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

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The Integration of Forced Migrants Into the Italian Labor Market

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The Integration of Forced Migrants Into the Italian Labor Market

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Forced migrants in Italy have so far received limited assistance and follow integration trajectories into the job market typical of economic migrants. Using a multilevel statistical approach and a new source of survey data, this article describes key aspects of the economic integration of forced migrants. Particular attention is paid to testing the hypothesis that there are significant differences between them and other migrants in the risk of unemployment and in access to the primary job market. Results from this study show a higher risk of unemployment than for other migrants but no difference in their access to regular employment.

KEYWORDS Forced migrants, Italy, integration, job market, refugee gap

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Forced migration flows toward the European Union have increased in both volume and importance in recent years and nowadays represent one of the most difficult and complex aspects of international migrations (Ambrosini, 2011; Castles, 2003). While the basic human right of forced migrants to be received is enshrined in international laws, receiving countries reacted to the growing number of applications by forced migrants in the past years by enacting wide-ranging security measures, which had a negative impact both on the safety and the rights of asylum seekers and refugees (Zetter, 2009). This can be seen clearly in the process leading to the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Close attention was paid by Member States to the control of external borders of the European Union, to the determination of the country in charge of examining each application, to the prevention of abuses, and to the control of secondary movements

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between states. One of the main principles, embodied first in the Dublin II Regulation and confirmed in the current Dublin III Regulation (EU N. 604/2013), is that only the first country allowing an asylum seeker to enter or remain in its territory is responsible for examining his or her application. This regulation, which has been heavily criticized for its adverse consequences on asylum seekers' rights (e.g., Schuster, 2011), places heavy burdens on geographically peripheral countries, where minimal social assistance is provided. It also forces the return of asylum seekers to the first country where they were registered even if they have social or family ties elsewhere that might facilitate faster and easier integration (ECRE, 2006; Korac, 2003). Consequently, countries such as Italy, Malta, and Greece, which traditionally were transit territories for refugees heading to Central and Northern Europe are increasingly becoming countries of settlement for forced migrants (Hein, 2010).

This article focuses on one of these countries, Italy, which is also a country of recent massive immigration.

As will be explained in more detail below, this article builds on many previous studies that have identified forced migrants as a group at economic disadvantage relative to other immigrants (Connor, 2010) and on the work conducted in the Italian setting by Ambrosini and Korac. The aim of this article is to analyze a key aspect of the settlement of forced migrants, their integration into the labor market, including a comparison with the outcomes experienced by other categories of migrants. Specifically, this analysis aims at verifying whether a "refugee gap" (Connor, 2010) exists in Italy with regard to access to the job market, as is the case in many countries. This kind of analysis is of particular interest in the Italian setting. Ambrosini (2012) demonstrates that, because of the deficiencies in the Italian system for the reception of immigrants, it is inherently difficult to differentiate between forced and economic migrants—a difficulty that is deep rooted and is even promoted by the Italian legislation on immigration. Forced migrants in Italy often find it easier to legitimize their presence by means of their work than as a consequence of the acknowledgment of their humanitarian rights. As observed by Korac (2001, 2003), analyzing the case studies of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, settled in Rome in the early 1990s, the lack of assistance had the indirect, positive effect of strongly enhancing refugees' personal agency and bridging social capital, even if this process was achieved through very heavy difficulties in achieving a minimal level of financial security. This article also aims to assess whether a similar process is still at work for the new waves of forced migrants settling in Italy, mainly from Africa and Asia, who received more—though usually still inadequate—temporary assistance.

The article proceeds in five sections. The first section focuses on the main findings on forced migrant integration in host societies. The second section focuses on the situation of Italy. The third section deals with

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the data and the statistical methodology used in the analysis. The fourth section presents the results from descriptive and multivariate analysis. Finally the last section identifies the research findings and discusses their implications.

THE INTEGRATION OF FORCED REFUGEES INTO WESTERN COUNTRIES

In Italy, as in most of the other immigration countries, relatively few studies have examined the economic experience of refugees. Research on this topic is more common in such non-European countries as the United States (e.g., Connor, 2010; Hume & Hardwick, 2005), Canada (e.g., Aydemir, 2011; Codell, Hill, Woltz, & Gore, 2011; Wilkinson, 2008), and Australia (e.g., Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006; Hugo, 2011; Waxman, 2001). In Europe most studies have been conducted in long-established-immigrant-receiving countries such as Great Britain (Bloch, 2007; Hussein, Manthorpe, & Stevens, 2011; Lyon, Sepulveda, & Syrett, 2007), Sweden (Åslund, Östh, & Zenou, 2010; Bevelander, Hagstromand, & Ronnqvist, 2009), the Netherlands (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010), and Belgium (Wauters & Lambrecht, 2008).

