

1 **Title**

2 Computational models of behavioral addictions: state of the art and future directions

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47 **Abstract**

48 Non-pharmacological behavioral addictions, such as pathological gambling, videogaming,
49 social networking, or internet use, are becoming major public health concerns. It is not yet clear
50 how behavioral addictions could share many major neurobiological and behavioral characteristics
51 with substance use disorders, despite the absence of direct pharmacological influences. A deeper
52 understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms of addictive behavior is needed, and
53 computational modeling could be one promising approach to explain intricately entwined
54 cognitive and neural dynamics. This review describes computational models of addiction based on
55 reinforcement learning algorithms, Bayesian inference, and biophysical neural simulations. We
56 discuss whether computational frameworks originally conceived to explain maladaptive behavior
57 in substance use disorders can be effectively extended to non-substance-related behavioral
58 addictions. Moreover, we introduce recent studies on behavioral addictions that exemplify the
59 possibility of such extension and propose future directions.

60 **Keywords**

61 computational modeling; model-based, model-free; reinforcement learning; Bayesian
62 active inference; neural models; neural simulations

63 **Introduction**

64 Psychobiological and neurocomputational investigations in addictive disorders have
65 largely focused on the effects of substances of abuse on neural dynamics, cognitive processes and
66 behavior (cf. reviews: Everitt & Robbins, 2016; Koob & Volkow, 2016; Mollick & Kober, 2020;
67 Redish, Jensen, & Johnson, 2008; Smith, Taylor, & Bilek, 2021). However, recent studies strongly
68 suggest that non-pharmacological behavioral addictions share with substance use disorders key
69 neurobiological (Antons, Brand, & Potenza, 2020; Potenza, 2013), computational (Lindstrom et
70 al., 2021; Ognibene, Fiore, & Gu, 2019; Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007;
71 Shimomura, Kato, & Morita, 2021), and behavioral features (Grant & Chamberlain, 2014; Grant,
72 Potenza, Weinstein, & Gorelick, 2010). These include widely accepted behavioral addictions such
73 as pathological gambling (el-Guebaly, Mudry, Zohar, Tavares, & Potenza, 2012), as well as others
74 on which the consensus is still forming, such as videogaming (Petry & O'Brien, 2013; Yao,
75 Potenza, & Zhang, 2017), social network or internet addiction (Jorgenson, Hsiao, & Yen, 2016;
76 Veisani, Jalilian, & Mohamadian, 2020), compulsive buying (Granero et al., 2016; Grant et al.,
77 2010), compulsive sexual behavior or pornography addiction (Griffiths, 2016; Love, Laier, Brand,
78 Hatch, & Hajela, 2015) and finally, more controversial, disordered eating behaviors such as binge
79 eating (Wiss, Avena, & Gold, 2020; Wiss, Avena, & Rada, 2018; Wiss, Criscitelli, Gold, & Avena,
80 2017).

81 In this review, we cast a wide net relying on an inclusive definition of addictions: a
82 relapsing, chronic disorder characterized by an initial pursuit of a desired outcome that leads to the
83 inflexible repetition of maladaptive behaviors, despite the harmful consequences (Everitt &
84 Robbins, 2016; Koob & Volkow, 2016). This definition highlights two complementary elements
85 of behavioral and cognitive control in addictions. First, it emphasizes a transition from reinforcing
86 action-outcome associations to compulsive stimulus-responses, i.e., from goal-oriented to habitual
87 behavior (Ersche et al., 2016; Everitt & Robbins, 2013; Volkow & Morales, 2015). In other words,
88 an 'urge' to respond to a reinforced cue is triggered irrespective of an actual desire for the outcome
89 (cf. 'need' vs 'want', Berridge & Robinson, 2016) or any assessment about desired future
90 environment or body states (cf. 'model-free control', Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Second, the chronic
91 and relapsing elements of the definition assign an important role to an underperforming goal-
92 oriented behavior and forward planning (or 'model-based control', cf. Dolan & Dayan, 2013),

93 possibly due to an incomplete, incorrect, or otherwise impaired belief structure or internal model
94 of both environment and body states. For instance, incorrect representations of future positive and
95 negative interoceptive outcomes can lead to craving (Grimm, Hope, Wise, & Shaham, 2001; Gu
96 & Filbey, 2017), often followed by the reinstatement of the addictive behavior (relapse), even after
97 prolonged periods of abstinence.

