suggests, modern neoliberal governmentalities do not have a uniform or universal logic. Just like Foucault described governmentality as flexible and adjusting to fluid reality, neoliberal governmentality has a constantly changing logic that is adjusted to a specific context in which it functions.

With the fall of the welfare state, the increase in the number of social, political, and economic uncertainties (migration flows, reduction of social protection programs, changes in the labour market, etc.) became more evident. In turn, they increased the perception of insecurity in general and that of urban spaces as well. As a result, these social processes have been strongly intertwined with the problem of urban insecurity not only in the public debate but also in security policies.

For example, the perception of migrants as a source of insecurity and danger developed in European countries alongside neoliberalisation (Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018). Perceived economic and national insecurity contributed to the rise of xenophobic feelings (Monahan, 2010); therefore, a discourse on the connection between migrants and insecurity has been reinforced. Consequently, migration issues impacted and have been included in criminal, economic, cultural, and other policies, including urban security ones (Bosworth et al., 2018). Therefore, neoliberal urban governance follows the security state in its exceptionalism of others. It could aim to exclude not only migrants but also the urban poor, the informal economy and other groups that often are racialised in discourse (Fonseca et al., 2002; Herbert and Brown, 2006; Wacquant, 2002).

As a response to a growing perception of insecurity and a lack of the state's response to it, in the 1980 – 1990s, grass-root and civil organisations started to emerge. Their activities aim to fill in gaps in the state's activities in the field of security provision and take forms of neighbourhood watch, crime victim assistance, etc. In addition, the state (at different levels of governance) encourages state-civil partnerships for security reasons providing grants and special budgets to stimulate a stronger and more participatory civil society (Crawford, 2009).

Another consequence of the increase in the number of uncertainties was a growing demand of the urban population for fortification. Neoliberal logic encourages people to create security through their actions: people should take action to minimise their exposure and contact with dangers, even when the actual presence of danger is debatable (Monahan, 2010). Although fortification itself was not a new phenomenon, the scale of demanded fortification and fear experienced by urban inhabitants intensified (Ellin, 1996). Increasing fortification creates an additional dimension of social inequality: those who can afford the fortification or live in fortified spaces and those who cannot and, therefore, can be perceived as suspects or in need of paternalistic help from a state (Monahan, 2010). Thus, there is an additional dimension of discrepancy in the logic of surveillance for these two groups. While the wealthier social groups employ it primarily to produce a security state, that is, to detect and tackle any deviance in their fortified housing, more marginalised groups are submitted to surveillance to enforce discipline in public housing.

This section has discussed the main features of neoliberalism and how urban insecurity is problematised under this framework. Here, urban insecurity is a complex social phenomenon that is not problematised just by criminal activities but also by other complex social processes (migration, marginalisation, economic conditions, and others). To deal with it, various policies and interventions could be implemented to address the social or situational roots of urban insecurity. Focusing on video surveillance, this framework suggests that it could be implemented not only to prevent crimes and instil discipline but also to exclude and further stigmatise social groups that are constructed as dangerous.

Chapter 4: Research questions and conceptual framework

1. Introduction

The study has examined a current body of knowledge and research on urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance in urban spaces. The literature review has revealed a broad conceptualisation of urban insecurity and the current lack of definitional consensus on the phenomenon. Additionally, the literature review showed a scarcity of problematisation research, considering urban insecurity in its complexity and controversies in the impact of video surveillance on urban insecurity. Meanwhile, the theoretical considerations allow building a framework for the analysis of urban insecurity and video surveillance as one of the tools of security provision in modern neoliberal cities, accounting for the contextual differences and possible variations in the logics of security provision and implementation of surveillance.

This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the research goals and questions. Therefore, the first part of the chapter illustrates how the current research aims to contribute to the existing body of academic literature on the topic. The second part presents a rationale behind the selection of Budapest and Milan for the current study. The chapter closes with the presentation of the conceptual framework guiding the research.

2. Research questions

The current research project aims at contributing to research on urban insecurity and video surveillance in two principal ways. Firstly, it seeks to conduct a problematisation analysis of urban insecurity and video surveillance as a solution in two contrasting contexts. Given a scarcity of research on the problematisation of urban insecurity and the broad nature of the phenomenon, the study could shed light on what social phenomena render urban insecurity problematic, what frames the discourse on urban insecurity, what solutions are constructed to address it, and whether video surveillance is constructed as a solution to it. Conducting a study in two diverse contexts could facilitate the discussion of the common and contextual features of urban insecurity problematisation.

Secondly, the current study aims to establish a dialogue between the two main theoretical approaches towards security provision and implementation of surveillance: surveillance society and security state. In particular, it aims at facilitating a discussion of the possibility to trace a co-existence of the two logics of security provision within the same context.

This project is designed to answer two main questions:

- how is urban insecurity problematised in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)?

- how is video surveillance constructed to be a response to deal with urban insecurity in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)?

To answer the main research question, the following intermediate questions should be addressed:

1. What is the current urban security context in Budapest and Milan?
2. How is urban insecurity problematised in the discourses generated by legislations, experts, and actors directly involved in tackling urban insecurity in the studied contexts?
3. How is video surveillance argued to be a response to deal with urban insecurity in the discourses generated by legislations, experts, and actors directly involved in tackling urban insecurity in the studied contexts?
4. Is there a relation between the perception of urban insecurity and the number of video surveillance cameras employed by the local authorities in the studied contexts?
5. What are the main differences and similarities between the selected contexts?

3. Selection of cases

As the main goals show, the study aims to conduct the research in two contrasting contexts to facilitate an understanding of generic and contextual features of urban insecurity problematisation and the construction of video surveillance as a solution. The research questions state that empirical research should be conducted in Budapest and Milan. The selection of the cases for the study should be based on their potential to provide substantive knowledge on the investigated topic (Poulis et al., 2013). The current chapter explains the main rationale and criteria for selecting Budapest and Milan for the current research.

In the existing scholarship on urban insecurity, European post-Soviet and Southern countries are understudied and at the periphery of the current research (Akçali & Korkut, 2015; Baptista, 2013; Benkő & Germán, 2016; Tulumello, 2018). However, this approach has been criticised in the recent literature that highlights these regions' role in understanding the neoliberalisation process[2] (Hadjimichalis, 2011; Taşan-Kok, 2004) and the prevalence of the concept of urban security there, especially among policymakers (Edwards et al., 2013). Therefore, for this study, these two European regions were selected.

The selection of countries within these two regions was based on the maximum variation approach. This analytical strategy allows collecting data on and investigating the phenomenon in different contexts in such a way highlighting general trends and particularities of each context (Flyvbjerg,

[2] The specificities of neoliberalism in each context are discussed in *2. Budapest: A post-Soviet metropolitan city in XXI century* and *2. Milan: A south-European metropolitan city in XXI century* in respective chapters.

2006). The following criteria were used to select countries: GDP per capita, median income, democracy index, Human Development Index, the ratio of urban/rural population, and the feeling of security. Thus, GPD per capita was used as a proxy for the economic situation in the country, democracy index – political situation, Human Development Index – social situation, median income – personal economic precariousness, the ratio of urban population – level of urbanisation, and the feeling of security – the perception of insecurity. As discussed in *Chapter 2: Literature Review*, all the indicators might impact the perception of insecurity. Figure 1 presents measurements for Hungary and Italy of the indicators used for the selection of cases.

Figure 1. Selection criteria: Measurements for Hungary and Italy



Data sources:

- *GDP per capita (measured in US$, 2018): the World Bank;*
- *Median equivalised net income (measured in €, 2018): Eurostat;*
- *Feeling of safety when walking along in local area after dark (measured as a sum of 'very safe' and 'safe,' 2018): European Social Survey, ESS9 – 2018;*
- *Human Development Index: the United Nations Development Program;*
- *The ratio of urban population (measured as a percentage of the total population): the World Bank;*
- *Democracy index (2018): The Economist Intelligence Unit.*

As it follows from the graphs, the main difference is observed in economic and political situations in the countries. The same conclusion might be drawn based on the existing literature on Hungary and Italy (Kerezsi & Lévay, 2008; Los, 2003; Melossi & Selmini, 2009; Ricotta, 2016)[3].

[3] It is discussed to more extent in *2. Budapest: A post-Soviet metropolitan city in XXI century* and *2. Milan: A south-European metropolitan city in XXI century* in respective chapters.

To study the local level of urban insecurity, it was decided to move beyond 'best practice' cases[4] and focus on two large cities of the countries: Budapest and Milan, respectively. The cities were selected because their population size is comparable and, in both cases, among the highest in their respective countries (Budapest is the most populated city in Hungary with 1.75 million inhabitants[5], Milan – the second in Italy with 1.4 million inhabitants[6]), both have the highest crime rates per capita in their countries[7], and the problem of urban insecurity and perception of urban insecurity is the acutest in the countries (Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018). At the same time, the socio-economic situation in the cities is different (Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018), as well as the level of autonomy of the local authorities (mayors, municipalities) in defining urban security policies (Cséfalvay, 2011; Moroni & Chiodelli, 2014). These differences are presented in more depth in *2. Budapest: A post-Soviet metropolitan city in XXI century* and *2. Milan: A south-European metropolitan city in the XXI century* in respective chapters.

4. Conceptualisation

In this research, *crime* is understood as breaking the law in unorganised forms: petty crime, burglaries, break-ins, murder, disorder, incivilities, etc., as opposed to organised forms of crime (human trafficking, organised terrorism, organised drug dealing, and others).

In this research, *insecurity* is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon that reflects both uncertainties developing in the modern world (migration, unemployment, global terrorism, local crime, etc.) and their perception. The perception entails both emotional (fear of the threats) and rational (estimation of being a victim). Moreover, these dimensions of insecurity are in a complex interrelation with each other.

Security state is a society in which security provision is one of the main concerns of the state (at different levels) and non-state actors (private and civic organisations). This society is characterised by the willingness to calculate risks and dangers that may arise within the population and prevent them. Prevention is achievable due to the joint exploitation of security apparatuses, legal codes, and disciplinary techniques.

Following Lyon (1994), *surveillance* is defined as diverse contexts within which various personal data is collected, processed, and stored by different private and state agents. In this research, surveillance is considered a tool for exercising disciplinary power. On the one hand, surveillance

[4] For example, in Italy, the case of Emilia Romagna region and, especially, its project 'Città sicure' are well-studied in the literature (Melossi & Selmini, 2012; Selmini, 2005).
[5] Data on January 1, 2020, from the Hungarian Central Statistical office.
[6] Data on January 1, 2020, from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
[7] Data on the police registered crime on January 1, 2018, from the Hungarian Criminal Statics System and ISTAT.

might be used for instilling a surveillance society. On the other hand, it might be used for instilling a security state. One specific way of collecting data is considered in this research – through CCTV systems employed by state institutions.

Surveillance society is a society that aims to eliminate any opportunity for deviation from existing norms by instilling discipline. The exercise of disciplinary power is possible due to the ability to survey over and analyse the behaviour of individual bodies and punish those who show a deviation.

Urban insecurity relates to existing uncertainties and their perceptions in a specific urban setting. So, the local urban population constantly faces the uncertainties and dangers of different nature (local and global), which affects the perception of insecurity in urban spaces.

Urban space is both a city's physical space and a social construct. Its physical nature is characterised by natural givens of the territory and those created by various actors through urban planning programs and individuals (private fences, privately maintained flower beds, etc.). At the same time, it can be considered as a social construct as the same physical space can have a different meaning to different persons or groups when interacting with this space and the people within it. Besides, urban space is a highly contested space as many diverse groups (for instance, local authorities, businesses, local inhabitants, and tourists) exploit the same physical space but have different expectations about it as well as perceive it in diverse ways.

Video surveillance or CCTV is understood as public surveillance systems implemented for crime prevention, investigation, and fear reduction purposes and managed by the police or local governments. Video surveillance is a context-dependent measure as it focuses on the local, particular spaces and aims at dealing with local issues (Zurawski, 2010).

Chapter 5: Research methodology

1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the methodology of the research. As it follows from the main research questions, this study employs problematisation analysis. This approach examines how a phenomenon, urban insecurity in this study, is rendered problematic in a particular context and what responses, video surveillance in the current project, are suggested to deal with it. Therefore, problematisation analysis focuses on both: a constructed problem and suggested solutions. However, there is no unidirectional and causal relation between a particular difficulty and a possible response (Foucault, 2002).

Although the nature of problematisation analysis suggests that it should be conducted within the constructivist framework, problematisation is always rooted in a specific historical context; therefore, it accounts for 'objective reality' (Borch, 2015). Additionally, as demonstrated in *Chapter 2: Literature Review* and section *4. Conceptualisation* of *Chapter 4*, urban insecurity can be interpreted and analysed as a socially constructed and real, objective phenomenon. Therefore, this research project adopts a mixed-methods approach to answer the main research and intermediate questions.

The mixed-methods approach allows for combining complementary strengths and overcoming the non-overlapping weaknesses of the methods employed in the research. Furthermore, applying the mixed-methods approach allows for improving the breadth, depth, and completeness of the knowledge about the studied phenomenon (Daigneault & Jacob, 2014; Maxwell, 2011). This is attainable by testing findings acquired through one method with another one, as well as searching for alternative evidence and understandings of the issue that the study focuses on. Previous research shows the relevance of the mixed-methods approach for exploring urban insecurity (Valente & Lanna, 2018).

The empirical research is divided into three main stages related to the methods employed:

- desk-based research to collect contextual information on urban insecurity in Hungary and Italy in general, and Budapest and Milan in particular. Additionally, this stage is devoted to the analysis of the relevant legislation in the studied contexts;
- semi-structured interviews with experts in urban insecurity and NGOs directly involved in dealing with urban insecurity in Budapest and Milan;
- statistical analysis (in particular, multilevel modelling) of secondary data to explore the effect of the number of CCTVs on the feeling of insecurity in Hungary and Italy.

The proposed stages are interconnected because each aims to enrich and inform the findings of the others, as the logic of mixed-method analysis suggests.

This chapter describes the employed methods following the research stages. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the researchers' reflections on the employed methodology and obstacles met during the fieldwork.

2. Desk-based research

The main aim of this research stage is to collect contextual information on the issue of urban insecurity in Hungary and Italy, and Budapest and Milan, respectively. The previous research shows the relevance of the desk-based research method for understanding the contexts in which the phenomenon of urban insecurity is studied (Valente & Lanna, 2018). Therefore, following the evidence on the factors that might be connected with urban insecurity presented in *Chapter 2: Literature review*, the information was collected for the following contextual indicators:

- the number of CCTV maintained by the local authorities;
- crime rates registered by the police depending on crime types:
    - homicide;
    - sexual offences;
    - robbery;
    - burglary;
    - vehicle offences;
    - criminal damage;
    - theft from a person;
    - shoplifting;
    - possession of weapon offences;
    - public order offences;
    - drug-related crimes;
    - and miscellaneous crimes against society;
- the number of foreign citizens residing in the country.

To make a comparison between and within the countries possible and more accurate, all the indicators were calculated per capita (per 100 000 inhabitants).

Since the number of CCTV is not published by the local administrations yearly (unlike other officially registered data published every year), the data for all the indicators were collected for a year in which the data for the number of CCTV is available. For Hungary, it is 2017, and for Italy, it is 2018.

Given the local nature of the phenomenon of urban insecurity, the data was collected at the lowest available administrative level. However, due to the structure of the national statistical data in each country, it was not always possible. Therefore, in cases in which the data is not reported at the lowest possible level, it is collected at the next available higher level. Table 2 clarifies the administrative level of data collection[8] and the data sources for each indicator.

Table 2. The administrative level and the sources of the data for the indicators for multilevel modelling for Hungary and Italy

		Number of CCTV	**Crime rates**	**Number of registered perpetrators**	**Number of foreign citizens residing in the country**
Administrative level	**Hungary**	County[9]	County	County	County
	Italy	Municipality[10]	Municipality and province[11]	Region	Municipality
Data source	**Hungary**	The State Police	The Hungarian Central Statistical Office and the Criminal Statistics System	The Hungarian Central Statistical Office	The Hungarian Central Statistical Office
	Italy	The municipality or the local police	The National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)	ISTAT	ISTAT

Another part of the desk-based research is devoted to the analysis of the current legislation in the field of urban security. As the literature review shows, studying legislation could help understand how the problem of urban insecurity is constructed as it reflects policymakers' perception of the problem. To perform the document analysis, a complete list of laws, legislative decrees, acts, regulations, provisions, and ordinances aimed at urban security provision and at tackling urban insecurity in power by December 31, 2019, has been compiled. In particular, the legislation is collected at the state, regional[12], and city (Milan and Budapest) levels. Appendix A presents the administrative level of the documents, the documents collected for the study, and the resources of the documents.

As *Chapters 2* and *3* show, there are different approaches to tackling urban insecurity that influence the adopted policies. In particular, the policies can be influenced by the dominance of crime oppression or prevention; within crime prevention, there is a division on social and situational

[8] Hungary is administratively divided into 7 regions, 19 counties and the capital (Budapest), and 197 districts (174 in the counties and 23 in Budapest). Italy is administratively divided into 20 regions, 107 provinces, and 7918 municipalities.
[9] Or 'megye' in Hungarian.
[10] Or 'comune' in Italian.
[11] At the municipal level data available only for 100 biggest municipalities. Therefore, the data is also collected for the level of province.
[12] In Italy only, for Lombardy region.

prevention, etc. Literature shows that there are usually combinations of different features from diverse models. Therefore, a coding guide was created based on the theoretical approach and the literature review. Following a coding approach suggested by Campbell et al. (2013), code families were created. This approach implies that primary (more general) and secondary (referring to specific aspects) codes constitute a code family. In the analysis of the legislation, there were four primary, 13 secondary, and four tertiary codes. Appendix B presents the codes and their definitions. The coding was performed in NVivo 12 software. After the coding phase, following the logic of critical content analysis, the relationships between the codes were studied (Bowen, 2011; Crabtree & Miller, 1992).

3. Interviews with experts

To deepen the understanding of the urban insecurity context in each country and city studied within them, interviews with experts were conducted. Given the complex nature of urban insecurity and inconsistency in the estimations of the effectiveness of video surveillance for tackling the problem, it is crucial to understand how people with established expertise in the field construct the phenomenon of urban insecurity and estimate the efficacy of video surveillance in each studied context. In particular, I aimed at a sample consisting of researchers of urban insecurity (both from sociological and criminological perspectives), policymakers, and police officers. Previous research shows that recruiting experts might be beneficial for clarifying complex phenomena (Edwards et al., 2013).

My ınitial plan was to have an interview with at least five experts in each city. However, due to the low response rate, I conducted seven interviews in total (four in Budapest and three in Milan). The average interview length is one hour. In Budapest, the fieldwork took place in April and August 2020, in Milan – from April to June 2021. Three interviews were conducted in English and one in Hungarian by a fellow colleague in Budapest.

In Hungary, the recruitment of the experts was done through the networking of my co-supervisor, Professor Barabás. Additionally, I recruited two experts based on their English publications and/or conference participations on the topic of urban insecurity in Budapest or Hungary in general. In Italy, the recruitment was based on their research activity or institutional involvement in the field of urban insecurity. Additionally, the snowball recruitment method was used in Italy. Specifically, I asked the regional and local governments' consultant to put me in contact with a police representative in Milan. Table 3 presents the fields of expertise of the interviewees.

Table 3. The fields of expertise of the interviewees in Hungary and Italy

Hungary	Italy
An expert in Geographic Information Systems and mapping the fear of crime; An expert in the local government and their involvement in urban security; An ex-police officer and an expert in the implementation of CCTV in Hungary; An expert in the employment of technologies for security provision in Hungary.	A researcher of urban insecurity and policies to tackle it and a consultant of the regional and local governments; An expert in crime prevention through urban design and planning in Milan; The head of a police station in Milan.

To interview the experts, the method of semi-structured interviews was employed in this research as it allows focusing narrowly on the studied topics but still encourages an interviewee to talk extensively. Hence, this method results in rich narratives about the studied problem. This method requires formulating the main questions in advance to steer the conversation. Additionally, follow-up questions should be formulated before the interview (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

The semi-structured interviews with the experts in the field of urban security were devoted to the discussion of the following topics:

- the current situation with urban security in Budapest/Milan and affluent/marginal neighbourhoods of the city;
- changes in the field of urban security (both objective and subjective) happening during the last 5 – 10 years, including the effects of the emergency and crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic;
- measures and policies to tackle urban insecurity and the perception of insecurity, with a particular focus on the implementation of CCTV.

The questions about affluent and marginal neighbourhoods were included, as previous research shows that security provision and conducting video surveillance could have different logics of implementation in diverse neighbourhoods (Monahan, 2010).

It should be briefly discussed that the interview guide was initially drawn before the start of the fieldwork in February 2020, that is, just before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. The pandemic created an emergency situation, and most states officially introduced a state of emergency to tackle the situation. Furthermore, the pandemic generated not only health insecurities but also social ones (change in the work conditions, risks of losing a job, etc.), which along with the restriction measures, affected the usage and perception of urban spaces. Therefore, it was germane for this study to understand how such a state of emergency might impact objective and subjective dimensions of urban insecurity. The complete interview guide is presented in Appendix C.

I should also note that the interviews were conducted during different stages of the pandemic development. This affected how experts responded to the questions and what effects of the pandemic on urban insecurity they noted. Thus, in Budapest, the pandemic was still in the early stages of development when I conducted the interviews. Consequently, the experts referred to the preliminary data or sometimes just their perception of the new circumstances. In Milan, the pandemic had been developing already for a year when the fieldwork was conducted. Therefore, the experts already had some analysed data and information.

At the beginning of the interview, each expert gave verbal permission to be audiotaped. However, in Milan, one of the interviewees did not give permission to record the interview due to the nature of their work and the necessity to request officially an opportunity to audiotape[13]. Therefore, the transcript was reconstructed in English based on the notes taken during the interview.

The interview data were subjected to critical content analysis (Crabtree & Miller, 1992). The coding guides were developed following the theoretical approach and the research questions that should be answered through the interview data. Again, the approach of coding families was applied (Campbell et al., 2013). In the analysis of the experts' interviews, there were seven primary, 20 secondary, and 28 tertiary codes. The coding guide for experts' interviews can be found in Appendix D. The coding procedure was performed with NVivo 12 software. As the critical content analysis method suggests, after the coding stage, the relationships between the codes were studied (Bowen, 2011; Crabtree & Miller, 1992).

4. Interviews with representatives of NGOs

Chapters 2 and *3* indicate that civil engagement could play an essential role in urban security production at the neighbourhood or city level. Therefore, to study the local context and problematisation of urban insecurity, interviews with the representatives of non-governmental and/or voluntary organisations working with the different aspects of urban insecurity were conducted. Furthermore, they are in direct contact with the local inhabitants as they could play one of the key roles in security provision at the local level (T. Bennett et al., 2006). Therefore, they might be key informants for understanding the construction of urban insecurity in the immediate environment of its production.

The previous research indicates that NGOs can generate an opposing to the legislation discourse on some social problems. In particular, in both Hungary and Italy, NGOs produced an inclusive discourse toward migrants during migration crises, while the legislation and politician produced more

[13] Given a bureaucratic procedure, it could have taken several months.

exclusionary ones (M. Colombo, 2018; Gőbl & Szalai, 2015). However, in the current academic literature, there is a lack of studies on how representatives of such organisations construct the problem of urban insecurity and possible solutions to it (T. Bennett et al., 2006). Hence, interviewing them helps understand how the phenomenon of urban insecurity is perceived and constructed in the immediate environment of its production.

Grass-root organisations are considered to emerge at the local level to coproduce the common good, which is local security and safety in this research. This implies that the civil sector works with the local authorities and the police to fulfil the goal. For instance, non-governmental and voluntary organisations can get involved in crime prevention activities in an attempt to reduce both crime rates and the impact of victimisation in their community (Lavrakas & Herz, 1982). The following types of involvement of grass-root organisations in tackling the problem of urban insecurity are identified in the literature (Grabosky, 1992):

- open government policy dimension:
    - legislation formulation: consultations with the government and public bodies lobbying for some proposals;
    - participatory planning: consultations with the local authorities or police to define the main urban insecurity problems and issues and develop ways to address them;
    - police monitoring: observation over law enforcement activities in order to identify abuse of power, corruption, etc.;
- volunteer activities:
    - neighbourhood watch programs: self-organisations of residents to be alert for and report suspicious activities in the neighbourhood;
    - citizen patrols: patrolling public spaces and reporting any suspicious activities to law enforcement. Sometimes these groups have some minor crime control functions (to stop unruly behaviour, hooliganism, etc.);
    - mediation: the resolution of minor interpersonal conflicts over such minor incivilities as noise in undue hours, litter, and others in the neighbourhood;
    - victim assistance: psychological and legal advice, pecuniary aid, and other forms of assistance to crime victims.

The selection of grass-root organisations for this research was based on this typology, especially on volunteer activities. Additionally, to account for the local contexts, the NGOs were selected based on the problems that were identified in the legislation analysis (the presence of homeless people, beggars in the streets, litter on the streets, presence of immigrants, and others). For the same reasons as for

the interviews with the experts, the method of semi-structured interviews was employed for this part of the research.

Initially, I planned to conduct the interviews with the representatives of organisations working in the affluent and marginal neighbourhoods, as modes of managing the problem and the logic behind the implementation of video surveillance could be different between such neighbourhoods. However, after I drew an initial list of organisations working in Budapest and Milan, I realised that I could expand my sample to all organisations working in these cities due to the fact that there are just a few of them. Therefore, the initial list of organisations selected for the research is presented in Table 4.

Table 4. The initial lists of NGOs and voluntary organisations in Budapest and Milan

Budapest	Milan
1. Budapest Civil Guard Association (Budapesti Polgárőr Szövetség); 2. The White Ring Hungary (Fehér Gyűrű Közhasznú Egyesület); 3. Budapest Methodological Centre of Social Policy and Its Institutions (Budapesti Módszertani Szociális Központ és Intézményei); 4. Safe and Liveable Cities Association (Biztonságos és Élhető Városokért Egyesület); 5. KultúrAktív	1. Neighbourhood Control Association (Associazione Controllo del Vicinato); 2. City Angels; 3. Consortium Becoming a Neighbour (Consorzio Farsi Prossimo); 4. Foundation House of Charity (Fondazione Casa della Carità); 5. Milan Suburbs (Periferie Milano).

Since the Budapest Civil Guard Association works in every district of Budapest, I decided to conduct two interviews with their representatives working in affluent and marginal neighbourhoods accordingly. The selection of the districts was based on three objective indicators:

- domestic burglary;
- educational level (the proportion of the population over the age of 25 with a higher education degree);
- property prices.

According to these criteria, the first district of Budapest was identified as affluent, while the XXIII district – as a marginal one.

In total, I conducted eight interviews (four in Budapest and four in Milan). The average interview length of an interview is one hour. In Budapest, the fieldwork was conducted in April and August 2020, in Milan – in September and October 2020. In Budapest, three interviews were conducted in English and one in Hungarian. In Milan, all the interviews were conducted in Italian.

During the interviews with the representatives of NGOs and voluntary organisations working in the field of urban security, the following topics were discussed:

- their main and secondary activities and cooperation with the state and public institutions;

- the current security context in the city and a specific neighbourhood (if they do not work in the whole city);
- the main changes in the field of urban security during the last five-ten years;
- the perceived effectiveness of the current policies, measures, and interventions aimed at the provision of urban security;
- the perceived effectiveness of video surveillance as a tool of urban security provision.

For the same reasons as for the interviews with the experts, the questions accounting for the COVID-19 pandemic were added to the interview guide. The full interview guide can be found in Appendix E.

All NGOs and voluntary organisations representatives were asked for an oral agreement to audiotape the interview. Also, it should be noted that one of the Hungarian respondents (Interview 1BV) asked to fill in the questionnaire in the written form due to personal family reasons and the unfolding pandemic. As an exception, I agreed to it.

Like with experts' interviews, I applied a coding family approach to the analysis of the interviews with representatives of NGOs. In the analysis of interviews with representatives of NGOs and voluntary organisations, there were seven primary, 23 secondary, and 18 tertiary codes. The corresponding coding guide is in Appendix F. The coding procedure was performed in NVivo 12 software. As the critical content analysis method suggests, after the coding stage, the relationships between the codes were studied (Bowen, 2011; Crabtree & Miller, 1992).

5. Multilevel modelling

This stage of the study aims at understanding whether there is a statistical connection between the perception of insecurity in urban spaces and the number of CCTVs. At this stage, the target population is all urban populations of the selected countries, which constitutes the largest proportion of the population of the countries. In Hungary, 71% of the total population lives in urban areas and in Italy – 70%[14].

Chapter 2: Literature Review shows that many factors impact the perception of security in urban spaces. In particular, at the personal level, gender, age, level of income, trust in state institutions, the solidity of social ties and social networks, current state of health, xenophobic sentiments, and previous victimisation experience are among factors that impact the perception of security in urban spaces. Also, such environmental variables as the size of the city, the number of installed CCTVs, and crime

[14] The World Bank. 2018. "Urban Population (% of Total Population)." [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?view=map [Accessed on October 5, 2019].

rates (especially those of public disorder crimes, thefts, and robberies) might impact the perception of insecurity. Therefore, it is crucial to control for other factors that might influence the perception of insecurity when calculating the effect of the number of CCTV cameras. The factors influencing the perception of insecurity can be categorised as individual- and second-level.

Additionally, the intermediate research question that should be addressed by statistical analysis implies that the analysed data should come from different data sources (survey and officially registered data) and levels of aggregation (individual and environmental). Therefore, multilevel modelling was chosen as a suitable instrument for producing the statistical estimations of the relationship between the number of video surveillance cameras and the perception of insecurity. This statistical technique helps analyse how individuals interact with their social and physical contexts and how they might influence them. In this analytical strategy, it is achieved by nesting individuals within larger social groups and introducing variables at the group level (Hox et al., 2018). In this research, the second-level variables were the variables collected at the level of the county in Hungary and of the region in Italy. Hence, individuals are nested into counties and regions accordingly.

Multilevel modelling has advantages that are relevant for this research. First of all, it allows accounting for the different effects in different groups. Hence, it allows for performing a comparative analysis. Secondly, it allows accounting for dependence between observations at all levels that might exist because there are similarities between and within the contexts (Hox et al., 2018). However, this statistical technique has a limitation, as it requires at least 20 observations at the highest level. Therefore, in this study, given that in Italy, there are 20 regions, and in Hungary, there are 19 counties and the capital city.

For the individual-level data, I used the European Social Survey (ESS) as it is conducted following the standardised procedure of sampling (multi-stage stratified random sample procedure), data collection procedure, and questionnaire. Therefore, it allows the comparison between the countries. The sample is representative of all persons aged 15 and older residents in private households in each country. The following datasets were used for this research:

- For Hungary: ESS Round 9 (2018), the number of respondents N = 1 661. Fieldwork lasted from 31.01.2019 to 22.05.2019. The mode of the interview was a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI);
- For Italy: ESS Round 8 (2016), the number of respondents N = 2 626. Fieldwork was from 11.09.2017 to 19.11.2017. The mode of Interview was CAPI.

The choice of different waves is justified by the availability of the necessary variables in the dataset. In particular, the Italian ESS Round 9 dataset does not contain the variable that identifies regions, while the Italian ESS Round 8 data file does.

The perception of insecurity was measured through the emotional aspect of the cognitive dimension of insecurity, as suggested by Bauman (1999). In particular, the question measuring it was formulated the following way: 'How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area (respondent's local area or neighbourhood) after dark?' Table 5 presents the individual-level factors that, according to the literature, impact the perception of insecurity and the questions which measure them.

Table 5. Individual-level factors and their indicators for multilevel modelling

Factor	**Indicator**
Gender	Gender
Age	Age groups
Level of income	Which of the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?
The solidity of social ties and social networks	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?
Trust in state institutes	How much do you personally trust the police?
State of health	How is your health in general?
Xenophobic sentiments	Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Previous victimisation experience	Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?
Size of the city	Which best describes the area where you live?

Although the size of the city is an environmental factor, due to the relatively high level of aggregation (county and regional), it was analysed at an individual level.

As for the county/regional level data, the information collected at the stage of desk-based research was employed for the analysis. Although this study aims at investigating one particular indicator of objective security and its impact on the perception of insecurity in urban spaces – the number of CCTV per capita, the literature review provides evidence that CCTV can be perceived as a part of objective security established in the area. Consequently, I also controlled for crime rates per capita for each type of crime.

A short description of the variables, their measurement, and the level of aggregation is presented in Table 6.

In this research, multilevel analysis was performed based on the procedure suggested by Hox et al. (2018). In this analysis, there is the data from J = 20 counties for Hungary (19 counties and the capital city, Budapest) and J = 20 regions for Italy, with different numbers of individuals n_j in each county

and region. At the individual level (X), I have the outcome variable 'feeling of safety' (Y) and P = 10 explanatory variables. At the county/regional level (Z), I have Q = 3 explanatory variables. To analyse these data, I can set up separate regression equations for each county/region to predict Y using X independent variables:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{pj}X_{pij} + e_{ij} \qquad \text{Formula 1}$$

Table 6. Variables, their level of aggregation, and measurements for multilevel modelling

Label	**Measurement**
Dependent variable	
aesfdrk	How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area (respondent's local area or neighbourhood) after dark? Very safe = 1 … very unsafe = 4
Independent individual-level variables	
gndr	Gender Male = 1, female = 2
agegroup	15 – 19 = 1, 20 – 29 = 2 … 60+ = 6
hincfel	Which of the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? Living comfortably on present income = 1 … finding it very difficult on present income = 4
domicil2	Which best describes the area where you live? 1 – a big city or suburbs/outskirts of a big city … 4 – a farm or home in the countryside
pplhlp	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? People mostly look out for themselves = 0 … people mostly try to be helpful = 10
trstplc	How much do you personally trust the police? No trust at all = 0 … complete trust = 10
imwbcnt	Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Worse place to live = 0 … better place to live = 10
sclmeet	How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues? Never = 1 … every day = 7
health	How is your health in general? Very good = 1 … very bad = 5
crmvct	Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years? Yes = 1, no = 2
Independent second-level variables	
cctvpc	The number of CCTV cameras in each region per 100 000 people
robberypc	The number of robberies in each region per 100 000 people
publicordpc	Hungary only: the number of public order crimes in each county per 100 000 people
theftfromperspc	Italy only: the number of thefts from a person in each region per 100 000 people

In regression formula 1, β_{0j} is the intercept, β_{pj} is the regression coefficient for the p explanatory variable, and e_{ij} is the residual error term. The subscript p refers to an independent individual-level variable, the subscript i refers to the individuals, and the subscript j refers to the counties/regions. The residuals errors e_{ij} are assumed to have a mean of zero and a variance to be estimated.

In this research, using variable labels instead of the mathematical symbols, Formula 1 can be written in the following way:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}gndr_{ij} + \beta_{2j}agegroup_{ij} + \beta_{3j}hinvfel_{ij} + \beta_{4j}domicil2_{ij} + \beta_{5j}pplhlp_{ij} + \beta_{6j}trstplc_{ij} + \beta_{7j}imwbcnt_{ij} + \beta_{8j}sclmeet_{ij} + \beta_{9j}health_{ij} + \beta_{10j}crmvct_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 2}$$

In multilevel modelling, it is assumed that each county/region (J) has a different intercept coefficient β_{0j} and different regression coefficients β_{pj} (Hox et al., 2018). Therefore, intercept coefficients, and slope coefficients vary across counties/regions, and quite often, they are referred to in the literature as random coefficients (Hox et al., 2018). The aim is to explain some variation in intercept and regression coefficients by introducing higher-level variables. For the intercept, the formula is:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + u_{0j} \quad \text{Formula 3}$$

And, for the slopes, it is:

$$\beta_{pj} = \gamma_{p0} + \gamma_{p1}Z_{qj} + u_{pj} \quad \text{Formula 4}$$

In equations 3 and 4, u_{0j} and u_{pj} are random residual terms at the county/regional level. These residual errors are assumed to have a mean of zero and to be independent of the residual errors e_{ij} at the individual level.

Substitution of equations 3 and 4 into Formula 1 gives a standard multilevel regression equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + \gamma_{pq}Z_{qj}X_{pij} + u_{pj}X_{pij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 5}$$

The segment $[\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + \gamma_{pq}Z_{qj}X_{pij}]$ contains the fixed coefficients (as they do not vary across counties/regions); therefore, it is called the fixed part of the model. The segment $[u_{pj}X_{pij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}]$ contains random error terms; therefore, it is called the random part of the model. The term $Z_{qj}X_{pij}$ (cross-level variation) is an interaction term that appears in the model due to modelling varying regression slope β_{pj} of an individual level variable X_{ij} with the county/region variable Z_j.

In this research, it is not supposed to find any cross-level variations; therefore, $\gamma_{pq} = 0$. Using variable labels instead of mathematical symbols, Formula 5 takes the form of Formula 6 for the Hungarian data:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} gndr_{ij} + \gamma_{20} agegroup_{ij} + \gamma_{30} hincfel_{ij} + \gamma_{40} domicil2_{ij} + \gamma_{50} pplhlp_{ij} + \gamma_{60} trstplc_{ij} + \gamma_{70} imwbcnt_{ij} + \gamma_{80} sclmeet_{ij} + \gamma_{90} health_{ij} + \gamma_{10\,0} crmvct_{ij} + \gamma_{01} cctvpc_j + \gamma_{02} robberypc_j + \gamma_{03} publicordpc_j + u_{4j} domicil2_{ij} + u_{8j} sclmeet_{ij} + u_{9j} health_{ij} + u_{10j} crmvct_{ij} + u_{12j} iphppl_{ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Formula 6

And Formula 7 for the Italian data:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} gndr_{ij} + \gamma_{20} agegroup_{ij} + \gamma_{30} hincfel_{ij} + \gamma_{40} domicil2_{ij} + \gamma_{50} pplhlp_{ij} + \gamma_{60} trstplc_{ij} + \gamma_{70} imwbcnt_{ij} + \gamma_{80} sclmeet_{ij} + \gamma_{90} health_{ij} + \gamma_{10\,0} crmvct_{ij} + \gamma_{01} cctvpc_j + \gamma_{02} robberypc_j + \gamma_{03} theftfromperspc_j + u_{4j} domicil2_{ij} + u_{7j} imwbcnt_{ij} + u_{8j} sclmeet_{ij} + u_{10j} crmvct_{ij} + u_{12j} iphppl_{ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Formula 7

Following the analysis strategy proposed by Hox et al. (2018), the analysis starts from the simplest model, which is the intercept-only model. Then gradually, various predictors are added. The estimates and standard errors are calculated at each step to see which parameters are significant and how much residual error is left.

The intercept-only model is a model without any predictors. The equation is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Formula 8

or using the variables labels:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Formula 9

In this equation, γ_{00} is the regression intercept (the mean of Y in the sample), u_{0j} is the residual at the county/region level, e_{ij} is the residual at the individual level.

The intercept in this model is the county/region mean of the feeling of safety. The intercept-only model tests whether there is a significant variation in these county/region means. Then, the intraclass correlation (ICC) is calculated in order to estimate the proportion of group-level variance in the total variance. In practice, it shows the expected correlation between two randomly drawn units in the same group. ICC is calculated through the following equation:

$$ICC = \frac{\sigma^2_{u_0}}{\sigma^2_{u_0} + \sigma^2_e}$$

Formula 10

In Formula 10, $\sigma_{u_0}^2$ is the variance of the county/regional level errors, and σ_e^2 is the variance of the individual-level errors.

The next step is estimating a model with fixed individual-level explanatory variables. In this model, the variance component of the slopes of the individual-level variables is fixed to zero. At this step, the contribution of each individual-level explanatory variable is estimated. The formula is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 11}$$

Or using the variables labels:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}gndr_{ij} + \gamma_{20}agegroup_{ij} + \gamma_{30}hincfel_{ij} + \gamma_{40}domicil2_{ij} + \gamma_{50}pplhlp_{ij} + \gamma_{60}trstplc_{ij} + \gamma_{70}imwbcnt_{ij} + \gamma_{80}sclmeet_{ij} + \gamma_{90}health_{ij} + \gamma_{10\,0}crmvct_{ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 12}$$

By adding the first-level variables, it is possible to assess what changes occur in the first and second-level variance terms. The improvements made by adding the individual-level variables can be tested by computing the difference between the deviances of this model and the previous one. It is done through the chi-square difference test in the ANOVA table. Such comparison is possible as models are nested. Additionally, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) can be utilised for models' comparison.

After this step, the second-level explanatory variables are added to the model. This model allows examining whether the group level explanatory variables explain between-group variation in the dependent variable. The formula is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 13}$$

Or using the variable labels for Hungary, it is:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}gndr_{ij} + \gamma_{20}agegroup_{ij} + \gamma_{30}hincfel_{ij} + \gamma_{40}domicil2_{ij} + \gamma_{50}pplhlp_{ij} + \gamma_{60}trstplc_{ij} + \gamma_{70}imwbcnt_{ij} + \gamma_{80}sclmeet_{ij} + \gamma_{90}health_{ij} + \gamma_{10\,0}crmvct_{ij} + \gamma_{01}cctvpc_j + \gamma_{02}robberypc_j + \gamma_{03}publicordpc_j + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 14}$$

And for Italy:

$$aesfrdk_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}gndr_{ij} + \gamma_{20}agegroup_{ij} + \gamma_{30}hincfel_{ij} + \gamma_{40}domicil2_{ij} + \gamma_{50}pplhlp_{ij} + \gamma_{60}trstplc_{ij} + \gamma_{70}imwbcnt_{ij} + \gamma_{80}sclmeet_{ij} + \gamma_{90}health_{ij} + \gamma_{10\,0}crmvct_{ij} + \gamma_{01}cctvpc_j + \gamma_{02}robberypc_j + \gamma_{03}theftfromperspc_j + +u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 15}$$

Again, by computing the difference in the deviance of this model and the previous one, it is possible to estimate the improvements made by adding the second-level variables.

Lastly, a random coefficient model is estimated. This step aims to assess whether any of the explanatory variables at the individual level have a significant variance component between the groups. The formula is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + u_{pj}X_{pij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad \text{Formula 16}$$

The formulas with variable labels are 6 for Hungary and 7 for Italy.

Hox et al. (2018) advise testing random variance on a variable-by-variable basis as including all possible variance terms in the model can lead to overparamaterisation of the model, which, in turn, can lead to the lack of convergence.

Again, by computing the difference in the deviance of this model and the previous one, it is possible to estimate the improvements made by adding the second-level variables.

In all models, a maximum likelihood estimator is used.

Calculation of descriptive statistics and correlation analysis is performed in IBM SPSS Statistics 26 software. Multilevel modelling is performed in R software version 4.1.0 ('Camp Pontanezen') using the 'lme4' package.

The 'lme4' package produces unstandardised regression coefficients, which implies that the scale of the explanatory variables should be taken into account when interpreting the results. The regression coefficients were standardised to facilitate the interpretation because this allows comparing the effects of different variables within one sample. However, unstandardised coefficients are used to compare the coefficients between the countries.

The following formula for the standardisation is used in this research:

$$standardized\ coefficient = \frac{unstandardized\ coefficient * SD\ of\ explanatory\ variable}{SD\ of\ dependent\ variable} \quad \text{Formula 17}$$

For performing the analysis, following the recommendations of ESS[15], the weights were used based on their availability in the datasets. For the analysis of the Hungarian data, 'anweight' (analysis weight) is used as it is considered suitable for performing the statistical analysis. For the analysis of the Italian data, 'pspwght' (post-stratified design weight) is used as it is suitable for single country analysis and should give the same estimates as 'anweight.'

6. A researcher's reflections on the fieldwork

Given that this study adopts a mixed-methods approach to investigating the research questions, some reflections on the fieldwork and challenges connected to the methodology itself and the situation of conducting the fieldwork due to the COVID-19 pandemic could be drawn.

During the desk-based research, one of the major difficulties in collecting the data on the number of CCTV in Italy was that no national office in Italy publishes any detailed information on it. Therefore, the data was searched in the municipal and local police reports. A complete list of Italian municipalities as of 2018 was drawn to achieve it. After that, the reports on the number of CCTV and surveyed areas were collected. However, not all municipalities publish this information. For this reason, cases in which it was not clear whether there were some cameras installed were indicated 'n/a' (not available). If it was clearly stated on the web page of the municipality that they did not have any video surveillance at the moment or when in documents it was clearly expressed that a municipality planned to install cameras for the first time in the coming years, the number of cameras was indicated as zero.