An interesting point arising from these studies is that although there are substantial differences in the legislation in place, the welfare provision available, and the definition of forced migrants some findings concerning their living conditions are quite common. Forced migrants are commonly identified as a vulnerable group. Integration in the labor market is often difficult and there are high levels of unemployment. When forced migrants do have a job, moreover, this is usually low-status, low-paid, insecure, and physically demanding, resulting in widespread over-qualification of workers (e.g., Åslund et al., 2010; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006). Low levels of education or working skills, too, are frequently obstacles to labor integration (Hugo, 2011; Hussein et al., 2011; Wauters & Lambrecht, 2008) and often related to poor language skills (Connor, 2010; Lyon et al., 2007; Waxman, 2001). Sometimes long stays in reception centers are found to be negatively correlated with employment and occupational status (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Korac, 2003; Schuster, 2004). Finally, government-assisted refugees are often located in municipalities where housing is available but employment opportunities are scarce (Bevelander et al., 2009).

Forced migrants are usually regarded as a disadvantaged group, relative not only to the citizens of the countries where they settle but also to other immigrants, leading some researchers to talk of a substantial "refugee gap" (Aydemir, 2011; Connor, 2010; Wilkinson, 2008). The most common explanation is that refugees have on average fewer socioeconomic resources, not having self-selected for migration by their own initiative, than economic

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migrants have. As a result, refugees have, on average, less formal education and lower language ability. A lack of family or ethnic network support and poorer mental and physical health are also common findings (Phillips, 2006). Refugees generally reside in more-disadvantaged neighborhoods than other immigrants, and many asylum seekers and refugees seem to experience housing deprivation, homelessness, and insecurity (IntegrA/Azione, 2012; Korac, 2003; Phillips, 2006; Swiss Refugee Council and Juss-Buss, 2011). Human capital theory and social capital theory are currently used to explain the economically disadvantaged position of refugees in receiving countries, implying that refugees' lack of employable skills and of economically advantageous social ties may be among the main causes of the poorer economic performance of refugees (Chiswick & Miller, 2001; De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Friedberg, 2000).

The importance of the labeling process has also been strongly argued to be an important factor. In his labeling theory, Zetter (1991, 2007) underlined how this process has a strength of its own in contributing actively to the definition of collective identities. It creates a powerful picture of the forced migrant, remolding the person as a victim to be looked after; one unintended outcome of this process is that refugees may therefore act on the basis of this ascribed identity, perpetuating dependency.

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THE EXPERIENCE OF FORCED MIGRANTS IN ITALY

Large numbers of arrivals of asylum seekers, especially on the coasts, are not new to Italy, but there were temporarily fewer of them following the 2009 agreement with Libya, by which Italy implemented a policy of preventive refoulement (Andrijasevic, 2010; Marchetti, 2011), which later brought the country a condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012. Italy's role became a major one again after the "Arab Spring" in 2011, when about 60,000 people landed on the southern coasts of the country (Marchetti, 2012); arrivals of people on the Italian coasts continued during 2013, when a tragic shipwreck on the coast of Lampedusa raised awareness of, and triggered unprecedented reactions to, the risks faced by migrants smuggled by sea to Europe.

Those who managed to reach Italy and apply for asylum faced many different problems. The first relates to the process of application. The major problems, resulting in an asylum procedure that is difficult to access, include gaps in the relevant laws, difficulties for asylum seekers in detention in accessing lawyers, and the lack of legal aid for claimants rejected either at the border or during the first stage of the asylum procedure (Bianchini, 2011). Moreover, Italy is no exception to the process observed in many countries of the proliferation of labels given to forced migrants, resulting in restricted access and rights related to asylum (Zetter, 2007). In Italy, an asylum

applicant can be granted the status of refugee or a permit for humanitarian, subsidiary, or temporary protection; these categories vary according to the duration of the permits and to the rights and entitlements they confer (for details, see CIR, 2012). Many studies have emphasized that only rarely in the recent past did people fleeing from wars and persecution find levels of protection consistent with international laws and standards (Ambrosini, 2012). Indeed, until the end of the 1990s, there was no comprehensive approach on the part of governments to the problems caused by the arrival of refugees: they simply continually reacted to emergencies (Hein, 2010; Vincenzi, 2000). Although Italy has made substantial progress since then, its asylum system is still undersized, fragmentary, and inefficient, with a crucial role being played by local NGO and charity networks (Ministero dell'Interno, 2012; Puggioni, 2005; SPRAR, 2012). Furthermore, reports by NGOs and journalists have uncovered repeated violations of human rights and failures to provide the safeguards for asylum seekers and returnees afforded by the Dublin II Regulation. The lack of support—in terms of accommodation and integration—for the majority of those granted a permit or who are waiting for a decision on their application leaves thousands of forced migrants in a state of exclusion and severe marginalization (IntegrA/Azione, 2012; MSF, 2011; NOAS, 2011; Pro Asyl Foundation, 2012; Swiss Refugee Council and Juss-Buss, 2011).

