The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systems
Bettarelli, L., Cella, M., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E. (2015). It's a Matter of Confidence: Institutions, Government Stability and Economic Outcomes [Working paper del dipartimento] [10.2139/ssrn.2660322].
It's a Matter of Confidence: Institutions, Government Stability and Economic Outcomes
Bettarelli, L;Cella, M;Iannantuoni, G;Manzoni, E
2015
Abstract
The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systemsI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.