Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.

Gamba, A. (2013). Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede game. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 85, 112-117 [10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009].

Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede game

Gamba, A
2013

Abstract

Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Preferences; Altruism; Evolution; Learning; Self-confirming equilibrium
English
2013
85
112
117
reserved
Gamba, A. (2013). Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede game. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 85, 112-117 [10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/71220
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