Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topological nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy sets are a countable group, the payoffs are functions of the group operation, and mixed strategies are not requested to be σ-additive. As a byproduct we show that if finitely additive mixed strategies are allowed, then Wald's game admits an equilibrium. Finally we extend the main results to uncountable games.

Capraro, V., Scarsini, M. (2013). Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 79(1), 163-180 [10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.010].

Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach

Capraro V;
2013

Abstract

Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topological nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy sets are a countable group, the payoffs are functions of the group operation, and mixed strategies are not requested to be σ-additive. As a byproduct we show that if finitely additive mixed strategies are allowed, then Wald's game admits an equilibrium. Finally we extend the main results to uncountable games.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Amenable groups; Existence of equilibria; Infinite games; Invariant means; Wald's game;
English
2013
79
1
163
180
none
Capraro, V., Scarsini, M. (2013). Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 79(1), 163-180 [10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.010].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/399445
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