98 Here we consider computational models of addiction based on reinforcement learning
99 algorithms, Bayesian inference and biophysical neural simulations, with a focus on ‘model-free’
100 and ‘model-based’ aberrant control. We discuss whether computational models originally
101 conceived to describe substance use disorders could be validly extended to behavioral addictions
102 and we present computational models that have been specifically developed to describe
103 maladaptive behaviors in behavioral addictions.

104

105 **Reinforcement learning models**

106 Reinforcement learning (RL, Sutton & Barto, 1998) is the dominant approach for modeling
107 addictive behaviors (CPSYMAP, Kato, Kunisato, Katahira, Okimura, & Yamashita, 2020). In RL,
108 a behavioral policy determines one’s actions at each state, resulting in state transitions that can
109 yield positive or negative outcomes, so allowing an agent (e.g., a person or an animal) to pursue
110 total reward maximization with temporal discounting. In model-based RL, agents use an internal
111 model of the environment (i.e., representations of transitions and rewards) to estimate the values
112 of behavioral policies and plan a course of action-state transitions. By contrast, in model-free RL,
113 agents estimate immediately available state/action values, typically through updating them by
114 using reward prediction errors (RPEs, Watkins & Dayan, 1992). As a result, model-based RL is
115 computationally costly yet flexible to changes in the environment, once these are represented in
116 the internal model, whereas model-free RL is computationally parsimonious yet characterized by
117 low flexibility (Strehl, Li, & Littman, 2009). Within this perspective, addictions are described as
118 a dysfunction of value-based behavior that affects both model-free and model-based control
119 modalities (Redish et al., 2008).

120 Based on the understanding that substances of abuse interfere with dopamine signals,
121 which have been suggested to encode RPEs in biological agents (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague,
122 1997; see section: Neural models), a seminal model (Redish, 2004) proposed that drugs of abuse

123 could act as fictitious RPEs. Due to their exogenous cause, these RPEs cannot be canceled out by
124 reward predictions, so that the estimated value of drug indefinitely increases. Other models have
125 proposed that enhanced RPEs may cause a decrement in the reward system sensitivity (Dezfouli
126 et al., 2009), resistance to habituation (Di Chiara, 1999), or sensitization to reinforced cues
127 (Bernheim & Rangel, 2004), and might accumulate through hierarchical decision-making
128 processes (Keramati & Gutkin, 2013). Any of these dysfunctions would promote overwhelming
129 biases towards the model-free control, driving the compulsive and inflexible selection of addictive
130 behaviors, irrespective of the negative outcomes (e.g., detrimental effects for one’s health or social
131 relations). These models assume that over-reliance on model-free control is caused by dopamine-
132 related, drug-induced, alterations in healthy neural circuit dynamics (Koob & Volkow, 2016; Korpi
133 et al., 2015; Luscher & Malenka, 2011). However, aberrant functioning in the neural regions
134 involved in reward processing have been also described in association with compulsive use of
135 pornography (Hilton, 2013), compulsive sexual behavior (Gola et al., 2017; Golec, Draps, Stark,
136 Pluta, & Gola, 2021), compulsive buying behavior (Granero et al., 2016), eating disorders (Baik,
137 2013; G. K. W. Frank, Shott, Stoddard, Swindle, & Pryor, 2021; Wiss et al., 2018), problematic
138 videogaming (Palau, Marron, Viejo-Sobera, & Redolar-Ripoll, 2017), and internet addiction
139 (Love et al., 2015). These findings indicate that aberrant RPE signals putatively responsible for
140 the over-reliance on model-free, at the expenses of model-based, control can be elicited in the
141 absence of pharmacological manipulation, e.g., due to predisposing factors (Antons et al., 2020),
142 suggesting the computational models based on these mechanisms can be used to describe
143 behavioral addictions, as well. For instance, a bias towards model-free control has been reported
144 in binge eating disorder using a task designed to highlight model-free vs model-based arbitration
145 (Voon et al., 2015). In another RL model tackling social network use, participants showed high
146 sensitivity to social rewards and reliance on RPE updates to determine their post sharing policies
147 (Lindstrom et al., 2021). However, formal testing with computational modeling is still very sparse
148 across behavioral addictions.