Another challenge was the fact that the police registered crime rates differ in the level of detail and structure in Hungary and Italy. Mainly, the types of crimes corresponded between the countries. However, for instance, the number of homicides was presented in a generalised way in Hungary, while in Italy, these data were presented in a more detailed way (there were sub-categories of mass murder, intentional homicides, attempted homicides, infanticides, manslaughter, and unintentional homicide). So, in such cases, when the data were presented in a more detailed way in one country, the sub-categories were summed to get a number for a group category. The 'User Guide to Crime Statistics for England and Wales' issued by the UK Office for National Statistics[16] was used for

[15] European Social Survey. 'Weighting European Social Survey Data.' [Online] Available at: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf [Accessed on October 6, 2021].

[16] The UK Guide was used as during the desk-based research stage it was planned that I would research three cities: one Hungarian, one Italian, and one English. However, later, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and travel restrictions, it was decided to focus on the European cities only. The reference to the Guide: Office for National Statistics. "User Guide to Crime Statistics in England and Wales." [Online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/methodologies/userguidetocrimestatisticsforenglandandwales [Accessed on July 9, 2020].

summing the sub-categories. Table 7 presents crime categories and their corresponding sub-categories.

Table 7. Crime types and their corresponding sub-categories

Crime type	**Corresponding sub-categories of crime**
Homicide	Mass murder, intentional homicides, attempted homicides, infanticides, manslaughter, unintentional homicide
Violence	Blows, culpable injuries, menaces
Sexual offences	Rapes, sexual activity with minors, corruption of a minor, exploitation and abetting prostitution, child pornography
Vehicle offence	Motorcycle theft, car theft, theft from vehicle, theft of cargo trucks carrying freights, moped theft
Theft from a person	Bag-snitching, pickpocketing
Criminal damage and arson	Damages, arson, damage followed by arson

Another issue that arose during the fieldwork was my limited language capacity, especially in Hungarian. Firstly, given that by the beginning of the fieldwork, I did not have any knowledge of the Hungarian language, I asked my co-supervisor, Professor Barabás, for help. She kindly gave me the contact of her PhD student from the University of Public Service, who agreed to provide me with Hungarian-English translations of some legislation not available in English and during the interviews with those respondents who preferred to have a conversation in Hungarian.

I should also state that I offered to send a preliminary set of questions to those Hungarian respondents who agreed to have an interview in English so that they would be able to familiarise themselves with the topics of the discussion in advance. All the experts used this opportunity. Based on the discourses produced by the Hungarian and Italian respondents, it is possible to conclude that the opportunity to familiarise themselves in advance with the interview questions encouraged the Hungarian respondents to prepare for the interview. In particular, they provided me with some visual materials (like their research results, photos, maps, etc.) and more precise data (for instance, results of some surveys, crime rates, and so on).

During the conduction of semi-structured interviews, I also encountered the problem of no response. In Hungary, I usually contacted the respondents by email in English. If, after some time, usually two weeks, I did not receive any communication back from them, I usually asked my Hungarian colleague to contact them in Hungarian. In Italy, I contacted all the respondents in Italian. However, unfortunately, even after trying to establish contact several times, some Hungarian and Italian respondents never answered back.

The COVID-19 pandemic also posed some challenges for conducting interviews with both the experts and representatives of the civil sector. In the first place, the pandemic's beginning coincided with the

start of my fieldwork and, consequently, affected greatly the organisational side of my work. I moved to Budapest at the end of February 2020, before the state of emergency was announced there. My initial plan was to stay there for three months and finish my fieldwork within this time. However, due to the uncertainties of the development of the coronavirus pandemic at that moment, it was decided to interrupt my research abroad period there at the end of April and finish the fieldwork in August 2020. Additionally, the strict restriction measures introduced in Italy also postponed the beginning of the fieldwork in Italy from June to September 2020.

The global COVID-19 crisis also affected the mode of conducting the interviews. Initially, it was planned to conduct all the interviews face-to-face. However, the adopted restrictions for the disease containment needed to be considered, so I switched to the online mode of conducting the interviews. In Hungary, all the interviews were conducted online via Skype or Facebook Messenger (respondents chose the most appropriate software for them). In Italy, due to the disease recession at the times of conducting the interviews, I gave each respondent the opportunity to choose the preferred interview mode: face-to-face or remote. In total, five interviews (two experts and three representatives of NGOs) were conducted in a face-to-face mode (in complete compliance with the recommendation for the containment of COVID-19). In addition, two interviews (one expert and one NGO representative) were conducted online (via Zoom and WhatsApp messenger, as the interviewees chose it).

The pandemic also affected the mode of interviewing the Hungarian experts and NGO representatives who do not speak English. Thus, due to the coronavirus crisis and switching to the online mode of interviewing, it was challenging to arrange simultaneous translations for those interviewees who did not speak English, given that it requires three persons to participate in the call (an interviewee, the translator, and me) and the possible connection distortions. Consequently, it was decided that the translator, instructed by me, conducts the interviews in Hungarian and then provides me with their audio records and transcripts already translated into English.

Lastly, I should account for my sentiments towards video surveillance because it has an ambiguous nature, as discussed in *Chapters 1, 2,* and *3*. I approached the research with a genuine interest to investigate the phenomenon without any formed opinion; instead, I considered video surveillance to be a double-edged sword: it might serve for the protection of the population and invading their privacy. This indeterminate state of my mind inspired the current research and drove the whole investigation process.

Chapter 6: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Budapest

1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to understanding the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest. It also explores what solutions are constructed to be effective to deal with the problem with a particular focus on video surveillance. Given that the problematisation analysis is always grounded in a specific historical context, this chapter starts with an overview of the socio-economic and political background and current context in Hungary in general and in Budapest in particular. Then, it proceeds to the study of how urban insecurity is problematised in the current Hungarian and Budapest legislation on the topic of urban security and crime prevention. Additionally, it is studied whether video surveillance is suggested among solutions to the problem in the legislation.

Further, it discusses the results of the fieldwork in Budapest: the interviews with the experts and representatives of NGOs. Specifically, in the respective sections, it is scrutinised how the experts and representatives of NGOs perceive the phenomenon of urban insecurity in Budapest and what measures, with the focus on CCTV, are considered the most efficient to tackle the problem in the city. The multilevel modelling results are presented in the following section that studies the main factors, including the presence of CCTVs, impacting the fear in urban spaces. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to a brief discussion of the study results on Hungary and Budapest.

2. Budapest: A post-Soviet metropolitan city in the XXI century

As it was noted in section *3. Selection of cases* in Chapter 4, the studied countries and cities differ in socio-economic and political situations. This section focuses on Hungary's socio-economic and political context in general and Budapest in particular.

In the 1980 – 1990s, Hungary transitioned from the Soviet regime to an open market. This societal change severely affected the country's economic, political, and cultural aspects of life. One of the germane for this study features of the period was an upsurge of registered crime rates during the 1990s due to weakened state control. As it follows from Figure 2, crime rates peaked in 1998, and after that, there has been a clear descending trend, although with some fluctuations[17]. As a result, the perception of insecurity and, more specifically, fear of crime increased during the 1990s (Kerezsi & Lévay, 2008).

[17] The acceleration in the decline of police registered crime in Hungary since 2012 can also be attributed to the changes in the Hungarian Criminal Code. In 2012, the value threshold for damage and pecuniary increased from 20,000 to 50,000 Hungarian forints (from approximately 70 to 170 euros). Another change in 2012 concerned the legal situation of the abuse of deeds. These amends to the Criminal Code left out from the police registered crime statistics a share of previously registered offenses (Gál, 2019; Kó, 2020).

Figure 2. Registered crimes per 100 000 inhabitants in Hungary and Budapest



Data source: Registered crimes, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office provides absolute numbers of crimes; therefore, I made calculations for 100 000 inhabitants.

The Hungarian transition to an open market is characterised in the literature as smooth and successful (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007; King & Váradi, 2002). Partially, the smooth transition was possible due to the peculiarities of communism in the country. In the literature, Hungarian communism is often called 'goulash communism' that is characterised by possibilities for the small business development, some features of market economy, private property, etc. (Eyal et al., 1998; Gallo, 2021; Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, 2019).

Nevertheless, Hungarian society has been significantly affected by the transition (Scheiring et al., 2018). The transition period was characterised by aggravated anomie of the Hungarian population: loss of a clear value system, lack of social trust and trust in authorities, a sudden drop in living standards, the introduction of new uncertainties in everyday life due to societal changes, and so on (Kerezsi, 2009; Los, 2003). These unfavourable socio-economic conditions fuelled the perception of insecurity in urban spaces (Kerezsi & Lévay, 2008), as *Chapter 2: Literature Review* shows that such social and ontological insecurities are tightly connected with the urban one. Additionally, these circumstances triggered social marginalisation (for instance, due to an increase in alcohol and drug consumption) and criminal trajectories for people who could not adjust to the new political and economic situation (Kerezsi, 2004).

The transition period was also a period in which neoliberal policies were introduced in Hungary (Dale and Fabry, 2018; Mijs et al., 2016). The research shows that neoliberalism has developed organically in the country since the 1950s, rather than inculcated or imported from Western countries (Gallo, 2021). In particular, (Fabry, 2018) highlights the role of the Financial Research Institute within the

Ministry of Finance since the 1970s and its program 'Turnabout and Reform' (1987) in the development of neoliberal thought in Hungary.

However, the neoliberalisation of the country has not been straightforward and has undergone some transformations due to economic, political, and social conditions and changes there. In the initial stages, the country was characterised by 'embedded neoliberalism,' the main feature of which is a balance between social welfare protections and market liberalisation (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007). In the 1990 – 2000s, the Hungarian social welfare system was considered one of the most generous across countries of the Visegrad group[18]. For instance, it offered early retirement and generous disability support (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007; Vanhuysse, 2006). At the same time, the Hungarian government was promoting different open market initiatives (for instance, liberalisation of the housing market, encouragement of privatisation in different spheres, etc.).

As Bohle and Greskovits (2012) point out, such 'embedded neoliberal' regimes are unstable as they aim at balancing two divergent political approaches. Hungarian government partially failed in this balancing as, by 2010, centre-right forces gained popularity and came to power (Stanojević, 2014; Szabó, 2013). Another reason for the growing popularity of the centre-right forces is the economic crisis of 2007, which provoked austerity policies, rising unemployment, poverty, etc. (Stubbs & Lendvai-Bainton, 2019). On this background, Viktor Orbàn and his party FIDESZ gained popularity with their promises of imposing new bank taxes, fighting against refugees and migrants, etc.

Thus, in 2010 Viktor Orbàn became the Prime Minister of Hungary for the second time, and his party FIDESZ got the majority of the seats in the Parliament. Initially, their discourse was based on the negative consequences of neoliberalisation and the promotion of an 'illiberal state' (Dale & Fabry, 2018). At the beginning of their term, the FIDESZ government was still trying to balance marketisation and social welfare provision. For example, in the labour market, on the one hand, it made employment relations more flexible and limited the rights of trade unions. On the other hand, the government made direct interventions in wage policies and sought to centralise services provided by the public sector (Szabó, 2013).

However, with time, this 'illiberal turn' has rebounded on the process of neoliberalisation in the country. Some authors describe the current political situation in Hungary as 'authoritarian populism' by pointing out that the ruling party seeks to consolidate its power by reducing the autonomy of the local authorities, establishing control over the media, and redistribution of the national capital by cooperating tightly with loyal oligarchs, etc. (Rogers, 2020). Others develop a 'national-

[18] The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

neoliberalism' perspective on the Hungarian situation, which is characterised by a balance between neoliberal economic policies and policies prioritising national interests as defined by the political elite (Ban et al., 2021; Gallo, 2021). Therefore, the Hungarian government seeks, on the one hand, to make the labour market flexible, attract international companies and investors and, on the other hand, to broaden social welfare, weaken the opposition by utilising political technologies, and exertion of populist discourse (Ban, 2021).

These peculiarities in the neoliberalisation process in Hungary have several implications for the study of urban insecurity. Firstly, as it was already mentioned, the currently ruling party seeks to centralise the power in the country. In particular, FIDESZ's parliamentary majority gave it enough power to pass the new Fundamental Law of Hungary, enacted in 2012. One of the changes is especially germane for this study: according to the new Fundamental Law, municipalities became included in the vertical of power and institutionalised. Consequently, their autonomy and involvement in urban regeneration, public education, health, social and cultural matters were limited (Hoffman, 2019). This change contributed to solidifying the role of the central state in managing security issues. In turn, it affects the management of urban insecurity problems as local authorities are more limited in their decision-making and more dependent on the central government.

The second implication of the 'illiberal turn' in Hungary is the presence of irregular immigrants in political and security discourses. As it follows from *Chapter 2: Literature review* and section *4. Neoliberalism and Urban Security* of *Chapter 3*, among factors facilitating insecurity in general and urban, in particular, is the stigmatisation of immigrants as dangerous and criminogenic. In Hungary, the presence of irregular immigrants in political and security discourses is a relatively young phenomenon as immigrants rarely appeared in public debates before the migration crisis in 2015, when Hungary became a transition point in global migration routes (Gőbl & Szalai, 2015). The Hungarian government's response to it was quite exclusionary, and one of its manifestations was a construction of a border barrier (Bocskor, 2018). Additionally, during and after the migration crisis, the Hungarian government and politicians from the ruling FIDESZ party started to intertwine security and anti-immigrant discourses to gain more political points. In particular, they were trying to create a direct association between migrants and different social threats and dangers (increased crime rates, labour market consequences, etc.) (Bocskor, 2018).

However, even before 2015, the Hungarian society and politicians showed some discrimination towards some ethnicities. Mainly, it is visible in the example of the Roma people who have been consistently discriminated against in employment, housing, and other policies (Kóczé, 2015). Additionally, Hungarian political anti-Roma discourse is constructed in such a way to produce an

image of Roma people as not being able to socially integrate into the society due to their culture and morality (Kóczé, 2015). Therefore, such an image allows for ever-increasing surveillance and scrutiny of the Roma people by the Hungarian police and other state bureaucracies (Kerezsi, 2018).

The societal changes and the specificity of the neoliberalisation process also affect how the problem of urban insecurity is handled at the city level, more specifically, in Budapest. The research shows that neoliberal policies, if they are planted in a city drawing on examples of advanced neoliberal cities, often ignore local contexts, needs, and conditions (Taşan-Kok, 2004). According to Taşan-Kok (2004), it is the case of Budapest.

Another reason for ignoring the current situation in the city is the dominance of centre-right and neo-authoritarian powers in Hungary that promote the restoration of the 'glorious past' of one of the capitals of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in development projects in Budapest (Akçali & Korkut, 2015). Consequently, these plans ignore the problems that are currently present in the city because they are more focused on reconstructing the 'glorious past.' Besides, the authorities might exploit such discourse to attract the electorate by making promises about the revival of the past glory and not discussing the problems to be solved properly.

An additional obstacle to creating favourable conditions for an open discussion of current urban problems is a lack of communication between policymakers, researchers, urban planners, and designers to formulate and implement urban security policies in Budapest (Benkő & Germán, 2016). Consequently, it complicates the realisation of urban security interventions and urban regeneration programs.

The empirical studies show that urban insecurity is problematised in Budapest through fear of crime, especially burglaries, anti-social behaviour, and other petty crimes, and the visible presence of 'others' in a broad sense. 'Others' comprehend all people who demonstrate any kind of deviant behaviour from socially accepted one in a neighbourhood: homeless, drug addicts, immigrants, ethnic minorities (especially Roma people) (Barabás et al., 2018; Stefanizzi and Verdolini, 2018).

However, there are differences between affluent and marginal neighbourhoods in the perception of insecurity in Budapest (Valente & Crescenzi Lanna, 2019). Thus, the research by Valente and Crescenzi Lanna (2019) shows that affluent neighbourhoods are characterised by decreasing fear of crime and local inhabitants' satisfaction with renovation projects implemented in the neighbourhood, while the inhabitants of marginal neighbourhoods are still concerned about crime incidence there. The inhabitants of the affluent neighbourhood of Budapest also built their discourse on insecurity around the visible presence of others (beggars, passers-by) and the high density of population. In the marginal neighbourhoods, the urban insecurity discourse is built around signs of urban decay: highly

visible signs of physical degradation, lack of proper street lighting, and socio-geographical isolation. High social and physical deprivation in marginal neighbourhoods of Budapest is corroborated by other research that shows that there are streets in which inhabited houses do not have electricity, water, gas, etc. (Barabás et al., 2018; Stefanizzi and Verdolini, 2018).

The common feature of affluent and marginal neighbourhoods of Budapest is a lack of informal control; however, the underlying reasons for it are different (Valente & Crescenzi Lanna, 2019). In affluent neighbourhoods, the formal forms of control (police patrolling) take precedence. Therefore, the inhabitants do not feel the need to exercise informal control. At the same time, in the marginal neighbourhood, the informal social control is considered useless and unproductive as, according to the inhabitants, it would not deter crime.

Accentuated by the transition period, housing problem and social division around it is also highly connected to urban insecurity in Budapest. Due to the specificity of communism in Hungary, which allowed some market economy features, the 1960 – 1970s were characterised by the increasing suburbanisation of Budapest. In particular, wealthier parts of the population moved from the inner city to northern and western suburbs as they were considered more prestigious, greener, and more comfortable to live in. The transition to an open market facilitated this trend as it allowed the marketisation of private property (Brade et al., 2009; Csanádi et al., 2011; Tosics, 2006). However, by 2000 suburbanisation started to slow down due to the authorities' investments in the city centre and redevelopment programs there (Tosics, 2006; Brade et al., 2009).

The research shows that suburbanisation and housing differentiation led to social segregation and even social polarisation in the 1990s that still persists. This social segregation impacts as the periphery of the city as the city centre. Thus, emerging middle class and wealthier people usually prefer to move into modern fortified housing estates and gated communities outside the city centre, the so-called inner circle. As the research on the residents of gated communities of Budapest shows, security concerns and a quest for social homogeneity are among the reasons for moving into such housing projects (Cséfalvay, 2009; Kovács & Hegedus, 2014). This physical and social segregation leads to conflicts between wealthier new settlers and poorer traditional inhabitants as, quite often, gated communities are located at the periphery of the city where once small villages with poorer inhabitants were located (Kovács & Hegedus, 2014).

As to the implications for the city centre, the relocation from the inner city to the suburbs has led to the concentration of poorer and Roma people in some districts of the city centre. The redevelopment programs of such districts frequently adopt a gentrification approach that inherently divides and marginalises their poorer inhabitants and, especially, Roma people, despite being officially 'colour-

blind' (Keresztély et al., 2017). The gentrification of the areas resulted in the appearance of physical borders between the redeveloped streets and the dilapidated ones, 'ghetto.' Social borders have also emerged between the new and old inhabitants as well as between non-Roma and Roma. Furthermore, there is a division within Roma society itself as there are 'desirable' and 'undesirable' Roma (Keresztély et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the gentrification process of Budapest's city centre is slow despite the renovation programs and a suitable housing legacy of the XIX – beginning of XX centuries. It is ascribed to a lack of a robust middle class in Hungary and, connected to it, a lack of enough resources to buy an apartment in the city centre (Csanádi et al., 2011).

Another policy approach to deal with lower-status inhabitants of the city centre is the 'de-concentration of poverty' (Csanádi et al., 2011). In particular, policymakers seek to relocate poorer inhabitants to other districts or even outside of Budapest. However, buying out cheap housing in the periphery and relocating marginal people there leads to their higher concentration in less infrastructurally developed areas and, as a consequence, further marginalisation (Csanádi et al., 2011).

A case of a particularly marginalised street of Budapest – Hős utca – is quite illustrative of different obstacles in the realisation of renovation and improvement programs. Thus, the authorities of the X district, in which Hős utca is located, are struggling to attract investors to improve the neighbourhood's conditions (Barabás et al., 2018). Unfortunately, even the government's investments do not help to resolve street's problems completely. In 2018, the Ministry of Interior gave a subsidy of 2.1 billion Hungarian forints (approximately 6.8 million euros) to the district's government in which Hős utca is located to be spent on renovation, buying properties from the people living there, court fees, debt payments, etc.[19] However, there were several weak points of this government's investment program. First of all, the program adopted mainly the situational approach disregarding the social measures that could have been done to improve the situation (provision of work opportunities, education, training, etc.). Secondly, although the district government offers to buy the property for more than it costs on the property market, the proposed payment is still not enough to buy a new one in other parts of the city[20]. Therefore, the inhabitants refuse to sell their properties there.

[19] Hős Utca Hangjai (2018) Mire is költhető a Hős utcára fordítható 2.1 milliárd forint? Available at: hosutcahangjai.blog.hu/2018/08/24/mire_is_koltheto_a_2_1_milliard_forint (accessed 3 May 2021).

[20] Atlatszo (2020) 2020 vége volt a határidő, de még mindig nem számolta fel a Hős utcai szegregátumot Kőbánya. Available at: szocio.atlatszo.hu/2020/12/10/2020-vege-volt-a-hatarido-de-meg-mindig-nem-szamolta-fel-a-hos-utcai-szegregatumot-kobanya/ (accessed 3 May 2021).

3. Legislation: Urban security as a strategic goal and video surveillance as a multi-purpose tool

3.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

Since a legal definition of the notion of urban security helps to understand a normative framework established in a country for maintaining urban security (Selmini, 2005), the analysis of the Hungarian relevant legislation started with a search for such a definition. The Hungarian law does not provide any unified definition, although this notion and an overlapping with it notion of crime prevention are discussed in the legislation. For example, in Act CLXXXIX on Local Government, 2011, Section 13(17) states that the local governments' task is to contribute to the public safety and security of the citizens living in the area and to public order maintenance in the municipality. Local governments also have a mandatory task of providing social and child welfare services, ensuring the provision and rehabilitation of homeless people, and maintenance of the cleanliness of the area. Furthermore, Section 17(1-4) establishes that the local government (in the counties and the capital) has the right to form a body that can use coercion in order to provide public safety.

From this description of tasks of the local governments, it could be concluded that the legal perception of urban insecurity follows the neoliberal logic of redistributing tasks to the local level as it is considered that the problem should be dealt with at the local level by local governments. However, as it has been already noted in *2. Budapest: A post-soviet metropolitan city in the XXI century,* in 2012, a new Fundamental Law of Hungary was enacted, which diminishes local authorities in their powers in different areas of policy-making and deliverance.

Besides, the analysis of the Act on Local Government allows reconstructing that it reflects the neoliberal 'preventive turn' (Garland, 2001), which is also implied by both surveillance society and security state theories. Such a conclusion could be drawn because most of the measures proposed in the Act have a preventive nature (maintenance of the cleanliness of streets, provisions of child welfare, etc.). Both situational and social crime prevention approaches could be traced in the text of the Act.

As it was already discussed in *Chapter 2: Literature review*, policies' areas tend to intertwine (Chalom et al., 2001), and even if some interventions do not have crime prevention as their primary goal, they still could reach it as an added value. Such intersection of different policy areas is also traceable in the Act on Local Government, as it provides not only for public security and safety but also for different social policies (for example, child welfare and social rehabilitation of homeless people), the implementation of which could also impact on the social roots of urban insecurity.

Simultaneously, there is a dissociation from the neoliberal logic of tackling urban insecurity. Thus, the Act on Local Government does not provide for cooperation with local communities and grass-root organisations or private entities. It might be attributed to the fact that such cooperation is codified at the central state level, the reasons for which are discussed later in this section. Therefore, it might be another sign of centralisation of power in Hungary that has started with the coming to power of the populist forces in 2010.

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (2013 - 2023) (adopted by the National Crime Prevention Council, Government Resolution №1744/2013) is another nation-level document that discusses security in general and urban security in particular. The Strategy prioritises urban security and sets out both situational and social prevention. In particular, the document aims to strengthen public order, increase the security of public spaces, decrease crime rates, reduce harm from and adverse effects of crime, provide adequate protection for Hungarian citizens, and improve citizens' feeling of security. Additionally, the Strategy's objectives are the prevention of juvenile delinquency, prevention of recidivism, prevention of victimisation, and provision of assistance to crime victims. The document highlights the vulnerability of the youth and the elderly. More concrete interventions suggested in the document are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. Crime prevention interventions proposed in the Hungarian and Budapest legislation

Document	**Social measures**	**Situational measures**
Act CLXXXIX on Local Government 2011	Social and child-welfare services and supplies; The provision and rehabilitation of homeless people; Homelessness prevention;	Public lighting; The maintenance of public order in the municipality;
The National Crime Prevention Strategy of Hungary, 2013 – 2023	Youth educational programs; Youth leisure programs (cultural, sport, etc.); Conflict prevention and management; Alcohol and drug addiction prevention; Information campaigns; Prevention of victimisation; Expansion of victim support services; Promotion of labour market opportunities and social reintegration of prisoners;	Municipal policing; CPTED and architectural tools; Fortification of property;
Budapest 2030 Long-Term Urban Development Concept	Improving the feeling of security of the local inhabitants; Educational activities; Rehabilitation programs; Strengthening neighbourhood relations; Community control.	Street traffic regulation; Street lighting; Video-surveillance; CPTED.

The document follows the economic rationality of neoliberalism and the security state as it suggests redistribution of the task of security provision to non-state actors in achieving the Strategy's goals.

Thus, the Strategy highlights the importance of the involvement of different actors: not only the state and police, but also local authorities, communities, church communities, private businesses, and citizens themselves should be involved in security provision. Moreover, the involvement of actors should be done through cooperation based on the principle of partnership.

Additionally, the document assumes cooperation between different ministries and policy agencies as the Strategy points out that crime prevention intersects with other policy areas. In particular, according to the document, health, family, child and youth protection, sport, education, culture, fight against drugs and alcohol abuse, social, employment, nature conservation, housing, social inclusion and the integration of the Roma, anti-segregation, cyber security, and anti-domestic violence policies have a close connection with crime prevention.

As it follows from the analysis of the document, it constructs urban insecurity mainly through crime and the feeling of insecurity. Furthermore, the safety of urban physical space and the vulnerability of some socio-demographic groups are also included in the discourse on urban security. The Strategy accounts for the complex nature of the crime, acknowledging that various social and spatial conditions could facilitate it. In particular, it points at the level of education, unemployment rates, general economic situation, alcohol and drug consumption, housing situation, spatial design, the accuracy and speed of the judiciary system, etc., as factors that could induce criminal activity. The feeling of insecurity is also constructed in the document as a complex phenomenon depending not only on a place of residence and its environmental features but also on such social factors as the economic situation in the country, immigration, attitudes towards minorities, media coverage, and representation of crime in it. So, the Strategy problematises urban security as a complex social problem that should be dealt with through social and situational interventions implemented by a multiplicity of actors cooperating with each other.

Therefore, the Crime Prevention Strategy is developed in the neoliberal logic of dealing with crime: redistribution of tasks to the local level and involvement of non-state actors, and crime prevention rather than crime coercion. Besides, the problematisation of urban insecurity is complex in this document as it accounts for a variety of factors that could contribute to it. For instance, urban insecurity is problematised through the underpinnings discussed in *Chapter 2.*

The notions of crime prevention and security provision also appear in other state-level documents. In particular, in the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 29 §1 states that the Prosecution Service should prosecute criminal offences and contribute to preventing crime and unlawful acts. Besides, Article 34 §1 states that State bodies and local governments should work jointly to achieve community goals. Therefore, it provides for cooperation between intra-state bodies. The Hungarian

National Crime Prevention Council is an example of such intra-institutional cooperation and joint work of different governmental bodies. The permanent members include representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the National Police, the National Association of Municipalities, etc. One of the main tasks includes the development of legislation, crime prevention programs, and action plans. It also helps monitor their implementation. The Council harmonises the actions of the central public administration bodies and the law enforcement agencies in the field of crime prevention and urban security and supports the activities of the local crime prevention bodies.

Additionally, Act XXXIV on the Police, 1994, discusses the issue of public protection. Thus, Section 14 of the Act states that the police officer should avoid dangerous situations compromising public security. The legislation also states that the police have a duty to perform policing functions related to maintaining order in public areas and carrying out correction duties. Therefore, the document also points out that a mixture of crime coercion and prevention is adopted in Hungary.

The Hungarian police participate not only in intra-institutional cooperation but also with grass-root organisations. For example, the White Ring Public Benefit Association, a victim support organisation, has a longstanding cooperation with the Hungarian police force. Furthermore, the police sign a Cooperation Agreement in which the main aims and tasks of the joint work are stated: enforcing the rights of victims, prevention of secondary victimisation, and provision of support to victims (Cooperation Agreement between the National Police Headquarters and the White Ring Public Benefit Association, 11 July 2016).

Another organisation that assists the police is the Civil Guard Association[21], a civilian crime prevention organisation. The work of this organisation is institutionalised through Act CLXV on the Civil Guard and the Rules of Civil Protection, 2011. The Act establishes the main tasks and rights the civil guards have. In particular, they should contribute to crime prevention by patrolling neighbourhoods and, especially, territories around the nursery, primary and secondary schools to prevent child and youth victimisation. Additionally, the Civil Guard should contribute to social crime prevention by conducting information campaigns (awareness-raising) and strengthening relations between, on the one side, the police and local authorities and, on the other side, local inhabitants. Besides, the Act encourages cooperation with the police.

[21] The Civil Guard was founded in 1991. There are around 60 000 members and 2 000 associations that are a part of the Civil Guard in Hungary. There are local, regional, and national associations that are managed by the Chief Board. Therefore, they have local units in Budapest and in other cities of the country. The main aim of the organisation is crime prevention and tackling subjective insecurity. According to the research, the Civil Guard is a valuable partner of the Hungarian Police and it plays an important role in improving the perception of security (László, 2017). It is mainly ascribed to a close relation between a volunteer and a local community.

In Budapest, the sub-divisions of this organisation are present almost in every district of the city. Its members do not have the same rights as police officers, but they actively help the police with public protection, being visible on the streets, and solving minor issues in their districts. They also have an initiative where the local community can help out in crime prevention by forming a group called Neighbours for Each Other to strengthen the community bonds.

It could be noted that the cooperation with the grass-root organisations is codified at the state level. This situation could be one of the signs of centralisation in the field of urban security provision as the central state also seeks to control cooperation with grass-roots organisations and uses juridico-legal techniques to codify its perception of how such organisations could be involved. Given the already discussed limitation of the powers of local authorities, it is possible to say the current Hungarian government seeks to consolidate its power in urban security provision. However, it seems that in Hungary, there is not only hierarchical governance over urban security but also the nodal mode.

Hierarchical governance implies a top-down model in which a central state has a crucial role (Kooiman, 2003); therefore, for instance, there is the limitation of the powers of the local authorities and the control over the involvement of grass-roots organisations. Nodal governance is realised through networks of different actors that explicitly focus on complex social problems, such as sustainability or crime (Gupta et al., 2015). Based on how the legislation on cooperation with grass-roots organisations is formulated, it is possible to say that there is nodal governance in Hungary, too, as these forms of cooperation are task-specific.

As it was noted in *Chapter 3*, stigmatisation of migrants developed along with neoliberalisation. As discussed in the previous section, the interconnection between the issue of irregular migration and security is relatively new in the Hungarian legislation. In 2015, irregular migration was introduced as an urgent matter for the first time. The Hungarian government adjusted the Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum and introduced the term crisis caused by mass immigration (chapter IX/A, Article 80/A). Furthermore, the Hungarian government justified the introduction of the state of emergency due to the presence of irregular migrants in several neighbouring countries, which have made stricter regulations for entering from them. At the same time, migrants are discussed in the National Crime Prevention Strategy among the factors that might aggravate the perception of insecurity. Besides, the previous section of this chapter pointed out that the presence of 'others' (migrants, Roma people, homeless, alcohol and drug abusers) might be a factor contributing to the high perception of insecurity in the country in general and in Budapest (Barabás et al., 2018; Stefanizzi and Verdolini, 2018). For instance, the Thematic Development Programs of Budapest also mention the problem of discrimination, however, not specifying social groups discriminated against.

Urban security and crime prevention also appear in the legislation at the local level, mainly in some strategic documents. Thus, in 2013, the Municipal Assembly of Budapest adopted the Budapest 2030 Long-Term Urban Development Concept (№767/2013 IV.24). The document sets out 17 strategic goals for the city development, and urban security is discussed as an integral part of the 'optimisation of human services' target. The Concept problematises urban security mainly through the feeling of security of the local inhabitants that should be improved, the lack of trust in the police and social workers, and public safety. To deal with urban insecurity and the problems that it encompasses, the Concept introduces social and situation interventions that should be implemented in the city by 2030: education activities, strengthening neighbourhood relations, installation of lighting and video surveillance, and other interventions presented in Table 8.

One of the goals of the Thematic Development Programs of Budapest, 2015, is social and urban regeneration. The issue is problematised through the housing problem, especially the privatisation of housing, the aggravation of social inequalities resulting from it, and the physical deterioration of public spaces. Among the goals of social and urban regeneration are crime and drug prevention and improving public safety. Other goals also intersect with urban security provision as they could achieve it as a side effect: urban areas and the built environment's physical renovation; reinforcement of communities, community development, and trust-building; local economic development in order to reduce unemployment; creation of an integrated, differentiated housing system in the capital; reinforcement of tolerance and reducing discrimination.

The problematisation of urban regeneration in the Thematic Development Programs of Budapest accounts for the acute problems of Budapest highlighted in the previous section. Thus, it encompasses the problem of housing and induced by it social segregation and inequalities that have been highlighted in the previous literature on Budapest (Tosics, 2006; Brade et al., 2009; Csanádi et al., 2011). Additionally, it refers to other social problems that have also been pinpointed in the literature: lack of trust in others and state institutes, intolerance to 'others,' low living standards (Kerezsi, 2009; Kerezsi & Lévay, 2008), and urban decay (Barabás et al., 2018; Stefanizzi & Verdolini, 2018).

The security issue also appears in the Budapest Transport Development Strategy, 2014 – 2030. Among the measures that the Strategy provides for is the creation of liveable public spaces. This measure includes life and property security and crime prevention. In this aim, the provision of security and implementation of surveillance are constructed among the goals to achieve a liveable city. The same framing of security is also present in Smart Budapest: The Smart Vision of Budapest, 2017, which considers the supply of security to be one of the city's services to its inhabitants.

So, at the level of Budapest, security is problematised through authorities' aspiration to provide better services almost in every document that mentions this problem. It coincides with one of the features of a surveillance society – a dichotomy between the provision of better services and enhancing surveillance (Taylor et al., 2008). So, the authorities aim at making the city more secure for its inhabitants (a better service), but the means for achieving it are related to increased surveillance (more police patrols, video surveillance, etc.).

Summing up, the Hungarian and Budapest legislation discusses urban security usually in some strategic documents, that is, legal documents aimed at achieving some goals in the future. Through these goals, it is possible to reconstruct the problematisation of the phenomenon: it is done through such issues as crime, physical and social degradation, feeling of insecurity, socio-economic vulnerability, lack of trust in others and state institutions, and others. Given the complex nature of urban insecurity, the legislation suggests dealing with it through various social and situational interventions.

Although, as Table 8 shows, the Hungarian legislation demonstrates an official tendency towards a mixed approach or even a preponderance of social crime prevention to urban security provision, it is worth referring to the case of Hős utca already discussed in the previous section of this chapter. This case illustrates that there is a disparity between the official policies and their realisation. As previously discussed, the plan of renovation of Hős utca consisted of primarily situational actions ignoring the social problems existing around this stigmatised area.

3.2. Video surveillance as a solution to urban insecurity

In Budapest, video surveillance is usually presented as one of the tools to improve the security situation. For example, the increase in the number of video surveillance cameras is mentioned among one of the interventions in the city's physical space in the Budapest 2030 Long-Term Urban Development Concept. In the same line, CCTV is discussed in the Budapest Transport Development Strategy as it presents video surveillance to be one of the instruments to provide security in public transportation and, as a result, in the whole city. According to Smart Budapest. The Smart Vision of Budapest, smart technologies (public lighting, traffic control, video surveillance, etc.), and their combination should be applied to developing public safety.

The same approach to video surveillance as one of the tools of security provision is presented in Act LXIII on Public Space Supervision, 1999. So, public supervision implemented by the local authorities is needed to maintain public order, cleanliness of streets, the safety of public transportation, safety of public and private property, and crime prevention. Therefore, in the text of the Act, video surveillance is constructed as a multi-purpose tool.

At the same time, the Hungarian legislation provides for some privacy guarantees. In particular, systematic surveillance in public areas implemented through camera systems, drones, or any other technology is included in the Mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessment List. Additionally, §6(4) of the Act on Public Space Supervision states that the data on video cameras installed by the local governments (districts) should be published on the official Mayor's website. Besides, the public should be informed about entering the territory under surveillance through appropriate signage containing information about data collectors.

3.3. Summary

The analysis of the Hungarian and Budapest legislation reveals that urban insecurity is treated there as a strategic goal. Partly, it might reflect discussed in the previous section tendency to ignore the local context in urban policies if neoliberalism was inoculated rather than developed naturally in the country (Taşan-Kok, 2004). Therefore, policymakers can draw on examples of other cities and try to introduce 'best practice' policies in the city through strategies. However, there are some examples that still account for the problems specific to Budapest, as the analysis of Thematic Development Programs of Budapest, 2015 shows. On the other hand, it was also suggested in the literature discussed in the previous section that there is a connection between populism and neglecting current problems. Thus, populist governments are inclined to make promises of delivering some tasks in the future and ignore problems currently present in a city. In the case of Budapest, the current government aspires to restore the 'glorious past' of Budapest (Akçali & Korkut, 2015).

At the same time, the problematisation of urban insecurity in the Hungarian and Budapest legal documents accounts for the complex nature of urban insecurity and its roots as it usually comprises both 'objective' and 'subjective' sides of the phenomenon. Objective urban insecurity is problematised through crime, incivilities, physical degradation, and housing problem. Fear of crime, lack of trust in others and state institutions, social inequalities, social degradation, and other factors are included in the problematisation of the subjective dimension of urban insecurity.

Given such complex problematisation of urban insecurity, the legislation suggests contrasting the phenomenon by implementing both coercion and prevention. Within the preventive approach to urban insecurity, the legislation provides for a mixed approach, which implies the implementation of social and situational intervention. Additionally, the legislation acknowledges that other areas of urban policies might contribute to tackling the problem of insecurity.

Video surveillance is constructed as one of the ways of security provision. In particular, it is constructed as a technology facilitating the safety of people and urban spaces, maintaining public order, cleanliness of the streets, etc. Therefore, it is treated as a multi-purpose tool. Additionally, the

legislation seeks to guarantee privacy and provide CCTV signages to warn people that they are entering a zone covered by video surveillance.

The analysis of the legislation also allows to trace some signs of a surveillance society in Hungary:

- surveillance society implies centralisation, which gradually happens in Hungary;
- there is a dichotomy between the provision of better services and increased surveillance. Moreover, the Hungarian legislation constructs video surveillance as a multi-purpose tool. As the surveillance society framework shows, building a discourse on video surveillance in such a way encourages its support in the population and facilitates its acceptance (Graham, 2006; Wood & Webster, 2009);
- applying the typology of disciplinary power inherent to video surveillance proposed by Norris and Armstrong (1999), the legislation constructs it, among other functions, as a crime deterrence and authoritative response tool. Thus, video surveillance serves for crime investigation and deterrence through raising awareness of the ongoing surveillance;
- highly visible video surveillance signage should remind the observed about being constantly put under surveillance and, consequently, the discipline could be instilled (Lippert, 2009). Besides, CCTV signage reinforces the asymmetry between an observer and observed as it provides very limited information about an observer (for instance, the districts' name by which the data is collected) while the identity of surveyed could be reconstructed more fully based on video recording (Lippert, 2009);
- video surveillance is also constructed as one of the tools to make the city smart. Therefore, it might be a sign that the Budapest authorities encourage the spread of different technologies capable of collecting the information (traffic control, video surveillance) and are interested in the investment in their further development. Such facilitation of the spread of surveillance technologies and investment in them is a sign of disciplinary society as well (Kitchin et al., 2017);
- the legislation emphasises CPTED, which aims at creating spaces in which formal and informal surveillance is easier to perform. Therefore, such spaces aim at transparency, which is one of the conditions for instilling discipline (Forrester, 2014).

Simultaneously, there are some features of the security state approach toward the problematisation of urban insecurity. In particular, some legal documents suggest that non-state actors should be involved in security provision, which is in line with the state's rationalisation of the expenditures on the security provision in the security state (Loader, 1999). Additionally, the state utilises juridico-legal mechanisms to institutionalise the role of non-state actors in the field of urban security provision (for

example, Act CLXV on the Civil Guard and the Rules of Civil Protection, 2011). At the same time, given that the current Hungarian government seeks to consolidate its powers, it could be in line with the centralisation of security provision.

4. Experts: Budapest as the 'fun capital of Europe' and video surveillance as 'an interesting marriage'

4.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

As shown in *Chapter2: Literature Review*, urban insecurity is a complex phenomenon that could be considered existing as objectively as subjectively, and these two sides of urban insecurity are in a complex relationship. Therefore, the experts' interview data analysis focuses on both sides of urban insecurity and explores how the experts problematise urban security existing objectively and subjectively.

All the Hungarian experts agreed that Budapest could be considered a secure city, mainly drawing upon crime statistics. Thus, they pointed out a decline in crime rates: *"I think it's generally a secure city […] if you look at the real data, there is a huge decree in crime"* (Interview 1BE). These evaluations coincide with the statistical data demonstrated in Figure 2. Especially, experts pointed out the decline in robberies, car stealing, and house break-ins. Putting Budapest into a broader Hungarian and even European context, the experts' perception of the crime situation remained consistent as they pointed out that the situation in the city follows a general European trend of crime reduction.

The improving urban security of Budapest can be explained by the visual increase in situational crime prevention interventions. So, according to the experts, the increased presence of police patrols in the streets and video surveillance contribute to rendering the city more secure: *"If I compare what was Budapest ten years ago and nowadays, you can find, you can see much more patrols in Budapest, you can see everywhere police cars and patrols. And there are more and more CCTV cameras"* (Interview 3BE).

Despite the declining crime trend, the problematisation of urban insecurity was done by experts through criminal activity. Firstly, crime rates are higher in the capital of Hungary than in the rest of the country (as Figure 2 confirms). Secondly, some types of crime are especially acute in Budapest as it offers more opportunities for their commitment: crimes against a person (stabbing, killing), drug dealing, cheating older people, etc. Thirdly, there is crime displacement from the streets and physical space to the Internet as cybercrime becomes more widespread. For instance, there is a form of

cheating the elderly in Hungary that could be translated as 'grandchilding,'[22] and its frequency has been growing during the last few years: "*So, for example, cheating old people […] this type of things now is quite widespread, and the police have made some arrests concerning this type of crime. […] And what they [police officers] told me and what I think should be true is the crime is not on the street now, it moved to the Internet and this area. So, it's much easier to commit a crime on the Internet, so it's quite typical. So, cheating or selling things"* (Interview 1BE).

Given that an increase in formal and video surveillance was named among the reasons for crime reduction, it is possible to assume that video surveillance serves the function of crime deterrence as street crime has reduced. However, it does not fulfil its function of instilling discipline and eliminating the potential for crime because criminal activities have shifted to the virtual space.

The COVID-19 pandemic accentuated the crime displacement from streets to the Internet as restrictions introduced for the disease containment limited heavily opportunities for committing a street crime, or burglaries and, consequently, criminals shifted to the Internet: *"But nowadays, in the last few months, you know, a lot of people were at home, and they tried to commit more grandchilding crime. […] But of course, it happened much more, I've read some articles"* (Interview 3BE). In addition, although the criminal statistics was still under analysis at the moment of conducting the interviews, experts expected a rise in domestic violence because people were forced to spend more time together in their houses. At the same time, such crimes as robberies, car thefts, and burglaries were anticipated to reduce.

The reputation of Budapest as *'one of the fun capitals of Europe'* (Interview 3BE) contributes to the problematisation of urban insecurity in the experts' discourse. Budapest has a higher density of foreign tourists due to its reputation as a relatively cheap city with many entertainments. In the city centre, there is a so-called 'party district' which is located in VI (Terézváros) and VII (Erzsebetvaros) districts of the city and has many bars, including ruined bars (bars opened in dilapidated buildings), pubs, restaurants, and night clubs. As a consequence, a rate of petty crime and social disorder (mainly induced by alcohol or drug consumption) is higher in the 'party district' of the city, which, in turn, disturbs the local inhabitants of the area: *"If you are in the city centre at Friday or Saturday night, there are many drunk foreign tourists. They cause a lot of problems; they spend a lot of money, but they cause a lot of problems"* (Interview 3BE). Among the problems caused by the visitors of the party district are bar fights, rowdy behaviour, noise, street alcohol consumption and pollution, etc.

[22] It is mainly a phone-based cheating the elderly with the aim of money extortion. In particular, the most frequent form is when a criminal calls an older person and says that their child or grandchild is in some sort of a problem (for instance, car accident, injury, etc.) and they need money urgently. The criminal asks to send money to their bank account and then disappears.

