In this short presentation we propose a formal framework based on a two-player game on Petri nets. We consider multi-agent systems in which a component, the controller, needs to guarantee a certain liveness property on the system behaviour, while keeping secret some of its actions to the other system components, and we discuss the basis for a uniform solution of this problem.

Adobbati, F., Bernardinello, L., Pomello, L. (2024). A Two Player Asynchronous Game with Privacy Constraints on Petri Nets (short paper). In Proceedings of the 25th Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (pp.213-218). CEUR-WS.

A Two Player Asynchronous Game with Privacy Constraints on Petri Nets (short paper)

Adobbati F.;Bernardinello L.;Pomello L.
2024

Abstract

In this short presentation we propose a formal framework based on a two-player game on Petri nets. We consider multi-agent systems in which a component, the controller, needs to guarantee a certain liveness property on the system behaviour, while keeping secret some of its actions to the other system components, and we discuss the basis for a uniform solution of this problem.
paper
non-interference; Petri nets; reveals relations; Two-player game;
English
ICTCS’24: Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science - 11 September 2024 through 13 September 2024
2024
De Liguoro, U; Palazzo, M; Roversi, L
Proceedings of the 25th Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science
2024
3811
213
218
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3811
open
Adobbati, F., Bernardinello, L., Pomello, L. (2024). A Two Player Asynchronous Game with Privacy Constraints on Petri Nets (short paper). In Proceedings of the 25th Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (pp.213-218). CEUR-WS.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/536161
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