149 Interestingly, RL models focusing only on aberrant model-free control underperform when
150 trying to account for those behaviors in addiction that are not cue-induced, e.g., because they are
151 novel, complex, or context-dependent. To fill this gap, several models have proposed to include
152 addiction-related dysfunctions in the model-based control component, so focusing on the
153 generation, update, and recall of state-action-state transitions. Crucially, although dopamine is

154 suggested to be also involved in model-based control (Deserno et al., 2015; Wunderlich,
155 Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012), aberrant RPEs are not directly considered in the computational
156 models focusing on the dysfunctions of model-based control, rendering irrelevant the issue of
157 whether behavioral addictions can develop in the absence of the drug-based manipulation of the
158 brain reward system. Model-based control dysfunctions fall into a few categories: forward
159 planning malfunctions (Redish & Johnson, 2007), incomplete representations in the internal model
160 (Redish et al., 2007), or incomplete access to the internal model during recall (Simon & Daw,
161 2012). In other words, this new class of RL models focuses on one's internal representation of the
162 environment, showing that incomplete or incorrect representations of state transitions (or mental
163 forward explorations of these transitions) can drive addiction-like suboptimal goal selections,
164 planning and ultimately behaviors. This approach, which changes the focus of investigation from
165 the generation of a habitual response to an impaired ability to plan and select goals, was used in
166 several models to account for behavioral addictions.

167 One study (Redish et al., 2007) simulated state misrepresentation in pathological gambling.
168 While gambling, one can experience big wins and subsequent losses, developing a
169 (mis)recognition that there is a state associated with wins and a different state associated with
170 losses, thus misrepresenting the same state as two different states. Then, negative RPEs caused by
171 losses would not attenuate a large positive value of the state associated with wins, and this
172 misassignment of credit due to the discrepancy between the actual environment and its internal
173 representation could lead to pathological gambling and relapse. Another proposal addresses the
174 issue of forward planning malfunctions by focusing on the relation between environment
175 complexity and cognitive resources available to the agent (Fiore, Ognibene, Adinoff, & Gu, 2018;
176 Ognibene et al., 2019). In this case, a mismatch between resources available and those required
177 results in repetitive suboptimal behavioral policies, reducing the sampling of contingencies in the
178 environment and escalating the exploration cost across phenotypes characterized by different
179 model-based and model-free control balance. Thus, addiction-like behaviors can emerge in agents
180 with bounded model-based resources, also inducing an inadequate representation of the
181 environment and irrespective of RPE malfunctions. Another study (Shimomura et al., 2021)
182 developed a model that relied on the "successor representation" (SR) of states (Dayan, 1993), a
183 process suggested to be used by humans (Momennejad et al., 2017; Russek, Momennejad,
184 Botvinick, Gershman, & Daw, 2017). In SR encoding for a given policy, states are similar if they

185 give access to similar sets of states, e.g., two doors leading to the same reward room would have
186 similar SR representations. Formally, a state is represented by a matrix of expected cumulative
187 discounted future state occupancies under a certain policy. The matrix that describes the
188 relationship among states enables partially model-based behavior through model-free RL-like
189 RPE-based value update. Shimomura et al. (2021) proposed that: 1) through a long-standing
190 reward-obtaining behavior, one potentially establishes “dimension-reduced SR”, and (2) the
191 reduced SR can become rigid. Under such a rigid and dimension-reduced SR, a sustained large
192 positive RPE is generated at the state with reward due to the inaccurate value approximations
193 caused by inadequate state representations, irrespective of any pharmacological manipulation,
194 potentially enhancing reward-obtaining behavior. Moreover, negative outcomes occurring after
195 the addictive positive reward cannot induce changes in behaviors, under the rigid reduced SR.

196 All these models (Ognibene et al., 2019; Redish et al., 2007; Shimomura et al., 2021) are
197 theoretically applicable across behavioral addictions, irrespective of the type of reward. Potentially
198 related to the environment exploration and representation dysfunctions, studies have indicated that
199 a key factor in the development of behavioral addictions such as problematic gambling,
200 videogaming, shopping, or social network use can be found in the complex (i.e., difficult to
201 compute and predict) organization of rewards experienced on a variable ratio reinforcement
202 schedule (Cash, Rae, Steel, & Winkler, 2012; Greenberg, Zhai, Hoff, Krishnan-Sarin, & Potenza,
203 2022; Young & Abreu, 2011). Another study has shown that gamblers are characterized by
204 reduction in directed (uncertainty-based) exploration and not in random exploration compared with
205 healthy controls (Wiehler, Chakroun, & Peters, 2021). Finally, a deficit in the exploration-
206 exploitation balance has been also suggested for binge-eating disorder (Reiter, Heinze,
207 Schlagenhaut, & Deserno, 2017). However, the mechanisms proposed in these models have not
208 yet been directly tested in ad hoc experiments.