On the other hand, tourists are frequently victimised in the area as they could be an easy target due to lowered vigilance. Moreover, crime rates in the 'party district' are contrary to the general crime reduction trend in the city, which is ascribed to the higher concentration of tourists there that could be easy victims for thieves: *"There are new trends emerging, like in the party district it's mostly theft which is due to the tourists coming to this area. […] Overall, the safety situation is improving, but for example, in the party district, it's getting worse"* (Interview 4BE). However, it should be noted that the estimation of tourists' victimisation might be problematic as the police statistics do not differentiate between foreign tourists and foreigners living constantly in Hungary and allocate them in the same category.

According to the experts, other problematic areas of the city are concentrated in Pest, located to the east of the Danube River. So, in addition to the 'party district,' the experts named the VIII district (Józsefváros), Hős street (X district, Kőbánya), and some of the railway stations (especially, Kőbánya railway station). Figure 3 presents a map of places that the experts mentioned as problematic.

Figure 3. A map of areas identified as problematic by the experts in Budapest

The 'party district' is represented by magenta colour, the VIII district – by orange, Hős utca – by purple, Kőbánya railway station – by red.

The problematisation of urban security of these areas was done through:

- a higher incidence of crime in these areas;
- the concentration of signs of physical decay: litter, poorly maintained houses;
- social degradation: the presence of alcohol and drug abusers, homeless, and Roma people.

For instance, Expert 3BE characterized Kőbánya railway station the following way: *"If you know Kőbánya railway station, it's a big station, it's the worst. You can find a lot of drunk people, gypsy people, drug users, homeless, a lot of cigarette stuff, and dirt everywhere."*

Despite the presence of such problems, some experts pointed out that there is a discrepancy between the reputation of these city areas and actual crime rates: *"This is also true for the VIII district because that has a really bad reputation; however, it's not the worst district in terms of security."* (Interview 4BE). The lower-than-expected incidence of registered crime in deprived neighbourhoods can be attributed to the fact that not every crime gets reported to and registered by the police: *"In fact, I would say that, for example, in Hös street, so I don't think that too much crime is committed there or announced. So, it's, probably, there are crimes which are not reported to the police. I can imagine"* (Interview 1BE).

While the Pest side of the city is considered less secure, the Buda side, located on the western bank of the Danube River, is perceived by the experts to be more secure and safer. Therefore, the experts' interviews show that Budapest is divided by the Danube River into two parts in terms of security: secure Buda and insecure Pest.

Buda is constructed as being inhabitant by wealthier people, with well-maintained houses, and less crime than Pest. Expert 3BE even stated that the life expectancy is higher among the inhabitants of Buda than Pest: "*You know that Budapest has two big parts: Buda and Pest. And it's a stereotype, but it's true when they say that Buda is much more safer. […] If you live in Buda, it's a much more expensive part of the city; if you live in Buda, you'll live like ten years more like you would live in Pest. […] So, if you go to Buda, you can find some district which is very safe, and you can find just nice houses, and there are much more rich people. The first, the second, the third district is safe; there are just a few crimes"* (Interview 3BE).

Such city division can be a sign of social stratification and segregation that was discussed in the second section of this chapter. So, wealthier social groups historically tended to settle in the western and northern parts of the city, while less so people live in the east of the city (Tosics, 2006; Brade et al., 2009; Csanádi et al., 2011).

As to the experts' discourse on subjective urban insecurity in Budapest, all of them agreed that the perception of insecurity is also improving as a growing proportion of people feel more secure in Budapest. Nevertheless, despite such a positive trend, some problems contributing to conditions of subjective urban insecurity still persist in Budapest.

The problematisation of subjective urban insecurity through crime rates is somewhat contradictory in the discourses generated by the experts. Three out of four experts pointed out that the feeling of security is not associated with crime rates. Expert 3BE, a proponent of an opposing perspective on this relationship, pointed out that citizens' awareness of declining crime rates in the city enhances their feeling of security: *"I think most of the people know that there are less crimes, most of the people*

feel better because they know that there are less crimes, so there is less possibility that somebody will commit a crime." Such discrepancy in the discourses generated by the experts coincides with the contradictory findings in the literature about the impact of crime rates on the perception of insecurity discussed in *Chapter 2: Literature review*.

Additionally, Expert 4BE provided some survey data that shows a dependency between a type of crime and fear of crime. So, the possibility of car theft generates the most anxiety (40%), followed by burglaries, while robberies and street harassment are the least worrying crimes (30% for each type of crime) for the citizens of Budapest. The same expert also provided data on the dependency between a time of day and the feeling of security. So, people feel more secure during the day than during the night in Budapest: *"From another statistic, 83% of inhabitants in Budapest think they are safe to walk around during the day, which is a good data compared to other European cities […] These numbers are much worse when people are asked how safe they feel walking around at night. In Budapest, only 63% feel safe at night, which is actually not bad"* (Interview 4BE).

The media plays an important role in shaping the perception of insecurity in Budapest. On the one hand, the media could facilitate the fear of crime as it could pay too much attention to some types of crime (especially, crime against a person) and sensationalise it: *"[T]here was a stabbing recently on Blaha Lujza square that got their [the media] attention as well and there was a stabbing on the tram recently but these are crimes against the person which will always be covered attentively by the media"* (Interview 4BE). Also, some places could be constructed as criminogenic in the Hungarian media, for instance, the above-mentioned party district. This discourse on the media is congruent with the previous evidence present in the current literature on the topic as it also shows the media's potential to construct fear of crime and geographies of fear (Shirlow & Pain, 2003; H. H. Smith, 1986; Tulumello, 2015).

On the other hand, the media could raise awareness about some crimes and reduce victimisation. Expert 1BE mentioned an information campaign in the media launched to warn the citizens about the grandchilding crime and reduce victimisation: *"And also, in the media, it's quite a lot of time announced that people should be aware and don't answer to these things"* (Interview 1BE). Simultaneously, such awareness-raising also can generate more insecurity as it constantly reminds citizens that there is a possibility of victimisation (Zedner, 2003).

The interview with Expert 1BE emerged that some spaces in Budapest are stigmatised as dangerous in the citizens' perception. She based her opinion on research conducted by her in which respondents could indicate places on a map that they consider to be insecure (as shown in Figure 4). These places

coincided with the ones mentioned by the experts and confirmed suggested earlier division of Budapest into secure and insecure by the Danube River.

Figure 4. A map of places of fear in Budapest



The most intense red colour represents the most fearful places, while the lack of colour represents the least fearful places. Source: Expert 1BE's map that was shared with me during the interview.

Expert 1BE pointed out that tramlines are perceived to be insecure due to incidents there: "*If you just look at this map that I share, it's quite obvious, there're tramlines, there's some kind of semicircles here in Budapest. So, if you just look at the map. For example, on these tramlines, there were quite a lot of incidents"*. Another explanation might be the overrepresentation of incidents on tramlines in the media that has been discussed above.

Additionally, as it follows from the map and the words of Expert 1BE, there are two other places of fear in Budapest: the already discussed infamous Hős street and the VIII district, that are inhabited by Roma people, who are stigmatised in Hungary as dangerous: *"One is Hős street […] and the VIII district. VIII district is heavily inhabitant by Roma minority people. So, there are seem to be a very problematic area. […] Yes, I should also mention that in my research, it's not my opinion, what I found, that in many times it was a possibility for the respondents not just draw on the map, but they could have an extra comment. Usually, they say, so for example, places where they can find Roma minorities, it's again a problem for them. So, again, it's sometimes it's fearful"* (Interview 1BE).

Such stigmatisation of Roma people suggests evidence for the previously discussed social segregation of the rest of the Hungarian society from them. Moreover, as the security state framework suggests, such social segregation is associated with homogeneous gentrification (Sorkin, 2008) that exists in Budapest. So, the Hungarian population demonstrates exceptionalism towards Roma people, perceiving them criminogenic and problematic. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the approach of the security state is also appropriate for the analysis of the wealthier neighbourhood of Budapest

because one of the aims of a security state is to protect one part of the population from another dangerous one (Bigo, 2006; O'Malley, 2004).

Speaking about the whole city, experts identified visible signs of physical and social degradation as contributing to rendering some urban spaces to be perceived as insecure. For example, experts mentioned litter, graffiti, and lack of proper maintenance among signs of physical degradation, while the homeless and high concentration of Roma people were named among signs of social degradation. Besides, the presence of tourists in the city centre also appears in the problematisation of subjective urban insecurity.

In sum, this part of the study shows that the experts problematised urban insecurity in Budapest through a complex of issues. In particular, they indicated crime, physical and social disorder, lack of formal control, stigmatisation of specific social groups and places, social segregation, and others. There are secure and insecure districts of Budapest; as it appears from the interview data, there is a correlation between social marginalisation and a district's reputation as insecure. On the other hand, some districts might be constructed as insecure due to the presence of tourists there and the reputation of Budapest as a 'fun capital of Europe.' Therefore, the problems may vary in their manifestation, not only in marginal and affluent neighbourhoods. Moreover, the experts also noted the role of the media in shaping subjective urban insecurity.

4.2. Possible solutions to the problem

To tackle urban insecurity, the experts discussed different interventions and measures. The respondents referred to the experiences of one of the most problematic areas of Budapest – the VIII district that started to introduce different measures in the 1990s trying to improve the situation there. The main discourse was built around crime coercion and situational crime prevention. So, the police managed to coerce street prostitution in the district: *"Maybe, not now but we have some experiences, so you mentioned this VIII district, so in this district, for example, there's the square, called Rákóczi square, it's also one metro stop. And in the past, there was a street called Bérkocsis street, and this area was a kind of no-go zone, and there were a lot of prostitutes on the street, but it was many, many years ago. And the police started to very heavy measures and after that these phenomena disappeared in a way"* (Interview 1BE).

Additionally, the district's government was among the first ones to introduce the district municipal police with the main aim of crime prevention. Expert 1BE also pointed out that the VIII district's government was among the first ones in Budapest to start installing video surveillance. Another measure that the VIII district government uses to deal with urban insecurity, especially its subjective

aspect, is CPTED by attracting investors capable of realizing such projects. So, in some parts of the district, new housing and business centre projects are built with an account for CPTED.

According to the experts, there have been examples of successful interventions in other parts of the city. The districts' governments are trying to introduce new programs: *"At the end of the 90s there was a rehabilitation program to improve the IX district, and now there is a program to improve the 'steel zones,' which are places like Kőbánya, where there used to be big factories, and now it's just old buildings that are not used"* (Interview 4BE). Expert 1BE mentioned that the government of the XIV district of Budapest launched a program to maintain the security systems of private homes. Thus, citizens should pay only for its installation, while the district government pays for its further maintenance and connects it to the police control room so that, in case of need, the police would come.

Simultaneously, Expert 2BE pointed out that since 2011 – 2012 local governments have been limited in their ability to decide on how to allocate their budget; therefore, they are less free in development of rehabilitation or crime prevention programs: *"But the independence, the autonomy of local governments is more complicated than this because in 1990 they got a lot of money even from the central budget which they could use freely. So, there were some targeted resources, but most of their resources were really free to use. And from 2010 – 2012, their money is targeted"* (Interview 2BE). Therefore, nowadays, the local governments can be limited in their choice of interventions they wish to realise as the money they receive from the central government should be spent on achieving a specific goal.

Speaking about another problematic area of the city, the 'party district,' Expert 4BE pointed out the importance of the visible presence of the formal control realised by the police in the district's streets to calm the subjective insecurity of the local inhabitants. *"There needs to be more police patrol and more control and maybe more CCTV, but I think the emphasis needs to be on the police patrols and them controlling the behaviour on the street and asking people to return inside, back to the nightclubs and bars."* At the same time, some restrictive measures could be considered ineffective and even detrimental for the area. In particular, the mayor of the 'party district' wanted to start closing entertainment places in the evening; however, such measure would significantly affect the district's attractiveness for tourists and, consequently, the businesses there.

Speaking more generally, the experts considered formal control realised through police patrols to be not only effective for reducing subjective insecurity but also the objective one. So, its effectiveness was discussed in the context of tackling drug dealing and prevention of break-ins and burglaries:

"Police are also told that if they see big vans and people moving furniture and high-value stuff, then they should send a patrol into the area to ask them about what they are doing" (Interview 4BE).

Another measure that the experts discussed was the involvement of the Civil Guard, a Hungarian analogue of the neighbourhood watch discussed previously: *"The Civil Guard is a non-profit organisation that works really well in Hungary, which is quite extraordinary compared to other European countries as well"* (Interview 4BE). However, at the same time, their joined work with the police varies from one district to another, which could be ascribed to a success of the local administration and police in establishing a cooperation with the Civil Guard, but also to personal factors. So, as Expert 2BE stated, there are sometimes ex-policemen in the Civil Guard, and they could have already pre-established connections with the local law enforcement. Besides, before the local authorities could establish district police, they had sought to encourage the Civil Guard as it was their way to deliver security provisions by involving the civil sector in urban security production.

Speaking of some problematic issues in the current policies on urban insecurity, Expert 1BE highlighted that one of the main problems of the current urban security measures implemented in Budapest is that they do not follow the crime trend. In particular, current measures aim to deal with crime as if its amount was growing, although the statistics show that it is declining: *"I recently read an article by Professor Klara Kerezsi, and she is analysing the decreasing trends. And in her article, she mentions that the measures, the recent measures, it's, how can I say correctly, so recent measures it's working in a city where the crime is not decreasing rather increasing. So, it didn't follow this decreasing trend, the measures I mean"* (Interview 1BE).

Expert 4BE also made some forecasts about the future measures that, according to him, have the potential to be implemented in Hungary. This discourse was also mainly built on situational crime prevention. So, he mentioned technological development (drone patrols and body cams) and increased investments into local law enforcement.

From the analysis of experts' interview data, it follows that there is a variation between the districts of Budapest in the ways of dealing with the problem of urban insecurity. Three main factors could explain this difference in management. Firstly, the crime rates in the district encourage the local authorities to deal with the problem in a particular way. So, local governments of the problematic districts might seek to change the space in such a way that they would be capable of instilling discipline there as the logic of surveillance society implies (Fussey & Coaffe, 2012). As the example of the VIII district shows, a high incidence of crime encouraged the district government to be among the first ones in the city to introduce the district police and video surveillance. Additionally, the VIII

district encourages the realization of CPTED to facilitate space's transparency, use of public spaces, and formal and informal surveillance.

Secondly, the personal will and interest in solving the problem of urban insecurity also play an essential role in whether the district does something about the problem of urban insecurity: *"So, normally, it's not always those local governments which are more attached to the problem of fear of crime which organise themselves to defend from the crime. But those where there's a person, an important person, who feels this responsibility, that it's important. For example, in the IV district, I know a person who got the responsibility of the vice mayor, and for him, it was a very important the topic of fear of crime and insecurity. So, he organised a kind of department or unit in the local government which had the responsibility to fight against crime and assure local security, deal with local insecurity feeling and kind of that"* (Interview 2BE).

Lastly, the problem of urban insecurity can be used for gaining political points for future elections. Consequently, districts' mayors and heads of the local police might do some interventions to attract more voters in the future: *"Every mayor and every police chief in the district knows that public security is a very important issue because if there are any problems that will lead to the end of their careers most likely. The public will judge a mayor and a police chief on the level of security in the district"* (Interview 4BE).

Another conclusion is that the experts considered crime coercion and situational crime prevention the most effective. Although they discussed the Civil Guard and their involvement, it was still discussed from the perspective of them exercising informal control over territory. Therefore, it seems that there is a discussed-above tendency of ignoring social prevention measures in the implementation of urban security measures that also impacts the discourses of the experts who can observe the implementation of situational prevention intervention and, therefore, estimate their effectiveness.

4.3. Video surveillance as one of the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity

In Hungary, the local governments are responsible for installing and further maintenance of video surveillance. At the same time, the police provide the local authorities with their services and knowledge in two major ways. Firstly, they provide advice on places in which cameras should be installed. Secondly, police officers monitor the footage and have access to the records. Due to such joint management over video surveillance, one of the experts characterized it as *'an interesting marriage'* (Expert 3BE).

However, according to the experts, there are some problems with the knowledge and services that the police provide to the local governments. Firstly, the police advise the installation of video cameras

based on their perception of crime hotspots or problematic areas, rather than actual studies of criminal activity in the area: *"The problem in Hungary and in many places anyway is that, in Hungary, the police captain asks the head of the department where was the most crime in the last few months. Ok, they don't use crime maps or any scientific method, but in their mind, there are some streets. And they put there some cameras, and the local government asks, mostly they say, ok, near the market or somewhere where they should put some cameras"* (Interview 3BE). Besides, there is no further evaluation of the efficacy of video surveillance after their installation and account for changing crime hotspots.

Secondly, the experts considered the current organisation of the work of control rooms ineffective. As Expert 3BE explained, police officers usually take extra shifts to monitor video surveillance to earn more money. Quite frequently, this extra shift follows their regular eight-hour shift; therefore, they feel rather tired to do the surveillance properly: *"So, you know, I finish my eight hours, I was very tired, and after that, I had to work other twelve hours, ok, I got money, but I couldn't watch normally the monitors. It was very bad. It's a problem everywhere in Hungary. I studied it many times; nobody cared about it. It's not effective, you know, those persons who watch monitors, they can't watch it normally."* The previous research also shows the detrimental effect of the poor organisation of work in the control rooms on the effectiveness of video surveillance (Norris & McCahill, 2006; Piza et al., 2015, 2019).

According to the experts, the local governments install video surveillance to achieve two main goals: crime reduction and calming the perception of insecurity in the area. So, Expert 4BE specified that video surveillance might be installed to prevent petty crime or physical degradation in the area: *"For example, in terms of littering, the local government is the one suggesting to install cameras in certain areas to prevent people from dumping their rubbish there."* At the same time, one of the tasks of local government is to improve the feeling of security in the district; therefore, video surveillance can be exploited for achieving this aim as well.

However, crime investigation can be a by-product of the technological update of CCTV systems installed in the area: *"So, I think these cameras are put more for the security feeling. But when a camera's hardware is changed, it's really to look for people on the street and for registration of how people move. Then, it becomes also a tool for investigation"* (Interview 2BE). Additionally, video surveillance installation is done within the project of making Budapest a smart city, as discussed in the previous section on the legislation.

Although the local authorities are responsible for installing and further maintenance of video surveillance, the state intervenes in managing video surveillance in Hungary. Firstly, it appears from

the interviews that video surveillance management gets more centralised in Hungary as there are plans to create a unified server for CCTV footage. Additionally, it could be drawn from the interviews the interest of the currently ruling party in football and investments in the infrastructure for this sport also contribute to the increase of surveillance in the country. *"Under the FIDESZ party, the country has spent lots of money on stadium security. These are due to the UEFA guidelines as well because they require to be provided with a high-quality image from CCTV if they need to identify someone later due to offending. The number of incidents that happened because of large-scale events have reduced as well"* (Interview 4BE).

From the analysis of the interviews, it emerges that there is a bureaucratic belief in the deterrent and disciplinary potential of video surveillance. Thus, in Hungary, there is an unofficial practice of installing fake video surveillance that does not actually work: *"Actually, I don't know that in Budapest how much cameras work or not work. But in ***, it happened many times. When I was an inspector, in the city centre, there were about 30 cameras, sometimes just about half of the cameras worked. So, we had cameras, but nobody cared whether they worked or not"* (Interview 3BE). However, it is expected that their mere presence should deter criminals and reduce the perception of insecurity in the area. Moreover, such presence of fake CCTV can be an element of 'stage-set security' (Coaffee & Wood, 2006) as its aim could be to show the citizens that something is done about the problem of urban insecurity and, therefore, they could feel more secure in the streets of the city.

The experts suggested that video surveillance should have some crime deterrence effect, even though there are no proper studies on this topic in Hungary. However, the crime deterrence effect is limited only to some types of crime: street drug dealing, prostitution, and car thefts because committing these crimes requires some time and, therefore, a police officer in a control room can detect them. Whereas crimes committed within a few moments can still be done in the presence of CCTV as criminals can simply cover their faces and hide their identity.

Additional evidence in favour of the crime deterrence effect of video surveillance is offered by Expert 3BE, who conducted a survey of prisoners in Hungary. The research shows that criminals tend to avoid areas covered by video surveillance as CCTV increases the chance of getting caught: *"Many people believe that criminals are crazy people, but, maybe, they aren't educated people, but they mostly won't commit the crime if they can see a camera. They don't want to go to the prison. […] You know, in the shops, where there are a lot of cameras, there will be less crime, because nobody wants to go to prison"* (Interview 3BE). However, from this summary of the research results, it

follows that video surveillance does not impose expected disciplinary power but instead induces crime displacement to the areas not covered by surveillance.

Besides, Expert 4BE draws a similar conclusion of crime displacement effect induced by video surveillance: "*I always say that the prostitute that operates in a certain area won't get a job in Tesco just because of the CCTV but will go to a different area to continue doing the same work. The VIII district was a perfect example of this; when in 2000, video cameras were installed, prostitution and the other crimes that come with it like pimping, drug dealing completely disappeared from the district. However, looking at the data from Budapest, this reduction couldn't be seen if you looked at the whole city and not just the district."*

The districts' governments take into account the crime displacement effect from video surveillance. Thus, Expert 4BE provided some evidence that crime displacement from one district to another took place in Budapest: *"There was a meeting where I took part, and the chief police from the VIII district said how the number of car thefts went down in the area, and then the chief police from the IX district said that their numbers actually went up."* Consequently, it could have encouraged districts governments to install video surveillance more or less equally throughout the city to avoid such crime displacement in the future. At the same time, districts differ in terms of resources they have and can allocate for maintenance of and updating the technology: *"There is a difference in quality because there are some cameras that were installed a long time ago"* (Interview 4BE). In turn, it could affect crime prevention and investigation abilities of CCTV as they become outdated.

Obviously, the full coverage of Budapest with video surveillance can lead to crime displacement to other cities of the country. Experts 4BE suggested that Great Britain's surveillance experience might be a solution for avoiding further crime displacement effect. However, he pointed out that Hungary should not follow the same path. *"One of the solutions is to install cameras in the whole country like in England to push out the crimes outside the country, where they have about 5.9 million cameras […] but I don't think this should be the road for Hungary"* (Interview 4BE).

The experts suggested that technological development will improve video surveillance efficiency for crime prevention. For instance, using predictive policing for the installation of CCTV in crime hotspots could improve its performance significantly: *"But, actually, the problem is that nowadays there is predictive software, maybe, you have heard about predictive police. If you could use predictive software, this software can tell us where we should put the cameras. So, it would be very good for us"* (Interview 3BE). Additionally, the development of an artificial intelligence software capable of recognising dangerous objects and movements could contribute to crime prevention: "*So, I also read some very nice articles and these were about not just about face recognition, but in that*

article, I've seen some examples of the system, the system they developed, the artificial intelligence system, they can recognize, for example, knives and some kind of equipment which can be dangerous. But not only these tools but they can recognize movements of people, so it's very interesting. […] [I]t's an automatic system; it can make an alert. And if it happens, maybe, the police can react more quickly, but it's not working recently; it's future. But it's making decrease or prevent some type of crime, yes" (Interview 1BE).

As to the perception of security, experts considered video surveillance to be quite effective for reducing the fear of crime and the feeling of insecurity in Budapest: *"I heard citizens that nowadays are so much relaxed because there's CCTV installed. […] the majority of people are more relaxed because of it"* (Interview 1BE). Besides, since the video cameras are distributed equally throughout Budapest, the city inhabitants do not have any difference in their perception in secure and insecure areas: *"About 15 years ago there was a difference, and you could say that people felt much better in those areas where there were more cameras, but because it is quite even now, I couldn't say there was a difference in how people perceive them in different areas"* (Interview 4BE). So, video surveillance has become a normal part of urban settings; it is no longer noticeable. However, there is a difference in the perception of video surveillance in different areas of the city. If, in general, people rely on video surveillance to protect themselves in areas perceived as criminogenic, they will still prefer the police patrols to be present.

The research also shows that the introduction of CCTVs to the area might also attract some economic activity to it as entrepreneurs might feel more secure to open a shop and other types of business in the area: *"People in the VIII district felt much safer after this [the introduction of video surveillance], they were okay to leave their houses at night because they couldn't see those people who were causing them trouble before, companies opened shops in the area"* (Interview 4BE). Therefore, video surveillance might encourage economic activity in a problematic area as its perception changes, and citizens can use public spaces more frequently and, consequently, the place attracts further investments and business activity (Fussey & Coaffe, 2012).

According to the Hungarian experts, the majority of the Hungarian population welcomes the video cameras and does not have privacy concerns: *"I think, mostly people like cameras and, mostly, they don't care about, you know, personal right. In Hungary, it's not a big problem. […] But in Hungary, you know, also the people who don't commit crime, they don't care about it. Ok, they are here, the police can hold the record for three days, but they don't care about it"* (Interview 3BE). From this quotation, it follows that the non-acceptance of video surveillance might provoke further surveillance over such people as they probably have something to hide if they do not want CCTVs to be installed.

The Hungarian population does not distinguish whether a camera is operated by the local authorities or some private body. Partially, it might be attributed to a lack of awareness about the cameras in the streets, which might be due to their low visibility or their blending in the urban environment.

Although the current study focuses primarily on video surveillance cameras installed by the local administration, Expert 4BE brought up the topic of CCTV installed in legally 'grey' zones as they survey semi-private or semi-public territories. In general, privately-maintained cameras cannot survey public areas; however, banks are struggling in surveying ATMs located outside bank offices and abiding by the law as they would still survey public spaces. Apartment buildings are another example of such a 'grey' zone as there are some common areas, and if inhabitants wish to survey common areas, they should obtain the support of 2/3 of the inhabitants of the building. At the same time, the police can ask to have access to footage taken by private bodies for the purposes of investigation.

The analysis of the experts' interview data shows that video surveillance is constructed as a part of the solution to the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, the experts pointed out that the technology can generate the perception of security of urban spaces and calm the fear of crime. Furthermore, there is almost no resistance towards video surveillance. The only drawback is that with time the technology becomes a part of a normal urban setting that is not noticeable anymore.

As to the objective side of urban insecurity, the experts were more critical in evaluating video surveillance. Although they related the reduction of crime rates to the increase in video surveillance, they also pointed at some serious drawbacks. Thus, they noticed a problem of crime displacement from the areas covered by video surveillance. Besides, police patrols could be more effective for crime prevention, and the reduction of urban fear as a physical presence of a guardian who can react faster is considered more effective.

4.4. Summary

The experts problematised urban insecurity in Budapest through such phenomena as crime, incivilities, stigmatisation of some social groups (the Roma people and homeless) and places, social and physical disorder, and others. These issues contributed to the problematisation of urban insecurity's objective and subjective dimensions. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the experts constructed urban insecurity as a complex phenomenon. The experts also highlighted the role of the media in framing urban insecurity discourse as it tends to overrepresent some types of crime.

Despite the complex problematisation of urban insecurity, the experts discussed mainly situational interventions implemented in the city: increased formal control, installation of video surveillance,

redevelopment of urban spaces, and others. This might reflect the already discussed above tendency of the Hungarian authorities to ignore social interventions when implementing the policies. It might contribute to a suggestion that the prevention measures in Budapest are designed for a city with increasing crime rates, instead of a city with decreasing crime rates as it is in Budapest. The additional problem is that sometimes the problem of urban insecurity is not addressed unless there is a civil servant in the district's administration who is interested in tackling the issue.

The experts perceived video surveillance positively in terms of the production of urban security. Therefore, the technology could contribute to tackling the problem in Budapest. Mainly, it might be effective for tackling subjective urban insecurity as people feel more protected in the presence of video surveillance. Furthermore, in Budapest, the population does not have any privacy concerns, and, therefore, there is no resistance to the spread of surveillance in the city. The main drawback is that nowadays, people might not even notice the presence of video surveillance cameras as they have become a normal part of the urban environment. As to objective urban insecurity, although the experts partially attributed the reduction in crime rates to the presence of video surveillance, they pointed out some issues: crime displacement, ineffective work of control rooms, etc. Therefore, the presence of street police patrols might be more effective than CCTV for both subjective and objective urban security provision.

The analysis of the expert's interviews also allows to distinguish some signs of surveillance society logic behind the provision of security and surveillance in the city:

- video surveillance has a crime deterrence function as defined by Norris and Armstrong (1998). Although video surveillance can deter some street crime and burglaries because the police registered crime rates have been decreasing during the last few years, video surveillance failed to instil discipline as criminals shifted to new virtual spaces;
- the increase in formal control is constructed as one of the most effective tools for solving the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, the experts discussed the increase of the police patrols and their involvement, which implies the increase of formal surveillance. According to the respondents, such formal surveillance deters crime in the areas in which it is introduced;
- there are some signs of centralization and concentration of power in the field of security provision in Hungary. The current Hungarian government tries to centralize the power by putting local governments into the vertical of power and limiting their freedom of budget allocation. Moreover, it actively participates in the centralization of video surveillance by creating a unified server for all the footage and promoting surveillance in sports infrastructure;

- video surveillance is an element of ‘stage-set security’ (Coaffee & Wood, 2006) or 'security theatre' (Schneier, 2008) as the installation of fake CCTVs can be interpreted as a visible attempt of the local authorities to show the inhabitants that something is done about their security concerns;
- video surveillance, along with other interventions, stimulated the economic activity in the area (Fussey & Coaffe, 2012), and the experts provided some evidence that business activity increased in the areas after the installation of video surveillance.

Simultaneously, there are some signs of security state logic in Budapest. They are especially evident in wealthier neighbourhoods of the city. Thus, there are signs of homogeneous segregation from others as described by Sorkin (2008) and ‘stranger society’ (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). In particular, the interview data shows that the wealthier population of Budapest tends to segregate from the places of fear and those whom they consider fearful (Roma people, homeless, drug addicts). Figures 3 and 4 are visible representations of it, as they demonstrate that all the places of fear are located in the Buda side of the city and, as Interviewee 1BE commented, quite often people consider the presence of the Roma people to be a part of the problem there.

The same logic of exception is visible in the experts' attitudes towards those who do not accept video surveillance: they do so because they have something to hide. Therefore, such people might be considered suspicious and require further surveillance as opposing video surveillance might signify suspicion and deviance.

Additionally, the security state framework might facilitate an explanation of the fact that video surveillance is not capable of instilling discipline and could just deter some crimes. The surveillance state framework suggests considering crime as a rational action (Clarke, 1995; Felson, 2002; Garland, 2001). Therefore, if a criminal is rational and knows that there are CCTVs, they will shift to another physical or even virtual space to maximize their utility and minimize the risks of being caught.

5. NGOs’ perspective: Living ‘in peace and safety’ in Budapest and video surveillance as a ‘two-sided coin’

5.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

The representatives of the grass-roots organisations coincided with the experts in their general estimation of security in Budapest. So, they described Budapest as a secure city due to declining crime statistics and a lack of organised crime there: *“Overall, we live here in peace and safety. We don’t have gangs and drug wars, we don’t have any real no-go zones, we don’t have problems with migrants”* (Interview 1BV). Visible signs of securitisation of Budapest also contribute to the construction of the city as secure. More specifically, the interviewees noted the increased presence of

formal control realised by the police and video surveillance on the streets. The increase in formal control can also be attributed to the creation of a standby police force in Hungary.

Despite acknowledging the decline in street crime, the representatives of NGOs still problematised urban insecurity through crime. More specifically, they discussed such street crimes as mugging, stealing, car theft, drug dealing, and fast driving. Besides, the problem of gender-based violence and violence in family and relationships appeared in the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest. As Interviewee 1BV puts it: *"Most of the murder cases are not the result of an attack on the street; unfortunately, they are the result of domestic violence."* Also, hate crimes based on ethnicity can happen in Budapest. Mainly foreigners constantly living or temporary in Hungary fall victims to these crimes.

Moreover, as it follows from the words of Interviewee 2BV, the police usually misidentify the nature of the crime against the foreigners: *"For example, we had cases with immigrants, but not really immigrants, students, for example, who are foreign, or foreign employees who were attacked on the street. And really, I think the police are not really experienced in dealing with these cases. So, if someone goes to the police station with: 'I'm attacked because I'm, I don't know, Indian,' and they say that 'I'm a migrant and I was attacked,' they say it was a minor assault, and that's it. But it's not a minor assault. It's a hate crime. The differentiation is not really good"* (Interview 2BV).

Additionally, the interviewees noted crime displacement from the streets to the Internet as criminals explore new opportunities for committing a crime. The grandchilding crime contributes to the problematisation of urban insecurity by the NGOs' representatives as it illustrates a shift of crime from physical to virtual space.

The representatives of grass-root organisations also noted that the COVID-19 emergency accentuated crime trends. Firstly, it did so by reducing opportunities for committing street crimes or burglaries since people were restricted from going out and mostly stayed at home. Secondly, it facilitated crime displacement from the streets. On the one hand, the interviewees suggested that there could have been a rise in domestic violence, even though the official statistics might not reflect it: *"Domestic violence is a very latent thing; we don't see how that has changed during the coronavirus crisis. In Hungary, the neighbours don't report this kind of thing anywhere, even if they do notice it"* (Interview 4BV). On the other hand, the interviewees assumed that there was a rise in crime committed on the Internet (grandchilding and selling fake medicine against COVID-19): *"Unfortunately, the virus is only an opportunity for perpetrators, so they made some new stories to deceive unsuspecting people. So, we recognise a new trend in fraud: they try to sell medicine against corona… and people believe them and buy this useless pill for a fortune"* (Interview 1BV).

Visible signs of both social and physical urban degradation contribute to the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest. In particular, the interviewees mentioned public drug consumption, homelessness, and neglected urban areas. Public drug consumption has been an acute problem for the last several years due to an increase in drug consumption by young people with a marginal background. Additionally, Interviewee 3BV noted that the popularity of cheap synthetic, 'designer' drugs contribute significantly to the problem of public drug consumption.

Although homelessness appears in the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest, Interviewee 3BV highlighted that a difference should be made between street homelessness and street crime as homeless people often do not commit any crime. Talking about this issue, Interviewee 3BV said: *"We have to emphasise that there is a big difference between the street homelessness, so the people who live on the street, and the crimes that made or happen on the street of Budapest from the view of urban insecurity, because a lot of crime that happen in streets are not made by homeless people."* Therefore, from this except, it follows that homeless people are stigmatised in the public's mind as dangerous and criminogenic, even though there is no evidence of causality between street homelessness and street crime. On the contrary, homeless people can fall victim to abuse or hate crime: *"We have a feeling that when, for example, youngsters fired the tent of homeless people who live in the forest or in the street, yes, it can be a hate crime. But we don't have data. So, the high number that I mentioned previously, that every third are abused on the street, so we don't think all of these abusing because of hate"* (Interview 3BV).

The stigmatisation of the homeless became acuter with the start of the COVID-19 pandemic since extremely marginal social groups such as the homeless could not stay at home because they simply did not have one. Therefore, health risk has added to the perception of homeless with the start of the coronavirus pandemic. For instance, Interviewee 2BV formulated her feelings and experiences of encountering the homeless people and street beggars during the times of the pandemic the following way: *"So, it, as if people who can afford to stay at home, stay at home because they can afford to deal with this crisis in this way. But there are people who can't; I don't know, people who are begging or things like that. […] And you get kind of angry because you try to stay at home. […] You really don't want to be prejudiced against them, but that's what I experience."*

As to the visible signs of urban physical decay, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations named Hős utca as the most problematic area of Budapest. The insecurity is problematised through a lack of maintenance and extreme physical degradation, *'inhuman conditions'* (Interview 1BV) on the street. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate hard infrastructural conditions and the level of urban decay on the street. Additionally, Interviewee 1BV highlighted the proximity of the street to the city centre, which

could be noted in Figure 3 in the previous section, and other city attractions such as the National Stadium (Puskás Aréna). For this reason, the interviewees failed to understand the local government's lack of attention and inability to solve problems on the street.

Figures 5 and 6. Conditions of life in Hős utca (Budapest)

Source: Interviewee 1BV's photos shared with me during the interview.

Simultaneously, the interviewees named some problematic districts in which the local governments try to solve the problem of insecurity. For example, Interviewee 2BV referred to the experience of the VIII district, the previous and current governments of which are interested in rendering the district more secure for its inhabitants. In particular, she stated: *"I live in district VIII, so I have more information about this. I know that the former leadership of this district put an emphasis on more security for the district's residents, but the new one as well. So, obviously, district VIII is such an obvious centre for prevention, this kind of attention that they needed to do this. So, I think it's developing."* This extract also confirms the experts' suggestion that among the main factors for realising security interventions are the presence of problematic phenomena in the area and the personal will of people in the local government to solve these problems.

Despite the positive changes in the district, from the discourses generated by the representatives of NGOs, it emerges that there are still crime-related problems there. In particular, fake estate agents rob foreigners who are looking for accommodation in Budapest.

There are also problems in the secure districts of Budapest. The main discussion was built around the first district, an affluent district located on the west shore of the Danube River and in which the main historic centre (the Castle Hill) is. Interviewee 4BV has a secure reputation mainly due to low crime rates, especially for car thefts, burglaries, and street tricksters. Nevertheless, there are signs of physical degradation, traffic issues, an influx of commuters during rush hours, and the grandchilding crime.

The pandemic also affected some places in the first district because they required more scrutiny as they were constructed as places of enhanced health risk in the governmental guidelines. For example,

Interviewee 4BV noted that playgrounds required more patrolling as they were closed to contain the spread of the disease: *"During the coronavirus crisis, we have patrolled the playgrounds more to check that people are not using them, the local governments closed them everywhere in order to slow down the possibilities of infection"* (Interview 4BV).

Despite various social and situational problems in Budapest, the interviewees stated that the perception of security improves in the city. Interviewee 2BV described the current situation with the perception of urban security in the city in the following way: *"I would say that the feeling of security has developed. Just to think back a few years, I think moving in the city, especially, inner-city, under crossing became, I don't know why, I wouldn't say they put cameras or something, but I think we can feel much more secure, safe in the city."* Although she struggled to identify some factors explaining it, Interviewee 4BV named enhanced formal control, Civil Guards' patrols, and different interventions in the physical space realised by the local governments (space renovation programs) as primary factors contributing to the increasing perception of security.

Among the factors contributing to the perception of insecurity, it is possible to distinguish from the interviews with the representatives of NGOs the following ones: a lack of people on the streets after dark, a lack of proper lighting, and the presence of 'others' (mainly the homeless people). Thus, Interviewee 2BV pointed out that the presence of people on the streets and proper lighting in the city centre is an advantage in comparison with the periphery of Budapest: *"I used to live in the XVIII district, which is way more out of the city, and I felt afraid more there because it can be so dark and lonely at night, I never felt this in the city."*

Furthermore, the presence of the homeless can provoke tension between a charity organisation and local inhabitants. Interviewee 3BV brought up a conflict in the XIII district, an affluent neighbourhood located in the north of Pest. The local inhabitants had a perception that not enough had been done by the organisation to tackle the problem of rough sleepers in the district. The organisation managed to resolve the tension through information campaigns and by engaging in direct communication with the local inhabitants: Additionally, opening a shelter for homeless people might be a source of tension between the local inhabitants and the organisation providing for the homeless. However, the organisation solves it through information campaigns in which they clarify that there is no connection between homeless people and crime, insecurity.

From the interviews, it appears that Budapest can be divided into two big parts – Buda and Pest – in terms of the perception of insecurity. Interviewee 4BV pointed out that people have different expectations from visiting Buda or Pest. Buda is visited for more luxurious experiences (for instance, more expensive restaurants and leisure establishments), while Pest – for cheaper entertainments.

Consequently, the areas attract different people: wealthier visit Buda and those looking for cheaper places – Pest: *"It is very different in every district, for example around Nyugati train station and at Oktogon there are crowds even at 11 pm, 12 or 1 am. In the first district, we have the castle, but people don't stay out so late as in other parts of the city. There are very different people who come to the first district, for example to a posh restaurant, than those people luring around Nyugati station"* (Interview 4BV).

The reproduction of a negative reputation of some city areas also appears in the interview data. For instance, Interviewee 2BV, when talking about the VIII district, pointed out that some people might still consider the district to be dangerous despite the changes implemented by the local government. Therefore, once an idea that some area is dangerous entrenches itself in the public's perception, it is very robust and hard to change these labels.

Such robust stigmatisation of insecure places can also appear in affluent districts. In particular, Interviewee 1BV noted that heavy traffic could create conditions in which people have a robust perception of a place as insecure even if nothing objectively dangerous has happened there: *"Let me give an example: there is an underpass in the III district of Budapest, under a terribly busy street of the surroundings. If we carried out there a survey about the feelings of people when they cross the underpass, certainly they said: we felt unsafety. But I worked there as a police officer, and I know, nothing ever happened there"* (Interview 1BV).

Summing up, this part of the research shows that the representatives of the NGOs constructed urban insecurity as a complex phenomenon. In particular, such issues include criminal activity and its changing and adaptive nature, visible signs of social and physical degradation and the visible presence of 'others' on the streets of the city, lack of formal control, lack of proper maintenance of the city streets, and others contributed to the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest. Additionally, the robustness of stigmatisation was discussed by the interviewees. Besides, the problematisation of urban insecurity by the representatives of the grass-root organisations, just like by the experts, reflects the city-specific problems. In particular, the interviewees problematised urban insecurity through homelessness and exclusion of homeless people, xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners, segregation from the poor and Roma people, delay and obstacles in implementing renovation programs, and others.

5.2. Possible solutions to the problem

The representatives of NGOs discussed both situational and social crime prevention measures to deal with urban insecurity. As it was already discussed above, according to the interviewees, the presence of police patrols reduces the crime rates and enhances the perception of security in urban spaces.

Interviewees also highlighted the importance of districts law enforcement units as they can implement situational interventions: *"In addition, in Hungary, every local municipality can decide to establish an own policing unit. They are called: Public Space Surveillance. They are not police officers, but they can fine for parking, littering and control public spaces"* (Interview 1BV). In addition to it, Interviewee 4BV highlighted the importance of other officials who can contribute to security provision by exercising control (for instance, transport ticket controllers and others) and video surveillance.

Additionally, the interviewees highlighted the importance of trust in the police and the maintenance of regular contact between the police officers and local inhabitants. Interviewee 1BV discussed one of the ways that the Hungarian police tries to establish a trusting relationship and also raise awareness about crime: *"For example, try to keep contact with elderly people, or making crime prevention projects. One of them is called: Go to homes. In this program, police officers talk about crime with inhabitants."* The importance of trust of the local inhabitants in the police was highlighted by Interviewee 4BV, who suggested that having regional police officers who have a strong relationship with local inhabitants can improve their trust significantly in the police and reporting criminal offences to them: *"What would be best is to have the regional police officers live in the neighbourhood where they work so they can get to know the people in the area and vice versa and the locals get to trust the officers as well. If the locals notice something, then they are more likely to report it to the regional officer once that trust is there between them"* (Interview 4BV). From this quotation, it follows that there is a lack of conviction that the police could protect in a case of offence or take actions to investigate a criminal offence in the Hungarian population. For these reasons, the Hungarians are not prone to report criminal offences to the police officers they do not trust.

Such conviction about the importance of direct communication between the police and local inhabitants can come from the experience of Interviewee 4BV. The interviewee said that the cooperation with the representatives of blocks of apartments facilitates a lot of the work of the Civil Guard as these people might report some issues once trust has been established.

At the same time, Interviewee 2BV stated that the police lack staff, which makes their work more difficult, especially in crime prevention: *"I know local police stations and municipal police stations are struggling with lack of numbers. So, I think that they would try much harder to prevent crimes and, for example, prevent crimes with their presence on the streets, but they don't have the numbers to do so"* (Interview 2BV). However, Interviewee 4BV noted that law enforcement resources differ from district to district. As it was mentioned previously, the districts have a right to form their local law enforcement units, which creates a discrepancy between them: *"It's a unique situation that every*

district has their own law enforcement now. In addition to this, there are also community support officers in every district. It is not a well-balanced model" (Interview 4BV).

Speaking of other situational interventions, speed checks were also discussed as a tool for the prevention of road accidents: *"I think it is also a great measure to do speed checks as most traffic accidents are correlated with speeding. Even those signs that tell you how fast you're going and tell you to slow down are really good at slowing down people because you automatically brake when you see them"* (Interview 4BV).

Representatives of grass-root organisations also acknowledged the contribution of other than their own NGOs to making Budapest more secure. For instance, Interviewee 2BV mentioned that the VIII district encouraged the appearance of a neighbourhood watch that works in a close connection with the police there.

NGOs also participate in educational programs that aim at crime and victimisation prevention. Moreover, according to Interviewee 2BV, these educational programs are aimed not only at potential victims, children, and adolescents but also at the police officers and social workers dealing with crime victims in their daily work. So, Interviewee 2BV talked about her organisation's experience in participation in educational activities in Budapest.

