'Moral' technologies and fondamental rights: is there a fundamental right to moral enhancement?

‘Moral’ technologies pose new dilemmas reflecting on the way science and law interact. The bioethical debate on ‘moral technologies’, in particular on ‘moral enhancement’, may focus primarily on ethical arguments or it may try to highlight the consistency between the ethical (moral) arguments with the legal framework in which the debate takes place, that is, according to a biolaw’s approach. If we deal with the questions arisen by ‘moral technologies’ in this second sense, we may try to investigate if and how ‘moral technologies’, and specifically ‘moral enhancement’, endanger ethical pluralism and may cause further discrimination practices and policies. Ethical pluralism and the anti-discrimination cause are indeed essential values and features of the modern European constitutional approach, which are best achieved through ‘equality’ in relation to (fundamental) rights. From a biolaw’s perspective, we should try to find out what is the relationship between the interest in and the quest for ‘moral enhancement’ and legal rights such as the right to health, self-determination, self-identity and the like; in other words, we should try to explain if the legal system already provides a solid foundation for a legal (fundamental) right to ‘moral enhancement’. In so doing, we will also be able to explore the potential impacts of a socially widespread ‘moral enhancement’ on shaping socio-political policies as well as to throw some light on the ‘real’ reasons hiding behind the efforts to boost the use of ‘moral’ enhancers: a different society with a different legal background? In a nutshell, the paper deals with ethical-legal questions concerning both equal management of the scientific advances at our disposal and selection of goals we want to achieve with the available devices. Also in the specific context of ‘moral enhancement’, whenever ethical and legal implications of scientific and technological advances are discussed, many considerations should rely (but they often do not) on the warranty of effective protection of fundamental rights like self-determination, health, dignity of individuals, and the like. What the paper suggests is that fundamental rights should mark the line between lawful and unlawful uses of science.