In the context of the property rights theory of the firm, we study the role of investment spillovers in shaping the efficiency ranking of ownership regimes. In our model, spillovers arise from asset-embodied investment and footloose investment. Under the former, the benefits of investment can be appropriated only through asset control; under the latter, the benefits of investment can be appropriated independently of asset control. Our model predicts that asset-embodied investment favors the adoption of non-integration, while joint ownership may prevail in the presence of footloose investment.

Gattai, V., Natale, P. (2016). Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 145, 109-113 [10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.025].

Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights

GATTAI, VALERIA;NATALE, PIERGIOVANNA
2016

Abstract

In the context of the property rights theory of the firm, we study the role of investment spillovers in shaping the efficiency ranking of ownership regimes. In our model, spillovers arise from asset-embodied investment and footloose investment. Under the former, the benefits of investment can be appropriated only through asset control; under the latter, the benefits of investment can be appropriated independently of asset control. Our model predicts that asset-embodied investment favors the adoption of non-integration, while joint ownership may prevail in the presence of footloose investment.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Incomplete contracts; Investment spillovers; Joint-control; Property rights;
Incomplete contracts; Investment spillovers; Joint-control; Property rights
English
2016
145
109
113
reserved
Gattai, V., Natale, P. (2016). Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 145, 109-113 [10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.025].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/136101
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