The application of the principle of specialty (lex specialis) in the law of international responsibility of States

The article addresses the application of the principle of specialty (lex specialis) in the law of international responsibility of States. The analysis is made based on the application of Article 55 of the Articles on the International Responsibility of States adopted by the United Nations International Law Commission in 2001, which establishes that the general rules codified by them cease to be applied to the extent that rules exist special provisions applicable to the same situation. The thesis defended is that the reduced number of mentions of Article 55 by international courts and tribunals can be explained by the difficult application of the principle as expressed in the provision, since it presupposes a complete conflict between general and special norms and establishes the exclusion total of the general rule. Through the analysis of decisions of courts and tribunals adopted in the last two decades, the article points to the fact that the principle of specialty can be applied as a form of complementa-tion between general and special norms or as a principle of interpretation, in order to allow the coexistence and harmonization of both rules. The article concludes that despite the fact that the principle of specialty tends to be applied in a more flexible way than the concept adopted by Article 55, this does not exclude the application of other meanings of the principle and its usefulness must be analyzed based on the context in which it was adopted.