Those who manage to obtain temporary assistance show outcomes similar to those observed in northern Europe in terms of social exclusion. High levels of unemployment, unsuitable housing conditions, poor language skills, health problems, and the lack of strong ethnic networks are recurrent findings in studies on asylum seekers in accommodation centers (Spar, 2012) or after discharge (Fioretti, 2012; Ministero dell'Interno, 2012). Better results are obtained when forced migrants benefit from coherent projects aimed at integration and the acquisition of useful skills (Ambrosini & Marchetti, 2008; Fioretti, 2012; Non solo Asilo, 2012), but the economic crisis has further reduced forced migrants' chances of escaping unemployment (Non solo Asilo, 2012).

As a consequence of this situation, all the research studies on forced migrants to date have referred to forced migrants, including those in Italy, as a vulnerable population. They often experience either a general lack of assistance followed by integration—for those who are able to organize themselves spontaneously and to create a self-reception system that facilitates their functional integration—or they receive assistance but still fail to gain integration. As a consequence forced migrants in Italy have often followed paths and trajectories into the labor market typical of economic migrants (Ambrosini, 2012; Korac, 2001). Given the limitations of the Italian system of asylum, the importance of integration into the job market, including, at the beginning, in the informal economy, is especially important for the achievement of economic independence and a more strongly legitimate status. It is particularly interesting to examine whether recently arrived forced migrants

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in Italy (in our sample, the mean number of years elapsed from arrival is four) show higher levels of exclusion from the labor market than other migrants or whether, conversely, receiving low levels of assistance results in similar levels of integration.

In most studies of the economic adaptation of refugees, three important variables are analyzed: employment, occupational level, and earnings (Connor, 2010). This study follows this standard practice only in part: we have used a variation in order better to examine the Italian context. Given the low occurrence of skilled occupations and the frequency of informal employment among immigrants in Italy (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011), the legal status of work, rather than the occupational level, was considered. It is also important to emphasize that our analysis of access to the job market regards irregular workers as employed. This is because in the Italian context irregular work has provided a valuable transition into regular work (OECD, 2005) and is therefore regarded as a first form of access. Moreover, information on monthly wages is available from the data, but in the sample there are too few wage records for forced migrants for the records to be used in a comparative analysis with other migrants.

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DATA AND METHODS

Studies on refugees often face major difficulties in finding adequate data on which to perform statistical analysis. Large-scale surveys on refugees are uncommon (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010) and lists from which to draw large random samples are extremely rare (Åslund et al., 2010). Other authors point out the lack of nationally representative data (Spring et al., 2003) and the existence of only small amounts of data on recent refugee cohorts (Connor, 2010). Furthermore, questionnaires may fail to include some key factors affecting the labor market experience of forced migrants (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010). In other cases, studies fail to include other subjects, precluding comparisons with migrants or native citizens. It is also difficult to follow integration paths when migrants leave the reception centers (Fioretti, 2012).

The data for this analysis comes from the twelfth edition of the Italian ORIM survey on immigrants. The fieldwork was carried out between May 2012 and June 2012. This survey is routinely carried out by the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multiethnicity of Lombardy, one of the main sources of information and data on immigration in Italy, and is an annual cross-sectional survey based on face-to-face interviews carried out using the center of aggregation sampling method (Baio, Blangiardo, & Blangiardo, 2011). Surveys based on centers of aggregation are specifically designed to collect information on a representative sample of immigrants, which also

includes irregular migrants (Accetturo & Infante, 2013). The interviews are performed face to face in Italian or in a foreign language by skilled foreign interviewers who have undertaken specific training. This study is based only on information on third country nationals (92.1% of the sample) included in the 2012 survey, which originally consisted of 7,000 men and women aged 14 and over with a foreign background (including undocumented, naturalized, and second generation migrants) and a subsample of 211 migrants who were seeking asylum or who were refugees or held a permit for protection. Refusal rates to the interview vary from 15% to 43% according to the center where the interview was proposed.