Additionally, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations discussed their cooperation with the district governments. So, Interviewee 2BV pointed out that it is easier for her organisation to establish and maintain a day-to-day contact with municipalities as they are more approachable: *"For example, in our day-to-day work, we contact municipalities because they are easier to contact. So, we can participate in the projects and these kinds of things financially as well. So, it's easier to build the relationships for day-to-day work."* Furthermore, district governments are directly involved in solving local problems such as homelessness security provision; therefore, they might be more open to communicating with NGOs. Additionally, Interviewee 2BV suggested that nowadays, districts have mainly left-wing leadership that also facilitates communication with them.

Interviewees considered friendly and solid personal relations with the local government or the police to be an important facilitator for cooperation. Another way of establishing informal relations with the state bodies is the presence of former or current civil servants or police officers on a board of an organisation. Additionally, a successful realisation of a joint state-NGOs project could lead to its further development and creation of even more extensive projects. Thus, Interviewee 2BV talked about the development of a greater educational project from their application to the III district's education project for one school: *"For example, one of the latest cooperation with district III started from a school because they needed assistance with a victim support case. And then we started working*

with the school, and then the social department, and then it grew into a larger project. And we have few districts like this or for financial reasons as well but also to work on this project, and then we can move and implement these projects for other districts, for example."

Simultaneously, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations noted that having just an informal connection might not be enough as it still does not allow them to participate in policy-making or formulation. Therefore, their experiences and opinions are under-represented in the policies.

The interviewees also noted a failure of the city and districts' governments to address the problem of homelessness: *"I think, here, in Budapest, the crucial point is the situation of homeless people. We don't have an integrated system to solve their problems, so they can spend their time wherever they want"* (Interview 1BV). Such failure could be ascribed that every district of the city has different resources to tackle the problem of homelessness: *"And it's [homelessness] also a very difficult issue to solve, so different districts have different means"* (Interview 2BV).

The Hungarian government also failed to deal with the problem of homelessness as, according to the interviewees, it just tried to remove the problem by banning sleeping on the streets and introducing fines for it. Besides, it seems that not only the representatives of NGOs share this opinion but also the Hungarian population in general. As Interviewee 3BV put it, drawing on some survey data: *"A lot of people, more than 61% thought, that these laws just vanish the problem. So, it's not a real solution to be punished for homeless people because they live on the streets. So, people see that it's only a shadow implementation, so it's not a real solution, or governments make stricter and stricter rules […]. But we see and, thanks to God, many people see that it's, doesn't work, so it's not a real solution."*

This inability to deal with the problem of homelessness might be another indicator of the Hungarian and Budapest governments' tendency to implement situational policies and situational crime prevention in practice. It is especially notable given that the local governments have a task of homeless rehabilitation as stated in Act CLXXXIX on Local Government, 2011, Section 13(17). Such a lack of proper attention to the social issues and solutions has been already noted in this research by drawing on the example of Hős utca and in the analysis of the experts' interviews.

In contrast, the representatives of NGOs paid a lot of attention to social crime prevention as they discussed the neighbourhood watch, educational programs to prevent victimisation, establishing direct contact with the local inhabitants, and others. Indeed, they also mentioned situational crime prevention as they discussed the visibility of formal control video surveillance, but the main discourse was built around social crime prevention. Mainly, it could be attributed to the social nature of work made by the grass-root organisations that participated in this study: provision of services for the

homeless, victim support, and neighbourhood watch. Therefore, this result also suggests that the NGOs can generate a contrast to the official discourse on critical social issues, which confirms the results of the research on Hungary by Gőbl and Szalai (2015). Consequently, it is germane to study their opinion to understand what perspectives on different social issues there are in society as legal and NGOs' discourses might impact the public's opinion and perception of the problem.

5.3. Video surveillance as one of the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity

The interviewees believed that video surveillance could be effective for crime prevention and investigation. So, Interviewee 2BV stated it the following way: *"And it's [the installation of video surveillance] a good idea because I think we have to take these small steps to prevent crimes, not just solve them after they have happened."*

Video surveillance's crime deterrence effect was also demonstrated in the experience of one of the organisations. Thus, Interviewee 3BV's organisation that works with the homeless installed video surveillance at the entrance to a shelter for the homeless people to protect women who were attacked by their partners. The organisation did not have enough security resources to prevent the attacks; therefore, they decided to invest in CCTV:

"I: It helped, the cameras helped us and, of course, the ladies. But it was not enough, so we had to renew or rethink the procedure of the entering of the ladies. So, we made cameras on the walls and made posters, information posters on the walls to warn people that they can be watched by cameras. And we think that these things were useful.

I: So, like, information posters were more useful than actual cameras?

R: Yes."

Therefore, this extract illustrated the deterrence potential of video surveillance but at the same time showed the importance of the visibility of video surveillance and awareness of its implementation.

The representatives of NGOs also suggested that the local governments invest in video surveillance because it works. On the one hand, it implies some economic rationality behind the installation of CCTVs because if a tool is effective, it is worth investing in it. On the other hand, it could reflect 'stage-set security' as video surveillance is a visible representation that the government is concerned about security and does something about this problem.

The interview data also confirms the supposition of the bureaucratic belief in at least deterrence or maybe even disciplinary potential of the mere visible presence of the video surveillance. In the previous section, one of the experts referred to an unofficial practice of installing CCTVs that are not actually working but are just present in the city's streets. Interviewee 2BV also mentioned this practice

that might be implemented for crime deterrence and reassuring the local inhabitants: *"Also, I was just thinking about, I don't know if it's still true or just an urban legend that there're lots of cameras, maybe, the majority of cameras that are not working, just are put there to resemble working cameras, so that people would feel more secure and others are being watched. So, they are there just for psychological effect."*

Simultaneously, interviewees shared an opinion that if a crime is widespread and an economic or social loss from it is not high, the police might not even use video surveillance to investigate it: *"Because I also think that there are lots of cameras and they don't necessarily use it, for example, to investigate a crime because mugging is so common that they won't request a camera recording from a tram, for example, for all muggings on trams because there are so many that they don't investigate"* (Interview 2BV). Therefore, it could encourage further crime since it is not appropriately investigated. Moreover, it undermines citizens' perception of surveillance as an effective tool because they experience that video surveillance is unnecessary if not used for the investigation.

The interviewees also suggested some limitations for video surveillance in terms of crime prevention. Firstly, they suggested that video surveillance can prevent only certain types of crime: car thefts, break-ins, burglaries, etc. Secondly, the interviewees noted that if a criminal is motivated to commit a crime or breaks the law regularly, they will still do it. For example, Interviewee 2BV formulated it the following way: *"It discourages people from committing crimes, who wouldn't commit crimes, and those who generally commit crimes and are used to doing it, they won't be discouraged from doing it by I don't know how many cameras. […] So, it's like this two-sided coin."*

Thirdly, video surveillance systems should be installed so that the whole area could be visible from the control room. However, as mentioned in the previous section, in Budapest, video surveillance can be installed based on an opinion rather than a study. As a consequence, it happens that there are some 'blind spots' not covered by video surveillance. Interviewee 4BV phrased it the following way: "*The previous mayor in this [first] district didn't listen to the police officers; he decided where to put the cameras. Therefore, in some areas, the cameras didn't 'see' each other, and they were put in places that aren't well frequented. Of course, there are certain areas where it is more likely that a crime will be committed, and the mayor didn't pay attention to this."*

Additionally, a lack of staff in a control room can obstacle the effectiveness of video surveillance as workers there are not capable of conducting surveillance properly: *"You can imagine a room like this has a wall completely covered with monitors and the people in the room are required to pay extreme attention all the time. Sometimes there are 8-9 cameras that they need to be looking at"* (Interview 4BV). Therefore, the same interviewee stated that the presence of formal control realised by the

presence of the police or the Civil Guard could be more effective than just watching video surveillance records.

Another side effect of video surveillance – crime displacement – also appeared in the discourses generated by the representatives of grass-roots organisations. Thus, Interviewee 4BV noted that this effect happened in Budapest when one of the districts' governments installed video surveillance for tackling the issue of prostitution: *"When the cameras were first installed, it was mainly to get rid of prostitution and take them off the streets, but this meant they were just pushed to another district."*

As to the impact of video surveillance on the perception of insecurity, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations considered CCTV to be a helpful tool for improving the perception of security. Furthermore, the inhabitants of Budapest sometimes request the installation of video surveillance and other means of fortification (for instance, Interviewee 2BV also mentioned lighting) as in the area of inhabitation as in their residential buildings.

However, Interviewee 1BV suggested that the mere presence of video surveillance is not enough for assuring people. There should be awareness of the human-technology connection: there should be police patrols that react immediately if a video camera's gaze catches something suspicious.

Simultaneously, the presence of video cameras in an area that is considered insecure can generate conflicting emotions among people living there or visiting it. On the one hand, people might feel more protected in an area perceived as insecure due to the presence of CCTV. On the other hand, if an area is full of video cameras, it might provoke the perception of an area as insecure because people could rationalise it by thinking that the district's government installed them because the area is criminogenic: *"I absolutely think that it has this double effect. Therefore, I would add also that if you have lots of cameras, yes, especially these large ones, you feel that this must be a risky area so that they put these many cameras. So, that's one fact. That's why I said that I must admit that they are effective, but they cause this feeling of stress, I don't know, for example"* (Interview 2BV).

According to the NGOs' representatives, the citizens of Budapest are not concerned about privacy issues and treatment of the data collected via video surveillance. In particular, the local inhabitants do not feel more concerned if private organisations or individuals employ the cameras. Simultaneously, the respondents said that there are some situations in which they personally consider video surveillance as an intrusion into their private life: *"For example, I really wouldn't like it if they installed cameras in our house because I wouldn't like to be watched 24/7. […] And there are other cameras, for example, in all corners of a shop or, for example, I myself am really enraged by cameras in schools and institutions. […] And I know that there are cameras that delete their file after some days or weeks. But it still doesn't feel good"* (Interview 2BV).

The findings from this part of the study suggest that in the discourse of NGOs' representatives, video surveillance appears as an instrument that can be a partial solution to the problem of urban insecurity. However, there are some limitations in creating the conditions of urban security. For instance, it is limited in its crime deterrence as not all criminals would stop their activity due to the presence of cameras. Another example is that if the work of control rooms communication between the technology and police officers is not well organised, it will affect the perception of video surveillance as a protection tool.

5.4. Summary

The representatives of the NGOs considered urban insecurity as a multidimensional phenomenon that impacted their problematisation of it. In particular, they problematised urban insecurity through crime and its changing nature, social and physical disorder, stigmatisation of some social groups and people, social and physical segregation, and other issues.

Given the complex nature of urban insecurity, the representatives of the NGOs also suggested tackling it by implementing a mixture of social and situational interventions, prioritising the former. Thus, they discussed the following interventions as effective for tackling urban insecurity: visibility of formal control, video surveillance, neighbourhood watch, establishing trust between the institutions of security provision and the local inhabitants, education, etc.

Therefore, video surveillance is considered as a part of the solution to the problem of urban insecurity. It might be effective for reducing both objective and subjective urban insecurity by, on the one hand, reducing crime rates and, on the other hand, reassuring the local inhabitants. At the same time, the interviewees discussed some drawbacks of the implementation of video surveillance: for instance, it could cause crime displacement, or the police might not use video surveillance for investigating or preventing some more minor crimes (like pickpocketing). In turn, it might affect the impact of video surveillance on both objective and subjective dimensions of urban insecurity.

The analysis of the interview data also allows to unveil some signs of surveillance society's logic behind the provision of security and surveillance in Budapest:

- the interviewees suggested that an increase in surveillance as technological (CCTV) as formal human (patrols) has led to the improvement of the security situation in Budapest, which could be due to the crime deterrence effect of increased surveillance;
- there is a dichotomy between the provision of better services by increasing surveillance and collecting more data on individuals through it because the local authorities invest more and more in this technology. On the other hand, one of the characteristics of a surveillance society

is the ability to collect and analyse an immense amount of information. However, from the interview data, it appears that sometimes an amount of collected data is so enormous that it is not even utilised (as in the case of mugging on trams);

- there is a crime deterrence effect from installing video surveillance and, more importantly, informing the population about the ongoing surveillance. However, they provided some evidence that there is a failure in delivering discipline instilment because crime might be displaced to other districts and spaces;
- video surveillance might be an element of 'stage-set security,' as the representatives of NGOs, like the experts, referred to an unofficial practice of installing CCTVs that are not actually working but are put there as an element of formal control and to reassure the public that something is being done about their concerns;
- some part of the Hungarian population might be concerned about a lack of privacy in public spaces as CCTVs deprive them of it (von Hirsch, 2000);
- the heightened presence of video surveillance might contribute to creating spaces of fear as the presence of highly visible surveillance might be considered a sign that an area is dangerous (van der Wurff et al., 1989; Williams and Ahmed, 2009).

At the same time, there are some signs of a security state approach towards security and surveillance in the city. Thus, the Hungarian society shows a tendency to exclude those who are deviant in some way (homeless, Roma people, foreigners, drug addicts, etc.). Mainly, it is evident in the wealthy parts of the city, as the case of the XIII district demonstrates. An exclusionary approach is also applied to those opposing video surveillance as they might have something to hide; therefore, they might require further surveillance and scrutiny.

Additionally, the crime displacement from physical to virtual space can be interpreted from the perspective of a security state that suggests that criminals, as rational actors, seek to maximise their utility. Given that the streets of Budapest are getting more and more saturated with surveillance, criminals shift from the physical to virtual space as it offers new opportunities to commit a crime and fewer chances of being caught. Furthermore, there is an economic rationalisation of video surveillance installation (Bigo, 2006). Thus, the interviewees suggested that the technology should fulfil its functions (crime deterrence and/or crime investigation) because otherwise, the local governments would not invest in them.

The analysis of the interviews with the representatives of the grass-roots organisations also shows that there is some resistance to both surveillance society and the security state. Although the interviewees suggested that an increase in surveillance, securitisation, and fortification might bear

fruit in terms of creating urban security, the proponents of both theoretical approaches pointed out that there is a critical side-effect from their implementation – the erosion of social ties, interaction, and solidarity (Koskela, 2002; Norris & Armstrong, 1999; Spitzer, 1987). At the same time, the representatives of NGOs pointed out the importance of establishing a trustworthy relationship between the population and the different actors in the field and also between the members of the population because it would greatly facilitate the creation of conditions of urban security.

6. Multilevel modelling of the relationship between the subjective urban insecurity and the number of video surveillance cameras in Hungary

The presentation of multilevel modelling results follows the analytical strategy described in Section 5 of *Chapter 6: Research methodology.* Besides, before proceeding to the main analysis, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the Hungarian sample and correlation analysis of the variables are discussed. The main aim is to account for possible effects that could impact the results of multilevel modelling.

6.1. Socio-demographic characteristics and descriptive statistics

Regarding the socio-demographics of the Hungarian sample (see Table 9), women account for a bit more than half (53%) of all the respondents. The mean age of Hungarian respondents is 49, and the median is 47. Concerning the income, respondents who can cope with their present income were the largest group, accounting for 59%. More than two-thirds of those surveyed lived in various cities (big cities, small cities, and towns), which is in line with the statistics provided by the World Bank.

As it follows from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 10, the deviations of the variables collected at the individual level are not very high in Hungary. Therefore, to test for the outliers, a three standard deviations (SD) rule of thumb was applied (Grafarend & Awange, 2012). That is, it was considered that values within interval were calculated the following way:

$$(Mean - 3 * SD; Mean + 3 * SD) \qquad \text{Formula 18}$$

account for 99.7% of the dataset.

Table 9. Demographic characteristics of the Hungarian sample (N = 1661)

Variable	Category	n	%
gndr	male	783	47.1
	female	878	52.9
agegroup	15 - 19	103	6.2
	20 - 29	228	13.8
	30 - 39	247	14.9
	40 - 49	320	19.3
	50 - 59	237	14.3
	60 and over	526	31.7
hincfel	Living comfortably on present income	155	9.7
	Coping on present income	938	59.0
	Difficult on present income	417	26.3
	Very difficult on present income	80	5.0
domicil2	A big city or suburbs/outskirts of a big city	556	33.2
	Town or small city	611	36.8
	Country village	490	29.5
	Farm or home in the countryside	4	0.2

At the regional level, the deviation for CCTVs per 100 000 inhabitants slightly exceeds the interval presented in Formula 18. Thus, the three SDs rule of thumb interval should be the following (-94.8; 208.2), while the maximum number of CCTVs per capita in Hungary is 225.7. However, given that the maximum number of CCTVs does not exceed one more SD from the upper boundary, it was decided to keep all the observations in the sample.

Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the Hungarian dataset

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
aesfdrk	2.1	0.6	1.0	4.0
gndr	1.5	0.5	1.0	2.0
agegroup	4.2	1.6	1.0	6.0
hincfel	2.3	0.7	1.0	4.0
domicil2	2.0	0.8	1.0	4.0
pplhlp	4.8	2.3	0.0	10.0
trstplc	6.4	2.4	0.0	10.0
imwbcnt	3.9	2.0	0.0	10.0
sclmeet	3.4	1.6	1.0	7.0
health	2.3	0.9	1.0	5.0
crmvct	2.0	0.2	1.0	2.0
cctvpc	56.7	50.5	6.3	225.7
robberypc	11.5	4.3	4.7	17.3
publicordpc	111.5	43.5	40	195.9

6.2. Bivariate correlations

A correlation analysis between the individual-level variables of the Hungarian data revealed that most of the variables have moderate but statistically significant correlations between them (see Table 11). So, in Hungary, the feeling of safety is positively associated with:

- gender (women feel less safe walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark);
- subjective estimation of household's income (those living in more challenging economic conditions feel less safe);
- and subjective estimation of own health (those with worse perceived health feel less safe).

Simultaneously, feeling of safety is negatively associated with:

- type of settlement (those living in big cities feel less safe);
- the belief that others are trustworthy (those who think that others should not be trusted feel less safe);
- trust in the police (those mistrusting the police feel less safe);
- frequency of social life (those having less strong social connections feel less protected);
- and previous victimisation experience (those with the previous victimisation feel less safe).

The only relatively high and statistically significant correlation exists between age and subjective health (0.571). Therefore, to test for possible multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated, and the threshold of the value of five suggested by Hair et al. (2010) was applied. As it follows from Table 11, all the VIFs are less than two; therefore, there is no risk of multicollinearity.

The analysis of the correlation of county-level variables showed that the number of CCTV per capita has moderate negative but statistically significant correlations with the rate of robbery and the rate of public order crimes (Table 12). At the same time, there is a positive and strong correlation between rates of robbery and public order crimes (0.722). However, VIF is less than three; therefore, there is no risk of multicollinearity.

6.3. Multilevel modelling

Following the steps suggested by Hox et al. (2018) and described in *Chapter 6: Research methodology*, the first model calculated for the Hungarian data was the intercept-only model. As it follows from the results presented in Table 13, ICC is approximately 0.13 for the model, which indicates that about13% of the total variance in the feeling of safety is explained at the county level.

At the next step, the individual-level variables entered the model. The analysis shows that almost every independent variable has a statistically significant relationship with the dependent one, except for gender and attitudes towards migrants. Also, trust in the police has a very low impact on the dependent variable. These results are in line with the correlation analysis in Table 11.

Table 11. Correlation matrix for individual-level variables for Hungary.

	aesfdrk	*gndr*	*agegroup*	*hincfel*	*domicil2*	*pplhlp*	*trstplc*	*imwbcnt*	*sclmeet*	*health*	*crmvct*	*VIF*
aesfdrk	1											
gndr	.044*	1										1.018
agegroup	.028	.092***	1									1.598
hincfel	.135***	.013	.112***	1								1.149
domicil2	-.078***	-.012	-.007	.177***	1							1.043
pplhlp	-.148***	-.010	-.095***	-.164***	-.045*	1						1.189
trstplc	-.132***	.039	.039	-.183***	-.003	.235***	1					1.089
imwbcnt	-.026	-.039	-.041	-.152***	-.103***	.280***	.069***	1				1.125
sclmeet	-.139***	-.104***	-.369***	-.163***	-.072***	.244***	.072***	.170***	1			1.239
health	.155***	.072***	***.571******	.267***	.084***	-.167***	-.074***	-.089***	-.302***	1		1.613
crmvct	-.193***	-.029	-.037	-.072***	-.004	.084***	.050**	-.017	.035	-.081***	1	1.017

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).*

Table 12. Correlation matrix for county-level variables for Hungary

	cctvpc	*robberypc*	*publicordpc*	*VIF*
cctvpc	1			1.02
robberypc	-.066***	1		2.117
publicordpc	-.084***	***.722*****	1	2.131

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

By adding the individual-level variables into the model, the deviance went down, which means that the quality of the model improved (also confirmed by the calculation of the chi-square difference). Additionally, slight growth in ICC suggests that the larger proportion of the total variance (around 15%) of the dependent variable is explained at the county level.

Previous victimisation experience, subjective health, and type of settlement had the most prominent and almost equal standardised coefficients. Therefore, they have almost the same impact on the feeling of safety when walking alone after dark. Interpreting these coefficients, it is possible to say that those with the previous victimisation experience, worse subjective health, and living in bigger cities have lower estimations of their safety.

Another group of variables that also have a statistically significant impact on the feeling of safety comprises age, subjective estimation of income, the solidity of social ties, and trust in others. Standardised coefficients of these factors are lower than those from the first group but still statistically significant. It is possible to interpret these impacts that those who are younger, with lower subjective income, less solid social ties, and less prone to trust others feel less safe when walking alone after dark.

What emerges from this multilevel analysis stage is that personal and socio-demographic characteristics such as age, type of settlement, health, and previous victimisation have a higher impact on the feeling of safety than more ontological and social ones. Therefore, following the literature review and especially Giddens (1991), I refer to such factors as trust in others and the police to the ontological security, while precarious economic situation and migration are considered social factors.

Therefore, the interpretation of these results might be made through the vulnerability perspective as, according to it, a person considers themselves to be more vulnerable to a crime due to their physical or socio-economic status (Gates and Rohe, 1987; Will and McGrath, 1995; Kristjánsson, 2007; Wyant, 2008; Brunton-Smith and Sturgis, 2011; Wallace, 2012; Britto, 2013; Lorenc et al., 2014; Herda, 2016; Rader et al., 2020). The individual-level variables model suggests a combination of physical and socio-economic status vulnerabilities. Thus, to physical vulnerability might be referred younger age, poorer health status, and being victimised previously, while such factors as financial status and living in a bigger city, in which usually more crime happens due to the opportunities there, can be referred to as socio-economic factors.

Table 13. Multilevel models for Hungary

	Intercept-only	**Individual-level variables**		**1- and 2-level variable**		**Random effects**	
Fixed effect	*Coeff (SE)*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff.*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff.*
constant	2.091*** (0.04)	3.416*** (0.209)	–	3.588*** (0.237)	–	3.347*** (0.395)	–
gndr		0.035 (0.03)	0.029	0.036 (0.03)	0.03	0.03 (0.029)	0.025
agegroup		-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.112***	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.112***	-0.042*** (0.011)	-0.112***
hincfel		0.084*** (0.023)	0.097***	0.087*** (0.023)	0.1***	0.084*** (0.023)	0.097***
domicil2		-0.107*** (0.023)	-0.14***	-0.109*** (0.023)	-0.143***	-0.11** (0.0137)	-0.144**
pplhlp		-0.024** (0.007)	-0.09**	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.086**	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.079**
trstplc		-0.017* (0.007)	-0.066*	-0.017* (0.007)	-0.066*	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.062*
imwbcnt		0.001 (0.008)	0.003	0.001 (0.008)	0.003	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.01
sclmeet		-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.095***	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.098***	-0.031· (0.016)	-0.08·
health		0.093*** (0.021)	0.142***	0.089*** (0.021)	0.136***	0.094*** (0.024)	0.144***
crmvct		-0.535*** (0.083)	-0.158***	-0.533*** (0.083)	-0.157***	-0.418* (0.147)	-0.123*
cctvpc				-0.001· (0.001)	-0.083·	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.083
robberypc				-0.028* (0.011)	-0.196*	-0.029* (0.011)	-0.203*
public ordpc				0.002 (0.001)	0.143	0.002 (0.001)	0.143
Random effect	*Variance (SD)*	*Variance (SD)*		*Variance (SD)*		*Variance (SD)*	
constant	0.026 (0.162)	0.027 (0.165)		0.018 (0.134)		1.845 (1.358)	
residual	0.176 (0.493)	0.159 (0.399)		0.159 (0.399)		0.15 (0.388)	
domicil2						0.017 (0.132)	
sclmeet						0.001 (0.049)	
health						0.002 (0.049)	
crmvct						0.234 (0.483)	
Deviance	3108.1	2610.0		2601.8		2566.0	
ICC	0.129	0.145		0.102		0.925	

**** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 · p < 0.1*

Significance is not calculated for the random effects. It is estimated by performing a chi-square difference test showing whether adding variables to the model statistically improves its quality.

The next step of the multilevel analysis is adding the county-level variables into the model. Here, the number of CCTV cameras installed by the local authorities per capita, the number of robberies per capita, and the number of public order crimes per capita entered the model. Their addition has a slight impact on the individual-level coefficients. For instance, there is a slight growth in the coefficients for subjective income, settlement type, and social life frequency. In turn, the coefficients for trust in others, subjective health, and previous victimisation experience reduce slightly with the introduction of the county-level variables. Therefore, the interpretation of the impacts of individual-level variables remains the same since the coefficients were not significantly affected by the introduction of the county-level variables.

As it follows from Table 13, the addition of county-level variables led to the reduction of ICC, so that 10% of the total variance in the feeling of safety is explained at the county level. Nevertheless, the reduction in the model's deviance is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, as shown in the chi-square difference test performed through the ANOVA table.

At this stage, the number of CCTV per capita has a negative association with the feeling of safety. It can be interpreted that with the rise in the number of CCTVs installed in the county, the feeling of safety increases. Unexpectedly, the number of robberies per capita is also negatively associated with the feeling of safety: in the areas with higher rates of robberies, the feeling of safety is higher. The possible explanation for it could be that robberies are mainly committed in areas where more affluent people live, therefore, places with a reputation of being secure.

At the last stage, the random-effects model is tested. This step tests whether some individual-level explanatory variables have a different effect for each county. Following the recommendation by Hox et al. (2018) and aiming at avoiding the overparameterisation of the model, the random effects are introduced based on a variable-to-variable principle, and the models are compared (through the chi-square difference test) to test whether the addition of the new parameters leads to the significant changes in its quality. After testing the models, the following individual-level variables are found to have a different effect for each county in Hungary:

- the type of settlement;
- the solidity of social ties;
- the subjective health;
- and the previous victimisation experience.

The introduction of the random effects affects the regression coefficients. In particular, the coefficients for subjective income, type of settlement, trust in others, trust in the police, frequency of social life, previous victimisation experience, and the number of robberies per capita fall

slightly. On the contrary, the regression coefficient for subjective health shows moderate growth. Additionally, the coefficient for the number of CCTV per capita loses its statistical significance.

As shown in Table 13, the introduction of the random variance of individual-level variables across counties leads to the rise of ICC to 0.925, which means that around 93% of the total variance in the feeling of safety is explained at the county level. Additionally, the reduction in the deviance is significant at the 0.01 level, as shown in the chi-square difference test performed through the ANOVA table. Therefore, given the significant increase in ICC compared to the previous model, it is possible to say that there is a variance in the feeling of safety and factors explaining it between counties in Hungary. However, this variance seems to be explained better by the variance in individual-level variables than by the variables measured at the county level (CCTV per capita, rate of robberies, and rate of public order crimes).

From the practical point of view, the introduction of random effects allows calculating the 95% predictive interval of the regression coefficients of the individual-level variables in the counties. It is done by subtracting and adding 1.96*SD of the distribution of the variable to the unstandardised regression coefficient. Hence, 95% predictive interval of the regression coefficient for the type of settlement is (-0.369; 0.149), for the intensity of social life – (-0.127; 0.065), for subjective health – (-0.002; 0.19), and for the previous victimisation experience (-1.365; 0.529).

The analysis of the final model shows that one of the most important factors impacting the feeling of safety is the rate of robberies: the higher the rate of robberies is, the safer a person feels. Again, it might be explained by a higher rate of robberies in areas that are usually considered secure. As to the personal-level factors, among the most important factors are subjective estimations of health, type of settlement, and previous victimisation experience. These variables, along with the financial status, correspond with the vulnerability perspective as they relate to perceiving oneself as being more vulnerable to crime due to physical and socio-economic factors. In the meantime, more ontological and social ones, such as trust in others and the state institutions, the solidity of social ties, and migration flows have a weaker relationship with the feeling of safety.

However, these results should be interpreted with caution because the level of aggregation is relatively high, that is, the level of the county. Moreover, as discussed in *Chapters 2* and *3,* video surveillance is a part of the spatial design of local spaces because video surveillance should be highly visible to have a deterrence or disciplinary impact on the surveyed. Therefore, higher levels of aggregation might not account for that. Nevertheless, the model shows some interesting insights into the nature of fear of victimisation in the Hungarian population as it shows the dominance of the vulnerability perspective in the explanation of fear of crime. Consequently, there is the preoccupation for oneself, while larger social and ontological factors are less influential in defining

one's fear of urban spaces in Hungary. This result suggests that the perception of self as vulnerable impacts the problematisation of urban insecurity in Hungarian society.

7. Discussion

This part of the research set out to understand how the problem of urban insecurity is problematised and what solutions to it, with a particular focus on video surveillance, are constructed in the Hungarian society and, more specifically, in Budapest. To achieve these primary goals, the analysis of the legislation, semi-structured interviews with experts and representatives of NGOs, and statistical analysis have been undertaken.

The research has shown some similarities and differences in the problematisation of urban insecurity by legislation, experts, and the representatives of the grass-root organisations. Thus, all the analysed sources accounted for the complex nature of urban insecurity. Therefore, crime (especially burglaries, robberies, break-ins, etc.), incivilities, and physical degradation have appeared in the problematisation of the objective side of urban insecurity. The subjective urban insecurity was problematised through high fear of crime, lack of trust in others and state institutions, social inequalities and segregation, social and physical degradation. Furthermore, there is an impact of objective insecurity factors on the perception of insecurity in Budapest.

At the same time, some differences in the construction of urban insecurity have also been traced. So, for instance, only in the legislation appeared explicitly the housing problem of Budapest that has several implications for the society, as discussed in the second section of this chapter. In turn, the experts and the NGOs' representatives have added the changing nature of the crime (in particular, crime displacement from physical to virtual space), stigmatisation of some social groups (the Roma people, homeless, poor, drug addicts, etc.), geographies of fear and their reproduction, lack of formal control as factors contributing to the problematisation of urban insecurity. Additionally, the experts highlighted the role of the media and sensationalisation and overrepresentation of crime in it, which generates the perception of insecurity in the population of Budapest, while the NGOs' representatives named sometimes insufficient attention and delay in renovation programs, lack of training of the police officers to be also problematic in Budapest.

Therefore, there are some differences in the problematisation of urban insecurity between the legislation, experts, and the NGOs' representatives. It could be attributed to the ways and level of involvement. Thus, most of the legal documents ignored the city-specific problems, which could be due to inoculation of neoliberalism, later peculiarities in the process of neoliberalisation in the country and the illiberal turn, and an officially colour-blind approach. Simultaneously, the experts

and the representatives of NGOs discussed the city-specific problems which might be attributed to their direct involvement in the environment of production of urban insecurity.

The statistical analysis also contributes to understanding the problematisation of subjective urban insecurity. The multilevel modelling highlights the important role of self-perception as vulnerable against a criminal due to physical or socio-economic factors. Although some interviewees brought up the topic of the vulnerability of the elderly, it was mainly related to 'grandchilding' crime which is not in a direct connection with the urban setting. Therefore, the multilevel modelling results highlight the importance of physical and socio-economic vulnerability for understanding urban insecurity in Hungary.

As to the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity, both situational and social crime prevention interventions appear in all the analysed materials, although with some peculiarities. Thus, officially, the legislation follows the neoliberal trend of a mixed approach to dealing with crime and urban insecurity. However, the realisation of some renovation projects shows that the Hungarian authorities are more prone to situational solutions. This tendency might have impacted the discourse of the experts on the solutions to urban insecurity, too, as they mainly focused on the situational interventions implemented in Budapest. It should be highlighted that such inclination towards situational interventions might also be related to the left-right wing views of the local governments, as it was pointed out by Interviewee 2BV, who noted that the districts, led by left-wing governments, are more interested in tackling social issues in the territory. However, as the experts pointed out, an official's interest in solving the issue also contributes to the involvement of the district's authorities in solving the problem of urban insecurity.

The experts also demonstrated an inclination towards situational solutions to the problem because their discourse revolved around such actions as increased policing, surveillance, and others. In contrast, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations were more in favour of social interventions as they discussed the necessity of educational programs, neighbourhood watch, establishing trustworthy relationships in the society, etc., as the leading solutions to the problem of urban insecurity. It could be explained by the fact that the work of the NGOs' representatives has a social nature as they are involved in providing services to the homeless, victim support, and neighbourhood watch.

Video surveillance is constructed as a part of a solution to the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, the legislation and all the interviewees considered video surveillance a crime deterrence tool. Although it should be visible, there should be appropriate signage about ongoing surveillance. Simultaneously, there are different limitations in implementing video surveillance as a solution to the problem of urban insecurity pointed out by the experts and NGOs' representatives. For

example, not every crime type could be prevented by the presence of video surveillance, the poor organisation of work of control rooms, lack of human-technology connection, and other limitations were named by the respondents. Moreover, there are some adverse consequences from the implementation of video surveillance that could take the form of crime displacement.

The legislation and respondents construct video surveillance as a tool for calming the fear of crime. Additionally, the interview data suggests that there is authorities' belief that video surveillance should improve the perception of security as allegedly there is a practice of installing CCTVs that are not actually working, which is done with a double purpose of crime deterrence and reassuring the population. On the other hand, the heightened presence of video surveillance can reinforce geographies of fear as it might signify that a place is not secure and criminogenic. The statistical analysis does not confirm a connection between the fear in urban settings and the number of video surveillance cameras.

Additionally, the results of semi-structured interviews show that the formal control realised by the physical presence of the police officers might be more effective as for crime prevention as for calming the perception of insecurity. Therefore, it emerges from the analysis that technologies still cannot replace human surveyors as the latter could react faster to dangerous situations, deter crimes, and might facilitate more trust in others and the police.

There are also some theoretical implications from this part of the study. The current research investigates whether there is a co-existence of different logics of security and surveillance provision within one city. The empirical research on Budapest shows a combination of surveillance society and the security state's logics in urban security provision there. However, as the analysis shows, the former is more prominent.

Thus, the study unveiled the following signs of a surveillance society in Budapest:

- centralisation, which gradually happens in Hungary through the centralisation of power in urban security provision and the creation of a unified server for all the CCTV cameras in the country;
- there is a dichotomy between the provision of better services and increased surveillance;
- video surveillance as a multi-purpose tool that serves not only for security provision but also for the provision of other services in the city;
- redevelopment of spaces applying CPTED that increases visibility and transparency of the spaces;
- increase in formal control (the presence of the street police patrols, video surveillance, CCTV signage) could deter crime and stimulates economic activity in the city;

- there are signs of ‘stage-set security,’ one of the manifestations of which is an alleged practice of installing video surveillance cameras that do not actually work;
- some part of the Hungarian population might be concerned about a lack of privacy in public spaces as CCTVs deprive them of it;
- the heightened presence of video surveillance might contribute to the creation and reinforcement of spaces of fear as the presence of highly visible surveillance might be perceived as a sign that an area is criminogenic.

Simultaneously, there are some features of security state logic towards urban insecurity. Interestingly, they are more pronounced in the discourses regarding more affluent neighbourhoods of Budapest. Thus, there is a tendency towards segregation of a wealthier part of the population from the poorer, Roma people, and others and, consequently, from the places of their inhabitation, which are concentrated in Pest side of the city. Therefore, it could be considered a ‘stranger society,’ in which everyone who does not confirm the norm and shows deviance should be excluded.

Interestingly, the logic of profiling is also applied to those who do not accept video surveillance. Such people are considered to have something to hide; they do not comply with the norms fully and, therefore, require further investigation and surveillance.

SecA securityate framework might also be applied to explain some phenomena. In particular, criminals are constructed as rational actors, which might explain their shift from an increasingly fortified physical space to the virtual one. The COVID-19 pandemic has facilitated this transition. Additionally, such construction of a criminal might explain a failure of video surveillance to instil discipline: a criminal would not commit a crime in a place that is covered by a CCTV system.

Interestingly, the analysis of the interviews with the representatives of the grass-roots organisations also shows that there is some resistance to both surveillance society and security state. Although the interviewees suggested that an increase in surveillance, securitisation, and fortification might bear fruit in terms of creating urban security, the proponents of both theoretical approaches pointed out that there is a critical side-effect from their implementation – the erosion of social ties, interaction, and solidarity (Koskela, 2002; Norris & Armstrong, 1999; Spitzer, 1987). At the same time, the representatives of NGOs pointed out the importance of establishing a trustworthy relationship between the population and the different actors in the field and between the members of the population because it would greatly facilitate the creation of conditions of urban security.

Chapter 7: Urban insecurity and video surveillance in Milan

1. Introduction

This chapter explores how the phenomenon of urban insecurity is problematised in Milan. It also aims to understand what solutions are constructed to tackle the problem effectively and whether video surveillance is considered among them. Following the logic of the problematisation analysis, which implies that the studied phenomenon is grounded in a particular historical context, the first section of this chapter explores the socio-economic and political background in Italy and, more specifically, that of Milan. The following section examines how urban insecurity is problematised in the current Italian and Milanese legislation and whether video surveillance appears there as a solution to the problem. Then, the chapter proceeds to the discussion of the results of the semi-structured interviews. Specifically, the two respective sections discuss how urban insecurity is problematised in Milan by the experts and the NGOs' representatives and what solutions to it they perceive to be effective. The multilevel modelling of the statistical data for Italy is presented in the following section dedicated to a study of a relationship between the number of video surveillance cameras as an element of the urban environment and the feeling of fear in an urban space. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the main results of the problematisation of urban insecurity in Milan and Italy.

2. Milan: A south European metropolitan city in the XXI century

In *Chapter 5,* it was stated that there are differences in socio-economic and political backgrounds between Hungary and Italy. Therefore, to account for it and facilitate the understanding of the studied problem in the Italian and, specifically, Milanese context, this section is devoted to describing its specificities.

The current body of literature on the development of neoliberalism and neoliberal policies in Italy suggests considering the 1980 – 1990s as a starting point for the process of neoliberalisation (Favretto, 2003; Ferragina & Arrigoni, 2021). Italian neoliberalism has been deeply rooted in Italian intellectual, economic, and political history since the end of the First World War (Masini, 2019). Among the most prominent intellectuals and institutes impacting the development of neoliberal thought in Italy were B. Croce, L. Einaudi, Ceses[23] think-tank, and Bocconi University (Ferragina & Arrigoni, 2021; Masini, 2019).

In the 1990s, the adaptation of neoliberalism was accentuated by socio-economic and political changes that unfolded in Italy. One of such changes was the end of the party system that had

[23] Centro studi e ricerche su problemi economico-sociali [Institute for Studies and Research on Economic and Social Problems].

existed in the country from the end of the Second World War, so-called the First Republic, due to an extensive political investigation of corruption ('Mani pulite' and 'Tangentopoli'[24]) in 1992. More than 5 000 civil servants were put under the investigation and several political parties dissolved as a result of the investigation (Democrazia Cristiana, Partito Socialista Italiano, Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, and Partito Liberale Italiano[25]) (Koff & Koff, 2000).

This political system crisis impacted the country's social and economic life. Thus, the society experienced rapid deindustrialisation, the disappearance of traditional social networks, loss of institutional trust, fragmentation of social identities, and intercultural and racial conflicts (Melossi & Selmini, 2009). However, this situation did not provoke a sharp rise in registered crimes, as Figure 7 shows. On the contrary, since 1990, crime rates have been more or less stable, fluctuating between 4 000 and 5 000 per capita, and since 2007 there has been a slight but discernable decreasing trend with some oscillations.

Figure 7. Registered crimes per 100 000 inhabitants in Italy and Milan



Data sources: for Italy – ISTAT, for Milan – Statistical Integrated System of the Municipality of Milan (SiSI). The agencies provide absolute numbers of registered crimes; therefore, I made calculations for 100 000 inhabitants.

The new government, appointed after the political scandal in 1992, started the implementation of austerity programs, among which was the elimination of the indexation of salaries in accordance with inflation rates (so-called *Scala Mobile*[26]), privatisation program, etc. (Ferragina & Arrigoni, 2021; Goldstein, 2006). The 2008 economic crisis has also facilitated the austerity programs. In particular, budgetary cuts affected education (cuts on public schools, increase in the number of students per teacher, etc.), healthcare (health pacts between the state and the regions that limited

[24] 'Clean hands' and 'Bribesville.'
[25] Christian Democracy, the Italian Socialist Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party, and the Italian Liberal Party.
[26] Sliding wage scale.

the access to healthcare services beyond the basic level), labour market (easier laying off of workers, further promotion of precarious working conditions, etc.) and other sectors (Andretta, 2018).

Forestiere (2009) identified an interesting feature of Italian neoliberalism. In particular, she noted that both centre-right and centre-left parties seek to implement and develop neoliberal policies. It is attributed to the 'catch-all' character of the Italian political parties that aims to get as many votes as possible by shifting to the centre of the political spectrum. In such a way, a policy continuation is formed in Italy.

Some authors propose to characterise Italian neoliberalism as selective. Selective neoliberalism is marked by the beginning of institutional changes and adaptation at the margins and their gradual extension to the whole society (Ferragina & Arrigoni, 2021). Therefore, it might strongly affect more vulnerable and marginalised social groups as institutional changes impact them in the first place. In particular, the authors refer to the growing flexibilisation of the labour market (for instance, the introduction of fixed-term contracts that offer fewer guarantees to employees) and the pension reform (for example, an increase in the retirement age, encouragement of the dissemination of private pension funds, etc.).

The end of the First Republic and the acceleration of the adaptation of neoliberalism in Italy also affected the security sector in general and urban security in particular. So, in the 1970 – 1980s, in Italy, institutional actors formed a discourse of war against organised crime, more specifically, the mafia and terrorism. In the 1990s, it shifted and expanded to a broader public urban insecurity, street crime, and urban decay (Ricotta, 2016). Since the beginning of the 2000s, urban security policies have expanded to traffic, migration, employment, environment, criminal activity, development of peripheries, and other urban policy issues. Therefore, urban security became an umbrella concept, ever-expanding to other areas of urban policy (Maneri, 2018).

Against the background of a new discourse on urban security and due to social changes provoked by the end of the First Republic, citizens' fear of crime started to grow along with an increasing demand for security provision in urban spaces. Consequently, since the beginning of the 1990s, local authorities have been requesting the expansion of their role in urban security provision as the primary role belongs to the Ministry of Interior and the national criminal justice system responsible for public security (Melossi & Selmini, 2009).

As a result of a broader request of the local authorities for responsibilities expansion, in 1993, Law 81/93 introduced the direct elections of mayors. In 1994, the regional government of Emilia

Romagna set up the project Città sicure[27] with the main aim of the promotion of crime prevention, producing studies and analysis of the policies' efficacy (Melossi & Selmini, 2009). In 1998, the first Protocolli di Intesa[28] between the prefectures[29] and municipalities were signed in Modena. The main aim of the Memoranda was to distribute security provision responsibilities, encourage knowledge sharing, and implementation of shared activities of the institutional actors (Ricotta, 2016). In 2001, the amendments to the Constitution gave more tasks to the local authorities in the field of urban security. At the same time, the Constitution still highlighted the leading role of the national state in public security provision. Therefore, the current urban security provision system is decentralised and based on the principle of subsidiarity: the national government performs those tasks that the municipalities cannot implement (Ricotta, 2016).

The trend towards decentralisation in urban security provision lies within the logic of neoliberalisation. Another characteristic of neoliberal urban policies is a preventive approach that is also traceable in Italy. Thus, the local authorities, that is, mayors and municipalities, seek to develop and implement different crime prevention interventions. However, there is a difference in the interventions implemented and promoted by the centre-left and centre-right governments. While the former focuses mainly on social crime prevention and integrated security policies that imply the involvement of citizens in security provision and production, the latter gives preference to situational crime prevention through increased policing, CCTV, fences, and other interventions in physical space (Melossi & Selmini, 2009).