209

210 **Bayesian and active inference models**

211 Computational models based on Bayesian inference suggest that the brain computes
212 probability distributions associating states, actions and events or outcomes (whether value-based
213 or not). These probability distributions, termed as prior beliefs or priors, are updated into posterior
214 beliefs or posteriors, relying on a signal of precision in prediction error, i.e., the dopamine-encoded

215 discrepancy between one's priors and actual state-action-outcome observations (Friston et al.,
216 2012). This is a relatively new approach in comparison with RL, with a comparably smaller
217 literature in terms of models of addictive behaviors. Current analyses carried out in relation with
218 substance use disorders have highlighted slower belief updating and related behavioral adaptation,
219 as in perseverative habitual responses (Ide, Hu, Zhang, Yu, & Li, 2015) and reduced ability to use
220 environment representations to guide choice selections, as in over-reliance on model-free control
221 (Harle, Zhang, et al., 2015). Other studies have highlighted the relation between neural responses
222 evoked by non-value based prediction errors and likelihood to relapse (Harle, Stewart, et al., 2015;
223 Harle, Yu, & Paulus, 2019), suggesting that the aberrant RPEs described within the RL framework
224 might be part of a more generalized dysfunction across all prediction errors. One further study
225 (Schwöbel, Marković, Smolka, & Kiebel, 2021) has proposed that context inference may play a
226 key role in substance use disorders, in a mechanism analogous to context-based RL (Redish et al.,
227 2007). An advantage that Bayesian inference models have on RL algorithms is that they estimate
228 the computational processes underlying belief updates, irrespective of rewards, therefore allowing
229 their seamless use across addictive behaviors. One example is provided by a recent investigation
230 into instrumental learning in bulimia nervosa (Berner et al., in press), in which a Bayesian observer
231 model highlighted slow belief updates and associated behavioral rigidity, consistent with similar
232 investigations in substance use disorders (Ide et al., 2015). Further investigations using Bayesian
233 inference models are required to reveal whether these mechanisms can be found across behavioral
234 addictions and highlight shared computational mechanisms with substance use disorders.

235 Among the theories based on Bayesian inference, active inference (Friston, 2013; Friston
236 et al., 2015) has emerged to describe behaviors as the result of the minimization of dopamine-
237 encoded prediction error (Friston et al., 2012). This theory has been successful in accounting for a
238 wide range of physiological and behavioral phenomena, including substance use disorders (Smith,
239 Taylor, et al., 2021). Similar to the described effects of over-reinforcement of addiction-related
240 cues, resulting in an over-reliance on model-free control, active inference explains compulsive
241 behavior in addiction in terms of excessive prediction error signaling. This in turn, results in
242 excessive belief confidence (precision), characterized as narrow distributions for the priors
243 (Kinley, Amlung, & Becker, 2022). Such distributions make it more likely to repeat the choice
244 associated with the addictive behaviors (Miller, Kiverstein, & Rietveld, 2020; Schwartenbeck et
245 al., 2015) and at the same time prevent further updates, e.g., to include negative outcomes or

246 interoceptive signals, contributing to craving (Gu, 2018; Gu & Filbey, 2017). Consistent with this
247 hypothesis, increased belief updating in association with drug related positive values, and a
248 reduced sensitivity to negative outcomes has been described across substance use disorders (Smith,
249 Kirlic, Stewart, Touthang, Kuplicki, Khalsa, et al., 2021; Smith et al., 2020). This hypothesis has
250 not been formally tested in behavioral addictions, yet. However, the already discussed ubiquitous
251 presence of both reward processing dysfunctions and aberrant rewards in association with
252 behavioral addictions (Baik, 2013; G. K. W. Frank et al., 2021; Gola et al., 2017; Golec et al.,
253 2021; Granero et al., 2016; Hilton, 2013; Love et al., 2015; Palaus et al., 2017; Wiss et al., 2018)
254 once again suggests that a process triggered by excessive prediction error signaling will be found
255 also across compulsive behaviors associated with behavioral addictions.

