We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented
De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E., Pimienta, C. (2019). Proportional Representation with Uncertainty. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 99, 18-23 [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.004].
Proportional Representation with Uncertainty
Iannantuoni, G;Manzoni, E;
2019
Abstract
We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented
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