Alongside neoliberalism, populist forces have been developing in Italy. As mentioned before, several political parties broke up as a result of the corruption investigation. Populist parties (such as Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and Alleanza Nazionale[30]) filled in the political gap. Furthermore, they, along with the media, substantially impacted the formation of the new rhetoric on security in the country (Bonfigli, 2014). In particular, they built a discourse of 'others' that entails migrants, ethnic minorities (the Roma people), and marginalised groups (for example, homeless, drug addicts) and 'dangers' coming from them. Given that this discourse was constructed against a background of growing attention to street crime and expansion of the concept of urban security, the right-wing politicians related the presence of 'others' with street crime, precarity in the employment, housing, and land markets, etc. (Bonfigli, 2014; Melossi & Selmini, 2009; Richardson & Colombo, 2013; Ricotta, 2016). Thus, the populist forces developed an image of

[27] Secure cities.
[28] Memoranda of Understanding.
[29] Representatives of the national government at the local level.
[30] Forward Italy, the Northern League and National Alliance.

'others' so that they could be perceived as a source of multiple insecurities, highly related to the urban one.

Although neoliberalism promotes crime prevention, some studies show that it is rooted in and supports further reproduction of racial inequalities and stigmatisation that qualify for the introduction of repressive and punitive measures (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Roberts & Mahtani, 2010). In Italy, the described construction of migrants, Roma, and other groups showing deviations from the norms gave grounds for the development of a punitive approach to them. The situation became especially acute in 2007 when Romania and Bulgaria became member states of the European Union and in 2008, when there was an increase in migration flows to Italy. Thus, in 2007, the 'emergency law'181/2007 was adopted, promoting the expulsion and repatriation of EU citizens if they were considered to pose a public or national threat (Hepworth, 2012; Kóczé, 2018). In turn, in 2008, the repressive measures were extended through the Security Package of 2008 and the declaration of a 'state of emergency' by the Italian Council of Ministers in the regions of Campania, Lazio, and Lombardy, which was later extended to the whole country and abrogated in 2011 (Kóczé, 2018). Then, in 2009, a new Security Package was adopted in which, again, migration was constructed as a threat to national and local security. Interestingly, these two actions were promoted by the centre-left (led by R. Prodi) and centre-right (S. Berlusconi) Italian governments, which confirms the discussed above continuation in some policies in Italy.

The Security Package of 2008 also gave mayors the power to issue contingent and urgent by-laws for urban security reasons. Considering that Lombardy is one of the most populated and wealthiest regions of Italy with a higher concentration of migrants and popularity of populist parties (for instance, Lega Nord), it is not surprising that one of the highest numbers of such by-laws was issued by the mayors of municipalities in this region (Ambrosini, 2013).

The analysis of the by-laws issued in Milan, the capital of Lombardy, by a right-wing mayor in the period of 2008 – 2010 shows that they mainly aimed at tackling in a repressive and prohibitive way such issues as street prostitution, alcohol consumption, begging, abusive occupation, petty crime (vandalism, graffiti, littering, etc.) and other issues (Ambrosini, 2013). Additionally, these by-laws affected directly and indirectly migrants by imposing limitations on using other languages than Italian on shop signs, clearance of unauthorised settlements, limitations on working hours for businesses in areas of concentrated migrants' presence (via Padova, piazzale Corvetto, and via Paolo Sarpi), etc. (Ambrosini, 2013).

Therefore, the by-laws constructed urban insecurity in a variety of ways. Firstly, they problematised it through the phenomena mentioned above: prostitution, begging, migration, etc. (Mireanu, 2020) suggests that the construction of irregular migrants, homeless, beggars, etc., as

‘dangerous’ has been used for the justification for increasing control and surveillance over them. Secondly, frequently, these by-laws constructed some places of fear in the city because they directly identified them as dangerous and criminogenic (for instance, mentioned above via Padova, piazzale Corvetto, and via Paolo Sarpi). At the same time, the danger was presumed to be self-evident without any need for further clarification. Thirdly, the documents also stated a growing fear and perception of insecurity due to the previously discussed phenomena. Again, such statements were positioned in a self-evident way without any explicit reference to or initiating research on the matter (Bonfigli, 2014).

In contrast, left-wing mayors of Milan promoted an integrating approach toward immigrants and implemented mainly social crime prevention interventions (Bonfigli, 2014). Therefore, there is a political division between Milan's right- and left-wing governments in urban security policies that they promote and adopt. It reflects the denoted above difference in the approach in Italy in general.

An area of the city between via Padova and viale Monza, located to the east-north, is emblematic to show the difference in managing urban insecurity problems by left- and right-wing politicians. The neighbourhoods located along the streets and between them are famous for the higher immigrant population rate, with immigrants mainly coming from Asia, North Africa, and South America (Bonfigli, 2014; Verga, 2016). While right-wing mayors construct immigrants as a source of urban security problems there, including crime, the left-oriented ones prioritise the importance of diversity and social integration (Verga, 2016). Simultaneously, both right and left programs tend to ignore the roots of the problems emerging in the area and aim at the elimination of undesired behaviours and practices and, as a consequence, at the gentrification of the area by attracting wealthier groups of the population in the area (Verga, 2016).

Besides the political discourse, the research shows that since the 1990s, the media have been paying a lot of attention to an increase in the feeling of insecurity in Milan, just like in the rest of Italy (Maneri, 2011). Media campaigns have drawn a connection between the notion of insecurity and such issues as illegal immigration, drug dealing and consumption, homelessness, and others. They also have focused on increasing petty crimes and signs of urban degradation in some neighbourhoods (Dal Lago & Palidda, 2010). Additionally, the media, just like right-wing mayors through the by-laws, have facilitated the construction of places of fear and have reinforced the stigmatisation of some places as unsafe by putting crimes committed there into the spotlight and overrepresenting them (Verga, 2016).

At the same time, the research points out the importance of Catholicism for understanding neoliberalism in Lombardy and Milan (A. Colombo, 2008; Muehlebach, 2013). Although the regional and local governments might seek to promote austerity programs and shrink welfare

programs, they simultaneously foster the activity of charity organisations and volunteers to provide services that the government no longer does (Muehlebach, 2013). Such charity organisations are often Catholic-oriented. Their activities aim to provide help to marginalised and fragile social groups: the poor, disabled, elderly, and immigrants. Moreover, as the research shows, such Catholic charities and volunteers can generate a discourse on immigration that emphasises the importance of their social acceptance and integration (M. Colombo, 2018).

The empirical studies show that, in Milan, the perception of urban insecurity is based on the fear of crime, especially burglaries, robberies, anti-social behaviours, and the presence in an area of inhabitation of 'others' in a broad sense. 'Others' are those demonstrating any kind of deviance from socially acceptable behaviour in a neighbourhood (homeless, drug addicts, immigrants, ethnic minorities) (Barabás et al., 2018; Stefanizzi and Verdolini, 2018; Mireanu, 2020). A higher rate of immigrants and their slow integration into the Italian society could be a source of social tensions in the area (Aalbers & Rancati, 2008; Marzorati, 2013). Additionally, in declining Milanese neighbourhoods, such factors as decreasing business activity, lack of proper social services, a larger size of residential buildings, and their poor management could lead to an increasing perception of insecurity there (Aalbers & Rancati, 2008).

The research also indicates the emergence of ways of incentivising citizens to participate in urban security production in Milan. Thus, in the city, several Internet-based projects aim to involve citizens in the city's decision-making and management. Among them is 'Smart Campus,' a project implemented in the district of Quarto Oggiaro to involve citizens in decisions regarding the improvement of the area for people with disabilities. Also, there is a website called 'PartecipaMi' with the aim of incentivising the participation of citizens in the management of the city (Chiodi, 2016).

3. Legislation: Urban security as a public good and the encouragement of the spread of CCTVs

3.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

The analysis of the Italian legislation began with the legal definition of urban security as it facilitates the comprehension of the normative framework for urban security provision in the country (Selmini, 2005). The Italian legislation provides several definitions of the intersecting notions of urban security and urban safety. All these definitions lie within the common framework. One of the most developed definitions is presented in the Ministry of the Interior Decree 'Public Safety and Urban Security: Definition and Areas of Application,' 2008. There, safety is understood as the physical integrity of the population, while urban security is defined as 'a public good that should be protected through activities within the local communities aimed at defending the respect

for the rules governing civil life for improvement of the living conditions in urban centres, civil coexistence, and social cohesion.' Therefore, urban security is a more general term that comprises safety.

The definition supervenes the neoliberal logic of redistributing responsibilities in urban security to the local level as it points out that activities should be implemented within the local communities. Furthermore, although the definition does not specify the institutions responsible for the realisation of the activities, Article 2 of the Decree establishes that it is a mayor. Therefore, the Decree succeeds in the neoliberal logic of redistributing the responsibilities to the local level. Additionally, the definition of urban security implies the involvement of local inhabitants and communities in the production of security by following the rules governing civil life, civil coexistence, and social cohesion. Consequently, the definition implies a disciplinary logic as it suggests the existence of norms and rules of civil life that the population should internalise.

The Decree also reflects the 'preventive turn' (Garland, 2001) characteristic of the neoliberal approach to urban insecurity. Article 2 provides for both crime prevention and repression. Thus, the mayor should intervene to prevent and contrast such phenomena as physical and social degradation and isolation, a decline in the quality of urban life, abusive occupation, etc.

Additionally, the text of the Decree reveals an intersection of an urban security policy with other areas of urban policies. Thus, the definition of urban security provides for improving the living conditions, which might entail a variety of interventions, not necessarily security ones. The mayor should intervene to tackle the social and situational roots of crime, which might imply addressing the issue through educational, housing, social, and other policies. Such intersection of urban policies is in line with the literature (Chalom et al., 2001) and the Italian context in which urban insecurity became an umbrella concept expanding to other policy areas (Maneri, 2011).

The analysis of the text of the Decree also allows reconstructing the problematisation of urban insecurity. Firstly, it is done through crime. The Decree refers to drug selling, pimping, exploitation of minors and disabled people for begging, illegal occupation of neglected and degraded properties and public property, and illegal commercial activity. Secondly, the Decree acknowledges the complex nature of the crime; therefore, it suggests intervening in both situational and social roots of crime. Thirdly, incivilities are considered as contributing to the production of urban insecurity. Thus, the text discusses alcohol-induced violence and public or private assets damage.

Although the Decree does not problematise urban insecurity through immigration, especially the irregular one, the description of the context in the previous section shows that Security Packages

(adopted in 2008, 2010, 2017, and 2018) drew a connection between the two phenomena suggesting that immigration is one of the sources of urban insecurity (Hepworth, 2012; Kóczé, 2018). Such intertwinement of urban insecurity with immigration was used to justify stricter migration legislation, especially in the Security Packages of 2008 and 2010 adopted by the right-wing government (led by S. Berlusconi).

Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the presence of irregular migrants, nomads, and their settlements was used as a justification for introducing the state of emergency in several regions of Italy. Initially, in 2008, a state of emergency was declared in Campania, Lazio, and Lombardy, and later, in 2009, also in Piedmont and Veneto (DPCM 21.05.2008; DPCM 28.05.2009). In 2011, the Council of State cancelled these Decrees (Section IV, №6050) due to the insufficient motivation and illegitimate nature of the reasons justifying the state of emergency.

In 2010, the Security Integration Plan[31] proposed an integrational and inclusive approach toward immigrants. Thus, the Plan highlighted the importance of the peaceful coexistence of foreigners and the Italian population for cities' liveability. However, despite Plan's discourse oriented towards acceptance and integration of immigrants, it still stated that foreigners' concentrated presence in a neighbourhood brings about insecurity as to the local Italian population as to the foreigners themselves. Therefore, while the discourse of the Plan does not consider foreigners to be dangerous, their concentrated presence might pose a threat to the urban social fabric.

The analysis of the documents, which draws a connection between urban insecurity and immigration, allows us to trace signs of a security state in Italy. More specifically, there are signs of governmentality of unease (Bigo, 2006). Thus, immigrants were constructed in the documents as dangerous 'others,' and the population should be protected from them. Furthermore, the 'state of exception' (Agamben, 2005) has been introduced to tackle the problem of the immigrants' presence in the state's territory.

Although Security Packages draw much attention to the issue of immigration which is used to problematise urban insecurity, other phenomena also contribute to the problematisation in the documents. For instance, Security Packages (in particular Decree Law 92/2008; Ministry of the Interior Decree 2008; Law 48/2017 on Integrated Security) discuss such issues as an ordinary crime (as opposed to organised crime), predatory crime, road safety, urban decorum, illegal occupation of private and public property, social degradation, marginalisation, and isolation, etc. in connection with urban insecurity. Therefore, such problematisation of urban insecurity shows

[31] Developed under auspices of the Ministry of Work and Social Policies, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education, University and Research.

that the Italian legal discourse accounts for a complex nature of urban insecurity that comprehends both social and situational problems.

As it was already mentioned in the previous section, the Security Packages of 2008 and 2010 signified a repressive turn. It could also be illustrated by the fact that the Security Package of 2008 also provides for the participation of the Armed Forces (usually, carabinieri) in control over the territory for achieving situational crime prevention (surveillance over territory, a search of suspicious persons, etc.) and immediate reaction to the criminal actions (Article 7-bis of Law 92/2008). Therefore, the increased control over territory might be interpreted through the prism of a surveillance society. So, increased control over territory might symbolise the presence of a guardian that is capable of giving an authoritative response (Norris & Armstrong, 1999) by intervening immediately in case of deviation or violation from the norms.

In contrast, later Security Packages (2017 and 2018) mainly focused on preventing urban insecurity, promoting a mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity. For instance, Law 48/2017 encourages, among other measures, the involvement of both the police and volunteers for increasing the control over the territory, recovery of the degraded sites, and the promotion of the culture of respect for the law. The complete list of suggested by Law 48/2017 interventions is in Table 14.

Table 14. Crime prevention interventions proposed in the Italian, Lombardy, and Milanese legislation

Document	**Social measures**	**Situational measures**
Law №48/2017 on Integrated Security	The promotion of the culture of respect for law and urban decorum; The promotion of social cohesion and civil coexistence; Prevention and elimination of marginality and social exclusion; The promotion of inclusion, social protection, and solidarity;	The recovery of degraded areas or sites; Video-surveillance; The increased visible presence of police officers and territorial volunteers; Prevention of the phenomena that disturb the free use of public spaces (illicit conduct, occupation of private and public property, sale of counterfeit or falsified goods, etc.);
The Lombardy Regional Law on Security 6/2015	Preventing and containing social hardship phenomena; Information campaigns; Cultural and social mediation; Promotion of social activities in risky areas.	Preventing and containing urban decay and incivility; Urban redevelopment; Damage reduction; Promotion of neighbourhood surveillance.

On the one hand, the measures reflect the signs of the security state. For example, the promotion of the involvement of citizens in dealing with urban insecurity could signify a perception of crime as 'a normal social act,' which could be prevented through the daily activities of citizens (Loader

& Sparks, 2007). Consequently, the state trains citizens to be more cautious and watch out for various threats rather than actual crime (Rosenbaum et al., 1998). On the other hand, a surveillance society also is present in the measures proposed by the Law. In particular, just like the Decree of 2008 in the definition of urban security, it promotes the culture of respect for the law, civil coexistence, and social cohesion that imply the existence of socially accepted norms that should be imposed on the whole society.

At the regional level, the regional legislation acknowledged the local and constantly changing nature of urban insecurity and suggested problematising it following the problems emerging at the local level (Agreement for the Promotion of Integrated Security between the Ministry of the Interior, the Lombardy Region and the Lombardy ANCI, 2019). Therefore, the Agreement highlights the importance of conducting research on the problems impacting urban insecurity. Furthermore, cooperation with the voluntary sector should also facilitate understanding of the problems emerging at the local level. Such a legal perspective on urban insecurity reflects Foucault's idea of a constantly changing nature of reality (Foucault, 1991). As a result, governmentality seeks to identify the best and most efficient ways to regulate such reality, which also might be realised through research.

Despite the promotion of such approach of the changing nature of urban insecurity, the regional legislation still suggests problematising urban insecurity through crime, incivilities, urban decay, social marginalisation and hardship, gender-based violence, and other issues (Lombardy Regional Law 6/2015; Agreement for the Promotion of Integrated Security. 2019; Protocol of Understanding for the Contrasting the Phenomenon of Violence against Women, 2017).

To tackle urban insecurity, the regional legislation promotes both prevention and coercion of the phenomena impacting it. For example, Article 5 of Lombardy Regional Law 6/2015 on Security states that the Region should conduct research on implementing the prevention and oppression of crime in urban areas. As to crime prevention, regional government and municipalities should also aim at a mixed approach and implement both situational and social crime prevention interventions, as Table 14 shows. Additionally, the regional legislation promotes undertaking such measures as an exchange of the information between the police of different levels (State Police, Financial Police, and local police), increase in video surveillance, involvement of voluntary organisations for increased informal control over the territory (Agreement for the Promotion of Integrated Security between the Ministry of the Interior, the Lombardy Region and the Lombardy ANCI, 2019).

The Milanese legislation problematises urban insecurity primarily through social issues (marginalisation, vulnerability, etc.) and the subjective dimension of urban insecurity. The local

official documents account for the complexity of factors impacting the perception of insecurity. So, they consider not only crime, urban decay, and degradation as factors impacting it, but also more general factors: social processes and changes (for instance, such construction of subjective urban insecurity is presented in Memoranda for Understanding "Project 'Neighbourhood Control,'" 2018).

Given such shifted focus to subjective urban insecurity, the Municipality mainly adopts social interventions to tackle the phenomenon. In particular, it develops social policies aimed at subjects at risk, promotes training at schools to disseminate the culture of legality, and so on (the Statute of the Municipality of Milan, 1991). Social services of Milan should also be engaged in removing social causes of marginalisation, encouraging and supporting the effective equality of opportunities and social insertion, training and work for people with disabilities, in difficulty, marginalised or at risk of marginalisation, promotion of social solidarity, providing services to crime victims (including victims of cybercrime), especially, to vulnerable victims – women, children and youth (Regulation for the Interventions and Social Service of the Municipality of Milan, 2006; Memoranda for Understanding between the Public Prosecutor at the Ordinary Court of Milan and the Municipality of Milan 'Joined Actions in Favor of Vulnerable Victims,' 2017).

However, the situational approach to urban insecurity also appears in the Milanese legislation. In particular, the municipal police should prevent crime by monitoring and patrolling the territory (the Regulation of Municipal Police Force, 1997).

The previous section has highlighted the role of the left/right affiliation of politicians in promoting urban security policies at the local level. Thus, the previous literature shows that the right-wing mayors of Milan often adopted a repressive approach to crime and other phenomena that were constructed to generate the feeling of insecurity in the city. For instance, L. Moratti, a right-wing mayor of Milan from 2006 to 2011, issued such provisions as Provisions to Fight Prostitution on the Road and for the Protection of Urban Security in Milan, Provision to Tackle Urban Degradation. Anti-Begging Measures in Milan and others. In these documents, there was a drawn a direct connection between urban insecurity and the presence of marginalised 'others' (immigrants, prostitutes, beggars, etc.). Therefore, the mayor was using the governmentality of unease to construct some social groups as posing threats to the rest of the society.

The current mayor of Milan, B. Sala (since 2016), is a centre-left politician who rarely addresses the topic of urban (in)security in mayoral provisions. For instance, the analysis of the ordinances issued by B. Sala shows that they mainly are issued in a case of special events, the conduct of which requires undertaking increased security measures. Such events entail big sports events (especially football games), music concerts, holiday entertainment events, activities, etc.

To sum up, the Italian national legislation considers urban insecurity to have both situational and social roots. More specifically, it problematises urban insecurity through crime (mainly petty crime), incivilities, urban physical and social degradation, and social marginalisation. Simultaneously, it contributes to the stigmatisation of some social groups by connecting their presence and the problems appearing in urban spaces. To deal with the problem of urban insecurity, the Italian state adopts both preventive and coercive approaches. Thus, the institutions involved in urban security provision should aim to prevent such phenomena as social marginalisation and urban degradation, but at the same time, they are allowed to use crime coercion in case a transgression has been committed.

At the regional level, urban security policies aim at dealing with various situational and social aspects of city life, and the problem of the presence of immigrants (whether legal or irregular) is not explicitly emphasised in it. The regional legislation of Lombardy accounts for the complex nature of urban insecurity and suggests tackling it in the immediate context of its production. It should be achieved by conducting studies at the local level and involving and cooperating with the civil sector.

The Milanese legislation problematises urban insecurity through social phenomena present in the city's territory and highlights the importance of subjective insecurity in the city. Logically, the Municipality mainly promotes various social measures to deal with the problem of urban insecurity in the city.

3.2. Video surveillance as a solution to urban insecurity

The Italian legislation considers video surveillance among interventions aimed at tackling urban insecurity. In the legislation aimed at urban security, video surveillance is discussed as a situational crime prevention measure that serves for enhanced control over territory. For instance, Law 48/2017 states that video surveillance installation should be encouraged as it increases territorial control, especially in extraordinary situations. Therefore, the legislation follows the logic of the security state approach within which it is possible to justify the expansion of video surveillance in emergency situations as they require enhanced control (Bigo, 2006).

Pact for Security between the Ministry of the Interior and the ANCI (2007) specifies that video surveillance supports the Police Forces in their activities in preventing and combatting degradation and illegality. Furthermore, CCTV facilitates a more comprehensive redevelopment of urban spaces. Therefore, the prefects and the mayors should encourage the spread of video surveillance systems. The document justifies the installation of video surveillance by claiming that this

technology can achieve multiple goals, which is a feature of surveillance society (Graham, 2006; Wood & Webster, 2009).

The same perspective of video surveillance as a multi-purpose tool appears in other legal documents. For instance, the Circular of February 8, 2005, "Video Surveillance systems. Definition of guidelines on the matter," offers a similar conceptualisation of the aims for installing video surveillance as in Pact for Security (2007). Thus, it states that video surveillance serves to control territory, the spread of legality, contrast the crime, incivility, and urban disorder phenomena. Provisions in Relation to Video Surveillance (2010) expand even further the scope of the implementation of CCTV as it names the following (non-exhaustive) applications of video surveillance: protection and safety of individuals, urban security, public order and safety, prevention, detection, or repression of crime, improvement of public services aimed at increasing individuals' safety, property protection, etc.

The analysis of the documents allows to single out additional signs of surveillance society in the Italian legislation. Firstly, video surveillance is constructed as a crime deterrence tool. Therefore, even if video surveillance might not exercise the power to eliminate a potential for deviance and crime, at least it achieves crime deterrence (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). Secondly, video surveillance is presented as a tool for providing better services to the citizens of Italy (Provisions in Relation to Video Surveillance, 2010). So, despite the accumulation of data on the citizens, video surveillance is also used for security provision and production (Garfinkel, 2000; Taylor et al., 2008; D. M. Wood & Webster, 2009).

Lastly, the Provisions suggest that individual rights for information should be respected; therefore, it provides for information notices of entering the surveyed zone. Simultaneously, the document suggests using a model of 'minimum' information provision by indicating a data collector and the purpose of video surveillance. Such discrepancy between the surveyed and surveyor is a sign of a surveillance society in which a figure of the observer remains hidden from the surveyed (Goold, 2002).

Simultaneously, the Italian legislation follows the security state that provides for the introduction of legislative protections of privacy and limitations for the implementation of video surveillance (Gras, 2004). Thus, the Circular (2005) outlines the main principles that should be applied to install video surveillance cameras to prevent possible abuse of data collected through them. These principles are necessity, relevancy, no-exceedance in data collection and treatment so that the Code on the protection of personal data is respected. The Provisions (2010) also suggest an additional principle of proportionality in choosing a video surveillance device and methods of placement (fixed or pivoting cameras, with or without zoom, etc.). The Circular also points out the importance

of the prudent choice of places where video surveillance is planned to install. So, the Provincial Committees for Public Order and Security should assess the needs and utility of the installation of video surveillance cameras to avoid their unjustified proliferation.

Furthermore, the Italian legislation also reflects the security state by providing for an opportunity to merge the data collected by video surveillance with other biometric data collected by the state institutes in exceptional situations. The exceptional situations entail situations of specific risks for fundamental rights and freedoms, the dignity of individuals, etc. Therefore, the authorities might increase their surveillance and control potential (Bigo, 2006). Additionally, economic rationality is also applied to the usage of video surveillance systems for urban security needs. So, the Provisions suggest using integrated video surveillance systems between public and private bodies as it complies with the principle of the economy of resources. In such a way, the government's need to rationalise its expenditures on security is justified (Loader, 1999).

Lastly, the Circular accounts for the constant technological development and suggests that it should be adapted if it is in line with the guarantees of efficiency from the implementation of CCTV and it increases the timeliness of the Police Forces' response in emergency situations. Therefore, it might reflect the security state's promotion of technological development and its further adaptation (Norris & Armstrong, 1999).

3.3. Summary

The Italian legislation problematises urban insecurity as a complex social phenomenon that comprises such issues as crime, incivilities, immigration, social insecurities, and others. Moreover, the legislation accounts for the Italian context. In particular, it shows the left/right division in policies promoted by the local and state politicians. Thus, the centre-right politicians try to problematise urban insecurity through immigration and other marginal groups. On the other hand, the centre-left politicians might adopt a more integrative approach to immigrants but still highlight that the concentrated presence of immigrants might be problematic.

Due to such complex problematisation of urban insecurity, the solutions proposed to confront the problem comprise both social and situational prevention. The analysis shows that the dominance of the centre-right or left powers leads to an inclination towards either a situational or social strategy of prevention, respectively. Furthermore, the centre-right governments tend to promote a coercive approach to dealing with deviance.

The legislation suggests that video surveillance among situational preventive measures be implemented in urban spaces. Moreover, the legislation promotes it by providing special funds to the local authorities to install video surveillance. Simultaneously, it imposes various limitations

on the implementation of video surveillance, accounting for the privacy of the city inhabitants, preventing the excessive installation of CCTV cameras, etc.

The analysis of the Italian legislation also shows a combination of the logics of surveillance society and security state behind the provision of security and surveillance in Milan, with the latter's dominance. Thus, the following signs of the security state are discernible:

- the redistribution of the provision of urban security to the local level and engaging citizens in its production. It serves the rationalisation of the economic expenses of the state on urban security;
- there are prominent signs of the 'governmentality of unease': the construction of some groups as dangerous and threats, which the Italian society should be protected from. In turn, it might lead to their further marginalisation;
- the increased surveillance and control over such groups is justified through their construction in such a way. Additionally, some places are also constructed as places of fear which require the expansion of surveillance and control there;
- furthermore, the introduction of the 'state of emergency' from 2008 until 2011 was justified by the presence of some ethnic groups in the territory;
- there is an exploitation of juridico-legal apparatus by the right-wing politicians for codifying their perception of insecurity, threats, and possible responses to tackle the problem;
- there are legislative protections of privacy and limitations for the implementation of video surveillance in Italy;
- at the same time, the Italian legislation provides for a possibility in exceptional situations to merge the data collected through CCTV with other biometric data collected by the state institutions;
- there is economic rationality behind the provision for integrated video surveillance systems allowing the state to have access to privately maintained video surveillance cameras;
- technological development and its further adaptation are encouraged by the state.

Simultaneously, the framework of surveillance society might be applicable to the analysis of the implementation of video surveillance in the country. Thus, the analysis of the Italian and Milanese legislation indicates that video surveillance is constructed as a tool for providing better services to the citizens of Italy and, on the other hand, collecting more data on them. Also, the legislation provides for the preservation of relative anonymity of the figure of the observer as CCTV signage should contain minimum information on the body collecting the information. Therefore, it facilitated the discrepancy between the observer and observed in the knowledge about each other.

In addition, the Italian legislation constructs video surveillance as a multi-purpose tool that serves to accept the technology and its proliferation in the territory as suggests the framework of surveillance society.

Lastly, a surveillance society might also be traced to the provision of security. In particular, the Italian legislation quite frequently refers to promoting the culture of respect for the law, civil coexistence, and social cohesion. At the same time, it does not specify what this culture is; therefore, it implies that there are some socially accepted norms that the members of society should internalise.

4. Experts: Urban security is 'always on a podium' and video surveillance is 'not really a panacea'

4.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

Chapter 2: Literature Review shows that urban insecurity is a complex phenomenon that contains both objective, environmental and subjective, perceived dimensions that are in a complex interplay. Therefore, the analysis of the interview data reflects both of these dimensions.

In general, the Italian experts constructed Italy as a secure country. Mainly, it is ascribed to low crime rates, especially in comparison with other European countries: "*But you see, it is the lower, that is the crime rate than in other European countries, and the tendency is that it is going down"* (Interview 1ME). Additionally, the quotation shows that there has been a crime descending trend during the last few years, which Figure 7 also shows.

The experts also described Milan as a secure and safe city which, again, is mainly due to lowering crime rates: *"So, the scientific answer – yes, it is a safe city. […] From a crime point of view, an intervention works pretty well"* (Interview 2ME). The quotation also demonstrates that there have been successful interventions aimed at tackling crime in the city. Deepening into crime trends in Milan, Expert 2ME pointed out the decline in predatory crime: burglaries, thefts in apartments, snatching, pickpocketing, and thefts from a person.

Nevertheless, the problematisation of urban insecurity included crime in the discourse of Italian experts. Thus, the experts pointed out that the rate of predatory crime is higher in Milan, just like crime in general. According to Expert 1ME, the higher incidence of crime and, primarily, predatory crime could be ascribed to the fact that Milan, as one of the largest and most economically developed cities, offers more opportunities to commit such crimes. Applying routine activity theory (Felson, 1994; Newton and Felson, 2015), a higher crime rate in the north of Italy in general, not just in Milan, could be explained. Thus, the northern regions are more economically

developed, ‘locomotives of Italy in Europe’ (Interview 1ME). Therefore, criminals might find more opportunities for committing offences.

Another factor contributing to the spread of predatory crime in Milan is the use of fortification techniques. On the one hand, there could sometimes be the excessive fortification of banks, shops, etc. Present means of fortification lead to a lack of visibility and informal control from the street of a situation in a bank or a shop. For instance, windows might not be transparent, or a cash desk might be located in the most hidden point in a shop. As Expert 2ME stated: *“That is, it's the opposite of what you should do because when someone comes, a shop bell rings. Obviously, if a distinctively normal person comes, I let him in, I think it is a customer. The moment I let him in, this is a thief - very well, the door closes behind, so no one can enter anymore, […] he takes me to the most hidden place where the cashier is, and he takes everything and can go away without been seen by anyone from outside.”*

Excessive fortification can be considered a sign of a security state in which every place might be considered a potential place of crime. Therefore, the fortification means are implemented to reduce the possibility of offences (Sorkin, 2008). However, in practice, excessive fortification might result in increased vulnerability.

On the other hand, there might be a lack of attention to crime prevention through spatial design in Milan. Therefore, criminals might exploit it for their advantage: *“It is a condominium here, nearby that has been poorly designed from that point of view because it has many accesses including some number from the railway and then you can escape. As soon as it was built, it started having a series of thefts, one after another”* (Interview 2ME).

According to the experts, crime is redistributed more or less equally throughout the city. There is even no difference between neighbourhoods that have ‘secure,’ which are usually in the city centre, and ‘insecure,’ which are in the periphery of the city, reputation. Mainly, it could be attributed to some successful interventions in the problematic neighbourhoods of the city that led to the reduction of crime rates there. Among such interventions, Experts 2ME and 3ME named urban space renovation and requalification, area redevelopment, increased policing, and formal control over the area.

The pandemic also impacted the problematisation of urban insecurity through crime in Milan. Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated the crime decline trend. Especially, the experts noted a reduction in violent crime, street crimes (muggings, etc.), burglaries, and so on. Logically, it is attributed to a total lockdown in Italy that lasted for almost 2.5 months (March – May 2020); therefore, it was almost impossible to commit street crimes and burglaries as, on the one hand,

there were no vulnerable targets on the streets of Milan and, on the other hand, the vast majority of the population stayed at home.

Secondly, other than lockdown policies introduced for containing the spread of COVID-19 have had a crime drop as their unintended by-product. Thus, they reduced the opportunities for crime by prohibiting gatherings, alcohol consumption, closure of bars, restaurants, and other entertainment venues, increased control over territory, etc. Expert 3ME summarized this effect from the pandemic policies the following way: *"If in usual time a criminal could have gotten lost in a crowd, nowadays, it is easier to identify them. Therefore, even though criminals tried to oblige the regulations, even if their motives differed from those of a usual citizen, they still respected the regulation."* Therefore, such transparency of public spaces facilitated exercising the disciplinary power, more specifically, crime deterrence. Expert 2ME described ironically the situation the following way*: "In our scientific network, we even joked saying that a subsidy should also be given also to thieves because they have lost a job too. There has certainly been a big, big drop. […] In fact, I think the police had a good time off, hahaha. But I'm joking, of course."*

Simultaneously, the experts expected that predatory crime would return to the previous levels with the reopening of public spaces and restart of social activity. Thus, after the start of the reopening, there were some violent incidents in the streets of Milan through which people let out their frustration with the situation.

Thirdly, in contrast with such a positive trend of crime reduction, the pandemic also created favourable conditions for a rise in domestic violence and femicides. The police and victims' assistance centres follow the protocols to help victims of domestic violence and facilitate their recovery. Fourthly, the Internet and phone-based scams have risen in numbers during the times of the pandemic. According to Experts 2ME and 3ME, the scammers mainly targeted the elderly. Therefore, there was a shift in crime from physical to virtual space. To tackle the rise of scams, the Municipality of Milan, along with neighbourhood control groups, conducted an awareness-raising campaign.

Security state theory might explain such a shift from physical to virtual space. Within this framework, a criminal is considered a rational actor (Clarke, 1995; Felson, 2002; Garland, 2001). Therefore, a shift to the virtual space might be considered a rational choice under the new circumstances: online and telephone scams should bring more benefits than committing crimes like robberies and burglaries.

Lastly, the pandemic has affected the labour market greatly, especially people in precarious working conditions. Thus, some people lost their jobs, and, as a result, it contributed to the

perception of insecurity in general and urban insecurity in particular. Furthermore, such people might have turned to the illegal sector to make some money: *"It [petty crime] is also related to the COVID times as many people have lost their work; they have now difficulty finding a new one. Unfortunately, some people can decide to turn to illegal occupations because they still have to eat"* (Interview 3ME).

The interview analysis demonstrates that organised crime and the mafia contribute to the problematisation of urban insecurity in Milan. Thus, Expert 1ME pointed out that the presence of some mafia and organised crime groups (Ndragheta and Latinos gangs) is acuter in Milan and Lombardy in general. Furthermore, the mafia has even infiltrated the political establishment in Milan.

Another crime-related issue through which the experts problematised urban insecurity is the growth in petty crime and incivilities during the last years (at least before the COVID-19 pandemic). Expert 1ME defined this phenomenon the following way: *"[T]hey are forms of violation of the standards of behaviour in public spaces that can be: urinating on the street, spitting, doing graffiti, which are not transgressions in themselves, often not even criminal offences or very, very bland."* Expert 3ME added small drug dealing, pickpocketing, and alcohol-induced aggressions to this definition.

Besides incivilities and petty crime, the Italian experts also problematised urban insecurity through visible signs of urban degradation. According to the experts, such issues entail abandoned litter or garbage on the streets, broken street lights, etc. The experts attributed the spread of such minor issues along with incivilities to a changing, 'neoliberal' lifestyle, which causes a decrease in the use of and informal control over the territory. Expert 2ME defined the emerging 'neoliberal' lifestyle the following way: *"[T]here is a new use of public space […]. That is, there is much more life inside their [people's] homes, so delivery food, Netflix, there is much less sharing of urban space. That is, and when you share space, you share it in some places in some moments, so an aperitif at Navigli, City Life, while the public space around the house is very often it is, it is neglected, it is not lived."*

The experts also problematised urban insecurity through various social phenomena. For instance, Expert 1ME pointed out the emergence of youth delinquency and gangs in Italy due to underdeveloped youth integration problems in Italy. The problem is already palpable in other European countries and arises in Italy. Another social issue through which the Italian experts problematised urban insecurity is the issue of migration. Since Milan is one of the country's largest and economically developed cities, it can offer more employment opportunities to people from other Italian regions and outside the country: *"[I]t is the most attractive city as the true*

international vocation. […] Milan has experienced a much more impressive migratory phenomenon from the South of Italy […]. So, southern immigration as well as a more significant foreign immigration" (Interview 1ME).

The presence of immigrants is more discernible in the periphery of Milan, and, sometimes, it could lead to social tensions between immigrants and the local Italian population. Moreover, a concentrated presence of immigrants is associated with marginality and poverty, creating conditions for the emergence of social tensions. As Expert 1ME stated: *"It is clear that from what I hear from colleagues, there is the difficulty of managing some peripheries, peripheral areas with evident problems, even tensions […]. There is a population of new arrivals or second generation and marginality, indigenous poverty; therefore, tensions of this type."*

In general, as it was briefly mentioned above in this section, according to the experts, the periphery of the city has a reputation of being 'insecure.' The experts especially highlighted Adriano, Comasina, Quattro Oggiaro, Rogoredo, Stadera, and via Padova as problematic areas of the city. A map of problematic areas named by the experts is presented in Figure 8. As discussed above, the experts highlighted the success of interventions in these areas to tackle the problem of crime. Nevertheless, there are some issues to be solved.

Thus, the experts problematised these districts through the issue of abusive occupation that is still acute there: *"It is clear that in the highly populated areas, there is a bigger problem of abusive occupation. Criminals also live in them, of course, as they should live somewhere"* (Interview 3ME). As it follows from the interview excerpt, there is an additional problem of coexistence with criminals, which might affect the perception of security in the area, especially when people witness arrests or police visits. Furthermore, it might undermine social trust and erode social relationships in the neighbourhood. As the logic of the security state suggests, knowing that someone is a criminal might lead to putting everyone under suspicion, which, in turn, erodes social trust (Sorkin, 2008).

From the analysis of the interview data, it emerges that a negative reputation of some peripheric areas is robust and might reproduce in the society even if some positive changes have been made to the physical space of the neighbourhood (renovation of public spaces, cleaning the streets, etc.). Expert 2ME exemplified this in the following way: *"In Milan, there is the famous case of Quarto Oggiaro, which was once the most insecure place. Today, all in all, with a series of interventions over the last fifteen years, this is no longer the case, but the name Quarto Oggiaro is a bit like the name Bronx in America."*

Figure 8. A map of areas identified as problematic by the experts in Milan



Quarto Oggiaro is represented by blue colour, Comasina – by brown, Adriano – by red, via Padova – by purple, Rogoredo – by green, Stadera – by orange.

Discussing 'secure' districts located in the city centre, the experts pointed out that this reputation might not reflect an objective situation there: *"However, the data on crime shows us the opposite picture: the larger number of crimes is registered in the city centre and the lower – in the periphery. Therefore, it reflects the cultural factor that people have"* (Interview 3ME). This 'cultural factor' is formed due to an image of a more controlled area in the city centre: it is clean, with proper street lighting, guarded residential areas, and an absence of signs of degradation.

Besides crime, there is a higher rate of incivilities in the city centre due to a higher concentration of bars, clubs, restaurants, and other entertainment venues (for instance, the area of Darsena or Columns of San Lorenzo). Consequently, sometimes, the phenomena of social degradation can coexist with the presence of formal control (the police or carabinieri).

From the analysis of the experts' interviews, it emerges that there are some signs of segregation in Milan: while a wealthier part of the population inhabits the city centre, the peripheries are populated by poorer groups. This segregation also has some features of a security state: there are some visible signs of segregation through fortification (Sorkin, 2008). Thus, wealthier people might afford to live in better maintained and guarded residential areas, while the poorer usually live in many-storied houses.

As to the subjective urban insecurity, the experts suggested that Milan is a city where people can feel secure based on crime statistics; however, the feeling of insecurity remains relatively high in the city. Expert 3ME stated that there is a discrepancy between the perception of insecurity and the objective security situation in the city: *"Obviously, it is not easy to deal with the perception of*

security because it is different from the actual data. The police use the following data: the location of a crime the time slots; therefore, we know where and when we should intervene. But we see that the perceived insecurity is generated in the areas that are different from those that we identified based on the scientific data."

Thus, Expert 1ME suggested that the perception of insecurity in the city is higher than the Italian average, which might be attributed to the conditions of life in large cities. In turn, it leads to a higher demand for security in Milan. Moreover, the Italians are very concerned with urban security as it continues to be among the most disturbing issues in the country: *"So it has surpassed many issues, the issue of security in the cities. I always say this to the mayors: it is always on the podium. That is, a new topic can arrive and drive it from the first to a second place, but driving it to the third or fourth place is almost impossible. So, in mind, in the back-thinking of the population, of a large segment of the Italian population, it is an important problem"* (Interview 1ME).

Expert 2ME proposed an alternative point of view that due to the growth of public attention to the problem of crime and urban insecurity in the 1990s (as described in the second section of the current chapter), the perception of insecurity is more or less equally distributed across the Italian cities regardless of their size. Furthermore, the difference in the perception of insecurity between the countryside and urban areas has been eliminated.

The pandemic might have removed urban insecurity from the first place of the most problematic issue in Italy. As Expert 1ME suggests: *"[I]n my opinion, there is an old saying, which applies here […] Chiodo scaccia chiodo*[32] *[…]. The same reasoning applies to the pandemic; that is, I have not, I have not yet seen surveys done in 2020 on the perception of security, but it is very reasonable to think that insecurity has decreased in the face of another fear that has replaced it, the greater fear, stronger. So today, I believe that in the top ten, in the hit parade of Italian fears, there is the pandemic, the fear of vaccination that can unseat urban insecurity."* In addition, the pandemic generated health-related fears and social ones. They include labour precarity, future uncertainty, etc. In turn, this heightened social uncertainty affected the perception of security in urban spaces.

The Italian experts also highlighted that the perception of insecurity is a relative phenomenon. Thus, contrasted with north-European cities, Milan, just like other Italian cities, might seem like a less maintained city; therefore, it could generate more insecurity among the local inhabitants: *"Again, an impression, I repeat you, that I don't have any data, that Italy is worse off than others; at least there is a propensity of Italians to think that compared to the north of Europe if we are in*

[32] One problem drives away another.

the cities of the north, they are much tidier, cleaner, more well maintained than the Italian ones" (Interview 1ME). As the quotation shows, such comparison for the worse might be a social construct not necessarily based on reality.

The experts problematised the perception of insecurity in Milan through predatory crime, especially burglaries, robberies, and thefts. Expert 1ME explained it as an invasion into one's private space, which consequently generates great insecurity. In addition, in recent years, public attention has expanded to the threat of terrorism. It happened due to terrorist attacks in other European countries that, however, affected greatly Italian perception of insecurity: *"Before these attacks, the 2 – 3% of the [Italian] population considered, let's say, terrorist attacks as a possible danger, after the attacks, this number has risen more than tenfold"* (Interview 1ME).

According to the experts, the media contributes significantly to the problematisation of urban insecurity through crime in Milan. In particular, the Italian media tend to overrepresent crime. It is especially tangible in contrast with other European countries, in which the media does not report the crime as much as in Italy: *"Maybe you, I don't recommend it, but if you don't have anything better to do, you can spend a week at home watching Italian television, the TV evening news, you will find an overrepresentation of programs that talk about crime constantly. It has no equal in English, German, French or Austrian public TV"* (Interview 1ME). Expert 1ME also gave a specific example of a series of violent robberies of tobacco shops in Milan in 1990 that *'triggered media campaigns that fed the perception of insecurity.'*

Apart from the media, right-wing politicians also exploit fear of crime and urban insecurity in their discourses, which impacts the perception of insecurity in the city. Expert 2ME suggested that the Municipality of Milan, especially when right-wing politicians lead it, fails to communicate urban security positively. It might be done to obtain more control and votes. According to Expert 3ME, the political discourse on urban insecurity can be twofold: on the one hand, it could be more critical if one wants to highlight the failures of the current policies and ways of tackling the problem; on the other hand, it could be positive if one wants to highlight their achievements in the field.

Such exploitation of security discourse might be analysed through the prism of the security state. In particular, the approach suggests that the politicians might seek to obtain more control and violate liberal rights by using security discourse (Bigo, 2006; Zedner, 2003). As it appears from the interview data and the analysis of the legislation, in Milan, right-wing politicians usually address insecurity by constructing images of violence, deviation, etc. In turn, the generation of such discourse on urban insecurity is also done to attract more votes in the next elections.

The experts problematised subjective urban insecurity also through incivilities and petty crime. Since these violations of norms happen in direct proximity to places of inhabitation, work, leisure, etc., they considerably affect the perception of insecurity in Milan. Therefore, incivilities provoke tensions between local inhabitants and those committing them: *"The real problem is often the coexistence between the residents, those we call the people of the day, that is, who have schedules, go to work, return home and have the right to rest, and often young people, often students who instead colonize the space in the time of the night for fun. So, there is a tension in, in sharing these spaces"* (Interview 1ME).