For our purposes, the data contains limitations, some due to the design of the study, others due to the survey's main purpose not being the study of forced migrants. The first limitation is that the subsample of forced migrants is small. The second is the selection effect, since data was obtained only from migrants who had not returned to their countries of origin or moved to other countries or died. Finally, the analysis is based on cross-sectional data, so it is not possible to test the directionality or causality of the relations between independent and dependent variables. Panel data or surveys including accurate time-related information about key aspects, like duration of unemployment, changes in household conditions or duration of stay in accommodation centers are better suited to testing the causality of relations, but studies of this kind on refugees are rare (Beiser & Hou, 2001). Despite these disadvantages, the use of cross-sectional data is widespread in research on immigrant integration and it is commonly used among the few studies on the economic integration of refugees (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010). On the positive side, this data is a relatively up-to-date source of information and it is unique in the southern European context, not only in including information on forced migrants living both outside and inside accommodation centers, but also in facilitating comparisons with other migrants, including, notably, irregular residents.

As the data set used in the analysis has a hierarchical structure with immigrants nested in countries of origin, a multilevel modeling technique is needed. Because of this structure, the conditional independence among migrants from the same country after controlling for the included covariates required by single-level logistic regression is usually not met, because women and men from the same country of origin share a common exposure to experience in the country of origin. It was therefore decided to use a generalized linear mixed-model approach to relax the assumption of conditional independence, fitting a two-level random-intercept logistic regression for each outcome of interest.

The model, a random-intercept logistic regression, specifies as follows:

$$\text{logit}\left\{\Pr(y_{ij}=1|x_{ij},\zeta_j)\right\} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \cdots + \beta_n x_{nj} + \zeta_j, \qquad (1)$$

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where $Pr(y_{ij} = 1 | x_{ij}, \zeta_j)$ is the probability of experiencing the outcome of interest (according to each model definition) for the i^{th} woman or man in the j^{th} cluster and x_{ij} is a vector of covariates corresponding to the i^{th} woman in the j^{th} cluster. The random intercepts $\zeta_j \sim (N, \psi)$ are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across communities j and independent of the covariates x_{ij}. Given ζ_j and x_{ij}, the responses y_{ij} for the i^{th} woman or man in the j^{th} cluster are independently Bernoulli distributed.

The estimated residual standard deviation of the random intercept, the estimated residual intraclass correlation and the median odds ratio as measures of dependency and heterogeneity are shown below the estimated odds ratios for observed covariates, calculated by exponentiating the respective coefficients.

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RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

This study considers as forced migrants those third-country nationals who have lodged an asylum application or have been granted either the status of refugee or a permit for humanitarian, subsidiary, or temporary protection. These conditions reflect different immigration statuses and categories of forced migrant, though permission to work is always granted, including to asylum seekers after 6 months from the presentation of the application, as was the case for 60 out of the 62 asylum seekers included in the sample. The most-frequent categories of permits are humanitarian protection (28.1%), asylum seeker (27.3%), and refugee status (23.5%). Subsidiary (11.5%) and temporary protection (8.3%) are less common, while other reasons for protection are a negligible portion of this sample.

The subsample of forced migrants mainly comprises citizens from sub-Saharan Africa (62.7%). Other important groups of nationalities come from Asia (18.8%) and northern Africa (14.7%). The proportions of citizens of non-EU eastern European and South American countries are insignificant.

The major countries of origin are Nigeria, Tunisia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, and Congo, while the countries from which asylum or protection seekers account for more than half of the presence in the sample are Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo, Chad, and Iraq.

Comparisons between forced migrants, their compatriots, and other third-country nationals are provided in Table 1.

Economic migration flows from the same countries of origin as forced migrants are mainly made up of men, resulting in a higher men-to-women ratio in this subpopulation than that recorded for citizens from other countries.

TABLE 1 Main Indicators Concerning Forced Migrants and Other Categories of Migrants, ORIM Survey 2012, Italy

	Forced Migrants' Country of Origin		Other Non-EU Countries
Indicators	Forced migrants	Other migrants	All migrants
Number of men in every 100 women	826	194	113
Mean age	30	35	36
% Born in Italy	0.0	0.3	0.8
% Unmarried	69.1	30.1	31.3
% Childless	69.3	35.1	35.1
% With no formal or primary education	22.3	17.2	12.6
% University-level education	13.4	13.3	14.1
% Living in accommodation centers for immigrants	42.7	1.2	0.9
% Living in insecure accommodation	3.7	0.7	0.6
Mean age on arrival in Italy	26	25	25
Mean number of years spent in Italy	4.3	9.8	9.7
% in Italy for less than 2 years	36.6	3.5	3.8
(If has at least 1 child), % that lives with at least 1 child	28.2	71.8	76.6
(If married) lives with partner	36.7	78.1	80.1
% Currently unemployed	59.2	15.8	13.2
% With at least 12 month of unemployment	82.1	61.2	56.1
% Currently working illegally	9.6	11.6	9.7
% With a regular job	26.9	64.7	69.8
Mean monthly wage (in euros)	800	1000	1000
Mean wage per worked hour (in euros)	6.9	7.5	7.2
% Employed in skilled activities	5.1	4.8	8.4

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This ratio is even higher for forced migrants, reaching the level of 800 men to every 100 women.

