In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party
Iannantuoni, G., De Sinopoli, F. (2009). On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems [Working paper del dipartimento].
On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems
IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA;
2009
Abstract
In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party
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