We reconsider the issues of fiscal policy interdependence in a monetary union, challenging the view that non co-ordination is always preferable. Moreover, we show that an expenditure bias occurs irrespective of the fiscal regime in place. We argue that a contractualist approach à la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.
Tirelli, P., Catenaro, M. (1999). Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets? [Working paper del dipartimento].
Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets?
TIRELLI, PATRIZIO;
1999
Abstract
We reconsider the issues of fiscal policy interdependence in a monetary union, challenging the view that non co-ordination is always preferable. Moreover, we show that an expenditure bias occurs irrespective of the fiscal regime in place. We argue that a contractualist approach à la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.
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