Comparing the outcomes of the compatriots of forced migrants with those of citizens of other countries, there emerge differences in education, access to employment, and legal employment. Descriptive analysis shows that forced migrants' compatriots have lower levels of educational attainment and housing security and higher levels of unemployment, long-term unemployment and illegal work than other migrants. These conditions are sharply worse among forced migrants.

Forced migrants are also usually younger and have a higher proportion of unmarried, childless, and less-educated persons than other migrants. Their median length of stay in Italy is shorter and their incidence of transnational families is high.

Another interesting point arising from our data is that forced migrants are only partially represented in official statistics. In our sample, 30% of the forced migrants are not registered in the Civil Registry ("Anagrafe") and only 24% of them completed the 2011 Census questionnaire, emphasizing the need for survey data for this particular subpopulation.

Multilevel Analysis Results

Two different groups of models are applied in this analysis. In Model l, unemployment is used as the dependent variable. In this survey it was possible to state whether the person interviewed was working illegally, even for a few hours per week, so "unemployment" here means being completely jobless.

Model 2 is slightly different: it compares migrants who have a regular job with those who are unemployed or have irregular work. Those not in the workforce were excluded from the analysis. As migrants often find their first job in the informal economy, having a regular job marks a more-solid achievement, even in the case of fixed-term contracts.

The results of the multilevel logistic regression models for unemployment and occupational status are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Each table contains 6 partial models: in testing the explanatory value of each set of factors hypothesized as explaining unemployment for immigrants, changes are observed in the dichotomous covariate, indicating that difference with other migrants is due to the refugee status—hereafter referred to as the forced migrants' gap. The last two columns contain the full model applied to the whole sample of third-country nationals (models 1.7 and 2.7) and to the subsample of forced migrants and their compatriots (models 1.8 and 2.8).

Results for models 1.1 and 2.1 (constrained models) indicate a wide gap between forced migrants and other migrants. In fact, compared with other foreigners including undocumented migrants, forced migrants are 8 times more likely to be jobless and 5 times more likely to be out of the primary job market, controlling for the level of human development in the country of origin.

The 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) is used here as country-of-origin control variable (UNDP, 2012). It is incorporated in the constrained models to control for differences in personal background related to differences between countries of origin. Many studies suggest that one of the factors that affect the economic status of immigrants is the country from which they come (the "origin effect") (Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004). HDI thus offers relevant, useful contextual material, being a composite index of well-being that summarizes key dimensions such as average national levels of income; education and health; and a number of approximate, aggregated dimensions of welfare and development in the countries of origin.

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TABLE 2 Estimated Odds Ratios and Standard Errors From Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Analyses Assessing Associations Between Selected Characteristics and Unemployment (Model 1)

Variables	Model 1.1 OR S.E.	Model 1.2 OR S.E.	Model 1.3 OR S.E.	Model 1.4 OR S.E.	Model 1.5 OR S.E.	Model 1.6 OR S.E.	Model 1.7 OR S.E.	Model 1.8 OR S.E.
Forced migrant (Yes, ref. = No)	**8.516 (1.420)*****	**7.172 (1.205)*****	**5.846 (1.011)*****	**6.713 (1.147)*****	**8.89 (1.507)*****	**4.220 (0.791)*****	**3.130 (0.611)*****	**3.010 (0.612)*****
Gender (female vs. male)		0.665(0.561)***					0.732(0.656)***	0.815(0.117)
Age (in single years)		0.984(0.003)***					1.002(0.050)	1.005(0.008)
Years elapsed since arrival in Italy			0.869(0.018)***				0.900(0.020)***	0.886(0.026)***
Years elapsed since arrival in Italy (squared term)			1.004(0.001)***				1.003(0.001)**	1.003(0.001)**
Spouse/parents in residence (Yes, ref. = No)				0.843(0.076)			1.069(0.108)	0.778(0.118)
Number of children in residence				0.770(0.035)***			0.814(0.042)***	0.830(0.653)*
Education (Higher secondary education certificate or University degree, ref. = Lower degree or None)					0.830(0.065)*		0.859(0.069)	0.830(0.097)
Lives in temporary accommodations (Yes, ref. = No)						6.410(1.309)***	4.597(0.972)***	3.706(0.950)***
Lives in insecure accommodation (Yes, ref. = No)						7.055(2.329)***	5.689(1.930)***	3.090(1.467)***