Besides, incivilities provoke an image of abandonment, absence of control, and protection. In turn, such perception generates a further feeling of insecurity. Expert 2ME also referred to the fact that the police cannot deal with all reported minor incidents: *"And therefore, there are nice, great interventions, but if a citizen has drunks at the entrance to the house who, for heaven's sake, maybe they don't do anything to anyone, but they are frightening. And he calls the local police; he hears the answer: 'Look, we don't have time to deal with these things.'"* Therefore, this lack of response and deficiency of public awareness, which public body should address such problems, generate a perception and feeling of abandonment which, in turn, contributes to the perception of insecurity in urban spaces.

The perception of an absence of management and maintenance is especially acute in the city's periphery. For instance, Expert 2ME suggested that the current government of Milan does not invest enough of its attention to the problems of the periphery and suburbs of the city, which impacts the locals' perception of security: *"I follow many neighbourhood committees, in the suburbs. And especially in the suburbs, this is true: so far, the Municipality has not kept the promise to take back the suburbs, also from the point of view of management, maintenance, of, of showing that the city is there for them"*. More specifically, such a perception of a lack of attention from the Municipality of Milan is formed compared to the city centre, which is much better maintained and taken care of.

The feeling of abandonment might also be fuelled by a lower rate of trust in such public institutions like the police, public medical system, social welfare, etc., in Italy than in other European countries. In turn, it affects their perception of security as people feel less protected by these institutions and cannot rely on them. According to Expert 1ME, solid social ties might compensate for this lack of trust in public institutions; however, those who do not have them feel increasingly vulnerable.

According to the experts, such a lack of trust in public institutions might be based on negative personal experiences. Thus, Expert 1ME illustrated it with an example of the coexistence of the

phenomena of incivility and the presence of formal control – the police or carabinieri – in the same space: *"[T]he funny, stupid thing is to see these social phenomena in coexistence with the police, army and local police who do not intervene. Because whoever is there is not committing an obvious crime."*

As shown in the previous paragraph, formal forms of control might not prevent incivilities and, consequently, might not alleviate the perception of insecurity. However, the experts pointed out the informal social control and spontaneous surveillance as a way of compensating and improving the perception of the areas where there are pronounced signs of urban decay in Milan. So, Expert 3ME referred to a 'party' area of Milan to demonstrate that the presence of people in the streets of the city can enhance the perception of security there: *"If we take the Columns of San Lorenzo that are always full of people, even at night. Especially, women will prefer to live there than in an area in which there is no one late at night in the street."*

Simultaneously, the absence of informal control and spontaneous surveillance can generate the perception of insecurity in the area. Thus, if an urban space is not very frequented, there are just a few shops, etc., all of these factors generate the perception of insecurity there: *"But very often people are afraid for this reason, they are afraid because they see the street, where 30 years ago there were all the shops and someone was checking what was happening on the street. Today it is a street of closed shop windows, of shops transformed into apartments, so there is no longer that urban vitality, which is the first, the first element of security of the territory"* (Interview 2ME).

The experts also problematised subjective urban insecurity through various societal factors and transformations that influence the perception of insecurity in Milan and the whole country. Thus, Expert 1ME referred to the social changes that were accelerated in the 1990s: worsening economic conditions, labour precarity, changes in social lifts as the traditional ones – education, work – do not function as good as in the past, political and ideological crisis, decline of the Catholic Church, and inter-ethnic tensions. As he stated: *"These concomitant factors have fuelled the social demand for security in our country."*

Although the experts identified immigration among the factors that impact subjective urban insecurity, they pointed out that it would be erroneous to connect the phenomenon of immigration and objective urban insecurity. Therefore, they pointed out that there is no objective basis for the impact of the presence of immigrants on subjective insecurity. Thus, Expert 1ME highlighted that immigration started in Italy when the crime trend was stagnant. Nevertheless, the Italians perceive immigrants as a threat partially because, according to Expert 1ME, they contributed more visibly to the socio-cultural change in the Italian society, cities, and public spaces as they brought about new religious and cultural practices. Besides, the Italian public is heavily impacted by the right-

wing discourse on immigration, which also obstacles the integration of immigrants into Italian society. Therefore, this issue might remain problematic in the coming years.

Experts problematised subjective urban insecurity also through various personal factors. Thus, the experts denoted such socio-demographic indicators as age, gender, social, and family networks. For instance, Expert 2ME put it the following way: *"So, in the same area, two persons can have two completely different ideas depending on their perception of reality, sex, family status, because it is also different from being alone or from having a strong family"* (Interview 2ME).

Summing up, the Italian experts treated urban insecurity as a complex phenomenon. Therefore, the experts problematised it through various situational and social factors. Specifically, the interviews' analysis shows that objective urban insecurity can be problematised through crime, including organised one, incivilities, urban and spatial design, absence of informal control, and other factors. As for subjective urban insecurity, the experts problematised it through such issues as crime, incivilities, social tensions around incivilities, an absence of local authorities' response to the problems presented in the territory, an absence of solid social ties, lack of trust in public institutions, etc.

4.2. Possible solutions to the problem

In Milan, the experts emphasized that urban insecurity is a complex phenomenon comprising a variety of problems. Therefore, to tackle it, it should be studied comprehensively, focusing on local security problems, reconstruction of the local context, social, economic, and cultural situation in the city before developing any policies to deal with it. Simultaneously, the municipal governments quite frequently lack the necessary skills to conduct such in-depth research: *"In my opinion, what is absolutely missing is, and this is a weakness of Italian policies, the ability of local administrations to have adequate skills to understand the nature of the problem that must be faced. Therefore, sociological and criminological skills are lacking within local administrations. Having said that, then like a domino effect, everything else is wrong"* (Interview 1ME).

According to the experts, there have been some changes in the approaches to tackle urban insecurity in Italy. Thus, Expert 1ME said that in the 1990s, a mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity was developed in Italy. This approach *'combined social prevention measures, harm reduction, with situational prevention interventions,'* which included video surveillance, lighting, alarm systems, and use of the local police. However, in the last years, situational crime prevention is becoming more dominant and widespread: *"There is no doubt that with some exceptions, in the last ten years there has been a strong prevalence of situational prevention measures"* (Interview 1ME).

This change is partially explained by the fact that technological development and application of its results are pretty attractive for the local administrators as they are perceived as a quick solution to the problems connected to urban insecurity in Milan. Thus, Expert 1ME refers to his experience consulting the local politicians: *"I work with the administrators for years, and regardless of their political stand, they are centre-left and centre-right, the fascination towards technologies, towards control is powerful in the administrators."* The last quotation shows a bureaucratic 'belief in the power of technology' (Norris and Armstrong 1999).

Another explanation is suggested by Expert 2ME. He argued that implementing a mixed approach to crime prevention or an integrated one, which implies active participation of the local inhabitants and grass-root organisations, is difficult and frequently does not bring immediate results that might not satisfy the politicians who are interested in winning the next elections.

Nevertheless, the experts pointed out the importance of a mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity. In particular, Expert 1ME provided an example of a mixed intervention: *"Let me give you an example, an urban park that is degraded, that has problems there, it is not enough that you put benches there, put a few more street lamps, a camera. If you don't work on users as well, […] if you also don't work with families, if you only work on the situational aspect, you will achieve nothing. If you work on families, on the environmental, educational context, you will have many more chances to achieve something there."*

An additional advantage of a mixed approach to urban security is the reduction of financial and social costs of realizing security provision programs because the society can take up some functions and responsibilities from the local administration and police. So, the encouragement of citizens to participate in urban security production has economic rationality as it facilitates the redistribution of responsibilities and, as a result, costs from the state to non-state actors.

Still, the mixed approach is not that spread in Italy nowadays. However, there are some exceptions, for example, the region of Emilia Romagna with its project 'Secure cities.' Additionally, the recent national legislation also tries to promote and revive the mixed approach to dealing with problems in urban spaces. Thus, the Minniti Decree (2017) *'proclaims that there should be social tools, neighbourhood control, urban planning for prevention'* (Interview 1ME).

The experts singled out CPTED among situational interventions to tackle urban insecurity. Additionally, they pointed out the visible presence of formal control that should be consistent: *"The most effective interventions are the ones that are made daily. For example, the presence of the patrols is significant for crime prevention; it creates visibility of the police in the area"* (Interview 3ME). The quotation shows that the exercise of disciplinary power through the constant

presence of the police officers, who might represent a figure of a guardian, might be effective for crime deterrence and prevention in Milan.

Another measure that is not realized at the moment but could be fruitful is an instant and adequate response to non-crime problems (like incivilities, urban degradation) reported by citizens. The experts pointed out that no public body is responsible for dealing with such issues, incivilities, and petty crime. As Expert 2ME formulated it: *"[T]his city is very lacking a response, there is no answer, because the resources are what they are and very often because a coordination is still missing, even though I have advised several times."* As it follows from the excerption from the interview, partially, a lack of such a body is due to limited financial resources in the city. Expert 3ME, a head of one of the police stations in Milan, also highlighted that sometimes people report to the police issues that the police are not responsible for solving. Therefore, it appears that there is an absence of clear communication on what public bodies' responsibilities are and which one should be contacted in case of need.

According to the experts, partially, the population's reliance on the police to solve even some minor daily problems is based on how local politicians address the problem of urban insecurity. In particular, the respondents also pointed at the right/left political division around the problem of urban insecurity, also discussed in the previous sections. Expert 2ME describes this division the following way: *"And unfortunately, we live in a country in which there is a bipolarity in the political world. Let's say the right tackles the issue of security in a rough, very unrefined way and only engages the forces of law and order to deal with fear. And the political world of the left, which instead does not want that you talk about security, it is a taboo that it does not want to address, it is considered to be the right-wing argument. In all this, in Milan, there is no discussion on security. […] While instead, unfortunately, everything is laid on the shoulders of the local police."* As a result of the political division, the police are overcommitted as they appear to be the only responsible public body.

An interchange between right- and left-wing governments in Milan contributes to an inability to adequately deal with the problem of urban insecurity in the city. As Expert 1ME explains it, a newly formed centre-right or centre-left Municipality of Milan always appoints new people to deal with the problem of urban insecurity. Therefore, there is no continuation and proper exchange of knowledge from a previous government to a new one, but rather '*the timer is reset, they start from the beginning.*' It is especially problematic given the complex nature of urban insecurity that includes crime and youth delinquency, education, urban planning, and other policy areas.

The experts also referred to the 'broken windows' theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), stating that improving physical space and removing signs of degradation could greatly improve the feeling

and perception of security there. In particular, Expert 2ME draws a specific example of Quarto Oggiaro, where a park redevelopment brought about more use of the public space and an increase in population: *"[T]he Quarto Oggiaro was an excellent case of the redevelopment. Building, most of the buildings began to be populated with the redevelopment of the Villa Scheibler and its park. It was a perfect example of how a neighbourhood increases in the level of quality and, therefore, the perception has changed."*

As to the social approach to dealing with urban insecurity, the experts suggested that information campaigns clarifying that Milan is a secure city to live in can improve the security feeling and nudge further participation in the city life. However, so far, the Municipality has not done it.

According to Expert 2ME, immigrants' integration programs are an essential tool to prevent subjective urban insecurity in the areas of Milan where there is a higher concentration of foreigners. Given that the right-wing parties built a discourse on a connection between crime rates and immigration in Italy, the presence of immigrants might lead to social tensions between local inhabitants and foreigners. Therefore, there is a need for integration measures to reduce the level of tension.

Additionally, the experts pointed out the involvement of citizens, local inhabitants in urban management. For instance, it could be participatory planning that Expert 1ME defined the following way: *"So, in my opinion, one of the positive experiences we have had over the years is that of participatory planning, participatory budgeting, in which the residents are involved at the local level in the administrative decisions that the local administration will carry out. […] Municipalities can make interventions more adequate because I assume that a resident knows the area well."*

Expert 3ME stated that in Milan, it is realized through the police keeping in contact with the Municipality and specific groups of local citizens: neighbourhood committees, associations of pharmacists, tobacco shop owners, etc. Such contacts provide the police with a constant information flow on the problems emerging in an area*: "So, based on this information we can decide where and when should go the patrols. So, based on the information, we identified some priority areas and times for patrolling to oppose the degradation or illegal activities."* Therefore, the police exercise governmentality by involving the citizens in tackling urban insecurity. Specifically, it allows the police to redistribute their resources more effectively.

Informal and spontaneous surveillance is another way for citizens' contribution to the production of security. To facilitate it, the local authorities should create favourable conditions for stimulating the public's space usage; shops should have large transparent windows, etc.

In sum, the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity proposed by the experts reflect a complex construction of the phenomenon. In particular, they highlighted the importance of tackling urban insecurity by implementing both social and situational interventions. Moreover, they suggested that the participation of citizens is vital for effective dealing with the problems in Milan, which corresponds to the role of informal control and spontaneous surveillance designated in the problematisation of urban insecurity.

Additionally, the experts designated some weak points in the current way of tackling urban insecurity by the Municipality of Milan. Specifically, they pointed at a lack of continuation and knowledge sharing between the governments, absence of clear communication with the local inhabitants, and absence of some interventions they considered effective.

4.3. Video surveillance as one of the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity

In Milan, the Municipality is responsible and pays for the installation and maintenance of video cameras, while the police are responsible for monitoring the footage in a control room. Although the experts were undecided on the criteria used for installing video surveillance cameras in Milan, Expert 1ME suggested that they might make decisions based on the requests of local inhabitants and the police recommendations. Experts 2ME and 3ME supposed that the Municipality first identifies the most problematic and vulnerable (with low natural surveillance) areas and installs cameras there. Expert 2ME stated that the State Police could provide some crime data to support their argument for installing CCTVs in crime hotspots.

There are various video surveillance systems installed in Milan. Expert 2ME pointed out that there are two different modes of video surveillance – in real life and retrospectively. Additionally, Expert 1ME also pointed out that there are more advanced video surveillance systems capable of exchanging information with other information technology systems (for example, CCTVs capable of reading cars' number plates, etc.). Apparently, the authorities are interested in the adaptation of further development of video surveillance which might lead to an increase in the amount of collected information and facilitate its analysis. As a result, authorities might more effectively exercise discipline and increase the scope of control and surveillance over individuals (Gray, 2002; Marx, 1985).

As it was discussed previously, in Milan, the local administrators might have an unconditional belief that technological solutions can tackle complex urban problems. Such technological solutions also entail video surveillance: *"And even politicians often think that putting two cameras can solve the problem. Well, in the meantime, if a criminal is really motivated of committing a crime in another place, we cannot..."* (Interview 2ME). As the quotation shows, the expert points

out that there are some limitations in the capacity of video surveillance to prevent crime. Simultaneously, the experts agreed that video surveillance is effective for crime investigation.

Expert 1ME believed that video surveillance has modest effectiveness in terms of crime prevention in Italy. However, the experts suggested that the technology might effectively prevent such crimes as predatory and car thefts. It happens mainly because it would require a criminal to plan their crime better; therefore, a criminal might decide not to commit it due to the presence of CCTV as it requires even further planning of how to avoid being caught. Additionally, the time of the commission of such crimes is usually rather long. Consequently, video surveillance increases the chances of being caught.

Simultaneously, video surveillance is ineffective for preventing such crimes as violent, crimes of passion because they happen spontaneously. Besides, according to Expert 1ME, video surveillance is ineffective against pickpocketing as they are committed very quickly, and cameras frequently do not catch them. Lastly, according to the words of Expert 2ME, a motivated criminal might invest in researching a place of crime before committing it, which will lead to reduced effectiveness of video surveillance or crime displacement to an area not covered by surveillance.

The analysis of the interview data shows that the experts treat a criminal as a rational actor aiming at maximizing their utility (Clarke, 1995; Felson, 2002; Garland, 2001). Given that video surveillance might increase their chances of being caught, they can try to avoid areas covered by CCTVs.

Moreover, video cameras might themselves be a target of crime. Thus, one of the experts who is also experienced in managing housing projects referred to his experience: *"Obviously, the first thing the residents asked was to put cameras. On the other hand, I suggested hiring a concierge to keep an eye on and save money. In the end, they bought a very expensive camera system, almost € 60 000 […]. The first theft after the cameras were installed was a month later; they stole the camera system. Also, because it's enough to put a hood on"* (Interview 2ME). The expert suggested that local inhabitants might ask for the installation of CCTVs because there is a lack of knowledge of other methods of securitisation or creating a secure space. Therefore, the security market fills in this gap by promoting their products and further fortification, which, however, might not actually protect (Zedner, 2003).

Expert 2ME supposed that video cameras could be up to their maximum efficacy for crime prevention only if they cover the whole city. Therefore, it implies the logic of the security state that puts every place and everybody under suspicion (Sorkin, 2008). However, according to the expert, England's example of almost omnipresent video surveillance is not something that should

happen in Italy because the society might not want to live in such an environment, and some people might be discontent about being constantly filmed.

Additionally, cameras should be of high resolution to be effective for both crime prevention and investigation. As Expert 3ME said: *"For sure, we have to have high-quality video surveillance, as unfortunately, the quality of the recordings not always allows to identify a culprit, but also to see what exactly happened. But when the video surveillance is of good quality, surely, it provides security."*

Therefore, experts construct CCTV as a part of an integrated way to tackle urban insecurity but not a unique solution. Expert 1ME referred to an example of a park renovation to show that only the installation of CCTVs cannot facilitate the usage of public spaces. Instead, it should be implemented along with other social and economic measures: *"It is not that if you put cameras in that park, it will start to be frequented, maybe you need to do something else along with the cameras. There should also be the involvement of residents, socio-cultural initiatives that bring you back there, even economic initiatives that encourage attendance, then, of course, it varies from case to case"* (Interview 1ME).

One of the experts suggested smartly using video surveillance. That is, to install and activate them when there is a knowledge that a crime might be committed or a wanted person might appear: *"For example, the preventive use, I know that on day X, there is a market, then, I have the cameras, I activate them and maybe... Or I know that in a certain area, there is a person who could be a wanted character, then I activate the cameras in that area. But I can't think of putting cameras everywhere because I think that in any case, I will not be able to prevent a crime in every place"* (Interview 2ME). Simultaneously, this expert suggested that deactivated cameras are useless for crime prevention because a prepared and experienced criminal can easily understand whether it works or not.

As to the perception of insecurity, the experts suggested that video surveillance is effective for improving it. Although the presence of the police forces on the streets is the most crucial factor for reassuring the inhabitants of Milan, video surveillance follows it: *"Surely, at the level of perception at this moment they [video cameras] are seen as, that is, after a policeman on the street, they are the second thing"* (Interview 2ME).

It is also confirmed by local inhabitants' request to install video surveillance in adjacent public spaces (by the Municipality) or inside their places of inhabitation (by a managing company). The experts explained it through the reliance of local inhabitants on video surveillance to solve crime problems through the installation of CCTV. The request of the inhabitants for the installation of

video surveillance might be considered a result of the implementation of governmentality of unease (Garland, 2001). So, given that the general public becomes increasingly aware of different threats due to the media and political discourse, they might seek to fortify the places of their inhabitation.

Expert 3ME stated that in his personal experience, video surveillance achieves as crime prevention as an increase in the perception of security*: "I tell you this as a private citizen, in a place where I live, in my condominium, thieves used to climb over the wall and then committed burglaries, so we installed very good cameras […], the burglaries stopped […]. Consequently, we, as the inhabitants, have a higher feeling of security."* Therefore, according to him, such increasing fortification might be effective.

Expert 1ME specified that the effectiveness of video surveillance for subjective security diminishes in the long term. It happens because, after video surveillance installation, people might realize that the problem does not disappear completely. Clear communication from the local authorities on the effectiveness of video surveillance can elongate the duration of the effect of video surveillance on subjective security. Simultaneously, given that in Milan, there is a lack of communication between the Municipality and Milanese citizens, local inhabitants might not receive such information. It is also the same for the police, which are not capable of communicating clearly positive effects from the application of one or another tool: *"[T]hey [the police] do not dedicate, in my opinion, enough time to, what in English is called, accountability towards the final beneficiaries. And this tends to delegitimize them because even if it is maybe a useful tool, but I don't tell it, […], it diminishes with time"* (Interview 1ME).

At the same time, experts pointed out a false sense of security as a drawback of video surveillance. Thus, in the presence of video surveillance cameras, people might feel more relaxed and less cautious. However, crime still happens; therefore, this feeling of protection might be false. It confirms the findings of Armitage et al. (1999), Welsh and Farrington (2009), and Welsh et al. (2015).

As to the perception of video surveillance as an invasion of one's privacy, according to the experts, the majority of the Italian population does not share such a perspective on CCTV. Especially compared with other European countries, the Italian population has lower levels of privacy concerns related to the implementation of video surveillance as it is constructed in society as a tool of security provision. Expert 1ME explains it by an inclination to prioritise security needs over personal ones. In addition, it might be another result of the implementation of governmentality of unease in Italy and Milan. Specifically, it promotes an idea of invisible and constant threat fighting, which requires the limitation of some liberal rights (Bigo, 2006).

Furthermore, the experts noted a lack of resistance to video surveillance which might be ascribed to the same reasons named above: a perception of video surveillance as a tool of protection and the propensity of the Italians to prioritise security concerns. Thus, Expert 2ME put it the following way: *"I believe that if the city were filled up with cameras tomorrow, someone would protest, but in the end, it would go pretty much according to the plan."*

Moreover, a lack of resistance to video surveillance might lead to a lack of transparency in conducting CCTV surveillance. In particular, Expert 2ME suggested that in Milan, half of the privately maintained cameras do not have proper signage; therefore, people are not even aware of entering the surveyed area and a responsible body for data collection. Such lack of transparency might also explain a uniform perception of the cameras installed by the Municipality and public bodies. Additionally, it might be explained by a positive image of a video camera as a tool of security provision.

Despite such low concern among the Italian population over the collection of private data through video surveillance, there is a variance between the contexts of private data collection. For instance, Expert 2ME gave the following example: people might be concerned about installing a new application collecting their data (as it was in the case of an application aiming at containing the spread of COVID-19). At the same time, they willingly give up some parts of their life and data to Facebook by registering in the network and posting photos, writing posts, etc.

As stated in the interview with the head of a police station in Milan, the officers in the control room are not interested in the private affairs of every citizen. They are only watching out for dangerous situations or public threats: *"But it really doesn't matter to me whether a person walks with their spouse or a lover, or if someone walks in via Turin to buy cigarettes, it doesn't matter to me whether they also buy some beer. There are some people who think they are controlled at every moment, but we simply don't have the capacity, enough personnel to control everyone. So, it's obvious that CCTVs are used exclusively to watch out for some serious situations, not for controlling everyone, not for observing private citizens, because we are not interested in them and their affairs"* (Interview 3ME).

Simultaneously, the quotation is somewhat emblematic of the surveillance society perspective. Firstly, Expert 3ME stated that there is a lack of police officers to observe everyone. Therefore, an increase in the number of people working in the control room would overcome this obstacle. Secondly, Expert 3ME based his opinion that there should be no abuse of power by the police officers in the control room as they are not interested in private citizens or their affairs. However, the previous research shows that it might not always be the case (G. J. D. Smith, 2012; Webster, 2009). Thirdly, according to Expert 3ME, anonymity in the public space is preserved due to

'informatization' (Frissen, 1989): personal details are not utilized in any meaningful way unless they show signs of deviance.

The Italian experts were not optimistic about possible future developments of video surveillance. In particular, according to the experts, CCTV with face recognition will strip off citizens' privacy completely. Therefore, the experts anticipate that the further development of technologies and merging different databases containing biological information might lead to an increase in the surveillance power of the state (Gray, 2002).

Additionally, the experts were against the possibility of the exchange of information between publicly and privately maintained cameras as it would undermine privacy. Simultaneously, the Italian police can ask for access to the footage recorded by private bodies in situations where there is a public threat or committed crime.

Overall, the experts considered video surveillance useful only if implemented along with other social and situational interventions. It corresponds with their general approach to tackling urban insecurity with mixed interventions. From the analysis of the experts' interviews, it emerges that there are some limitations in the capacity of video surveillance to prevent crimes. Furthermore, there should be some conditions for it to be effective (covering the whole area, being of high resolution).

The experts also suggested that video surveillance might be even more effective for improving the perception of security than for crime reduction. Thus, the local inhabitants might request its installation if they have a high fear of crime. However, again, some conditions should be fulfilled for video surveillance to impact the perception of security: the local authorities and the police can clearly communicate the effectiveness of the installation of CCTVs. Nevertheless, the Milanese population shows almost no resistance to the spread of video surveillance and, instead, is accepting, which might be attributed to a propensity to prioritise security over privacy.

4.4. Summary

The experts accounted for the complex nature of urban insecurity in their problematisation of the phenomenon. Although Milan is considered to be a secure city, urban insecurity remains an important topic in the city, which could be attributed to crime, the attention of the media and the politicians to it, stigmatisation of some social groups, and reproduction of 'places of fear,' and other issues.

Given the complex nature of urban insecurity in Milan, the experts considered that a mixed and participatory approach should be the most effective for tackling the problem. The latter approach implies citizens' involvement in urban security production: they might participate in the

management of the neighbourhood, and their opinions should be considered when planning and implementing some interventions. At the same time, experts pointed out that, currently, in Milan, there is an inclination towards situational interventions. Furthermore, there is right/left political division that obstacles contrasting the problem of urban insecurity in the most effective way.

The experts constructed video surveillance as a partial solution to the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, they pointed to a limited capacity of video surveillance to prevent crimes: not all crime types might be deterred, CCTV cameras might get stolen, etc. As to reassuring the local inhabitants, it might be even more effective than crime prevention. However, with time, a positive effect of the presence of video surveillance might go down if the police or the Municipality does not communicate positive results from the technology.

This part of the analysis also reveals the dominance of the security state and governmentality of unease framework to urban security provision and implementation of video surveillance in Milan. For example, the following signs can be distinguished:

- responsibilisation of local inhabitants and their involvement in urban security provision, which implies the economic rationality as the state pass on some functions to the local level;
- crime is considered by the experts as a rational act, which might explain a shift towards cybercrime, avoidance of places covered by video surveillance, looking for ways of going about video surveillance, etc.;
- the propensity of the Italian population to give up a part of their rights at the expense of security, which might be due to the construction of some groups and places as dangerous, criminogenic, etc.;
- there is an inclination toward putting everyone under suspicion, especially in the problematic areas of the city, due to political and media discourses on security in the city;
- there are some signs of segregation of a more affluent part of the population from a more marginal one as the former prefer to live in the city centre, fortified housing projects, etc.;
- in Milan, there is an excessive fortification of public and private places, which might increase vulnerability contrary to the expectations. Additionally, the market of security products and services encourages excessive fortification.

At the same time, signs of a surveillance society are also discernible, especially in the implementation of video surveillance. Thus, the experts highlighted the importance of a transparent space that provides for increased surveillance, a figure of the observer, and threats from technological development (increased surveillance and control over individuals, abuse of power by those who survey).

5. NGOs' representatives: displacing problems to the periphery of Milan and video surveillance is 'not useless, but it is insufficient'

5.1. Problematisation of urban insecurity

The representatives of NGOs, just like the experts, characterized Milan as a secure city. Mainly, they attributed it to declining crime rates, the visible presence of formal control (local police, the State Police, carabinieri) in the city's streets, and the presence of neighbourhood watch. Simultaneously, the interviewees noted that these visible control signs are not spread equally throughout the city. For instance, Interviewee 1MV made a distinction between a district where the charitable organisation is located and a neighbouring municipality: *"But I can see the difference here from Sesto, we are bordering with Sesto. At the moment you are there, you realize that there are patrols of this… […] the grandfathers for the neighbourhood, neighbourhood watch, or something like this. But I don't see it here"* (Interview 1MV).

Although, in general, the interviewees draw a connection between the presence of formal control and the decline in crime trends, Interviewee 4MV offered an alternative view on it. Thus, he suggested that an increase in the control might have produced a crime displacement effect, meaning that crime just moved from the city, but the problem itself has not been solved. In particular, he illustrated it on an example of organised drug dealing in the district of Milan called Fleming, suggesting that one of the drug cartels decided to move out from Milan due to an increase in the number of police officers patrolling the area.

The representative of the grass-roots organisations also constructed Milan as a secure city due to the vivacity of life in the city. On the one hand, the vivacity could take a form of a variety of social, cultural, and educational activities, also held by the NGOs themselves. For instance, Interviewee 4MV said that the NGO he works at held up to 300 events (movie screenings, theatre, debating club, etc.) a year. However, the interviewee stated that despite a multiplicity of social activities, there is low awareness among the Milanese population.

On the other hand, the presence of people in the streets of the city, a variety of shops, services (bars, libraries, repair shops, beauty parlours, and so on), etc., also contributes to the notion of the vivacity of Milan, according to the interviewees. Undoubtedly, this dimension of vivacity is tightly interconnected with the former. Furthermore, these two dimensions contribute to the security of Milan because they encourage the use of public space. Interviewee 4MV described the following way how the opening of various small businesses contributed to the security of one of the neighbourhoods in which the organisation is active: *"And therefore, the presence of businesses was designed to, and it actually encouraged life in the neighbourhood. […] Since there is a social*

life, and social life guarantees a whole series of elements, including the defence." (Interview 4MV)

Again, as in the case of visible signs of control, the interviewees suggested that these activities are not equally distributed within Milan and its outskirts. In particular, Interviewee 2MV suggested that Sesto San Giovanni, a municipality bordering Milan in the northeast, has a richer cultural life than the neighbourhoods of Milan; therefore, they might be considered more secure.

Although the representatives of the grass-roots organisations noted a crime decline in the city, they still problematised urban insecurity through crime. More specifically, they identified violence, robberies, and abusive occupation as the most problematic criminal activities. In addition, interviewee 4MV highlighted that the elderly are especially vulnerable to violence and robberies.

The interviewees accounted for the complex nature of the crime. In particular, they pointed out that criminal phenomena are usually produced in poorer neighbourhoods due to social and environmental circumstances there. Simultaneously, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations draw a connection between crime and some social groups, namely immigrants and nomads. Thus, Interviewee 2MV suggested that immigrants frequently have more economically disadvantaged conditions, which, in turn, might create a favourable environment for the emergence of criminal phenomena. Therefore, criminal intentions appear among the immigrants due to economic hardship. Interviewee 4MV applied the same rationale to the nomads.

In addition, the NGOs' workers highlighted a lack of adequate response to the problem of crime in Italy. Thus, some petty crimes might not be punished appropriately or investigated, contributing to recurrent criminal offences. Interviewee 4MV referred to his experience to illustrate it: *"But I caught a, a Chilean snatcher if I remember correctly. And he said to me: "Ah, listen, this month you have already caught me four times. And look what a beautiful country Italy is. In Canada, they caught me two years ago, and I had to go to jail for two years." […] So, it is clear where I should go to steal: where is it easier or where is it less easy? If I had to choose between two fairs in Montreal or Milan, I'd come to Milan."*

This excerpt, along with the example of a drug-dealing cartel in Fleming, shows that criminals are constructed as rational actors. Particularly, they can estimate their benefits of committing a crime in one place or another and choose a place in which there is less probability of punishment.

As a result of the absence of an adequate response to the problem of crime, the local inhabitants of Milan might demand or implement the fortification of their houses: *"As I was saying, in another*

neighbourhood, Quarto Cagnino, the Gescal[33] *houses were built, they were all like this [without fences], now they are all fenced. Did those who were there have to put some money to fence unnecessarily? No, they fenced off because 'whoever in duty' did not guarantee security"* (Interview 4MV). Therefore, the logic of a security state applies here as people start to fortify their houses as a result of increasing awareness of crime (Garland, 2001) and, at the same time, neoliberal policies of responsibilisation of citizens (Monahan, 2010).

Incivilities also appeared in the problematisation of urban insecurity in the discourses of the NGOs' workers. Thus, aggressions, alcohol-induced misbehaviour, and baby-gangs[34] were named the most troublesome issues for urban insecurity in the city. The interviewees connect crime activity and the spread of incivilities to the conditions of life in a large city like Milan. Such viewpoint lies within the framework of the theory of routine activities (Felson, 1994; Newton & Felson, 2015): in bigger cities, there are more opportunities for crime due to the routine activities of its inhabitants and the absence of guardians in some spaces. On the other hand, it also reflects the security state theory. According to it, there is a constant war against crime, and the absolute state of security is unachievable due to the ability of criminals to develop new forms of crime (Freedman, 1992).

Just like the experts, the NGOs' representatives also noted a decline in crime and incivilities brought about by the restriction measures aimed at containing the spread of the COVID-19. Mainly, they noted a decrease in burglaries, break-ins, street crime, and activity of baby-gangs. For instance, Interviewee 2MV summarized the situation the following way: *"If we are all at home, it is a little more problematic to make a burglary. How to do it? I ring the bell and tell you, 'I'm robbing you; I don't want to, but I have to.' […] I was talking about baby-gangs before. But if you couldn't go outside, how would you steal from the little kids?"* Furthermore, Interviewee 2MV described the situation in the city's streets as *'incredibly calm and tranquil.'*

In addition, the workers of the grass-roots organisations confirmed the trend, designated by the experts, of the growth in the number of scams during the lockdown times. Therefore, there was a shift from street crime to crimes committed not in the physical space during the times of lockdown. Again, it might be explained by constructing a criminal as a rational actor capable of shifting to other crime types or developing crime activities due to an estimated increase in benefits.

The representatives of the NGOs also problematised urban insecurity in Milan through visible signs of urban decay and physical degradation. This issue is especially acute in the periphery of

[33] GEStione CAse per i Lavoratori [The management of houses for workers].
[34] An organised group of adolescents who usually commit petty crime or incivilities (bullying of children or younger teenagers, painting graffiti, pickpocketing, shoplifting, etc.)

the city in comparison with the city centre. However, as Interviewee 3MV suggested, this problem is common in all large Italian cities: *"In big cities, there is this apparent well-being in the centre, but if you go to the suburbs, you realize what the real situation is in public housing."*

In general, from the analysis of the interview data, it appears that the periphery of Milan is constructed as an area of concentration of urban security problems. Interviewee 4MV presumed that it could be explained by a will of the government of Milan to displace visible problems from the city centre to the periphery of the city: *"So there is a perception that Milan has problems and they should be sent to the periphery. Let's free Milan; they [the problems] are over there."* In turn, it is attributed to an attempt to make the city centre more attractive.

The presence of stigmatised and marginalised groups also contributes to the problematisation of urban insecurity by the workers of the grass-roots organisations. In particular, they named drug users, immigrants, Roma people, baby-gangs as a problematic issue creating an insecure environment in Milan. Interestingly, the interviewees indicated that these groups that bring about insecurity could change with time. For instance, Interviewee 4MV said that immigrants displaced nomads in one of the peripheric areas of Milan. Consequently, it shows that the problem of urban insecurity is constantly changing and is constructed following the change in reality.

The NGOs' workers also pointed out that the presence of deviant from the norm people is usually more pronounced in the suburbs of Milan. Interviewee 3MV attributed it to lower levels of control there: *"And the, the problem is, you see, the biggest problems arise from the suburbs […]. Then there are weak points, poor controls over the places of, of Roma settlings, right"* (Interview 3MV).

Due to the tendency of displacing the problems from the city centre to the periphery, some groups of 'others' might arrive from Milan's centre to the suburbs. Interviewee 4ME gave the following example: "*20 years ago the site, the place, the place where the best Milanese viados*[35] *could be found was next to the Monumental Cemetery, the China town. A security councillor arrived, I don't know, how he thought, a security counsellor arrived, he said: 'I will clear the Monumental Cemetery from viados.*' *And then they all arrived here. Here, they don't bother the locals, of course, as much as they did over there, so they all are here."*

Regarding the subjective insecurity in Milan, the interviewees suggested that it is improving. At the same time, they pointed out the difference between the perception of insecurity and objective security in the city. Furthermore, there is a difference between negative perceptions of some of the districts of Milan, predominantly located at the periphery of the city, and the situation there. For instance, one of the NGO's workers invoked his experience of living in one of the 'insecure' places

[35] Male sex workers.

of Milan, which was also pointed out by the experts – via Padova: *"I have always lived in Milan, in the district of via Padova. […] So, here, you feel life practically every day, it is an extremely lively neighbourhood"* (Interview 1MV). As the quotation shows, contrarily to its reputation, the interviewee characterized the neighbourhood as lively and, therefore, secure. Consequently, it is possible to draw a conclusion about the robustness of a negative reputation that tends to reproduce once it is established in society (Tulumello, 2015).

This social construction of places of fear might be sustained by a lack of the Municipality's action to change it: *"Well, we can make all these [problematic] neighbourhoods known to the city. What do I know about Rogoredo? I only know that there are drugs, period. Instead of the San Siro area being famous as the neighbourhood of squatting, changing it a little, it would have become the district of musicians"* (Interview 4MV).

According to the representatives of the civil sector, such crimes as robberies, abusive occupation, and scams against the elderly contribute to the shaping of subjective urban insecurity in Milan. Nevertheless, Interviewee 3MV highlighted that the city's fear of crime might be exaggerated.

The NGOs' workers also problematised subjective urban insecurity through visible signs of physical and social urban degradation that are tightly connected. Thus, Interviewee 2MV proposed the following vision on the topic: *"If an area is strongly degraded because the park is filthy, because there are syringes because there're all these many things, they become occupied obviously by people who increase the decay, and consequently decay brings insecurity, also at the level of perception."* Therefore, Interviewee 2MV followed the 'broken windows' theory that minor signs of degradation might lead to further degradation and aggravate the perception of security in the area (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Furthermore, he suggested that urban degradation might be a reason why the periphery of Milan became problematic. Thus, according to him, visible signs of degradation obstruct people from living in the territory, which leads to further degradation.

The analysis of the interviews also shows that the stigmatisation of some groups of the population contributes to the problematisation of subjective urban insecurity. Immigrants are especially stigmatised in Italy, as shown in the previous sections of this chapter. According to the representatives of the NGOs, the media reinforce the negative stereotypisation of immigrants.

Therefore, a dense presence of immigrants might affect the perception of the place: *"In Milan, what I personally think, there is also the topic of the immigration which often in people's minds is connected to insecurity. […] And so, seeing zones of the city which are densely inhabited by people who immigrated to Italy, there appears the perception of insecurity"* (Interview 2MV). Additionally, Interviewee 4MV highlighted that the arrival of a new population to an area might

change the social composition there; however, there is a lack of integration programs or natural assimilation that might also lead to further stigmatisation of immigrants, ghettoization, and social tensions.

Meanwhile, some interviewees pointed out that immigrants might have an even greater feeling of insecurity due to their negative stigmatisation and, as a result, attitude in society, including institutional settings. For instance, Interviewee 1MV accounted for a part of his work the following way: *"Then you have to accompany them [immigrants] to the law enforcement and act as an intermediary, because many times people, put this down in a way you want, but they are afraid if they have to go there […]. Especially foreigners experience this, having to go to the police station as a traumatic event […]. But you never have, you haven't done anything, you go there to say that you have been robbed rather than to say you have done something wrong."*

Furthermore, the stigmatisation of foreigners might lead to tension between a charity organisation helping them and the local inhabitants. Interviewee 1MV, who works in such an organisation, put it the following way: *"If a problem happens with a foreigner even if we have maybe nothing to do with this person, there is a doubt immediately: 'Ah, they come from you'"* (Interview 1MV). At the same time, the organisation tries to open up a dialogue with the citizens to remove the stigma and encourage social acceptance of immigrants.

Other stigmatised groups are already mentioned viados and the homeless. The interviewee suggested that the Milanese population has a negative perception due to their asocial behaviour and occupation of public spaces that should be shared with them. For example, Interviewee 4MV came up with the following example of the behaviour of viados: *"If I want to put a banquet in the middle of the street, I have to ask for permission, pay for the occupation of public land. The viados occupy all the streets, they are there with their tables, they are there with their chairs, and here nobody says anything, but above all nobody does anything"* (Interview 4MV).

Lastly, the representatives of NGOs named people consuming alcohol or drugs as a stigmatised group. Again, a negative perception of such people might extend to the space in which they are present: *"At times, to pass by a park where there are people who drink beer in, in the collective imagination, it is insecurity. So, passing by even a group of adult people who have a bottle of beer in their hand makes one afraid"* (Interview 2MV).

The construction of some groups as dangerous and producing insecurity follows the logic of governmentality of unease (Bigo, 2006; O'Malley, 2004). Thus, there is profiling of some groups as threatening, and the population might ask the government to protect from them or seek their ways of protection through segregation, which is partially realised in Milan as wealthier people

live in the city centre or gated communities. In comparison, the poorer people live in the city's periphery and cannot afford any means of fortification.

Social stratification might take even visible forms. For instance, Interviewee 1MV referred to the coexistence of wealthier and poorer parts of the population in the Adriano district in the following way: *"If you look at it, you go down here, you go in the direction of Padova street, you'll see ruined houses, if you go in another direction, if you go towards the others areas, you'll see new villas, buildings with gates"* (Interview 1MV).

Insufficient visible formal control was also named as an issue contributing to subjective urban insecurity in Milan. Specifically, the representatives of grass-roots organisations noted that the Milanese population expects to see more formal controls in the city's streets; however, this expectation is not met due to limited resources. In turn, it gives grounds for a feeling of abandonment and insecurity.

The interviews' analysis also reveals that a lack of informal control and spontaneous surveillance contribute to urban insecurity. Thus, empty streets at night might generate the feeling of insecurity even in the city centre, which is usually perceived as a secure area of Milan.

The NGOs' representatives also constructed subjective urban insecurity by lacking social cohesion in Milan. The interviewees attributed it to the conditions of life in a large city. Interviewee 3MV suggested the following example: *"As you know very well, that maybe there are buildings of 8 – 10 floors […] and within this building, there are situations in which someone on the first floor knows nothing, doesn't even know who lives there, lives on the upper floors. This is a bit problematic; it's called an urban desert."* Such an 'urban desert' leads to the erosion of social ties, deresponsibilisation to help others, and indifference in Milan.

Interestingly, all the respondents mentioned a rise in social solidarity during the pandemic. Despite the pandemic added new meanings to urban insecurity, as it was shown in the previous section, it also produced more social support and cohesion: *"Instead when there was the coronavirus, […] we gave a hand to our neighbours, we did some, we did the shopping, maybe, small things that we could do. The coronavirus in some sense 'has given a hand' to solidarity, to social health, all of these things"* (Interview 3MV). Interviewee 2MV also pointed out that there was less social tension in the period of lockdown as social solidarity became more prominent as a coping mechanism.

The workers of the grass-roots organisations also discussed the problem of youth delinquency as a factor contributing to the problematisation of subjective urban insecurity. In particular, according

to them, a lack of attention to adolescents and their needs leads to their marginalisation and formation of baby-gangs or other illegal activities.

Additionally, an issue of scarce employment opportunities and precarious labour conditions was presented in the interviewees' discourse on the topic of urban insecurity. According to the respondents, this problem became especially acute in times of pandemic when some people lost their work: *"But on the other hand, it [the pandemic] has created so many unemployment, so many job losses, and this is a problem that comes in the next few months, right. Because there are so many people who also worked precariously and in fact lost their jobs"* (Interview 3MV). As the excerpt shows, Interviewee 3MV considers the issue of unemployment to have long-term consequences that could affect Italian society in the long run.

To summarize the analysis of the interviews with the NGOs' representatives, it is evident that the interviewees accounted for a complex nature of urban insecurity. Although they constructed the phenomenon through crime and visible signs of physical urban degradation, their discourse paid much more attention to the social roots of urban insecurity: social tensions, stigmatisation of some groups and, simultaneously, their increased vulnerability, marginalisation, disaggregation of traditional social ties, the perception of abandonment, and others.

Additionally, the interview data offers some interesting insights. In particular, the NGOs' representatives pointed out a tendency of the Municipality of Milan to displace problems from the city centre to the periphery. Additionally, the interviewees explained how the stigmatisation of different social groups happens in Milan. Therefore, it shows the importance of studying the opinions of people working at the local level as they are immersed in the direct environment of the production of urban insecurity.

5.2. Possible solutions to the problem

As it follows from the problematisation of urban insecurity, the representatives of NGOs accounted for the complex nature of this phenomenon with an inclination to the social origins. Therefore, they mainly discussed social measures and their implementation as a possible solution to urban insecurity, while the situational approach was considered an additional, although indispensable, instrument for the provision of urban insecurity.

The NGOs' workers named social integration projects among effective social prevention measures. More specifically, the interviewees named education and social assimilation as useful tools for integrating ethnic minorities and immigrants. For instance, Interviewee 1MV pointed out that these measures have been successfully implemented in the neighbourhoods along via Padova: *"It is a multi-ethnic zone that has a lot of integration projects in the schools, which pay a lot of*

attention to this topic. It is a very active neighbourhood in terms of, concerning integration." As a result, there is less multi-ethnic tension and stigmatisation of foreigners in the neighbourhoods, which positively impacts the perception of urban security.

