The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systems

Bettarelli, L., Cella, M., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E. (2015). It's a Matter of Confidence: Institutions, Government Stability and Economic Outcomes [Working paper del dipartimento] [10.2139/ssrn.2660322].

It's a Matter of Confidence: Institutions, Government Stability and Economic Outcomes

Bettarelli, L;Cella, M;Iannantuoni, G;Manzoni, E
2015

Abstract

The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systems
Working paper del dipartimento
presidential system, parliamentary system, confidence requirement, government stability
English
2015
1
28
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2660322
University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 309
Bettarelli, L., Cella, M., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E. (2015). It's a Matter of Confidence: Institutions, Government Stability and Economic Outcomes [Working paper del dipartimento] [10.2139/ssrn.2660322].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/250322
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