The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.
Bertoletti, P. (2022). The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 10(2), 183-189 [10.1007/s40505-022-00225-3].
The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements
Bertoletti, P
Primo
2022
Abstract
The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.
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