Interviewee 2MV, who also proposed through education and assimilation to integrate Roma families, suggested that implementing these measures does not bring immediate results, as they are time-consuming and might require a lot of effort. However, in the long run, they are more effective than the situational ones as they might remove a negative stigma and lower tension in society.

In contrast, the interviewees were rather critical of the Security Packages, especially those adopted by the centre-right government, as discussed in this chapter's first two sections. In particular, Interviewee 1MV pointed out that it impeded the integration of foreigners, facilitated irregular immigration, and, in turn, generated even more urban insecurity.

The representatives of the civil sector also mentioned other dimensions of educational activities. For instance, one of the NGOs is also engaged in clarifying the rules and norms of civil coexistence at schools. Thus, Interviewee 3MV gave a concrete example of their project with schools in which they explain how to avoid dangerous situations or their work with local inhabitants explaining to them how to share public spaces and protect their houses. Interviewee 4MV also highlighted that the organisation, in which he works, also conducts studies on problems and needs of the peripheric neighbourhoods of Milan. It is done to understand what kind of cultural activities they might introduce there and how to revive the area in general.

The grass-roots organisations' representatives also pointed at the creation or redevelopment of public social spaces as an effective measure stimulating an increase in the use of public areas and, in turn, the perception of security. For example, interviewee 4MV referred to the experience of one of the suburbs of Milan: *"Because the logic was: we should create areas where there are services. That is, I would spend a moment here, and then I go there. […] It all stimulated social life here."*

However, just the creation or redevelopment of such social space is not enough as it should be maintained, too. In particular, it should be clean, renovated in due time, etc. Interviewee 2MV also denoted the following situational interventions that might increase the territory's use: architectural barriers, benches, and CCTVs.

According to the interviewees, a more active social life might also result in increased spontaneous surveillance and informal control over the territory. Interviewee 2MV formulated it the following way: *"A simple hypothesis: if there is a park where mothers can bring their children […], and,*

inevitably, a secure zone is created because if an area is visited, it is lived. […] I think this, it could be a major form of prevention, of self-control." From the interview excerpt, it is evident that Interviewee 2MV suggested that the presence of others can impose discipline as it prevents deviations from the norms.

The analysis of the interview data also shows that the interviewees believed that citizens might contribute to the improvement of urban security in a variety of ways. In particular, citizens' involvement might be through the already mentioned spontaneous surveillance and informal control, but also through more organised exercise of control (for instance, neighbourhood watch), participation in public discussions of the problematic issues, and management and planning of urban security in the district along with the local governments.

Interviewee 1MV stated that the involvement of citizens in the planning brings positive results because the citizens know the territory the best. The words of Interviewee 3MV could be a summary of the opinion of the representatives of NGOs: "*In my opinion, the trump card in the coming years will be the increase in citizen participation and participatory security; this is fundamental."*

The interviewees also noted that there is some interest from the Italian institutions to involve the citizens in the production of urban security. In particular, Interviewee 3MV draw the following example: *"ANCI[36] […] has drawn, has made one, one, one, let's say, a vademecum on participatory security, right. They invited all Italian cities to encourage participatory security. Participatory security means that citizens participate in security life in a way not, not, not armed, not as patrols, but as citizens who pay their attention."* Therefore, the Italian authorities might seek to implement the neoliberal approach to urban security by redistributing the responsibility of urban provision to the local level and involvement of the citizens.

Furthermore, Interviewee 3MV suggested that involving citizens in such a way might reduce thefts and scams. In particular, he referred to the experience of the neighbourhood watch initiative in Italy in general: *"Look, we have reduced the incidence of thefts from 30 to 70% where they are. Let's say that 70 is the maximum, but 30% is already a good result. […] Maybe, people then, because they pay attention. If people apply and participate seriously, then we are at good results."* As the excerpt shows, the respondent attributes such crime reduction effect to the fact that people are more aware, cautious, and paying more attention to what happens in the city's streets.

Despite such success in crime reduction, Interviewee 3MV stated that the neighbourhood watch movement is still at a nascent stage in Italy. Currently, neighbourhood watch works mainly in

[36] Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani [The National Association of Italian Municipalities].

smaller municipalities, while in such large cities as Milan, Rome, and Turin, the movement is present mainly in the city's periphery, and the number of participants is relatively low. It might be explained by the 'urban desert' that exists in Milan; therefore, people do not feel responsible for intervening or engaging in this sort of activity.

Alongside informal surveillance, the representatives of NGOs also implied that formal surveillance could be effective for improving urban security. For example, Interviewee 4MV suggested that there should be *'the vision of someone who controls.'* The respondent also implied some conditions for such surveillance to be effective: firstly, there should be knowledge of problematic places and times; secondly, the patrols should be increased in these places and times.

Simultaneously, the civil sector workers noted that there is a shortage of police officers patrolling the streets of Milan. Consequently, it might lead to a lowered level of control over the territory, which, in turn, might result in the discussed above the feeling of abandonment or increased perception of insecurity. Interviewee 4MV expressed an alternative point of view that there are enough police officers in Milan; however, the human resources are not adequately managed in the city: *"But, I say in Milan we have 11 000 policy agents, tell me what do they do? […] So, we have a lot of resources, and we don't have management skills."*

Interestingly, it appears from the interview data that the formal control might be exercised not only by the police but every service (even if performed by an NGO) that might resemble formal control in some way (for instance, wearing a uniform). Thus, Interviewee 2MV provided an example of the experience of another NGO that cleans the streets of Milan to illustrate that formal surveillance might also be imposed by other services: *"Upon entering the parks where they often cleaned, they were in parks where there was the presence of drugs, just like in the whole city. And so, in some situations, we have seen these guys, generally young, they abandoned those places that my colleagues visited."* Therefore, the analysis shows that formal and informal controls might impact both objective (crime, presence of marginalised groups, signs of urban degradation) and subjective (the use of public space, feeling of security) factors of urban insecurity.

The last quotation, along with others on the formal and informal control, demonstrates a disciplinary potential of a presence of an observer in an area. Although there is no evidence that it might facilitate the internalization of norms, but at least it achieves a deterrence effect (Norris & Armstrong, 1999).

Additionally, the NGOs' representatives appreciated the joined work of different state and non-state actors in terms of the improvement of urban security. For example, Interviewee 3MV pointed out the importance of the joined work of such civil initiatives as neighbourhood watch and the

police, as the former might inform the latter on some incidents and issues in the neighbourhood. Such perception is in line with the words of Expert 3ME, who stated that there should be a flow of information from citizens to the police because a citizen knows best the weakest points of their neighbourhood. As a result, the management of the police resources might be performed more effectively and targeted.

As to the situational interventions, the civil sector workers are considered to be effectively discussed above renovation and proper maintenance of the public spaces and surveillance. Surveillance might also take the form of the ability to identify at least visually a person violating the law or rules, which prevents deviation as it disciplines them. Thus, Interviewee 2MV referred to his experience of working in public showers in Milan: *"Before it was possible to enter more freely, whenever they arrived, had a shower and went away. Starting at a certain point, we introduced a very banal membership card in which we asked for some data […]. But the thing that helped was to ask to take a photo. […] So, the fact that we can identify a person visually, of identifying them, in my opinion, makes the person who wants to eventually commit violent acts more responsible because they know that they can be recognized."*

In addition to it, the respondents also named visible fortification of public and private spaces. The analysis shows that the economic rationality lies behind an optimistic estimation of this measure: *"So, is a fence useful? Yes, I think at least it serves. Otherwise, I'm going to spend the money on something else"* (Interview 4MV).

However, the interviewees considered that some situational interventions might be useless. For instance, Interviewee 1MV provided two examples of situational interventions in parks of Milan. In the first case, the Municipality installed fences around the park and gates at the entrance that close at night; however, '*if one wants to enter, they still can jump over it.*' In contrast, the second example of a park alongside the Martesana channel in Milan was an example of another successful redevelopment of the area. Thus, the local authorities installed the street lights, playgrounds, benches, cleaned it, stimulating people to use it more. Interviewee 2MV confirmed the words of Interviewee 1MV, stating that the cleanliness of an area is *'the basis'* that improves the perception of security in the area and stimulates the use of public spaces.

The physical removal of problematic people (homeless, Roma people, etc.) was also named as an ineffective measure to deal with urban insecurity. Firstly, according to Interviewee 2MV, it would lead to the displacement of these groups to another peripheric area of Milan as the authority would not allow them to transfer to another neighbourhood in the city centre. Secondly, such an approach does not lead to the solution to the hardship which these people find themselves in; therefore, it leads to the displacement of the problem instead of solving it. As an alternative, Interviewee 2MV

suggested establishing a dialogue with the marginalised and stigmatised people and trying to reintegrate them back into society by understanding their needs and trying to provide for them.

Interviewee 4MV suggested an explanation of the implementation of unsuccessful interventions by the Municipality of Milan. Thus, according to him, there is a lack of deep understanding of and a comprehensive view of the problems present in Milan. Partially, it might be related to a point made by Expert 1ME, who denoted a lack of continuation in managing the issue of urban insecurity in Milan.

Moreover, Interviewee 4MV pointed out that the communication and implementation of joint projects with the local authorities might be impeded by the bureaucratic procedure existing in the institutions: *"'They have to have my approval,' said a secretary of a mayor of the time, […] that's their logic. And is this a logic of the civil society community here? No, it is a logic of arrogance. If I am an administrator or a civil servant or a worker in the municipality, 'you must have my approval.'"* Therefore, the respondent suggested that such logic of a civil servant means that instead of solving the problems, they rather want to follow their job description strictly.

A legal form of charitable organisation might be an additional obstacle in establishing a relationship with the authorities in Italy. For instance, Interviewee 3MV provided an example based on the experience of the association: *"We are recognized, we are 'tolerated,' but we do not have official recognition. Let me tell you a secret. I am trying to transform my association into a community because there is probably more chance of being recognized one day in the future."* Another perceived difficulty in establishing a proper collaboration is a lack of recognition of non-professional and voluntary activity in Italy. As Interviewee 4MV put it: *"However, amateurism does not exist in Italy: either you are a professional, or you don't exist."*

Having personal connections between a charitable organisation and the local authorities might overcome different obstacles in establishing communication between the local authorities and the civil sector. For instance, Interviewee 1MV stated that their relationship with the Municipality is facilitated since the organisation's president knows some people are working there. Alternatively, it is possible to overcome various obstacles if a civil servant is interested in a proposed project and, therefore, might not follow the bureaucratic procedure strictly: "*We found an official in the Municipality […] who looked at our faces, saw that we were not bandits, and gave us the agreement to organise a concert in a place that had not yet been inaugurated. […] whoever wants to give, can give*" (Interview 4MV).

Additionally, the local authorities might be interested in the services, experiences, and practices that the NGOs have. Therefore, they might initiate communication with such civil organisations.

For instance, they might encourage neighbourhood watch to implement information campaigns and ask NGOs to provide some services (cleaning the streets, social services, etc.). Interviewee 1MV also pointed out that the police might be interested in receiving assistance from NGOs: *"Many times, the police find itself in the frontline and calls us to say 'but I have to kick her out, but this is a mother with children, help us, ***, to find a way.' There are both these sides, on the one hand, the humanity of one person who sees a family that ends up on the street, and on the other hand – the inhumanity. 'I am the policeman; you are shit.'"*

Therefore, from the discourse generated by the NGOs' representatives, there is a combination of hierarchical and nodal governance (Kooiman, 2003; Crawford, 2009; Gupta et al., 2015) over the problem of urban insecurity in Italy. Thus, on the one hand, some civil servants try to establish hierarchy when collaborating with the civil sector by following all the bureaucratic procedures strictly. As a result, the 'logic of arrogance,' as Interviewee 4MV called it, impedes the realization of various joint interventions.

On the other hand, some civil servants might be interested in implementing specific joint actions and, consequently, might be flexible with the official procedure to implement them. Therefore, it might be interpreted as nodal governance, which fosters collaboration of different actors for solving specific aims.

State of the art described by the workers of the grass-roots organisations contradicts in a way the one presented in the legislation. As it was described in the third section of this chapter, the legislation promotes co-governance, which implies the involvement of public, civil, and private actors as equal partners in solving the problem. Consequently, such diversion between the official position and the interviewees' discourse might indicate that there might be some difference between the legislation and its realization in practice.

To sum up, the representatives of NGOs considered social interventions and the active involvement of the citizens to be among the best solutions to the problem of urban insecurity, both objective and subjective. Although the interviewees discussed situational measures, they were mainly considered to be effective if implemented along with social interventions.

Additionally, the interviewees took instead a critical approach toward the local authorities and the interventions they implemented. Partially, their criticism was aimed at a lack of proper competence to introduce intelligent solutions. Additionally, the analysis of the interview data shows that, according to the civil sector representatives, there is a lack of attention to the problems present in Milan's periphery and problematic areas.

5.3. Video surveillance as one of the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity

In general, the representatives of NGOs suggested that video surveillance might be a helpful tool for improving both objective and subjective urban security. However, just like other situational interventions, the installation and maintenance of CCTVs should be a part of an integral approach to tackling urban insecurity. Interviewee 3MV put it as follows: *"If there was a city in which there was an integrated camera system, alarm systems, and citizen's participation, then, then, there would be a real city where you'd live well."*

Therefore, a shared perception of the interviewees was that video surveillance could not be a unique solution to the problems presented in the city. As Interviewee 2MV formulated it: *"This way, I think that, yes, if tomorrow the City of Milan on the whole metropolitan area puts CCTV cameras, I don't think that anything would change. […] So, video surveillance is not a useless thing; the way I see it, it is insufficient to resolve all the problems, that's it."*

The NGOs' representatives perceived video surveillance as a useful tool for crime prevention. In particular, the interviewees provided some specific examples of the crime deterrence effect resulting from the installation of video surveillance. According to Interviewee 2MV, this crime deterrence happens due to the ability to visually identify those who violate the law or norms and show deviance, just like in the case mentioned above of the public showers. Consequently, the discipline can be imposed by the presence of video surveillance. Furthermore, the interviewee suggests that video surveillance might have some transformative power to change individuals' attitudes and impose norms on them.

Interviewee 1MV recalled the following situation to illustrate the crime deterrence potential of video surveillance: *"For example, we have made, let's say... a very strong request at some sides of viale Certosa where there is the phenomenon of prostitution, it is very evident. […] It has had an immediate effect. Also, a deterrent effect, hasn't it? Because the cameras that are put there are very visible, very well shown."* Consequently, the quotation shows that video surveillance should be visible to achieve the crime deterrence effect. It confirms a general logic of the experts and the NGOs' representatives of visibility of control and surveillance to achieve disciplinary power and deter crime.

On the other hand, the respondents assumed that video surveillance cannot deter every type of crime. While, according to the NGOs' representatives, video surveillance might prevent burglaries, prostitution, and minor offences, violent crimes are not affected by the presence of video surveillance because people usually commit them in a state of affection.

Consequently, cameras might be effective for crime investigation: identifying and finding a culprit after the offence has been committed. For instance, it might be effective for investigating burglaries or incivilities. Another mentioned category is incivility, mainly committed by the youth or baby-gangs. Interviewee 3MV remembered an episode of an arrest of members of one of the baby-gangs near Rome as they were caught on video surveillance and identified due to the video recordings.

At the same time, the workers of the civil sector singled out some conditions for video surveillance to be effective as for crime prevention as for crime investigation. Firstly, the efficacy of video surveillance depends on the proper installation of the CCTV system itself: whether it has been installed in the critical points of the city, in the correct positions, covers the whole area without any blank points, etc. The interviewees pointed out that an absence of research before installing video surveillance reduces its efficacy a lot as they do not control problematic zones. Interviewee 1MV remembered how video surveillance was installed in a peripheric neighbourhood of Milan: *"And we hoped that they put the cameras at the strategic points for the security. And instead, they have put, as you can see in the photo, along the road. That perhaps five – ten years ago could have been useful given the number of vehicles passing, but now practically here the passage of vehicles has reduced ten times, there is no more need in these cameras."*

Secondly, the proper management of the system that provides for the connection between CCTVs, officers in the control room, and street patrols should bring as a result an immediate reaction in case of emergency. Additionally, there should be awareness of an immediate punishment if the norms and legislation are violated. This awareness improves the efficacy of video surveillance to deter crime and improves the perception of urban security.

Interviewee 4MV also suggested that CCTV systems should be adequately maintained, especially since some criminals might deactivate them. Deactivation of video surveillance shows that, on the one hand, the criminals are aware of its investigative potential and undertake some actions for not being caught. On the other hand, it shows that video surveillance is not always effective for crime prevention because criminals, as rational actors, learn how to bypass it.

Lastly, spontaneous surveillance and society's engagement in the production of urban security can increase the efficiency of video surveillance and other fortification technologies. Interviewee 3MV summarized this point the following way: *"You see, you see that participatory security is always fundamental. That is, obviously, it is important to have a camera, so important, but then it is important having citizens who participate."* Therefore, video surveillance might be useful, but there should also be citizens' response when a crime is being committed.

Given these conditions, the interviewees raised a question of the cost-effectiveness of video surveillance in Milan. Thus, Interviewee 1MV, referring to their organisation's experience with video surveillance which "*in 17 years it has served us about three or four times,*" suggested that the money spent on CCTV systems and their maintenance might be used for other situational but more urgent needs. For example, he proposed to spend the money on the renovation of schools and school territories. Alternatively, Interviewee 2MV proposed to spend the money on increasing formal and informal control, which might also create employment opportunities. He formulated it the following way: *"If I take some people who maybe haven't worked for a while, with this money I do a project, I have the budget, I give the salary to these people, I send them to the territory, they make the territory more secure for me, they make it better. […]. This thing is generative; it generates well-being. I help improve the territory and generate security to live the territory. And what is more, I provide income to people who didn't have it."*

Regarding the impact of video surveillance on the perception of insecurity, NGOs' workers considered the technology to effectively improve the feeling and perception of security in Milan. Awareness of entering into a zone under surveillance might also facilitate the feeling of security.

Therefore, it reflects the construction of video surveillance as a tool of protection and care in a surveillance society (Lyon, 2001): there is someone who is watching out for us and will intervene when needed. It is also confirmed by a request of the local inhabitants to install the cameras in the neighbourhood: *"I have heard this [requests by the local inhabitants of the installation of CCTV]. […] And video surveillance is a very much requested thing […]. Yes, actually, that's why the municipality has done it."* Therefore, video surveillance becomes a part of 'stage-set security' (Coaffee & Wood, 2006) as it shows that the authorities are concerned with the problem of insecurity and do something about it.

At the same time, the representatives of the grass-roots organisations presupposed that there are some conditions for video surveillance to be effective at the level of perception. Firstly, either video surveillance or its signage should be highly visible, which might serve as a constant reminder of the presence of an observer. Secondly, there should be proper information about a human-technology connection: from a video camera to a control room and from the control room to the street police patrols. As Interviewee 3MV formulated it: "*Video-surveillance system works only if there's a continuum: there should be someone who is watching the screen and can send a signal to patrol officers, and so on, and so on. And people, citizens, should know, be aware that there is this continuum."*

Additionally, Interviewee 1MV pointed out an issue that, with time, video surveillance might become an ordinary feature of the urban environment. As a result, their efficiency as for crime prevention as improvement of the perception of insecurity decreases.

Therefore, in the discourse of the NGOs' workers, it appears again that informal surveillance and participatory security might be even more effective than video surveillance for improving the feeling of security in Milan. As Interviewee 2MV put it: "*This [the improvement of the feeling of security] can be done by my colleagues, just like by the mothers with children rather than by cameras. Paradoxically, if there is the presence of some people who arrive and watch, they occupy the territory; it is the first step towards creating a safer environment.*"

According to the representatives of NGOs, local inhabitants are not very much concerned about privacy issues existing around the implementation of CCTV. Furthermore, they are not concerned about whether the Municipality or a private body performs video surveillance. Interviewee 3MV explained it by the limitations imposed on the implementation of private CCTVs by the Italian legislation. Therefore, the legislation protects the Italian citizens from possible abuses in data collection by private bodies.

Overall, the representatives of the NGOs considered video surveillance to be an effective tool to tackle the problem of urban insecurity. However, it is not capable of being the only solution to the phenomenon; therefore, the installation of CCTVs is not enough to deal with urban insecurity without other actions that have mainly social character. Furthermore, some of the interviewees suggested that informal control over the territory might be even more effective for dealing with urban degradation, crime, and fear in urban spaces.

The respondents also highlighted that the Milanese population is not concerned with installing video surveillance. Therefore, it is not perceived as a tool of control or an instrument of data collection but rather as a technology capable of protection. The research evidence also confirms it by request for video surveillance by the local inhabitants.

5.4. Summary

The representatives of the NGOs problematised urban insecurity as a complex phenomenon rooted in both the physical and social environment. Thus, the problematisation of urban insecurity included such situational phenomena as the absence of maintenance, litter, abandonment of physical spaces, and others. Simultaneously, such social phenomena as stigmatisation, segregation, social tensions, and the absence of integration programs also contributed to urban insecurity.

As to the solutions to the problem of urban insecurity, the interviewees considered social and participatory measures to be the most effective. It might be attributed to the nature of their work, which usually is social (help those in need, involvement of citizens in urban security production, etc.). Still, situational interventions are constructed as indispensable but supporting measures to social integration, as they aim to tackle some physical space problems.

The prioritization of social and participatory security is reflected in the construction of video surveillance as a possible solution to the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, it was considered a useful technology for crime deterrence and improving the perception of security in Milan; however, the implementation of video surveillance alone is not enough. It should be combined with other, mainly social actions (for instance, citizens' participation). Furthermore, the efficacy of video surveillance diminishes with time as it becomes a part of the urban environment, and people do not notice them anymore. Furthermore, there are some conditions for video surveillance to be effective: high visibility, and people should be aware that there is an authoritative response.

From the interviews with the NGOs' representatives, it appears that the logic of governmentality of unease and appeal to the logic of a security state is dominant for the security provision in the city. In particular, such a conclusion might be drawn based on the following signs:

- economic rationality in engaging NGOs and citizens in urban security production as it facilitates the reduction of the state's expenditures on the security provision;
- there is a facilitation of social profiling and construction of some groups (immigrants, Roma, homeless, etc.) as dangerous;
- there is a facilitation of social and physical segregation. Displacing some phenomena to the periphery of Milan encourages it as wealthier people prefer to live in the city centre that is gradually getting released from the problems, while poorer people need to live in the periphery of the city that is increasingly marginalised;
- an additional result of social and physical segregation is the fortification of private and public spaces in Milan.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the logic of a surveillance society lies behind the implementation of surveillance in the city. Thus, according to the interviewees, a visible presence of an observer, be it official or unofficial, technological or human, would bring about an improvement in urban insecurity by deterring crime and increasing control. Furthermore, in some situations, a presence of an observer might facilitate the internalization of the norms governing the society. In addition, video surveillance is constructed as a technology that not only collects the data but also as a technology of care because it symbolizes that the state is concerned about the problem of urban insecurity and the needs of the local inhabitants.

6. Multilevel modelling of the relationship between the subjective urban insecurity and the number of video surveillance cameras in Italy

The presentation of the results of the analysis of the Italian statistical data follows the analytical strategy outlined in section 5 of *Chapter 6: Research methodology*. Additionally, to account for possible effects due to the structure of the data itself, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the Italian sample and correlation analysis of the indicators are presented and discussed before the main analysis.

6.1. Socio-demographic characteristics and descriptive statistics

In the Italian sample, women account for a bit more than half of the surveyed respondents (Table 15). The mean and median ages in the Italian sample are equal to 50 years both. Regarding a self-estimation of the current income, around 47% of those surveyed said that they could cope on their current income, which was the largest group. The share of those who can live comfortably on their current income was almost the same as the share of those who stated that they find it difficult to make ends meet. There were almost 23% of all the Italian respondents in each group. Just slightly above half (52%) of the respondents stated that they lived in cities of various sizes (big cities, small cities, and towns), while 44% reported living in country villages. This self-reported place of inhabitation diverges from the data provided by the World Bank (Figure 1), which states that 70% of the Italian population lives in urban areas.

Table 15. Demographic characteristics of the Italian sample (N = 2626)

Variable	Category	n	%
gndr	male	1264	48.1
	female	1362	51.9
agegroup	15 - 19	175	6.6
	20 - 29	298	11.3
	30 - 39	351	13.4
	40 - 49	477	18.1
	50 - 59	481	18.3
	60 and over	846	32.2
hincfel	Living comfortably on present income	575	22.5
	Coping on present income	1199	46.8
	Difficult on present income	587	22.9
	Very difficult on present income	199	7.8
domicil2	A big city or suburbs/outskirts of a big city	449	17.1
	Town or small city	915	34.9
	Country village	1158	44.1
	Farm or home in the countryside	102	3.9

As Table 16 demonstrates, the deviations of the variables collected at the individual level are not very high. Using Formula 18, 99.7% confidence intervals were calculated for every variable used

for the research. The results show that no values were lying outside the calculated intervals as at the individual, as at the regional level.

Table 16. Descriptive statistics for the Italian dataset

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
aesfdrk	2.3	0.8	1.0	4.0
gndr	1.5	0.5	1.0	2.0
agegroup	4.3	1.6	1.0	6.0
hincfel	2.2	0.8	1.0	4.0
domicil2	2.3	0.8	1.0	4.0
pplhlp	4.2	2.3	0.0	10.0
trstplc	6.1	2.3	0.0	10.0
imwbcnt	3.5	2.5	0.0	10.0
sclmeet	4.7	1.6	1.0	7.0
health	2.2	0.9	1.0	5.0
crmvct	1.9	0.3	1.0	2.0
cctvpc	44.1	22.4	13.4	110.3
robberypc	45.8	23.1	9.51	104.0
theftfromperspc	268.5	162.8	34.4	489.4

6.2. Bivariate correlations

An analysis of correlations between the individual-level variables of the Italian dataset shows that most of the variables have statistically significant correlations between them. However, these correlations are moderate (Table 17). In Italy, the feeling of safety while walking alone after dark is positively associated with:

- gender (women feel less safe walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark);
- age (older people feel less safe)
- subjective estimation of household's income (those finding it more difficult to cope on their current income feel less safe);
- subjective estimation of own health (those with worse perceived health feel less safe).

At the same time, the feeling of safety is negatively associated with:

- type of settlement (those living in big cities feel less safe walking alone after dark in their neighbourhood);
- the belief that others are trustworthy (those not trusting others feel less safe);
- trust in the police (those not trusting the police feel less safe);
- the impact of immigrants on the perception of the country (those considering immigration as a negative impact on the country feel less safe);
- frequency of social life (those having fewer social encounters feel less safe);
- previous victimisation experience (those with previous victimisation experience feel less safe).

Regarding other correlations, a relatively high and statistically significant correlation is between variables measuring subjective health and age (0.537), which could be interpreted that with age, people tend to have lower estimations of their health. To test for possible multicollinearity, VIFs were calculated. As Table 17 shows, none of the values of VIFs exceeds two and, therefore, applying a threshold value of five (Hair et al., 2010), there is no risk of multicollinearity.

The correlation analysis of the Italian region-level variables reveals that the CCTV rate does not significantly correlate with the rate of robberies (Table 18). Simultaneously, the number of video cameras per capita has a large and statistically significant correlation with the rate of thefts from a person (0.738). This relationship might have several explanations. Firstly, it could be attributed that the police record more robberies in areas covered by video surveillance because CCTV facilitates the observation over the territory. On the other hand, robberies might more frequently happen in bigger cities that are usually covered by more video cameras than in the countryside.

Given that the relationship between the two variables is high, the diagnosis for multicollinearity was performed by calculating VIFs. As it follows from Table 18, the values of VIFs do not exceed the threshold of five. Consequently, further analysis can be performed without the risk of multicollinearity.

6.3. Multilevel modelling

Following the analytical strategy proposed by Hox et al. (2018) and described in *Chapter 6,* the first model calculated for the Italian data was the intercept-only model. As it follows from Table 19, ICC is a bit less than 4% which means that around 4% of the total variance in the feeling of safety is explained at the regional level. On the one hand, it can be explained by the fact that the level of data aggregation is relatively high; consequently, the difference that might exist within regions (for instance, between provinces or municipalities) are not accounted for. On the other hand, as Expert 2ME said during the interview, the difference in the levels of insecurity is more or less equally diffused across the Italian population. Therefore, there is no difference in the feeling of security experienced by people living in different regions.

The next stage consisted of adding the individual-level independent variables into the model. The statistical analysis shows that almost every predictor has a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, except for age and trust in the police. Additionally, such independent variables as trust in others and subjective income estimation have very low impacts on the dependent variable.

Table 17. Correlation matrix for individual-level variables for Italy

	aesfrdk	*gndr*	*agegroup*	*hincfel*	*domicil2*	*pplhlp*	*trstplc*	*imwbcnt*	*sclmeet*	*health*	*crmvct*	*VIF*
aesfrdk	1											
gndr	.220***	1										1.015
agegroup	.128***	.040**	1									1.467
hincfel	.142***	.046**	.063***	1								1.118
domicil2	-.099***	-.033*	-.017	-.029	1							1.022
pplhlp	-.123***	.013	-.046**	-.163***	.027	1						1.125
trstplc	-.054***	.01	.044**	-.102***	.014	.147***	1					1.049
imwbcnt	-.202***	.014	-.144***	-.167***	-.063***	.304***	.142***	1				1.163
sclmeet	-.140***	-.090***	-.317***	-.171***	-.069***	.033*	.017	.126***	1			1.173
health	.227***	.078***	***.537*****	.237***	-.003	-.084***	-.033*	-.157***	-.302***	1		1.504
crmvct	-.125***	.027	-.005	.013	.064***	.035*	.002	.038*	-.019	-.050**	1	1.013

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).*

Table 18. Correlation matrix for regional-level variables for Italy

	cctvpc	*robberypc*	*theftfromperspc*	*VIF*
cctvpc	1			2.889
robberypc	-0.002	1		1.568
theftfromperspc	***.738*****	.403***	1	3.454

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

With the addition of the individual-level variables in the model, the deviance went down, and it can signify that the quality of the model is improved. The chi-square difference test also confirms it. Besides, ICC showed a slight growth after introducing the individual-level predictors. At this stage, a bit more than 4% of the total variance of the dependent variable is explained at the regional level.

Gender has the largest standardized coefficient. Therefore, interpreting this coefficient, it is possible to assume that women have a lower estimation of their safety when walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark. The perception of the impact of immigrants on life in the country and subjective estimations of health have the second-largest coefficients. Therefore, it is possible to interpret them that those with more xenophobic views and lower estimations of their health experience a higher feeling of unsafety.

Lastly, previous victimisation experience, a type of settlement, and frequency of social encounters have weaker but still statistically significant at 0.001 level relationship with the feeling of safety. These results might be explained the following way: people with the previous victimisation experience, living in bigger cities, and having less solid social ties experience safety less frequently when walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark.

Therefore, the analysis of the model with individual-level variables shows that the predictors of the feeling of safety have various natures in Italy. As it appears from the results of the statistical estimation, the feeling of safety might be explained by personal factors (age, health, type of settlement), social (tolerance towards immigrants), and ontological (the solidity of social ties).

In the next step, the region-level variables were added to the model. In particular, the number of CCTV per capita, the number of robberies per capita, and the number of thefts from a person per capita entered the model. The introduction of the second-level variables to the model led to a slight growth of coefficients for gender, subjective financial status, type of settlement, and subjective health. Therefore, the interpretation of the impacts of individual-level variables does not change because the addition of region-level variables did not impact the coefficients greatly.

As Table 19 shows, the addition of region-level variables had a consequence of the reduction of ICC: only 2% of the total variance in the dependent variable is explained at the regional level. However, the reduction in the model's deviance is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, as shown in the difference in the chi-square difference test performed through the ANOVA table.

Table 19. Multilevel models for Italy

	Intercept-only	**Individual-level variables**		**1- and 2-level variable**		**Random effects**	
Fixed effect	*Coeff (SE)*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff.*	*Unstand. coeff. (SE)*	*Stand. coeff.*
constant	2.269*** (0.04)	2.53*** (0.156)	–	2.462*** (0.175)	–	2.453*** (0.189)	–
gndr		0.312*** (0.031)	0.192***	0.313*** (0.031)	0.193***	0.316*** (0.03)	0.195***
agegroup		-0.004 (0.012)	-0.008	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.008	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.004
hincfel		0.049* (0.019)	0.052*	0.05* (0.019)	0.053*	0.048* (0.019)	0.051*
domicil2		-0.084*** (0.02)	-0.083***	-0.085*** (0.02)	-0.084***	-0.076. (0.035)	-0.075.
pplhlp		-0.017* (0.007)	-0.049*	-0.017* (0.007)	-0.049*	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.043
trstplc		-0.007 (0.007)	-0.02	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.02	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.02
imwbcnt		-0.054*** (0.007)	-0.166***	-0.054*** (0.007)	-0.166***	-0.054*** (0.008)	-0.166***
sclmeet		-0.031** (0.011)	-0.061**	-0.031** (0.011)	-0.061**	-0.032** (0.011)	-0.063**
health		0.137*** (0.022)	0.149***	0.138*** (0.021)	0.15***	0.135*** (0.021)	0.147***
crmvct		-0.255*** (0.044)	-0.107***	-0.255*** (0.044)	-0.107***	-0.24*** (0.051)	-0.101***
cctvpc				-0.004. (0.002)	-0.111.	-0.004. (0.002)	-0.111.
robbery pc				0.001 (0.002)	0.028	0.001 (0.002)	0.028
theftfrom perspc				0.001* (0.000)	0.201*	0.001** (0.000)	0.201**
Random effect	*Variance (SD)*	*Variance (SD)*		*Variance (SD)*		*Variance (SD)*	
constant	0.023 (0.152)	0.022 (0.15)		0.01 (0.102)		0.107 (0.327)	
residual	0.638 (0.799)	0.539 (0.734)		0.539 (0.734)		0.521 (0.721)	
domicil2						0.013 (0.116)	
pplhlp						0.002 (0.039)	
imwbcnt						0.000 (0.018)	
sclmeet						0.000 (0.016)	
crmvct						0.009 (0.095)	
Deviance	6232.1	5333.9		5322.8		5283.3	
ICC	0.035	0.04		0.019		0.171	

**** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 . p < 0.1*

Significance is not calculated for the random effects. It is estimated by performing chi-square difference that shows whether adding variables to the model statistically significantly improves its quality

The estimates produced for the model with individual and region-level variables show that the number of CCTV per capita has a negative and statistically significant at 0.1 level association with the feeling of safety. It can be interpreted that the residents of the Italian regions with higher numbers of Municipality-installed video surveillance cameras feel safer walking alone after dark in their neighbourhood. The number of thefts from a person has a positive relationship with the feeling of safety, which means that in regions with a higher incidence of such offences, the population feels less safe. Lastly, the coefficient for the number of robberies is not statistically significant. It can be explained by a suggestion of Expert 1ME that thefts affect people's perception of insecurity the most because they symbolize an intrusion into someone's privacy, while other crimes might affect less as they do not affect people directly.

The last stage of the analytical strategy proposed by Hox et al. (2018) is to add to the model random effects. It tests whether some of the individual-level predictors have a different effect for each group or region in the case of this study. The modelling with random effect was performed based on a variable-to-variable principle and models' comparison (through the difference in chi-squares test) to check whether the introduction of new parameters to the model leads to significant improvements in its quality.

As a result of testing the models, the following variables were found to have random effects:

- the type of settlement;
- the belief that others will help;
- attitudes towards migrants;
- frequency of social life;
- previous victimisation experience.

The addition of random effects to the model slightly affected the regression coefficients compared to the previous model. As Table 19 shows, coefficients for gender and social life frequency show slight growth compared to the previous model. Meanwhile, the coefficients for age, subjective income, type of settlement, trust in others, subjective health, and previous victimisation experience fell a little compared to the previous model. The coefficient for the trust in others lost its statistical significance.

Compared with the previous model, ICC shows significant growth from 0.02 to 0.171 after introducing the random effects. It implies that 17% of the total variance in the feeling of safety is explained at the region level. Additionally, the chi-square difference test shows that the model's quality improves statistically significantly at the 0.01 level, as shown by the chi-square difference test. The increase in ICC after the addition of random effects demonstrates that there is a variance

in the feeling of safety and factors explaining it between the Italian regions. More specifically, this variance is explained by the variation in the individual-level variables (type of settlement, belief that others might help, attitudes towards migrants, frequency of social life, previous victimisation experience) across the regions rather than by such environmental factors as the number of video surveillance or crime rates.

On the practical side, the introduction of the random effects allows for calculating 95% predictive intervals of the regression coefficients of the individual-level indicators. It is achieved by subtracting and adding 1.96*SD of the distribution of the variable to an unstandardized regression coefficient. Thus, 95% predictive interval for the regression coefficient for the type of settlement is (-0.303; 0.151), for belief that others might help – (-0.091; 0.061), for attitudes towards migrants – (-0.089; -0.019), for frequency of social life – (-0.063; -0.001), and for previous victimisation experience – (-0.426; -0.054).

The analysis of the final for the Italian dataset model reveals that factors impacting one's feeling of security in the neighbourhood have a complex nature. Firstly, such environmental factors as the number of thefts from a person and the number of video surveillance cameras impact the feeling of safety. Thus, the invasion of one's privacy deteriorates the feeling of security in the neighbourhood, while video surveillance seems to produce an image of protection. Secondly, personal factors, corresponding with the vulnerability model, explain the feeling of safety. In particular, from the analysis, it appears that women, those living in larger cities, having lower income and weaker health, feel more vulnerable when walking alone after dark.

Thirdly, some ontological factors also seem to explain one's feeling of safety, particularly the existence of solid social ties, while such factors as trust in the police and other people do not have any statistically significant impact. Interestingly, it confirms the words of Expert 1ME, who stated that Italians have a lower level of trust in the institutions, and the solidity of social ties compensates for it and might serve as a social support network in case of a need.

Lastly, societal processes also affect one's feeling of security in the city's streets. This model included the attitudes towards migrants, and more xenophobic views aggravate the feeling of safety when walking alone after dark. It might be explained by the impact of the right-wing politicians and the media, who might connect the phenomena of immigration and crime in their discourses. Additionally, such an effect might be a sign of a 'strangers society,' in which everyone who shows some kind of deviance from normality automatically falls under suspicion.

Although it should be pointed out that these results, especially for the regional-level indicators, should be interpreted with some caution as the level of aggregation is high and does not account

for the possible differences within the regions (for instance, between provinces and municipalities). Additionally, a higher level of aggregation does not account for the local nature of urban insecurity and the impact of video surveillance on the local population. Still, the model demonstrates the complex nature of the feeling of safety in the Italian society that comprises personal, ontological, and social factors.

7. Discussion

This chapter has discussed the results of the empirical study aimed at understanding how the problem of urban insecurity is problematised and what solutions to it, with a special focus on video surveillance, are constructed in the Italian society and, more specifically, in Milan. To reach this goal, the analysis of the legislation, semi-structured interviews with experts and representatives of the NGOs, and statistical data have been undertaken.

In general, it appears from the analysis that, in Milan, urban insecurity is constructed as a complex social problem that comprises both objectively existing issues in the city and the perception of various issues. In particular, the legislation and respondents problematised both objective and subjective urban insecurity through crime, incivilities, physical degradation of some sites in the city, absence of maintenance, etc. Additionally, such factors as immigration, social degradation, stigmatisation, and others contributed to the perception of insecurity in Milan. The complex nature of subjective urban insecurity in Milan is also confirmed by the statistical analysis that shows that a multiplicity of factors is related to the fear in urban areas.

At the same time, different parts of the fieldwork brought up some specific insights into the problematisation of urban insecurity in Milan and Italy. Thus, the legislation confirmed the discussed in the first section of this chapter problem of the left/right division over the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, the right-wing governments at both state and local levels seek to exploit the juridico-legal techniques to codify the profiling of some groups of the population (immigrants, nomads, etc.) as deviant and some places as dangerous. In turn, all the respondents highlighted the changing nature of the crime (for instance, the shift from a physical to virtual space) and the role of the media in the production of urban insecurity.

The experts pointed out the importance of societal changes and their acceleration in Italian society. Additionally, they stated that there is no continuity in managing urban insecurity in Milan, which might be attributed to the right/left division over the problem of urban insecurity. It leads to an absence of proper and positive communication between the Municipality and the citizens and, more importantly, to an absence of a body that is responsible for dealing with urban security problems other than crime.

In turn, the representatives of the NGOs highlighted such issues as a tendency to displace the problems from the city centre to the periphery of the city, which leads to such important issues as the perception of abandonment and further marginalisation of the population there. Moreover, the interviewees described various mechanisms of stigmatisation and marginalisation of those groups that are considered to be dangerous.

The statistical analysis contributes to the understanding of subjective urban insecurity. For example, the multilevel modelling points out that the rate of robberies might aggravate the perception of insecurity; meanwhile, the number of CCTV cameras might improve the feeling of security. Additionally, it shows that the perception of self as vulnerable against a criminal due to socio-economic factors also contribute to an increase in the perception of insecurity. In contrast, a solidity of social ties and more accepting attitudes towards migrants might amend the perception of insecurity.

Given the construction of urban insecurity as a complex phenomenon, both situation and social interventions were offered to tackle in legislation and by all the interviewees. However, the legislation is heavily impacted by the left/right orientation of the government, as the former might promote more repressive and situational measures and the latter more social. Moreover, the experts pointed out that currently, there is a shift toward implementing situational interventions as they might bring some visible results faster than the social ones, which is important for attracting the voters.

The experts favoured a mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity as both social and situational measures might complement each other. Additionally, the experts suggested that the involvement of the citizens in managing urban insecurity might be especially effective because the citizens know better all the issues and problems present in their neighbourhood.

The representatives of the NGOs promoted more social interventions, while the situational ones should support the social ones. Again, they pointed out the importance of a dialogue with the citizens. However, it should not only be facilitated for informing better the policies but also to encourage their participation in the life of the city and urban security production.

These differences in the discourses on urban insecurity and solutions to it might be attributed to the nature of involvement in the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, the politicians might exploit juridico-legal techniques for obtaining their gains, while the experts and the representatives of NGOs might seek to improve the quality of life in the city. Additionally, the social orientation of the NGOs might be attributed to the fact that most of them are charitable organisations that aim at helping those in need.

As to video surveillance, the technology was constructed to be a part of the solution to the problem of urban insecurity. The more recent legislation also encourages the installation of video surveillance and seeks to provide budgetary support to the local authorities to install and maintain CCTV systems. Additionally, the legislation provides for the limitations on the use of video surveillance.

The experts and the representatives of the civil sector suggested that video surveillance might be just a part of the solution to the problem of urban insecurity. Moreover, from their discourses, it appears that there are some limitations in the ability of video surveillance to solve the problems (for instance, not every crime is prevented by CCTVs), and the technology might be more effective for reassuring the citizens. However, for video surveillance to be effective in reassuring the citizens, it should be highly visible, and there should be aware that they are effective for protecting the citizens (more specifically, that there is an immediate reaction to the problem caught by the cameras).

Such difference in the construction of solutions to the problem of urban insecurity might be ascribed to the nature of involvement in the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, legislation and experts might be more prone to finding solutions that can bring more visible and quick results that are usually achievable through the implementation of situational interventions (for instance, some types of crime disappear from the areas in which surveillance has been increased, etc.). Moreover, the work of the NGOs' representatives has a social nature as they are involved in the provision of services to the homeless, victim support and neighbourhood watch.

From the theoretical point of view, the analysis of the Milanese data suggests that the signs of the security state and, more specifically, governmentality of unease are more pronounced in Italy and Milan. Thus, the analysis allows to determine the following signs of a security state:

- the rationalization of the economic expenses of the state on urban security provision (redistribution of the responsibility to the local level, engagement of citizens and civil sector into urban security production);
- crime is considered as a rational act;
- the 'governmentality of unease': some social groups (immigrants, Roma, nomads, homeless) are constructed as dangerous and criminogenic, the Italian society should be protected from them;
- such construction of these groups justifies increased surveillance and control over them as well as over the territories of their concentration;

- there are some signs of segregation of more affluent people from ‘problematic’ groups and the poor;
- there are signs of excessive fortification of public and private spaces in Milan;
- from 2008 until 2011, there was a state of emergency justified by the presence of some ethnic groups in the territory;
- right-wing politicians exploit the juridico-legal apparatus to codify their perception of threats and possible responses to tackle these threats;
- the legislation provides for the protection of privacy and limitations for the implementation of video surveillance in Italy;
- the Italian population is prone to give up a part of their liberal rights at the expense of security;
- there is a possibility to merge the data collected through CCTV with other biometric data;
- technological development and its further adaptation are encouraged by the state.

