This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000â2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
Dalla Pellegrina, L., Garoupa, N., Gómez-Pomar, F. (2017). Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The case of administrative review. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 52, 16-28 [10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003].
Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The case of administrative review
Dalla Pellegrina, L;
2017
Abstract
This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000â2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
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