(*Continued on next page*)

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TABLE 2 Estimated Odds Ratios and Standard Errors From Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Analyses Assessing Associations Between Selected Characteristics and Unemployment (Model 1) (*Continued*)

Variables	Model 1.1 OR S.E.	Model 1.2 OR S.E.	Model 1.3 OR S.E.	Model 1.4 OR S.E.	Model 1.5 OR S.E.	Model 1.6 OR S.E.	Model 1.7 OR S.E.	Model 1.8 OR S.E.
Forced migrant (Yes, ref. = No)	**8.516 (1.420)*****	**7.172 (1.205)*****	**5.846 (1.011)*****	**6.713 (1.147)*****	**8.89 (1.507)*****	**4.220 (0.791)*****	**3.130 (0.611)*****	**3.010 (0.612)*****
Has followed an Italian language course (Yes, ref. = No)					0.995 (0.006)		0.998(0.006)	0.996 (0.009)
Has finished part of his/her education in Italy (Yes, ref. = No)					0.942 (0.112)		1.037(0.142)	1.002 (0.207)
Country of origin's HDI	0.156 (0.076)***	0.210 (0.420)***	0.145 (0.071)***	0.146 (0.086)***	0.177 (0.088)***	0.165 (0.075)***	0.198(0.095)**	0.346 (0.212)
Constant	0.468 (0.142)*	1.233 (0.450)	1.096 (0.351)	0.643 (0.202)	0.589 (0.190)	1.464 (0.535)	1.467(0.535)	1.210 (0.588)
Number of level-1 units	5780	5771	5738	5777	5724	5663	5663	2446
Number of level-2 units	110	110	110	110	110	110	109	43
Log likelihood	−2344.4	−2324.3	−2299.6	−2310.2	−2319.0	−2203.1	−2203.1	−1022.62
AIC	0.813	0.808	0.803	0.802	0.813	0.793	0.784	0.849
OR_{median}	1.076	1.046	1.075	1.108	1.085	1.005	1.005	0.926
$\sqrt{(\psi\ \hat{})}$	0.330	0.309	0.330	0.351	0.366	0.261	0.282	0.224
ρ(countryoforigin)	0.032°	0.028°	0.032°	0.036°	0.033°	0.020°	0.023°	0.015
% change in Forced Migrant's coefficients as compared to Model 1.1	0	−8.0	−17.6	−11.1	+2.0	−32.7	−46.7	

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001, °Likelihood-ratio test of $\rho = 0$ Prob > = chibar2 < 0.05.

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TABLE 3 Estimated Odds Ratios and Standard Errors From Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Analyses Assessing Associations Between Selected Characteristics and NOT Being Regularly Employed (Model 2)

Variables	*Model 1.1* OR S.E.	*Model 1.2* OR S.E.	*Model 1.3* OR S.E.	*Model 1.4* OR S.E.	*Model 1.5* OR S.E.	*Model 1.6* OR S.E.	*Model 1.7* OR S.E.	*Model 1.8* OR S.E.
Forced migrant (Yes, ref = No)	**5.158 (0.910)*****	**4.618 (0.833)*****	**2.680 (0.501)*****	**4.163 (0.746)*****	**5.374 (0.960)*****	**2.382 (0.486)*****	**1.454 (0.316)**	**1.258 (0.279)**
Gender (female vs. male)		1.337(0.102)***					1.401(0.114)***	1.736(0.234)***
Age (in single years)		0.962(0.004)***					0.986(0.005)**	0.980(0.008)**
Years elapsed since arrival in Italy			0.786(0.015)***				0.799(0.016)***	0.808(0.222)***
Years elapsed since arrival in Italy (squared term)			1.007(0.001)***				1.007(0.001)***	1.006(0.001)***
Spouse/parents in residence (Yes, ref. = No)				1.007(0.780)			1.097(0.095)	0.797(0.106)
Number of children in residence				0.727(0.028)***			0.875(0.039)**	0.848(0.057)*
Education (Higher secondary education certificate or University degree, ref. = Lower degree or None)					0.759(0.051)***		0.775(0.055)***	0.816(0.855)*
Lives in temporary accommodations (Yes, ref. = No)						13.607(4.354)***	10.612(3.497)***	9.360(3.777)***
Lives in insecure accommodation (Yes, ref. = No)						70.363(71.269)***	77.127(79.23)***	27.93(29.72)**