256 Active inference also describes model-based dysfunctions as affecting the formation or
257 recall of the structure of priors characterizing an internal model. Different models have
258 investigated aberrant forward planning in terms of low confidence in future outcomes
259 (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015), reduced precision in the state transition matrix (Fradkin, Adams,
260 Parr, Roiser, & Huppert, 2020), reduced confidence in the generated internal model of the
261 environment (Smith, Kirlic, Stewart, Touthang, Kuplicki, Khalsa, et al., 2021), or a reduced ability
262 to generate deep policies (Mirza, Adams, Parr, & Friston, 2019). These deficits in turn generate
263 the belief that events projected in the future, when computable, are characterized by uncertainty
264 and unpredictability, and this bias seems to remain stable in the long term (Smith, Kirlic, Stewart,
265 Touthang, Kuplicki, McDermott, et al., 2021). Therefore, immediate, precise, and easy to compute
266 (and to predict) rewards are, once again, preferred, in a process analogous to the dysfunctions
267 associated with model-based control for the RL framework. We previously discussed that a
268 common feature across several behavioral addictions is the presence of environments characterized
269 by complex reward schedules that are difficult to compute (Cash et al., 2012; Greenberg et al.,
270 2022; Young & Abreu, 2011). The active inference framework generalizes this principle beyond
271 the need to focus on rewards, entailing that behavioral addictions can emerge in the intersection
272 between model-based dysfunctions and any sufficiently complex environment (e.g., due to
273 ramified or variable state-action-outcome contingencies). This would include behavioral
274 addictions characterized by complex reward schedules (such as gambling or videogaming), as well
275 as others characterized by difficult to compute and variable health related, economic, or social

276 outcomes (e.g., social network use, eating disorders, compulsive buying, compulsive sexual
277 behavior, or pornography addiction).

278

279 **Neural models**

280 Both RL and active inference perspectives rely on dopamine signals to trigger behavioral
281 plasticity. The RL paradigm interprets dopamine burst firings as encoding RPEs, responsible for
282 value-based updates (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Watabe-Uchida,
283 Eshel, & Uchida, 2017). Instead, the active inference approach postulates that dopamine signals
284 represent precision in event distribution predictions and trigger the update of beliefs (Friston et al.,
285 2016; Friston et al., 2015). Whether in terms of rewards or precision, the ubiquity and robustness
286 of the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying dopamine signals (Fiore, Dolan, Strausfeld, &
287 Hirth, 2015) has led to the early belief that dopamine release would be significantly affected only
288 by extreme events, such as pharmacological manipulations. Indeed, substances of abuse interfere
289 with dopaminergic signals, albeit neither homogeneously nor linearly (Nutt, Lingford-Hughes,
290 Erritzoe, & Stokes, 2015), triggering significant and long-lasting synaptic alterations across
291 several brain regions (Korpi et al., 2015; Luscher & Malenka, 2011). However, as mentioned
292 above, several investigations have now revealed that a similar, prediction error-based (cf.
293 Shimomura et al., 2021), multifaceted role is played by dopamine in behavioral addictions (Antons
294 et al., 2020; Baik, 2013), including pathological gambling (Clark, Boileau, & Zack, 2019; Potenza,
295 2013), videogaming (Liu et al., 2017; Palaus et al., 2017; Weinstein, 2010), compulsive sexual
296 behavior (Kraus, Voon, & Potenza, 2016; Voon et al., 2014), compulsive use of pornography (Gola
297 et al., 2017; Hilton, 2013), and binge eating (Bello & Hajnal, 2010; Volkow et al., 2002; Wang et
298 al., 2011). These investigations further suggest that the neural plasticity triggered by drug-induced
299 dopamine signals is comparable with the same dopamine-mediated process triggered by the
300 consumption of palatable food, variable reward schedules characterizing gambling or
301 videogaming, use of pornography and so forth.

302 A key target of dopamine-mediated neuroplasticity are the cortico-striatal synapses (Everitt
303 & Robbins, 2016; Koob & Volkow, 2016; Luscher, Robbins, & Everitt, 2020). In biophysical
304 neural models simulating cortico-striatal circuit dynamics, mesolimbic dopamine bursts trigger
305 cortico-striatal long-term synaptic potentiation (Montague et al., 1996; Nelson & Kreitzer, 2014;

