Although the link between economic inequality and dishonest behavior is well-established in the literature, their causal relation is still unclear. Here we investigate the causal link between economic inequality and dishonest behavior in a simulated society with high or low economic inequality, while holding middle-class status of the participants constant across conditions. Study 1 (N = 479) focuses on tax evasion, showing that high (vs. low) economic inequality increases the tendency to not declare taxable income. Study 2 (N = 228) analyzes cheating behavior, showing that participants under high (vs. low) economic inequality cheat more to increase their income. Together, the studies provide experimental evidence that economic inequality plays a causal role in dishonest behaviors, such as tax evasion and cheating.
Galdi, S., Durante, F., Maass, A. (2023). Dishonesty When the Game Is Unfair Experimental Evidence for the Effect of Economic Inequality on Tax Evasion and Cheating. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 54(6), 337-347 [10.1027/1864-9335/a000531].
Dishonesty When the Game Is Unfair Experimental Evidence for the Effect of Economic Inequality on Tax Evasion and Cheating
Durante, FSecondo
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2023
Abstract
Although the link between economic inequality and dishonest behavior is well-established in the literature, their causal relation is still unclear. Here we investigate the causal link between economic inequality and dishonest behavior in a simulated society with high or low economic inequality, while holding middle-class status of the participants constant across conditions. Study 1 (N = 479) focuses on tax evasion, showing that high (vs. low) economic inequality increases the tendency to not declare taxable income. Study 2 (N = 228) analyzes cheating behavior, showing that participants under high (vs. low) economic inequality cheat more to increase their income. Together, the studies provide experimental evidence that economic inequality plays a causal role in dishonest behaviors, such as tax evasion and cheating.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.