Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions” by Marco Buti and Daniele Franco offers a defence of the SGP and its 2005 reform resting on two pillars: i) fiscal discipline is a pre-condition for fiscal flexibility; ii) the very nature of the Union calls for the adoption of fiscal rules and at the same time severely limits the set of enforceable ones. Established that fiscal discipline is conducive to fiscal flexibility, the book makes a convincing case for strengthened peer monitoring as the appropriate and viable device to achieve the goal of fiscal discipline in the Union.
Natale, P. (2006). Book Review "Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions" di Buti, M. and Franco, D. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [10.1007/s00712-006-0220-8].
Book Review "Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions" di Buti, M. and Franco, D
NATALE, PIERGIOVANNA
2006
Abstract
Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union. Theory, Evidence and Institutions” by Marco Buti and Daniele Franco offers a defence of the SGP and its 2005 reform resting on two pillars: i) fiscal discipline is a pre-condition for fiscal flexibility; ii) the very nature of the Union calls for the adoption of fiscal rules and at the same time severely limits the set of enforceable ones. Established that fiscal discipline is conducive to fiscal flexibility, the book makes a convincing case for strengthened peer monitoring as the appropriate and viable device to achieve the goal of fiscal discipline in the Union.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.