306 Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999). These alterations in turn bias future choice selections,
307 favoring the repetition of the stimulus-response combination that led to dopamine signals, resulting
308 in instrumental conditioning, thus providing the neural mechanisms underlying the described
309 increased reliance on model-free control (Barto, 1995; M. J. Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly R, 2004;
310 Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001a, 2001b). Furthermore, the presence of multiple parallel
311 cortico-striatal circuits characterized by different functions, but similar architectures (Haber, 2016;
312 Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015; Obeso, Rodriguez-Oroz, Stamelou, Bhatia, & Burn,
313 2014) led to the hypothesis that dopamine signals could affect the neural dynamics of multiple
314 circuits at the same time (Fiore et al., 2018). In particular, the neural dynamics of dorsal
315 (sensorimotor selections) and ventral (value processing and goal selections) cortico-striatal circuits
316 are usually associated with model-free and model-based control (Dolan & Dayan, 2013;
317 O'Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017). Therefore, in the dorsal circuit dopamine signals are
318 assumed to bias sensorimotor selections and model-free behavior. Conversely, in the prefrontal
319 circuit, these signals are hypothesized to bias the selections of goals or future values, affecting
320 forward planning and goal selection plasticity, or the model-based control system (Fiore et al.,
321 2018).

322 In terms of neural circuit transient dynamics (Durstewitz, Huys, & Koppe, 2021) cortico-
323 striatal long-term potentiation triggered by mesolimbic dopamine signals results in increased
324 circuit stability (Fiore et al., 2018). Neural models indicated that drug-induced mesocortical
325 dopamine signals have a similar effect on prefrontal cortico-cortical connectivity and dynamics
326 (Lapish, Balaguer-Ballester, Seamans, Phillips, & Durstewitz, 2015), further deteriorating state-
327 transition flexibility, and strengthening attractor-like dynamics. Although the effects of
328 mesocortical dopamine release in substance use disorders are multifaceted (Ceceli, Bradberry, &
329 Goldstein, 2022), attractor-like dynamics in the prefrontal cortex are consistent with the reported
330 rigid representation of future state-action values (cf. 'incentive salience', Ceceli et al., 2022) and
331 interoceptive states (Gu et al., 2015; Naqvi & Bechara, 2009), both key elements in the phenomena
332 of craving and relapse. As discussed for the mesolimbic dopaminergic signals, these phenomena
333 associated with mesocortical dopamine-induced alterations are not restricted to pharmacological
334 manipulations, since behavioral addictions are based on the same dopamine dynamics (Antons et
335 al., 2020; Baik, 2013). Further studies into the specific neural mechanisms underlying behavioral
336 addictions will be needed to confirm or disprove this hypothesized similarity.

337

338 **Conclusions and future directions**

339 The objective of computational psychiatry (Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016; Montague, Dolan,
340 Friston, & Dayan, 2012) is to develop neurocomputational measures of disease- and subject-
341 specific neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying decision-making, with the ultimate goal to
342 inform precision diagnosis and treatment. Models relying on RL algorithms, Bayesian inference
343 and neural dynamics that focus on vulnerabilities related to model-free and model-based control
344 can explain the emergence and rigidity of maladaptive choices, despite the adverse consequences.
345 Although most of the models here discussed were developed to describe substance use disorders,
346 they can explain hallmark features of a wide range of behavioral addictions, with RL and active
347 inference models more suitable to investigate (aberrant) structures of rewards and beliefs,
348 respectively, and neural models dedicated to the investigation of (aberrant) attractor dynamics in
349 neural activity. A key challenge in relation with behavioral addictions is to determine which of
350 these compulsive behaviors qualifies as a legitimate form of addiction. We propose that the
351 multifaceted neurocomputational representations of substance use disorders here described across
352 modelling frameworks can be used as a benchmark to formally define a cluster of alterations that
353 characterizes addictions. Those behavioral addictions found to meet these criteria -e.g., behavioral
354 rigidity due to over-reliance on model-free control, impaired forward planning due to inadequate
355 representations in model-based control, or increased stability in transient neural dynamics- should
356 be included as a form of addiction. Some data suggested that behavioral and brain activity
357 measures estimated relying on computational models can outperform traditional clinical measures
358 in predicting clinical status, likelihood of relapse or vulnerability in substance use disorders (e.g.,
359 see: Harle, Stewart, et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2020). Thus, we expect the discussed computational
360 models could provide a guide for behavioral addiction classification, in the near future.

361 Finally, it has been suggested (Heilig, Epstein, Nader, & Shaham, 2016; van den Ende et
362 al., 2022) that these models have so far neglected the complex interplay of social (e.g., peer
363 influence or isolation, societal stigma or tolerance etc.) and psychobiological factors. As many
364 behavioral addictions are clearly affected by social interactions, it will be crucial for future
365 investigations to include these social components (cf. Frolichs, Rosenblau, & Korn, 2022), using
366 a new generation of tasks and neuro-computational models.

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