On the other hand, there are some signs of a surveillance society, especially in the discourses on the possible implementation of surveillance as a solution to the problem of urban insecurity. More specifically, it was highlighted by the experts and representatives of the grass-root organisations that a visible presence of an observer (which might be human or technological, official or unofficial) deters crime in the city. It might even achieve the internalization of norms and transform the surveyed in some situations. Additionally, there is a discourse on rendering public spaces more transparent, facilitating official and unofficial surveillance and control.

Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusions

1. Discussion of research results

The research set out with the aim of generating knowledge on urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance for tackling it in the contexts of Budapest and Milan. More specifically, the main goal of the research is to answer the two main questions. The first question is formulated in the following way: How is urban insecurity problematised in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)? The second question is: How is video surveillance constructed to be a response to deal with urban insecurity in Budapest (Hungary) and Milan (Italy)? The research purpose and questions were formulated accounting for the current body of academic knowledge *(Chapter 2: Literature review)* that unveiled a lack of conceptual clarity on the phenomenon of urban insecurity, a scarcity of problematisation research on urban insecurity, and controversies in the results of the studies on the effectiveness of video surveillance in an urban setting. The literature review also highlighted a complex nature of urban insecurity that could be studied within either positivist or interpretivist paradigm. Simultaneously, it demonstrates that the 'objective' and 'subjective' sides of urban insecurity are tightly interconnected with each other. Therefore, the literature review suggests a mixed-methods approach to comprehending urban insecurity and the implementation of video surveillance.

Also, the research discusses the main theoretical approaches to the provisions of security and implementation of surveillance (*Chapter 3: Surveillance Society or Security State?*). The models varied in their understanding of the power relations behind security provision, urban spaces, and acceptance mechanisms by a society of deepening surveillance and securitisation. At the same time, both theories are congruent in their comprehension of the growing importance of technologies for security provision and deepening surveillance, bureaucratic interest in their constant development and adaptation, the discrepancy between an observer and observed. Additionally, some studies, informed by the two theories, indicate that dialogue between them might be very productive in terms of analysis of the empirical data and knowledge production as they clearly demonstrate how various logics behind the security provision and implementation of video surveillance might coexist even within the same city.

After identifying the discussion of the surveillance society and security state theoretical approaches, their impact on neoliberalism is discussed. In turn, neoliberalism has a significant impact on the problematisation of urban insecurity, especially in the political and media discourses. Furthermore, a neoliberal framework to urban insecurity impacted the ways of tackling the phenomenon in modern cities: through situational or social interventions, their combination, engaging local inhabitants, rendering local authorities more responsible, and others. Therefore, the

neoliberal standpoint offers a vantage point for analysing urban insecurity as a complex interplay of local and global processes, ways of dealing with it, and implementation of urban insecurity in urban public spaces.

Based on the literature review and theoretical approach, the research adopted a problematisation analysis approach to investigate urban insecurity, while video surveillance is studied as a possible solution to the problem of urban insecurity. The problematisation analysis implies considering the studied phenomenon within the interpretivist framework as it focuses on the generated discourses on the phenomenon and investigates how it is suggested to solve the problem. Simultaneously, it implies that the phenomenon is grounded in the context and reality, suggesting applying the positivist framework to study the problem. Therefore, it makes it possible to implement research applying mixed-methods, as discussed in *Chapter 5: Research methodology.*

The empirical research started with the desk-based research of approximately 40 legal documents issued in both studied contexts[37], presented in respective sections of *Chapters 6 and 7*. Although the legislation of both countries problematised urban insecurity through crime, incivilities, social and physical degradation, the analysis reveals several principal differences in the problematisation of urban insecurity in the Hungarian and Italian legislation. Thus, the Hungarian legislation usually constructs urban security as a strategic goal, although some exceptions exist. Such construction shifts the focus of its problematisation from the current problems present in the city to the goals the policies aim to achieve. It might be explained by the propensity of urban policies to disregard the current problems if neoliberalism was inoculated rather than developed naturally in the city, as noted by Taşan-Kok (2004). Another explanation lies in the political context in the country: there is a dominance of populist conservative powers in the country, which aim to reconstruct the glorious past of Budapest as one of the capitals of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Akçalı and Korkut 2015). Therefore, it might affect urban security provision too by emphasizing reaching goals in the future.

The Italian political context also greatly affects the problematisation of urban insecurity in Milan. Thus, there is an interchange between centre-right and centre-left governments. The former pays much attention to urban insecurity in their policies, constructing it through specific phenomena and prioritizing repressive and situational interventions, while the latter rarely addresses urban insecurity directly, putting emphasis on social interventions in the city. Therefore, mainly the perception of the right-wing politicians gets codified in the Italian and Milanese legislation: an

[37] At the state, region (in Italy only), and city levels.

exceptional approach towards immigrants, nomads, Roma people, who are constructed not only to be criminogenic by themselves but also render places of their inhabitation so.

The majority of the Hungarian policies do not draw a connection between insecurity and immigration or Roma people, which is due to their official 'colour blind' approach (Keresztély et al., 2017). However, the Hungarian and Budapest legislation problematise urban insecurity through a lack of trust of the Hungarian population in others and state institutions, social inequalities, homelessness, and housing problem. Therefore, it reflects not only the political context but also the socio-economic one. All these issues are also specific to the Hungarian context as they are the result of the societal transformation that Hungary underwent at the end of the XX century.

As to the solutions to urban insecurity, the analysis of the legislation in both cases shows the promotion of a mixed-approach to tackling the phenomena: implementation of situational and social interventions and engagement of citizens into security production. For instance, the legal documents of both cities promoted such measures are respected for the legality, prevention of social marginalisation, cleanliness of the streets, the increased presence of the police, etc. Still, the research shows that the centre-right wing governments in Italy and Milan could promote a more repressive and situational approach to tackling urban insecurity by introducing curfew in some locations in the city, forbidding prostitution and begging, etc.

It should also be commented that the analysis focused only on the legislation and did not account for policies' implementation, their reformulation, etc. However, it could be preliminarily concluded that in Budapest, there is a difference between the officially promoted mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity and the realization of policies that tend to ignore the social side of the solution. It was illustrated in the example of Hős utca. In contrast, the later empirical data suggests that in Milan, the politicians seek to implement their policies fully.

As to video surveillance as a tool of urban security provision, legislations of both countries and cities provide for its implementation in public areas. More specifically, video surveillance is constructed as a multi-purpose technology facilitating crime investigation and crime prevention. Furthermore, it should reassure the local inhabitants. Although both legislations provide for some limitations for its implementation (for instance, a necessity of proper signage), the Italian legislation seems to account more for the privacy of the Italian population.

The second step of the empirical research was conducting semi-structured interviews with the experts and representatives of NGOs. Due to the difference in the ways of engaging with the

problem of urban insecurity, the results of the interviews with these two groups of respondents are discussed in separate respective sections of *Chapters 7 and 8*.

All the interviewees in both cities problematised urban insecurity through crime, incivilities, visible signs of physical and social degradation, lack of formal and informal control, and stigmatisation of some social groups and places within the cities. Additionally, all the respondents highlighted the role of the media in framing the discourse on urban insecurity due to the overrepresentation of crime in it.

Interestingly, all the respondents in both cities problematised urban insecurity through such crimes as burglaries, robberies, and thefts. It might be explained by the fact that these crimes are common in big cities, and they concern their inhabitants because they symbolise an invasion into a private space. Additionally, the respondents from both Budapest and Milan pointed out an important trend of crime displacement from physical and virtual spaces. More specifically, while there is a crime decline in 'traditional' crimes, especially in such as burglaries, robberies, thefts, etc., there is a growing number of telephone and Internet scams. It might be attributed to the increasing saturation of the public spaces in both cities with the means of fortification; therefore, the criminals seek new opportunities for committing a crime. Furthermore, the respondents expected that the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated this trend due to shrinking opportunities to commit street crimes and burglaries and increased opportunities to commit online scams.

However, there were specificities in each context due to the political, socio-economic, and cultural situations there. Thus, in Budapest, the respondents problematised urban insecurity through the stigmatisation of Roma people and the homeless, which, in turn, adds to the stigmatisation of areas of their robust presence. The stigmatisation leads to the segregation of the wealthier Hungarian population from them. More specifically, the interviewees constructed Buda to be secure and inhabited by more affluent people, while Pest – insecure with a higher presence of marginal social groups. Within Pest, some places could be considered as places of fear with a very robust negative reputation: for instance, the VIII district and Hős utca. Despite some improvements made in the VIII districts, it still has a reputation of an insecure city area. The representatives of the NGOs suggested that a lack of attention to the issues existing in the city and, especially, problematic districts and obstacles in the realization of renovation programs contribute to the problematisation of urban insecurity in Budapest.

In Milan, the stigmatisation concerned Roma people and the homeless to a lesser extent, as the immigrants are constructed by the right-wing politicians and the media as criminogenic in Italian society. The results of the stigmatisation are almost parallel to those of Budapest: there is social and physical segregation of a wealthier part of the society from those who are stigmatised and the

poor. Thus, the city centre of Milan is inhabited more by a wealthier population, while the 'problematic' one lives in the periphery of the city. Furthermore, the concentration of immigrants renders places of their inhabitation problematic. The reputation of such places seems to be also robust in Milan as there have been some successful interventions, but the reputational changes do not happen as fast as changes in the objective situation there.

The analysis of the interview data also shows a difference in the location of places of insecurity and fear in the cities. So, in Budapest, their problematic places are located in the city centre, while in Milan – in the periphery of the city. Again, it might be attributed to contextual differences in the cities. In Budapest, a wealthier population traditionally tended to populate the western and northern parts of the city as they are greener, more prestigious to live in, etc. While in Milan, the city centre has been a traditional place of inhabitation for a more affluent population due to its prestigiousness, while the periphery was a place of inhabitation for the working class.

Nowadays, the reputation of Budapest as a 'fun capital of Europe' contributes to the problematisation of the city centre, especially in the side of Pest. In contrast, in Milan, the authorities seek to displace the problems from the city to the periphery, which leads to an increasing perception of abandonment and insecurity there and further marginalisation of the population there.

Another important difference in the problematisation of urban insecurity is that there is a more developed discourse on the social factors of insecurity in Milan. Thus, the experts and the representatives of the NGOs highlighted societal transformations (urbanisation, immigration, role of religion) and their increasing speed, 'urban desert' in big cities, a lack of social cohesion, lack of trust in public institutions, etc. In Budapest, it seems that this discourse is still emerging at the very local level as these issues appeared briefly in the discourses of the representatives of the civil sector.

There are also disparities in constructing effective ways to tackle urban insecurity in the cities. In particular, in Budapest, there was a difference even between the discourse produced by the experts and the NGOs' representatives. Thus, while the experts believed that the situational measures (increased policing of the city areas, surveillance, urban design, etc.) should be the most effective for tackling urban insecurity, the representatives of NGOs prioritised social interventions (educational activities, promotion of social trust, engagement of the citizens through participation in neighbourhood watch, and others). It might be ascribed to a fact that while experts are more impacted by the implementation of mainly situational measures in Budapest, the representatives of NGOs, who work in direct contact with the population and are usually working with vulnerable and marginal groups of the population, could be more prone to prioritise those measures that aim

at social roots of urban insecurity. Again, it illustrates the emergence of social discourse on urban insecurity at the local level.

In contrast, in Milan, all the respondents highlighted the importance of not only the mixed approach to tackling urban insecurity but also the participatory approach to security provision. The integrated approach implies the involvement of the citizens of the city in the discussion of the policies and management over the city. They appeal to it as the interviewees believed that the city's inhabitants have a more profound knowledge of their area; therefore, their contribution might help to tackle the problematic issues there.

As to video surveillance, all the respondents suggested that it might effectively tackle street crime and reassure local inhabitants. However, in both cities, the respondents pointed out that not every crime might be prevented by the presence of a CCTV camera. In particular, they pointed out that video surveillance might deter some street crimes and serve to investigate crime. At the same time, in both contexts, the respondents suggested that premeditated crimes, violence, murder, etc., are not affected by the presence of video surveillance.

Additionally, the respondents named several conditions for video surveillance to be effective there should be a quick authoritative response to illegal actions that a surveillance camera catches, which not only reduces the probability of crime but also reassures law-abiding citizens. The visibility of video surveillance, which might also be achieved through appropriate signage, is another crucial condition for video surveillance to deter crime and improve the perception of security in an area. Lastly, video surveillance should be located in the city's strategic points and cover the whole problematic area, which is not always done in both cities. Moreover, in Budapest and Milan, video surveillance seems to be installed more based on the opinions of the police or the head of a local authority rather than a comprehensive study.

Both in Budapest and Milan, video surveillance does not generate concerns about privacy invasion. Therefore, the population is instead accepting towards the technology as it is frequently perceived as a sign of care and protection. Additionally, in both cities, the interviewees pointed out that video surveillance becomes a part of the urban landscape; therefore, the local inhabitants stop noticing it. It leads to the reduced ability of video cameras to provide the perception of security. In Milan, the experts suggested that the police and the Municipality might communicate positive results from the implementation of video surveillance, which might prolongate its impact on the perception of security.

In Budapest, there is an interesting illustration of the bureaucratic belief in the ability of video surveillance to deter crime and reassure the local inhabitants. Thus, allegedly, there is a practice

of installing video surveillance cameras that do not work; however, theoretically, their mere presence should deter crime. In contrast, in Milan, such a strategy would not work because, according to the experts, criminals are capable of understanding if a camera does not work. Furthermore, some criminals know how to deactivate video surveillance systems and steal them.

All the respondents concluded that for now, video surveillance is not capable of substituting the presence of a police officer or any other official or unofficial observer. Mainly, it might be due to a slower response time to the problems detected through video surveillance, while a human guardian present in the territory might react quicker. However, while the Italian experts raised the question of privacy and whether it might be beneficial to increase surveillance at the expense of privacy, the Hungarian respondents were more optimistic about the further development of surveillance technologies (dangerous objects recognition, predictive policing, etc.).

The last part of the empirical research consisted of multilevel modelling. This part of the research aimed to investigate whether there is a connection between the feeling of security and the presence of video surveillance cameras. The model included different control variables that accounted for factors of urban insecurity discussed in *Chapter 2: Literature review*. Therefore, the model included socio-demographic and attitudinal indicators along with the crime rates for robberies, thefts, and burglaries.

The models for Hungary and Italy show some principal differences between the countries in the factors impacting personal feeling of security there. Thus, in Hungary, as it appears from the analysis, the feeling of security is impacted primarily by factors that measure individual physical and socio-economic vulnerability to crime. In particular, such factors as subjective estimations of one's health, financial status, type of settlement, and previous victimisation experience strongly impact the feeling of security in Hungary. In the meantime, attitudes towards migrants, having solid social ties, crime rates, and the number of video surveillance cameras have a very weak or even insignificant relationship with the feeling of security.

In Italy, the multilevel analysis shows that a complex set of factors might form the feeling of insecurity in urban areas. Just like in Hungary, factors indicating one's vulnerability contribute to the feeling of insecurity. At the same time, ontological and social factors are connected with the perception of urban insecurity. Thus, having solid social ties and being more accepting of migrants reduce the perception of insecurity. It confirms the finding from the interview analysis that there is more attention to social roots of insecurity in Italy, while in Hungary, this discourse is at the nascent stage. Lastly, the statistical analysis shows that video surveillance might alleviate the perception of insecurity, while the incidence of robberies deteriorates it further.

The research also offers some interesting theoretical insights. In particular, the analysis shows that there are differences in the logics of the provision of urban security and implementation of surveillance in both cities. So, the analysis of the data from Budapest reveals the dominance of the surveillance society framework, while in Milan, the security state is dominant.

Partially, this difference might be attributed to the specificities of neoliberalism in both contexts. In Budapest, there was an 'illiberal turn' that mainly manifested in the concentration of power, which coincides with the concentration of power in a surveillance society. Additionally, the Hungarian government has been trying to balance further liberalisation of the country and the provision of welfare. Therefore, it might have impacted the perception of video surveillance as a tool of care, better provision of security since there is a perception that the state tries to take care of its citizens.

Interestingly, in Budapest, the provision of security in more affluent neighbourhoods might be implemented within the logic of the security state. Primarily, it is due to the practices of profiling and the exception of those who show deviance. Thus, the local inhabitants seek to segregate from the Roma people, homeless, alcohol and drug abusers, etc.

Therefore, there is a combination of the two logics of urban security provision in Budapest. While in the whole city, there is an inclination towards crime deterrence and instilling discipline, in the affluent neighbourhoods, there is a tendency towards excepting those who are deviant and protecting the 'normal' society from the deviant.

In the meantime, in Milan, the state seeks to give up the provision of some welfare services and, therefore, encourages the participation of the citizens and NGOs. Such economic rationality lies within the framework of the security state. Therefore, on the one hand, it leads to a higher involvement of different civil organisations in the city, and, on the other hand, it leads to the fortification of public and private spaces there.

Additionally, the politicians exploit the juridico-legal apparatus to codify their perception of urban insecurity, mainly through immigration, and possible solutions to the problem. In turn, such stigmatisation of some social groups as criminogenic leads to social and physical segregation and justifies an increased fortification.

In Milan, the signs of surveillance society are more prominent in the discourse of the effectiveness of surveillance for tackling the problem of urban insecurity. Thus, it is suggested that the presence of a figure or a symbol of the observer might deter crime in the city. In some situations of a possibility to identify a person visually, it might even instil discipline. Mainly, it refers to the situations of provision of some services to the marginalised groups of the population.

Interestingly, as it appears from the data analysis, video surveillance fails to instil discipline. Thus, even when the respondents mentioned the deterrence function of video surveillance in a physical space, they still pointed out that the mere presence of video surveillance is not enough for eliminating an opportunity for crime. In particular, the respondents mentioned that criminal activity might shift to another space (both physical or virtual), criminal might target video surveillance equipment, etc.

Consequently, in Milan, the security state logic is dominant, with some signs of surveillance society framework mainly about the marginalised groups of the population, while in Budapest there is a dominance of a surveillance society approach, with some signs of a security state. Given the results, two conclusions might be drawn. Firstly, a theoretical dialogue between the two approaches might be fruitful in terms of conducting empirical research as it shows how these two logics might be combined even within one city. Secondly, the level of the economic and social prosperity of the city might explain the dominance of one of the logics of the provision of urban security.

2. Policy implications

The study results also have some implications for urban security policies in the studied contexts. Firstly, there is a lack of comprehensive study of the territory and its needs in terms of urban security provision in both contexts. Such studies should be conducted repeatedly due to the constantly changing nature of urban insecurity. Thus, a profound study on urban insecurity, investigating both spatial and social dimensions, facilitates understanding the current needs in the city, the most problematic issues, and so on. Furthermore, it might facilitate the estimation of the need to install video surveillance and assess the utility of CCTV systems already present in the territory. This research highlights the necessity of such studies as their results might impact both crime rates and the perception of insecurity in the cities.

As to video surveillance, given that the respondents suggested that it could be only a partial solution, it is suggested that the local authorities seek for ways of combining video surveillance installation with other social and situational interventions and the involvement of the citizens in production of urban security. Additionally, it is vital that video surveillance follows two main conditions. Firstly, it should be highly visible or, at least, people should be informed of the presence of video surveillance by appropriate signage as higher visibility of video surveillance seem to facilitate the perception of security and deter some crimes. Secondly, there should be (almost) immediate authoritative response to the images caught by video surveillance. Furthermore, to increase the perception of security, it is vital that the citizens are aware that there will be an immediate reaction in case of emergency.

Additionally, in both cities, the criteria for the installation of video surveillance are not transparent and, as it appears from the interview data, frequently opinion-based. Therefore, it is recommended to do the research of crime statistics, citizens' requests, presence of other interventions in the territory before the installation of CCTV systems. One of the tools that might facilitate it is the usage of predictive policing, especially given that both in Budapest and Milan there is such a software. In Hungary, there is Böbe software, in Milan – KeyCrime. Additionally, the transparency in the matters of the installation of video surveillance (criteria for the installation, number of cameras, etc.) might contribute to the prevention of corruption in the field and facilitate citizens' trust in the police and video surveillance.

Lastly, there is a need to establish effective communication between the citizens, the local authorities, and the police as it would facilitate the improvement of the perception of insecurity in both studied cities. In particular, the current study shows a need in communication and information campaigns on the actions undertaken by the local authorities and the police, their effectiveness, etc. Although it is partially implemented in Milan, since some groups provide the police with some information on the issues present in the territory, communication from the police and Municipality should be encouraged as it could increase the transparency and the perception of security in the city. The same should be implemented in Budapest, where there is an additional problem of a lack of trust in the police and local authorities.

3. Future research

The current research suggests further developments and possible directions for research. First, it shows that there is a co-existence of different logics of urban security provision with the dominance of one. However, it could be explored further what other factors along with the political situation, social and economic affluence might impact the dominance of surveillance society or security state. Therefore, it opens the field for comparative research aiming at understanding the possible combinations of the various logics of urban security provision and factors behind their implementation.

The research also indicates an understudied topic of the implementation of video surveillance along with the various social and participatory interventions. Therefore, it suggests conducting some experimental research on the simultaneous introduction of video surveillance and, for example, neighbourhoods watch in an area. Such a study would allow us to understand the effectiveness of joined interventions for crime reduction and the improvement of the perception of insecurity.

Although the current study explores the problematisation of urban insecurity in the current policies aimed at tackling the issue, it does not explore their implementation, evaluation of their results, etc. However, there is some evidence that there might be a discrepancy between the official policies and their implementations. Research on the implementation of policies might shed light on the ways urban insecurity is tackled in the cities and how video surveillance contributes to it.

The current research does not touch upon the topics of corruption and possible abuse in the usage of video surveillance. However, the current body of literature indicates the existence of such problems. Therefore, it is worth investigate further the decision-making process lying behind the installation of CCTV cameras in Budapest and Milan as at the moment they are not entirely transparent. Additionally, it is worth studying in-depth possibilities for abuse of power of the observer over observed and its prevention. Such research might contribute to understanding the power relations behind the implementation of video surveillance in large cities.

Lastly, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on urban fabric is another aspect that calls for further investigation and comprehension. The pandemic profoundly affected urban inhabitants and added new layers to urban insecurity by accentuating the health risks, especially in densely inhabited areas, highlighting labour precarity, future uncertainties, etc. Additionally, it transformed the urban spaces by affecting their physical appearances and their perception. Therefore, it contributed to urban insecurity in various ways that should be investigated in the future.

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Appendix A. The list of legal documents collected for the legislation analysis

The administrative level of the documents, the documents collected, and the sources of the documents for Hungary (Budapest) and Italy (Lombardy and Milan).

Administrative level	***Country /city***	***Documents***	***Sources***
National	Hungary	The Fundamental Law of Hungary (the Constitution of Hungary), 2012; Act XXXIV on the Police, 1994; Act LXIII on Public Space Supervision, 1999; Act LXXX on Asylum, 2007; Act CLXV on the Civil Guard and the Rules of Civil Protection, 2011; Act CLXXXIX on Local Government, 2011; Criminal Code, Act C, 2012; Act XC on Criminal Procedure, 2017	Wolter Kluwer Hungary legislation database
		The National Crime Prevention Strategy, 2013 – 2023	The official web-page of the National Crime Prevention Council
		Cooperation Agreement between the National Police Headquarters and the White Ring Public Benefit Association, 11 July 2016	The official web-page of the White Ring Public Benefit Association
	Italy	The Constitution of the Italian Republic, 2012; Legislative Decree №267 “Consolidated Text of the Laws on the Organisation of Local Authorities”, 2000; Decree Law №92 “Urgent Public Security Measures”, 2008; Ministry of the Interior Decree “Public Safety and Urban Security: Definition and Areas of Application”, 2008; Law №94 “Provisions on Public Security”, 2009; Law №95 “Treaty of Prum”, 2009; Decree Law №187 “Urgent Security Measures”, 2010; Law №48 “On Integrated Security”, 2017; Legislative Decree “Urgent Provisions on International Protection and Immigration, Public Security, as aell as Measures for the Functionality of the Ministry of the Interior and the Organisation and Functioning of the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organised Crime”, 2018	The Official Gazette of Italian Republic

		Security Pact between the Ministry of the Interior and the ANCI, 2007; Circular of February 8, 2005 “Video-surveillance systems. Definition of guidelines on the matter”	The official web-page of the Ministry of the Interior
		Provisions in Relation to Video Surveillance, 2010	The official web-page of the Italian Data Protection Authority
regional	Lombardy	Regional Law №6 “Regional Regulation of Local Police Services and Promotion of Integrated Urban Security Policies”, 2015;	The Database of Regional Law, the Council of Lombardy Region
		Protocol of Understanding between the Lombardy Region and the Prefectures – the Territorial Offices of the Government of Lombardy for the Contrasting the Phenomenon of Violence against Women, 2017 Agreement for the Promotion of Integrated Security between the Ministry of the Interior, the Lombardy Region and the Lombardy ANCI, 2019	The official web-page of the Prefecture of Milan
city	Budapest	Budapest 2030 Long-Term Urban Development Concept (№767/2013 IV.24); Thematic Development Programs, 2015 (Project of KMOP-5.1.1/D2-13-2013-0001); Budapest Transport Development Strategy, 2014 – 2030; Smart Budapest. The Smart City Vision of Budapest, 2017;	The official web-page of the Municipality of Budapest
	Milan	Memoranda of Understanding between the Public Prosecutor at the Ordinary Court of Milan and the Municipality of Milan “Joined Actions in Favor of Vulnerable Victims”, 2017; Memoranda of Understanding between the Prefecture of Milan and the Mayor of Milan “Project ‘Neighbourhood Control’”, 2018;	The official web-page of the Prefecture of Milan
		The Statute of the Municipality of Milan, 1991; Regulation of the Municipal Police Force, 1997; Regulation for Interventions and Social Services of the Municipality of Milan, 2006; Regulation of the Municipal Group of Volunteers for Civil Protection, 2011; Boroughs Regulation of the Municipality of Milan, 2016; Contingent and Urgent Mayoral Ordinances;	The official web-page of the Municipality of Milan

Appendix B. The coding guide for the legislation analysis

Codes used for the legislation analysis and their definitions

Code	Definition
GOAL	The expected result from implementation of the document
Goal-problem	Which specific problems are mentioned in the legislation when the problem of urban insecurity is discussed
Goal-problem-social	Problems that have a social nature (marginalisation, social vulnerability and insecurity)
Goal-problem-situational	Problem that have roots in the physical space
Goal-aims	Which specific aims the document has
MEASURE	Measures and interventions suggested to implement in order to achieve the goals
Measure-repressive	A law is violated and a reaction follows
Measure-preventive	Detecting a potential crime and minimizing its probability
Measure-preventive-social	Measures aimed at improving social conditions, living standards of the vulnerable or marginalised populations
Measure-preventive-situational	Manipulations, interventions in the physical space
ACTOR	According to the legislation, actors that are involved in urban security provision and their responsibilities
Actor-national	Which official national actors are discussed in the legislation and their main responsibilities
Actor-regional (in Italy only)	Which official regional actors are discussed in the legislation and their main responsibilities
Actor-city	Which official actors at the city level are discussed in the legislation and their main responsibilities
Actor-municipal	Which official municipal actors are discussed in the legislation and their main responsibilities
Actor-police	The police (of different levels, for example, the state, municipal, etc. police forces) and their main responsibilities
Actor-non-governmental / voluntary	Which voluntary organisations (if any) are discussed in the legislations
Actor-others	Other actors that are discussed in the legislation and their main responsibilities
RELATION	Relations between the different actors that are stated by the legislation
Relation-hierarchical	Hierarchical relation that assumes subordination
Relation-horizontal	Horizontal relation that assumes cooperation

Appendix C. The interview guide for the semi-structured interviews with experts.

Topic 1. Current situation with urban insecurity in the city

If we make a comparison between the city and other country's cities, would you say that the city is a secure place? Could you tell me, why? Could you, please, based on your experience, tell me about the most pressing or urgent security-related issues in the city?

If we again make a comparison between the city and other country's cities, in your opinion, what are the main problems that mainly disturb the local population? Why? If we talk about the perception of security in the city, what are the factors that improve it? Why? What are the factors that worsen the situation? Why?

Would you say that there are some areas of the city that have a reputation as "unsafe", "dangerous" neighbourhoods? Which are they? Why are they perceived in this way? Would you say that this reputation is consistent with the objective security situation in these neighbourhoods? Why? If not, could you tell me how is this neighbourhood characterized?

What about the neighbourhoods that have a reputation of "safe" areas? In your opinion, why are they perceived in this way? Is their reputation in line with the objective security situation? Why?

Topic 2. Recent trends and changes

If we talk about last 5 – 10 years, crime rates have been going down or up? Which crime rates have been decreasing? Which have been increasing? Could you tell me what are the factors that contribute to this descending trend? What factors contribute to the increase?

In your opinion, are there any crime types that have the biggest impact on the perception of insecurity in the city? Which are they? And besides the crime rates, are there other factors that contribute to the decrease in the perception of insecurity in the city? Which are they? And which factors contribute to the increase in the perception of insecurity? Have there been any changes in the last 5 – 10 years?

Now, let's discuss the changes that are brought about the coronavirus emergency. In your opinion, have there been any changes in the crime situation under the new circumstances? Which crimes have decreased? Why? Which crimes have increased? Why? Have new types of crime emerged? Why?

Still talking about the COVID-19 emergency, has the perception of insecurity changed? For what reason?

Topic 3. Measures to tackle urban insecurity.

I would like to pre-covid times. If we talk about crime prevention, in your opinion, what are the most effective policies and interventions? Why? And what are the least effective? Why?

And if we talk about the perception of insecurity in the city, what policies and interventions are the most effective to improve it? Why? What are the least effective? Why?

If we return again to the covid pandemic, have there been new policies or measures against crime activity in this period? Which ones? Have there been new measures or policies to reassure the local population? Which ones?

In your opinion, is video surveillance effective for crime prevention? Are there any crime types against which the implementation of CCTV is especially effective? Can you explain why? And least effective? Can you explain why?

In your opinion, is video surveillance effective for improving the perception of insecurity? Why?

And in the context of the city, is it more effective for crime prevention or for improving the perception of insecurity of the local citizens?

Maybe, you know the criteria that is used for the installation of CCTV in the city? In your opinion, should they be changed?

In your opinion, what is the attitude of the citizens towards video surveillance? Is the local population concerned about their privacy? If yes, is something done about it? In your opinion, is there a difference in the attitude towards video surveillance if it is used by the local government or by private bodies (banks, shops, etc.)?

Is there anything you would like to add to the conversation? Thank you very much!

Appendix D. The coding guide for the analysis of the interviews with the experts

Code	explanation
ACTIVITY	Discussion of an expert's activities, their work
CITY	Discussion of the current security situation in the city
City-objective	Discussion of whether there are visible and/or objective features of security in the city (low crime rates, gated communities, intercoms, video-surveillance, presence of policemen, patrols, etc.)
City-problems	Discussion of the main security-related problems in the city (types of crime, signs of urban decay, etc.).
City-problems-causes	Discussion of the causes of the problems present in the city
City-subjective	Discussion of whether the local population of the city feels secure in it, how the locals estimate their possibility of victimisation
City-subjective-causes	Discussion of the causes, factors influencing the perception, feeling of security in the city
NEIGHBOURHOOD	Discussion of the city's neighbourhoods with reputations of being secure or insecure
Neighbourhood-secure	Discussion a neighbourhood with secure reputation
Neighbourhood-secure-objective	Discussion of whether there are visible and/or objective features of security in the neighbourhood (low crime rates, gated communities, intercoms, video-surveillance, presence of policemen, patrols, etc.)
Neighbourhood-secure-problems	Discussion of the main security-related problems in the neighbourhood (types of crime, signs of urban decay, etc.).
Neighbourhood-secure-reputation	Discussion of whether the reputation of being secure reflects the actual situation in the neighbourhood
Neighbourhood-insecure	Discussion a neighbourhood with insecure reputation
Neighbourhood-insecure-objective	Discussion of whether there are visible and/or objective features of security in the neighbourhood (low crime rates, gated communities, intercoms, video-surveillance, presence of policemen, patrols, etc.)
Neighbourhood-insecure-problems	Discussion of the main security-related problems in the neighbourhood (types of crime, signs of urban decay, etc.).
Neighbourhood-insecure-reputation	Discussion of whether the reputation of being insecurity reflects the actual situation in the neighbourhood
CHANGES	Discussion of the changes in the security situation in the city during the last five – ten years, including covid-emergency
Changes-objective	Discussion of the recent changes in objective security (crime rates, security measures and policies)
Changes-objective-causes	Discussion of the possible reasons for changes in the objective security situation in the city
Changes-subjective	Discussion of the recent changes in the feeling of security of the local inhabitants: feel more or less secure, vulnerable, etc.
Changes-subjective-causes	Discussion of the possible reasons for changes in the perceived insecurity in the city
Changes-covid	Discussion of whether covid-19 emergency brought about some changes in the security situation, affected crime rates, impacted the perception of security
MEASURES AND POLICIES	Discussion of the main measures and policies adopted in the country, city to tackle the problem of urban insecurity

Measures and policies-coercion	Discussion of the crime coercion measures and policies as an instrument of security provision
Measures and policies-coercion-effective	Discussion whether crime coercion is effective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-coercion-ineffective	Discussion of whether crime coercion is ineffective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-situational prevention	Discussion of the situational crime prevention measures and policies as an instrument of security provision
Measures and policies-situational prevention-effective	Discussion of whether situational crime prevention is effective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-situational prevention-ineffective	Discussion of whether situational crime prevention is ineffective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-social prevention	Discussion of the social crime prevention measures and policies as an instrument of security provision
Measures and policies-social prevention - effective	Discussion of whether social crime prevention is effective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-social prevention - ineffective	Discussion of whether social crime prevention is ineffective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-mixed	Discussion of the mixed approach to crime prevention as an instrument of security provision
Measures and policies-mixed-effective	Discussion of whether the mixed approach is effective for urban security provision
Measures and policies-mixed-ineffective	Discussion of whether the mixed approach is ineffective for urban security provision
CCTV	Discussion of video surveillance as a tool for urban security provision
CCTV-crime prevention	Discussion of the usage of video surveillance for crime prevention
CCTV-crime prevention - effective	Discussion whether video surveillance is effective for crime prevention
CCTV-crime prevention - ineffective	Discussion whether video surveillance is ineffective for crime prevention
CCTV-investigation	Discussion of the usage of video surveillance for crime investigation
CCTV-investigation-effective	Discussion whether video surveillance is effective for crime investigation
CCTV-investigation-ineffective	Discussion whether video surveillance is ineffective for crime investigation
CCTV-fear reduction	Discussion of employment of video surveillance for fear reduction
CCTV-fear reduction-effective	Discussion of whether video surveillance is effective for fear reduction

CCTV-fear reduction-ineffective	Discussion of whether video surveillance is ineffective for fear reduction
CCTV-privacy	Discussion of video surveillance as a data collection tool and invasion into privacy
ACTOR	Discussion of the main actors involved in urban security provision, their responsibilities
Actor-state	Discussion of state actors involved in the provision of urban security
Actor-state-national	Discussion of the national state institutions involved in the provision of urban security
Actor-state-regional (in Italy only)	Discussion of the regional official institutions involved in the provision of urban security
Actor-state-city	Discussion of the city level public institutions involved in the provision of urban security
Actor-state-police	Discussion of the police involvement in the urban security provision
Actor-NGO and voluntary	Discussion of the voluntary organisations and NGOs involved in urban security provision in the city
Actor-other	Discussion of other actors involved in urban security provision
Actor-joined	Discussion whether actors have any joined activities, partnerships, and so on for urban security provision

Appendix E. The interview guide for the interviews with the representatives of the NGOs

Closed questions

Did your organisation participate in one or several of the following activities during the last year? Please, select all the applicable options:

1. Consultations with the local government, police in order to formulate laws and policies or adjustments to them;
2. Consultations with the local authorities in order to discuss the needs of the local inhabitants about urban insecurity;
3. Observation over police activities in order to detect abuse of their duties, corruption, and other illegal actions;
4. Other activities where there was contact with any governmental body (please, specify)
5. Nothing

For each previously selected activity, please, tell, how many times did you participate in them the last year? One answer for each activity

	One time	Two times	Three – five times	Six or more	Not applicable
Consultation with the local government, Police formulation	1	2	3	4	9
Consultation with the local authorities to discuss the local needs	1	2	3	4	9
Observation of police activities	1	2	3	4	9
Other activities	1	2	3	4	9

Still talking about the last year, could you, please, recall whether your organisation participated in one or several of the following activities?

1. Neighbourhood watch – patrolling of streets and public spaces in cooperation with the local police/authority to detect and prevent incivilities;
2. Citizen patrol – patrolling of streets and public spaces only by volunteers and reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement;
3. Mediation – help in resolving conflicts between the residents (over such issues as barking dogs, litter, noisy neighbours, and so on) in order to prevent incivilities;
4. Victim assistance – provision of free of charge (or for a very small payment) psychological or legal advice to crime victims
5. Other activities related to work with the local inhabitants (please, specify)
6. Nothing

For each selected previously activity, please, tell, how often did you participate in them the last year? One answer for each activity

	Once or two times a year	Every half of a year	Every two-three months	On a monthly basis	On a weekly basis	Not applicable
Neighbourhood watch	1	2	3	4	5	9
Citizen patrol	1	2	3	4	5	9
Mediation	1	2	3	4	5	9
Victim assistance	1	2	3	4	5	9
Other activities	1	2	3	4	5	9

Open questions

Topic 1. Current situation with urban insecurity in the neighbourhood in which an organisation is active

Does your organisation work in the whole city or only in one neighbourhood?

If we talk about the city in general would you say this is secure city to live? Why? Would you say that people feel secure here or not? Why?

And what about the district in which you are working: would you say it is secure compared to the other districts of the city? Why? Do people living in this district feel secure compared to the other districts of the city? Why do you think that is?
Can you, please, tell whether there are some physical attributes of security (for instance, private fences, gated entrances, intercom, and so on) in the neighbourhood/city? Which are they?
Could you, please, based on your experience, tell me about the most pressing or urgent security related issues in the district/city?
In the conversations with the local inhabitants what security issues are the most pressing?
From your perspective, are the social ties solid in the neighbourhood where your work/city (trust among the neighbours, they have communal activities, and so on)? Why do you think so?
Topic 2. Recent trends and changes
If we talk about the last five - ten years, would you say that the security situation in the neighbourhood/city has changed? Has it become more/less secure? Why?
And what about the feeling of security of the local inhabitants: do they feel more secure now or less? Can you think about any explanations for the changes (if there are any)?
Now, let's discuss the changes that are brought about by the coronavirus emergency. In your opinion during this period did people feel less secure being outside? Were they more worried about becoming a crime victim? Have you heard of any demands of the locals for enhancing security in the neighbourhood/city?
Topic 3. Measures to tackle urban insecurity
Which measures do you consider to be the most effective for enhancing the security in the neighbourhood/city in which you work? Why? And what about the measures for enhancing the feeling of security? Why are they effective?
Are there any measures that are least effective? Why do you think so?
And is we talk about video surveillance, would you say that it is effective for preventing crime? Why? What about crime investigation?
And would you say that video-surveillance is effective for improving feeling of security in the streets? Why?
Have you ever heard from the local inhabitants their opinion or maybe have a discussion with them on the implementation/installation of the CCTV in this district/city? What was their perspective?
Sometimes local inhabitants ask for installation of video surveillance, have you ever heard about this in your district/city? If yes, what were the circumstances, why did they ask for it?
Do you think there is a difference in people's perception of video-surveillance if it is used by the municipality or by private organisations (banks, shops, etc.)?

Is there anything you would like to add to the conversation?
Thank you very much!

Appendix F. The coding guide for the analysis of the interviews with representatives of NGOs

Code	explanation
Government relations	Discussion of whether an NGO cooperates/has some relationships with the local (municipal) governmental bodies, local police
Government relations-formal	Discussion of whether the relationships with governmental bodies/police are formalized
Government relations-informal	Discussion of whether the relationships with governmental bodies/police are informal (through personal connections, informal consultations, etc.)
Activity	Discussion of the main NGO's activities, description of their day-to-day activities
City	Discussion of whether the current situation in the city
City-objective	Discussion of whether there are visible and/or objective features of security in the city (low crime rates, gated communities, intercoms, video-surveillance, presence of policemen, patrols, etc.)
City-problems	Discussion of the main security-related problems in the city (types of crime, signs of urban decay, etc.).
City-problems-causes	Discussion of the main causes of the current security related problems present in the city
City-subjective	Discussion of whether the local population of the city feels secure in it, how the locals estimate their possibility of victimisation
City-subjective-causes	Discussion of the causes, factors influencing the perception, feeling of security in the city (media, stereotypes, etc.)
City-vulnerable	Discussion of the vulnerable groups (those who are at risk of victimisation, abuse) in the city
City-cohesion	Discussion of whether there are solid social ties, trust in the city (manifested through communal activities, the trust to leave the apartment keys to a neighbour/worker of a local shop, etc.)
Neighbourhood[38]	Discussion of the current situation in the neighbourhood in which the NGO works
Neighbourhood-objective	Discussion of whether there are visible and/or objective features of security in the neighbourhood (low crime rates, gated communities, intercoms, video-surveillance, presence of policemen, patrols, etc.)
Neighbourhood-problems	Discussion of the main security-related problems in the neighbourhood (types of crime, signs of urban decay, etc.).
Neighbourhood-problems-causes	Discussion of the main causes of the currently present in the neighbourhood problems
Neighbourhood-subjective	Discussion of whether the local population of the neighbourhood feels secure in it, how the locals estimate their possibility of victimisation
Neighbourhood-subjective-causes	Discussion of the causes, factors, influencing the perception, feeling of security in the neighbourhood (media, stereotypes, etc.)
Neighbourhood-vulnerable	Discussion of the vulnerable groups (those who are at risk of victimisation, abuse) in the neighbourhood
Neighbourhood-cohesion	Discussion of whether there are solid social ties, trust in the neighbourhood (manifested through communal activities, the trust to leave the apartment keys to a neighbour/worker of a local shop, etc.)
Changes	Discussion of the changes in the security situation in the city/neighbourhood during the last five – ten years, including covid-emergency

[38] Only if applicable.

Changes-objective	Discussion of the recent changes in objective security (crime rates, security measures and policies)
Changes-objective-causes	Discussion of possible causes in the change in the objective situation in the neighbourhood/city
Changes-subjective	Discussion of the recent changes in the feeling of security of the local inhabitants: feel more or less secure, vulnerable, etc.
Changes-subjective-causes	Discussion of possible causes in the change in subjective security in the neighbourhood/city
Changes-covid	Discussion of whether covid-19 emergency brought about some changes in the security situation, affected crime rates, impacted the perception of security
Measures and policies	Discussion of the main measures and policies adopted in the country, city to tackle the problem of urban insecurity
Measures and policies-social	Discussion of social crime prevention measures (keeping the youth away from the streets, education, improvement of living conditions, etc.) in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies–social-effective	Discussion of whether social crime prevention measures are considered to be effective in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies–social-ineffective	Discussion of whether social crime prevention measures are considered to be ineffective in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-situational	Discussion of situational crime prevention measures (manipulations with, intervention into the physical environment, installation of light, CCTV, gates, etc.) in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-situational-effective	Discussion of whether situational crime prevention measures are considered to be effective in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-situational-ineffective	Discussion of whether situational crime prevention measures are considered to be ineffective in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-mixed	Discussion of the mixed approach to crime prevention in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-mixed-effective	Discussion whether the mixed approach to crime prevention is effective in the neighbourhood/city
Measures and policies-mixed-ineffective	Discussion whether the mixed approach to crime prevention is ineffective in the neighbourhood/city
CCTV	Discussion of video surveillance as a tool of urban security provision in the neighbourhood/city
CCTV-crime prevention	Discussion of the usage of video surveillance for crime prevention
CCTV-crime prevention-effective	Discussion whether video surveillance is effective for crime prevention
CCTV-crime prevention-ineffective	Discussion whether video surveillance is ineffective for crime prevention

CCTV-crime investigation	Discussion of the usage of video surveillance for crime investigation
CCTV-crime investigation-effective	Discussion whether video surveillance is effective for crime investigation
CCTV-crime investigation-ineffective	Discussion whether video surveillance is ineffective for crime investigation
CCTV-fear reduction	Discussion of employment of video surveillance for fear reduction
CCTV-fear reduction-effective	Discussion of whether video surveillance is effective for fear reduction
CCTV-fear reduction-ineffective	Discussion of whether video surveillance is ineffective for fear reduction
CCTV-demand	Discussion of whether there is a demand from the local inhabitants for the installation of vise surveillance in the neighbourhood/city
CCTV-privacy	Discussion of video surveillance as a data collection tool and invasion into privacy