(*Continued on next page*)

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TABLE 3 Estimated Odds Ratios and Standard Errors From Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Analyses Assessing Associations Between Selected Characteristics and NOT Being Regularly Employed (Model 2) (*Continued*)

Variables	*Model 1.1* OR S.E.	*Model 1.2* OR S.E.	*Model 1.3* OR S.E.	*Model 1.4* OR S.E.	*Model 1.5* OR S.E.	*Model 1.6* OR S.E.	*Model 1.7* OR S.E.	*Model 1.8* OR S.E.
Forced migrant (Yes, ref = No)	**5.158 (0.910)*****	**4.618 (0.833)*****	**2.680 (0.501)*****	**4.163 (0.746)*****	**5.374 (0.960)*****	**2.382 (0.486)*****	**1.454 (0.316)**	**1.258 (0.279)**
Has followed an Italian language course (Yes, ref. = No)					0.998(0.005)		1.002(0.005)	0.993(0.009)
Has finished part of his/her education in Italy (Yes, ref. = No)					1.498(0.154)***		1.534(0.182)***	1.082(0.201)
Country of origin's HDI	0.327 (0.145)*	0.323(0.147)*	0.266(0.124)**	0.280(0.343)**	0.407(0.181)*	0.331(0.141)**	0.261(0.127)**	0.813(0.426)
Constant	0.874 (0.243)	2.420(0.775)	4.154(1.286)***	1.20(0.374)	1.117(0.323)	0.816(0.218)	5.101(1.842)***	3.577(1.539)**
Number of level-1 units	4,793	4,785	4,777	4,793	4,750	4,785	4,719	2,059
Number of level-2 units	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	43
Log likelihood	−2902.7	−2832.1	−2754.9	−2853.0	−2861.4	−2815.1	−2610.7	−1139.3
AIC	1.213	1.186	1.156	1.193	1.208	1.176	1.113	1.122
OR_{median}	1.048	1.069	1.091	1.068	1.123	0.984	1.083	0.781
$\sqrt{(\psi\ \hat{})}$	0.311	0.326	0.340	0.325	0.304	0.267	0.335	0.103
ρ(country of origin)	0.029°	0.031°	0.034°	0.031°	0.037°	0.021°	0.033°	0.003
% change in Forced Migrant's coefficients as compared to Model 1.1	0	−6.7	−39.9	−13.1	+2.5	−47.1	−77.2	−

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001, °Likelihood-ratio test of $\rho = 0$ Prob > = chibar2 < 0.05.

This measure helps to control for social distance between natives and immigrant groups deriving from the experience of worse overall conditions in the country of origin that may result in greater difficulties or more discrimination in the labor market (Van Tubergen et al., 2004). Notably, this variable is significant in all the models fit on the entire sample. The average 2011 HDI is in fact 0.508 for forced migrants' countries of origin, while it is 0.674 for other countries, thus marking a wide gap between the characters of the countries of origin. This gap is relevant to both models and is reflected in job market outcomes.

The gap evidenced in constrained models, however, reduces when controlling outcomes for other variables, known in the literature to affect migrants' job-market outcomes, which will be analyzed in each partial model.

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Sociodemographic Features

The very peculiar characteristics of this subpopulation, comprising mostly young men, explains 8% of the gap in unemployment [1-(ln(7.172)/ln(8.516))] and 6% of the gap in regular employment (models 1.2 and 2.2).

Migration Experience and Family Situation

Empirical evidence in the Italian setting clearly shows that time elapsed since a migrant's arrival and cohabitation with family members, especially with the partner and with children, is positively correlated with indicators of cultural, social, political, and economic integration (Cesareo & Blangiardo, 2009). The shorter mean time spent in Italy for forced migrants explains 17.6% of the higher odds of unemployment and 39.9% of the gap in participation in the primary job market (models 1.3 and 2.3), while the reduced incidence of nuclear families is related to a lower variation in the forced migrants' gap (models 1.4 and 2.4).

Education and Skills

In most studies of the economic integration of immigrants in host societies, human capital theory constitutes an important explanation of their performance in the labor market (Chiswick & Miller, 2001). Some researchers also suggest that education obtained in the country of immigration may have a larger positive effect on economic integration (Friedberg, 2000; De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010). According to our models, education has a general positive effect only in the achievement of a regular job, while, accordingly to previous research in Italy, highly educated immigrants are not less likely

to be unemployed than poorly educated ones (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011). The widespread segregation in low-level jobs also explains the insignificant effect of language courses attendance (which is used here as a proxy for better language proficiency, a piece of information that was unavailable from the data set).

