This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, for collusive bribery. In our theoretical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the probability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool to reduce corruption.

Rotondi, V., Stanca, L. (2015). The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 51, 219-235 [10.1016/j.joep.2015.09.008].

The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence

STANCA, LUCA MATTEO
2015

Abstract

This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, for collusive bribery. In our theoretical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the probability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool to reduce corruption.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Corruption, Bribery, Particularism, Universalisism
English
2015
51
219
235
reserved
Rotondi, V., Stanca, L. (2015). The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 51, 219-235 [10.1016/j.joep.2015.09.008].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/89964
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