Housing Conditions

Previous studies have indicated that finding secure housing is critical to a refugee's ability to integrate (Phillimore & Goodson, 2008). Control for housing circumstances, where migrants living in temporary accommodation (e.g. accommodation centers) and in unauthorized or insecure dwellings (e.g., squats or shacks) are contrasted with other arrangements, results in the greatest reduction of the forced migrants' gap (models 1.6 and 2.6). Of course, as for some other previous covariates, the relation is not one of strict causality: migrants live in bad housing because they lack income, and at the same time, living in bad or temporary housing prevents them from finding a job. In particular, long stays in reception centers may hinder the acquisition of social capital, limiting contacts with natives and other immigrants, the latter being particularly important given the role of migrants' networks in entering the Italian job market. At the same time, appropriate assistance in accommodation centers is not always guaranteed: according to our data only 54% of forced migrants in accommodation centers at the time of the survey said they had received proper assistance. The vicious circle of joblessness and bad housing emerges as an especially critical factor for the subpopulation of forced migrants, given the high prevalence of insecure or temporary housing conditions. However, the gap in job-market outcomes was not higher for forced migrants than for other migrants with the same housing condition (i.e., the interaction of forced migrant status and bad housing was statistically not significant).

Final Models

Controlling for all these covariates models 1.7 and 2.7 shows that a significant gap remains for forced migrants in the risk of unemployment (OR = 3.1, 95% CI: 2.1–4.6), while no significant relation is observed for the odds of not having a regular job.

As a robustness check, all models were also estimated in the subsample of forced migrants and their compatriots (models 1.8 and 2.8), confirming the same findings. As an additional check, a model testing the odds of unemployment was fitted only on the subsample of forced and irregular migrants. Even though this subsample is very small ($N = 465$), the same result holds in terms of difference between asylum seekers and irregular

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migrants (OR = 3.2, 95% CI: 1.8–5.6). Finally to control for the fact that some forced migrants may over time have changed their permits of stay into a permit for work, the model was also run only on migrants who experienced a maximum stay in Italy of 5 years (N = 1,620). Again the model resulted in a significant odds ratio of unemployment for forced migrants (OR = 3.6, 95% CI: 2.2–5.9), while no statistically significant difference emerged for the odds of not having a regular job.

DISCUSSION

This analysis confirms the existence in the Italian context, similarly with other new countries of immigration of southern Europe, of a gap between the outcomes of forced migrants and other migrants in access to employment, including access to the informal economy. Moreover, our analysis highlights the fact that forced migrants have higher odds of unemployment even than irregular migrants. This gap is not merely due to the observed higher occurrence in the subpopulation of forced migrants of characteristics correlated with lower employment rates in the same way as they are for other categories of migrants. Among the factors not controlled in the analysis, worse outcomes for forced migrants may be related to poorer psychological and health conditions, the lack of a family-level strategy supporting the migration, the absence of intentional steps prior to the migration to ensure a more successful adaptation (e.g., language courses), and their displacement to areas not chosen for economic reasons. Weaker ethnic networks may also be considered (Bolzoni, 2009), as asylum seekers originate mainly from communities that are poorly represented among migrants in Italy, but this cannot be taken as one of the main explanations. In fact the analysis shows that a gap also exists between forced migrants and their compatriots. The process of labeling may be considered a determining factor of the fragility of forced migrants. As observed by Manocchi (2011, 2012) for the Italian context, this process combined with the inadequate Italian system of support may produce dynamics that hinder the process of social and economic integration.

In conclusion this study shows that for recent flows of forced migrants into Italy, the minimal support provided in the Italian setting is not leading to a "tough-but-effective" path of integration based on self-help, migrants' empowerment, aid from charity networks, and legitimization through work, formal or informal. Although success stories of this kind do exist (Ambrosini & Marchetti, 2008), this study shows that forced migrants experience greater difficulties than all other groups in finding any form of job to provide for their keep. The suggestion that their situation approximates to that of economic and family migrants is not supported by our data in terms of levels of unemployment. Moreover this study suggests that this gap is related particu-

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larly to the first phase of entry into the job market. In fact, the gap observed in access to the regulated job market, even if it exists, is fully explained by the higher incidence in this subpopulation of characteristics related to lower regular employment, showing that once migrants enter the labor market they do not face greater difficulties than other migrants in finding a regular job.

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